Commit 363a90c2d5 ("crypto: safexcel/aes - switch to
library version of key expansion routine") removed
CRYPTO_AES in the config. However, some portions of codes
still rely on generic AES cipher (e.g. refer to
safexcel_aead_gcm_cra_init(), safexcel_xcbcmac_cra_init()).
This causes transform allocation failure for those algos,
if CRYPTO_AES is not manually enabled.
To resolve that, we replace all existing AES cipher
dependent codes with their AES library counterpart.
Fixes: 363a90c2d5 ("crypto: safexcel/aes - switch to library version of key expansion routine")
Signed-off-by: Peter Harliman Liem <pliem@maxlinear.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
From commit d03c544192 ("dma-mapping: disallow .map_sg
operations from returning zero on error"), dma_map_sg()
produces warning if size is 0. This results in visible
warnings if crypto length is zero.
To avoid that, we avoid calling dma_map_sg if size is zero.
Signed-off-by: Peter Harliman Liem <pliem@maxlinear.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The use of swab() is causing failures in 64-bit arch, as it
translates to __swab64() instead of the intended __swab32().
It eventually causes wrong results in xcbcmac & cmac algo.
Fixes: 78cf1c8bfc ("crypto: inside-secure - Move ipad/opad into safexcel_context")
Signed-off-by: Peter Harliman Liem <pliem@maxlinear.com>
Acked-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Without MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE, crypto_safexcel.ko module is not automatically
loaded on platforms where inside-secure crypto HW is specified in device
tree (e.g. Armada 3720). So add missing MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE for of.
Fixes: 1b44c5a60c ("crypto: inside-secure - add SafeXcel EIP197 crypto engine driver")
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Marek Behún <kabel@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When mixing bit-field and none bit-filed in packed struct the
none bit-field starts at a distinct memory location, thus adding
an additional byte to the overall structure which is used in
memory zero-ing and other configuration calculations.
Fix this by removing the none bit-field that has a following
bit-field.
Signed-off-by: Ofer Heifetz <oferh@marvell.com>
Acked-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove dev_err() messages after platform_get_irq*() failures.
drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel.c: line 1161 is redundant
because platform_get_irq() already prints an error
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/platform_get_irq.cocci
Signed-off-by: Tian Tao <tiantao6@hisilicon.com>
Acked-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The cipher routines in the crypto API are mostly intended for templates
implementing skcipher modes generically in software, and shouldn't be
used outside of the crypto subsystem. So move the prototypes and all
related definitions to a new header file under include/crypto/internal.
Also, let's use the new module namespace feature to move the symbol
exports into a new namespace CRYPTO_INTERNAL.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2,
and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3.
This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no
longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent
possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA
versions, and usage of it should be phased out.
Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and
<crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want
the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both.
This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't
want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving
sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
An incorrect sizeof() is being used, sizeof(priv->ring[i].rdr_req) is
not correct, it should be sizeof(*priv->ring[i].rdr_req). Note that
since the size of ** is the same size as * this is not causing any
issues.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Sizeof not portable (SIZEOF_MISMATCH)")
Fixes: 9744fec95f ("crypto: inside-secure - remove request list to improve performance")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The code in the current implementation of safexcel_hmac_alg_setkey
can be reused by safexcel_cipher. This patch does just that by
renaming the previous safexcel_hmac_setkey to __safexcel_hmac_setkey.
The now-shared safexcel_hmac_alg_setkey becomes safexcel_hmac_setkey
and a new safexcel_hmac_alg_setkey has been added for use by ahash
transforms.
As a result safexcel_aead_setkey's stack frame has been reduced by
about half in size, or about 512 bytes.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As both safexcel_ahash_ctx and safexcel_cipher_ctx contain ipad
and opad buffers this patch moves them into the common struct
safexcel_context. It also adds a union so that they can be accessed
in the appropriate endian without crazy casts.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch moves the priv pointer into struct safexcel_context
because both structs that extend safexcel_context have that pointer
as well.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch adds support for EIP197 instances that include the output
classifier (OCE) option, as used by one of our biggest customers.
The OCE normally requires initialization and dedicated firmware, but
for the simple operations supported by this driver, we just bypass it
completely for now (using what is formally a debug feature).
Signed-off-by: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@rambus.com>
Acked-by: Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
On systems with coherence issues, packet processed could succeed while
it should have failed, e.g. because of an authentication fail.
This is because the driver would read stale status information that had
all error bits initialised to zero = no error.
Since this is potential a security risk, we want to prevent it from being
a possibility at all. So initialize all error bits to error state, so
that reading stale status information will always result in errors.
Signed-off-by: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@rambus.com>
Acked-by: Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Balance the irqs of the inside secure driver over all
available cpus.
Currently all interrupts are handled by the first CPU.
From my testing with IPSec AES-GCM 256
on my MCbin with 4 Cores I get a 50% speed increase:
Before the patch: 99.73 Kpps
With the patch: 151.25 Kpps
Signed-off-by: Sven Auhagen <sven.auhagen@voleatech.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_* flags were apparently meant as a way to make the
->setkey() functions provide more information about errors. But these
flags weren't actually being used or tested, and in many cases they
weren't being set correctly anyway. So they've now been removed.
Also, if someone ever actually needs to start better distinguishing
->setkey() errors (which is somewhat unlikely, as this has been unneeded
for a long time), we'd be much better off just defining different return
values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK and all the unneeded logic that
propagates these flags around.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch fixes another hang case on the EIP97 caused by sending
invalidation tokens to the hardware when doing basic (3)DES ECB/CBC
operations. Invalidation tokens are an EIP197 feature and needed nor
supported by the EIP97. So they should not be sent for that device.
Signed-off-by: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@rambus.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The EIP97 hardware cannot handle zero length input data and will (usually)
hang when presented with this anyway. This patch converts any zero length
input to a 1 byte dummy input to prevent this hanging.
Signed-off-by: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@rambus.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Due to the additions of support for modes like AES-CCM and AES-GCM, which
require large command tokens, the size of the descriptor has grown such that
it now does not fit into the descriptor cache of a standard EIP97 anymore.
This means that the driver no longer works on the Marvell Armada 3700LP chip
(as used on e.g. Espressobin) that it has always supported.
Additionally, performance on EIP197's like Marvell A8K may also degrade
due to being able to fit less descriptors in the on-chip cache.
Putting these tokens into the descriptor was really a hack and not how the
design was supposed to be used - resource allocation did not account for it.
So what this patch does, is move the command token out of the descriptor.
To avoid having to allocate buffers on the fly for these command tokens,
they are stuffed in a "shadow ring", which is a circular buffer of fixed
size blocks that runs in lock-step with the descriptor ring. i.e. there is
one token block per descriptor. The descriptor ring itself is then pre-
populated with the pointers to these token blocks so these do not need to
be filled in when building the descriptors later.
Signed-off-by: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@rambus.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fixes coccicheck warning:
drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c:2534:1-3: WARNING: PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO can be used
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: zhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
