mirror of
https://github.com/netbirdio/gvisor.git
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This new method allows checking for the existence of assigned addresses without taking an extra reference that needs to be DecRefed. DecRef takes exclusive locks. Contention on the addressState lock causes performance issues when multiple goroutines are processing IP packets simultaneously. This isn't the case today since IP processing is single threaded, but will be eventually. PiperOrigin-RevId: 623567408
1231 lines
43 KiB
Go
1231 lines
43 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2021 The gVisor Authors.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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package ipv6
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import (
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"fmt"
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"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/buffer"
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"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip"
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"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/header"
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"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/stack"
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)
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// icmpv6DestinationUnreachableSockError is a general ICMPv6 Destination
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// Unreachable error.
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//
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// +stateify savable
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type icmpv6DestinationUnreachableSockError struct{}
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// Origin implements tcpip.SockErrorCause.
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func (*icmpv6DestinationUnreachableSockError) Origin() tcpip.SockErrOrigin {
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return tcpip.SockExtErrorOriginICMP6
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}
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// Type implements tcpip.SockErrorCause.
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func (*icmpv6DestinationUnreachableSockError) Type() uint8 {
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return uint8(header.ICMPv6DstUnreachable)
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}
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// Info implements tcpip.SockErrorCause.
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func (*icmpv6DestinationUnreachableSockError) Info() uint32 {
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return 0
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}
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var _ stack.TransportError = (*icmpv6DestinationNetworkUnreachableSockError)(nil)
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// icmpv6DestinationNetworkUnreachableSockError is an ICMPv6 Destination Network
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// Unreachable error.
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//
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// It indicates that the destination network is unreachable.
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//
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// +stateify savable
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type icmpv6DestinationNetworkUnreachableSockError struct {
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icmpv6DestinationUnreachableSockError
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}
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// Code implements tcpip.SockErrorCause.
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func (*icmpv6DestinationNetworkUnreachableSockError) Code() uint8 {
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return uint8(header.ICMPv6NetworkUnreachable)
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}
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// Kind implements stack.TransportError.
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func (*icmpv6DestinationNetworkUnreachableSockError) Kind() stack.TransportErrorKind {
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return stack.DestinationNetworkUnreachableTransportError
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}
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var _ stack.TransportError = (*icmpv6DestinationPortUnreachableSockError)(nil)
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// icmpv6DestinationPortUnreachableSockError is an ICMPv6 Destination Port
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// Unreachable error.
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//
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// It indicates that a packet reached the destination host, but the transport
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// protocol was not active on the destination port.
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//
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// +stateify savable
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type icmpv6DestinationPortUnreachableSockError struct {
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icmpv6DestinationUnreachableSockError
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}
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// Code implements tcpip.SockErrorCause.
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func (*icmpv6DestinationPortUnreachableSockError) Code() uint8 {
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return uint8(header.ICMPv6PortUnreachable)
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}
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// Kind implements stack.TransportError.
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func (*icmpv6DestinationPortUnreachableSockError) Kind() stack.TransportErrorKind {
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return stack.DestinationPortUnreachableTransportError
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}
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var _ stack.TransportError = (*icmpv6DestinationAddressUnreachableSockError)(nil)
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// icmpv6DestinationAddressUnreachableSockError is an ICMPv6 Destination Address
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// Unreachable error.
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//
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// It indicates that a packet was not able to reach the destination.
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//
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// +stateify savable
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type icmpv6DestinationAddressUnreachableSockError struct {
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icmpv6DestinationUnreachableSockError
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}
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// Code implements tcpip.SockErrorCause.
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func (*icmpv6DestinationAddressUnreachableSockError) Code() uint8 {
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return uint8(header.ICMPv6AddressUnreachable)
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}
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// Kind implements stack.TransportError.
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func (*icmpv6DestinationAddressUnreachableSockError) Kind() stack.TransportErrorKind {
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return stack.DestinationHostUnreachableTransportError
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}
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var _ stack.TransportError = (*icmpv6PacketTooBigSockError)(nil)
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// icmpv6PacketTooBigSockError is an ICMPv6 Packet Too Big error.
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//
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// It indicates that a link exists on the path to the destination with an MTU
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// that is too small to carry the packet.
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//
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// +stateify savable
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type icmpv6PacketTooBigSockError struct {
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mtu uint32
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}
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// Origin implements tcpip.SockErrorCause.
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func (*icmpv6PacketTooBigSockError) Origin() tcpip.SockErrOrigin {
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return tcpip.SockExtErrorOriginICMP6
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}
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// Type implements tcpip.SockErrorCause.
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func (*icmpv6PacketTooBigSockError) Type() uint8 {
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return uint8(header.ICMPv6PacketTooBig)
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}
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// Code implements tcpip.SockErrorCause.
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func (*icmpv6PacketTooBigSockError) Code() uint8 {
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return uint8(header.ICMPv6UnusedCode)
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}
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// Info implements tcpip.SockErrorCause.
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func (e *icmpv6PacketTooBigSockError) Info() uint32 {
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return e.mtu
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}
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// Kind implements stack.TransportError.
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func (*icmpv6PacketTooBigSockError) Kind() stack.TransportErrorKind {
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return stack.PacketTooBigTransportError
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}
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func (e *endpoint) checkLocalAddress(addr tcpip.Address) bool {
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if e.nic.Spoofing() {
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return true
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}
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if addressEndpoint := e.AcquireAssignedAddress(addr, false, stack.NeverPrimaryEndpoint, true /* readOnly */); addressEndpoint != nil {
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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// handleControl handles the case when an ICMP packet contains the headers of
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// the original packet that caused the ICMP one to be sent. This information is
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// used to find out which transport endpoint must be notified about the ICMP
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// packet.
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func (e *endpoint) handleControl(transErr stack.TransportError, pkt *stack.PacketBuffer) {
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h, ok := pkt.Data().PullUp(header.IPv6MinimumSize)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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hdr := header.IPv6(h)
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// We don't use IsValid() here because ICMP only requires that up to
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// 1280 bytes of the original packet be included. So it's likely that it
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// is truncated, which would cause IsValid to return false.
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//
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// Drop packet if it doesn't have the basic IPv6 header or if the
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// original source address doesn't match an address we own.
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srcAddr := hdr.SourceAddress()
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if !e.checkLocalAddress(srcAddr) {
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return
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}
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// Keep needed information before trimming header.
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p := hdr.TransportProtocol()
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dstAddr := hdr.DestinationAddress()
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// Skip the IP header, then handle the fragmentation header if there
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// is one.
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if _, ok := pkt.Data().Consume(header.IPv6MinimumSize); !ok {
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panic("could not consume IPv6MinimumSize bytes")
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}
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if p == header.IPv6FragmentHeader {
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f, ok := pkt.Data().PullUp(header.IPv6FragmentHeaderSize)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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fragHdr := header.IPv6Fragment(f)
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if !fragHdr.IsValid() || fragHdr.FragmentOffset() != 0 {
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// We can't handle fragments that aren't at offset 0
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// because they don't have the transport headers.
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return
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}
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p = fragHdr.TransportProtocol()
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// Skip fragmentation header and find out the actual protocol
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// number.
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if _, ok := pkt.Data().Consume(header.IPv6FragmentHeaderSize); !ok {
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panic("could not consume IPv6FragmentHeaderSize bytes")
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}
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}
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e.dispatcher.DeliverTransportError(srcAddr, dstAddr, ProtocolNumber, p, transErr, pkt)
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}
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// getLinkAddrOption searches NDP options for a given link address option using
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// the provided getAddr function as a filter. Returns the link address if
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// found; otherwise, returns the zero link address value. Also returns true if
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// the options are valid as per the wire format, false otherwise.
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func getLinkAddrOption(it header.NDPOptionIterator, getAddr func(header.NDPOption) tcpip.LinkAddress) (tcpip.LinkAddress, bool) {
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var linkAddr tcpip.LinkAddress
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for {
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opt, done, err := it.Next()
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if err != nil {
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return "", false
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}
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if done {
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break
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}
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if addr := getAddr(opt); len(addr) != 0 {
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// No RFCs define what to do when an NDP message has multiple Link-Layer
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// Address options. Since no interface can have multiple link-layer
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// addresses, we consider such messages invalid.
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if len(linkAddr) != 0 {
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return "", false
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}
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linkAddr = addr
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}
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}
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return linkAddr, true
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}
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// getSourceLinkAddr searches NDP options for the source link address option.
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// Returns the link address if found; otherwise, returns the zero link address
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// value. Also returns true if the options are valid as per the wire format,
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// false otherwise.
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func getSourceLinkAddr(it header.NDPOptionIterator) (tcpip.LinkAddress, bool) {
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return getLinkAddrOption(it, func(opt header.NDPOption) tcpip.LinkAddress {
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if src, ok := opt.(header.NDPSourceLinkLayerAddressOption); ok {
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return src.EthernetAddress()
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}
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return ""
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})
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}
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// getTargetLinkAddr searches NDP options for the target link address option.
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// Returns the link address if found; otherwise, returns the zero link address
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// value. Also returns true if the options are valid as per the wire format,
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// false otherwise.
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func getTargetLinkAddr(it header.NDPOptionIterator) (tcpip.LinkAddress, bool) {
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return getLinkAddrOption(it, func(opt header.NDPOption) tcpip.LinkAddress {
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if dst, ok := opt.(header.NDPTargetLinkLayerAddressOption); ok {
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return dst.EthernetAddress()
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}
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return ""
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})
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}
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func isMLDValid(pkt *stack.PacketBuffer, iph header.IPv6, routerAlert *header.IPv6RouterAlertOption) bool {
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// As per RFC 2710 section 3:
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// All MLD messages described in this document are sent with a link-local
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// IPv6 Source Address, an IPv6 Hop Limit of 1, and an IPv6 Router Alert
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// option in a Hop-by-Hop Options header.
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if routerAlert == nil || routerAlert.Value != header.IPv6RouterAlertMLD {
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return false
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}
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if len(pkt.TransportHeader().Slice()) < header.ICMPv6HeaderSize+header.MLDMinimumSize {
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return false
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}
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if iph.HopLimit() != header.MLDHopLimit {
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return false
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}
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if !header.IsV6LinkLocalUnicastAddress(iph.SourceAddress()) {
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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func (e *endpoint) handleICMP(pkt *stack.PacketBuffer, hasFragmentHeader bool, routerAlert *header.IPv6RouterAlertOption) {
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sent := e.stats.icmp.packetsSent
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received := e.stats.icmp.packetsReceived
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h := header.ICMPv6(pkt.TransportHeader().Slice())
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if len(h) < header.ICMPv6MinimumSize {
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received.invalid.Increment()
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return
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}
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iph := header.IPv6(pkt.NetworkHeader().Slice())
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srcAddr := iph.SourceAddress()
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dstAddr := iph.DestinationAddress()
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// Validate ICMPv6 checksum before processing the packet.
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payload := pkt.Data()
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if got, want := h.Checksum(), header.ICMPv6Checksum(header.ICMPv6ChecksumParams{
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Header: h,
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Src: srcAddr,
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Dst: dstAddr,
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PayloadCsum: payload.Checksum(),
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PayloadLen: payload.Size(),
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}); got != want {
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received.invalid.Increment()
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return
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}
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isNDPValid := func() bool {
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// As per RFC 4861 sections 4.1 - 4.5, 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 7.1.1, 7.1.2 and
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// 8.1, nodes MUST silently drop NDP packets where the Hop Limit field
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// in the IPv6 header is not set to 255, or the ICMPv6 Code field is not
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// set to 0.
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//
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// As per RFC 6980 section 5, nodes MUST silently drop NDP messages if the
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// packet includes a fragmentation header.
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return !hasFragmentHeader && iph.HopLimit() == header.NDPHopLimit && h.Code() == 0
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}
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// TODO(b/112892170): Meaningfully handle all ICMP types.
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switch icmpType := h.Type(); icmpType {
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case header.ICMPv6PacketTooBig:
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received.packetTooBig.Increment()
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networkMTU, err := calculateNetworkMTU(h.MTU(), header.IPv6MinimumSize)
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if err != nil {
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networkMTU = 0
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}
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e.handleControl(&icmpv6PacketTooBigSockError{mtu: networkMTU}, pkt)
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case header.ICMPv6DstUnreachable:
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received.dstUnreachable.Increment()
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switch h.Code() {
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case header.ICMPv6NetworkUnreachable:
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e.handleControl(&icmpv6DestinationNetworkUnreachableSockError{}, pkt)
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case header.ICMPv6PortUnreachable:
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e.handleControl(&icmpv6DestinationPortUnreachableSockError{}, pkt)
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}
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case header.ICMPv6NeighborSolicit:
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received.neighborSolicit.Increment()
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if !isNDPValid() || len(h) < header.ICMPv6NeighborSolicitMinimumSize {
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received.invalid.Increment()
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return
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}
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ns := header.NDPNeighborSolicit(h.MessageBody())
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targetAddr := ns.TargetAddress()
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// As per RFC 4861 section 4.3, the Target Address MUST NOT be a multicast
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// address.
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if header.IsV6MulticastAddress(targetAddr) {
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received.invalid.Increment()
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return
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}
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var it header.NDPOptionIterator
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{
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var err error
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it, err = ns.Options().Iter(false /* check */)
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if err != nil {
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// Options are not valid as per the wire format, silently drop the
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// packet.
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received.invalid.Increment()
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return
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}
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}
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if e.hasTentativeAddr(targetAddr) {
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// If the target address is tentative and the source of the packet is a
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// unicast (specified) address, then the source of the packet is
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// attempting to perform address resolution on the target. In this case,
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// the solicitation is silently ignored, as per RFC 4862 section 5.4.3.
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//
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// If the target address is tentative and the source of the packet is the
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// unspecified address (::), then we know another node is also performing
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// DAD for the same address (since the target address is tentative for us,
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// we know we are also performing DAD on it). In this case we let the
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// stack know so it can handle such a scenario and do nothing further with
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// the NS.
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if srcAddr == header.IPv6Any {
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var nonce []byte
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for {
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opt, done, err := it.Next()
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if err != nil {
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received.invalid.Increment()
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return
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}
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if done {
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break
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}
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if n, ok := opt.(header.NDPNonceOption); ok {
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nonce = n.Nonce()
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break
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}
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}
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// Since this is a DAD message we know the sender does not actually hold
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// the target address so there is no "holder".
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var holderLinkAddress tcpip.LinkAddress
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// We would get an error if the address no longer exists or the address
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// is no longer tentative (DAD resolved between the call to
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// hasTentativeAddr and this point). Both of these are valid scenarios:
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// 1) An address may be removed at any time.
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// 2) As per RFC 4862 section 5.4, DAD is not a perfect:
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// "Note that the method for detecting duplicates
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// is not completely reliable, and it is possible that duplicate
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// addresses will still exist"
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//
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// TODO(gvisor.dev/issue/4046): Handle the scenario when a duplicate
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// address is detected for an assigned address.
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switch err := e.dupTentativeAddrDetected(targetAddr, holderLinkAddress, nonce); err.(type) {
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case nil, *tcpip.ErrBadAddress, *tcpip.ErrInvalidEndpointState:
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default:
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected error handling duplicate tentative address: %s", err))
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}
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}
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// Do not handle neighbor solicitations targeted to an address that is
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// tentative on the NIC any further.
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return
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}
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// At this point we know that the target address is not tentative on the NIC
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// so the packet is processed as defined in RFC 4861, as per RFC 4862
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// section 5.4.3.
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// Is the NS targeting us?
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if !e.checkLocalAddress(targetAddr) {
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return
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}
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sourceLinkAddr, ok := getSourceLinkAddr(it)
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if !ok {
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received.invalid.Increment()
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return
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}
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// As per RFC 4861 section 4.3, the Source Link-Layer Address Option MUST
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// NOT be included when the source IP address is the unspecified address.
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// Otherwise, on link layers that have addresses this option MUST be
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// included in multicast solicitations and SHOULD be included in unicast
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// solicitations.
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unspecifiedSource := srcAddr == header.IPv6Any
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if len(sourceLinkAddr) == 0 {
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if header.IsV6MulticastAddress(dstAddr) && !unspecifiedSource {
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received.invalid.Increment()
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return
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}
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} else if unspecifiedSource {
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received.invalid.Increment()
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return
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} else {
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switch err := e.nic.HandleNeighborProbe(ProtocolNumber, srcAddr, sourceLinkAddr); err.(type) {
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case nil:
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case *tcpip.ErrNotSupported:
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// The stack may support ICMPv6 but the NIC may not need link resolution.
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default:
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected error when informing NIC of neighbor probe message: %s", err))
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}
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}
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// As per RFC 4861 section 7.1.1:
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// A node MUST silently discard any received Neighbor Solicitation
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// messages that do not satisfy all of the following validity checks:
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// ...
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// - If the IP source address is the unspecified address, the IP
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// destination address is a solicited-node multicast address.
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if unspecifiedSource && !header.IsSolicitedNodeAddr(dstAddr) {
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received.invalid.Increment()
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return
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}
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|
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// As per RFC 4861 section 7.2.4:
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//
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// If the source of the solicitation is the unspecified address, the node
|
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// MUST [...] and multicast the advertisement to the all-nodes address.
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//
|
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remoteAddr := srcAddr
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if unspecifiedSource {
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remoteAddr = header.IPv6AllNodesMulticastAddress
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}
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// Even if we were able to receive a packet from some remote, we may not
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// have a route to it - the remote may be blocked via routing rules. We must
|
|
// always consult our routing table and find a route to the remote before
|
|
// sending any packet.
|
|
r, err := e.protocol.stack.FindRoute(e.nic.ID(), targetAddr, remoteAddr, ProtocolNumber, false /* multicastLoop */)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// If we cannot find a route to the destination, silently drop the packet.
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
defer r.Release()
|
|
|
|
// If the NS has a source link-layer option, resolve the route immediately
|
|
// to avoid querying the neighbor table when the neighbor entry was updated
|
|
// as probing the neighbor table for a link address will transition the
|
|
// entry's state from stale to delay.
|
|
//
|
|
// Note, if the source link address is unspecified and this is a unicast
|
|
// solicitation, we may need to perform neighbor discovery to send the
|
|
// neighbor advertisement response. This is expected as per RFC 4861 section
|
|
// 7.2.4:
|
|
//
|
|
// Because unicast Neighbor Solicitations are not required to include a
|
|
// Source Link-Layer Address, it is possible that a node sending a
|
|
// solicited Neighbor Advertisement does not have a corresponding link-
|
|
// layer address for its neighbor in its Neighbor Cache. In such
|
|
// situations, a node will first have to use Neighbor Discovery to
|
|
// determine the link-layer address of its neighbor (i.e., send out a
|
|
// multicast Neighbor Solicitation).
|
|
//
|
|
if len(sourceLinkAddr) != 0 {
|
|
r.ResolveWith(sourceLinkAddr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
optsSerializer := header.NDPOptionsSerializer{
|
|
header.NDPTargetLinkLayerAddressOption(e.nic.LinkAddress()),
|
|
}
|
|
neighborAdvertSize := header.ICMPv6NeighborAdvertMinimumSize + optsSerializer.Length()
|
|
pkt := stack.NewPacketBuffer(stack.PacketBufferOptions{
|
|
ReserveHeaderBytes: int(r.MaxHeaderLength()) + neighborAdvertSize,
|
|
})
|
|
defer pkt.DecRef()
|
|
pkt.TransportProtocolNumber = header.ICMPv6ProtocolNumber
|
|
packet := header.ICMPv6(pkt.TransportHeader().Push(neighborAdvertSize))
|
|
packet.SetType(header.ICMPv6NeighborAdvert)
|
|
na := header.NDPNeighborAdvert(packet.MessageBody())
|
|
|
|
// As per RFC 4861 section 7.2.4:
|
|
//
|
|
// If the source of the solicitation is the unspecified address, the node
|
|
// MUST set the Solicited flag to zero and [..]. Otherwise, the node MUST
|
|
// set the Solicited flag to one and [..].
|
|
//
|
|
na.SetSolicitedFlag(!unspecifiedSource)
|
|
na.SetOverrideFlag(true)
|
|
na.SetRouterFlag(e.Forwarding())
|
|
na.SetTargetAddress(targetAddr)
|
|
na.Options().Serialize(optsSerializer)
|
|
packet.SetChecksum(header.ICMPv6Checksum(header.ICMPv6ChecksumParams{
|
|
Header: packet,
|
|
Src: r.LocalAddress(),
|
|
Dst: r.RemoteAddress(),
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
// RFC 4861 Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)
|
|
//
|
|
// 7.1.2. Validation of Neighbor Advertisements
|
|
//
|
|
// The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
|
|
// could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
|
|
if err := r.WritePacket(stack.NetworkHeaderParams{Protocol: header.ICMPv6ProtocolNumber, TTL: header.NDPHopLimit, TOS: stack.DefaultTOS}, pkt); err != nil {
|
|
sent.dropped.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
sent.neighborAdvert.Increment()
|
|
|
|
case header.ICMPv6NeighborAdvert:
|
|
received.neighborAdvert.Increment()
|
|
if !isNDPValid() || len(h) < header.ICMPv6NeighborAdvertMinimumSize {
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
na := header.NDPNeighborAdvert(h.MessageBody())
|
|
|
|
it, err := na.Options().Iter(false /* check */)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// If we have a malformed NDP NA option, drop the packet.
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
targetLinkAddr, ok := getTargetLinkAddr(it)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
targetAddr := na.TargetAddress()
|
|
|
|
e.dad.mu.Lock()
|
|
e.dad.mu.dad.StopLocked(targetAddr, &stack.DADDupAddrDetected{HolderLinkAddress: targetLinkAddr})
|
|
e.dad.mu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
if e.hasTentativeAddr(targetAddr) {
|
|
// We only send a nonce value in DAD messages to check for loopedback
|
|
// messages so we use the empty nonce value here.
|
|
var nonce []byte
|
|
|
|
// We just got an NA from a node that owns an address we are performing
|
|
// DAD on, implying the address is not unique. In this case we let the
|
|
// stack know so it can handle such a scenario and do nothing further with
|
|
// the NDP NA.
|
|
//
|
|
// We would get an error if the address no longer exists or the address
|
|
// is no longer tentative (DAD resolved between the call to
|
|
// hasTentativeAddr and this point). Both of these are valid scenarios:
|
|
// 1) An address may be removed at any time.
|
|
// 2) As per RFC 4862 section 5.4, DAD is not a perfect:
|
|
// "Note that the method for detecting duplicates
|
|
// is not completely reliable, and it is possible that duplicate
|
|
// addresses will still exist"
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(gvisor.dev/issue/4046): Handle the scenario when a duplicate
|
|
// address is detected for an assigned address.
|
|
switch err := e.dupTentativeAddrDetected(targetAddr, targetLinkAddr, nonce); err.(type) {
|
|
case nil, *tcpip.ErrBadAddress, *tcpip.ErrInvalidEndpointState:
|
|
return
|
|
default:
|
|
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected error handling duplicate tentative address: %s", err))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// At this point we know that the target address is not tentative on the
|
|
// NIC. However, the target address may still be assigned to the NIC but not
|
|
// tentative (it could be permanent). Such a scenario is beyond the scope of
|
|
// RFC 4862. As such, we simply ignore such a scenario for now and proceed
|
|
// as normal.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(b/143147598): Handle the scenario described above. Also inform the
|
|
// netstack integration that a duplicate address was detected outside of
|
|
// DAD.
|
|
|
|
// As per RFC 4861 section 7.1.2:
|
|
// A node MUST silently discard any received Neighbor Advertisement
|
|
// messages that do not satisfy all of the following validity checks:
|
|
// ...
|
|
// - If the IP Destination Address is a multicast address the
|
|
// Solicited flag is zero.
|
|
if header.IsV6MulticastAddress(dstAddr) && na.SolicitedFlag() {
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the NA message has the target link layer option, update the link
|
|
// address cache with the link address for the target of the message.
|
|
switch err := e.nic.HandleNeighborConfirmation(ProtocolNumber, targetAddr, targetLinkAddr, stack.ReachabilityConfirmationFlags{
|
|
Solicited: na.SolicitedFlag(),
|
|
Override: na.OverrideFlag(),
|
|
IsRouter: na.RouterFlag(),
|
|
}); err.(type) {
|
|
case nil:
|
|
case *tcpip.ErrNotSupported:
|
|
// The stack may support ICMPv6 but the NIC may not need link resolution.
|
|
default:
|
|
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected error when informing NIC of neighbor confirmation message: %s", err))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case header.ICMPv6EchoRequest:
|
|
received.echoRequest.Increment()
|
|
// As per RFC 4291 section 2.7, multicast addresses must not be used as
|
|
// source addresses in IPv6 packets.
|
|
localAddr := dstAddr
|
|
if header.IsV6MulticastAddress(dstAddr) {
|
|
localAddr = tcpip.Address{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r, err := e.protocol.stack.FindRoute(e.nic.ID(), localAddr, srcAddr, ProtocolNumber, false /* multicastLoop */)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// If we cannot find a route to the destination, silently drop the packet.
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
defer r.Release()
|
|
|
|
if !e.protocol.allowICMPReply(header.ICMPv6EchoReply) {
|
|
sent.rateLimited.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
replyPkt := stack.NewPacketBuffer(stack.PacketBufferOptions{
|
|
ReserveHeaderBytes: int(r.MaxHeaderLength()) + header.ICMPv6EchoMinimumSize,
|
|
Payload: pkt.Data().ToBuffer(),
|
|
})
|
|
defer replyPkt.DecRef()
|
|
icmp := header.ICMPv6(replyPkt.TransportHeader().Push(header.ICMPv6EchoMinimumSize))
|
|
replyPkt.TransportProtocolNumber = header.ICMPv6ProtocolNumber
|
|
copy(icmp, h)
|
|
icmp.SetType(header.ICMPv6EchoReply)
|
|
replyData := replyPkt.Data()
|
|
icmp.SetChecksum(header.ICMPv6Checksum(header.ICMPv6ChecksumParams{
|
|
Header: icmp,
|
|
Src: r.LocalAddress(),
|
|
Dst: r.RemoteAddress(),
|
|
PayloadCsum: replyData.Checksum(),
|
|
PayloadLen: replyData.Size(),
|
|
}))
|
|
replyTClass, _ := iph.TOS()
|
|
if err := r.WritePacket(stack.NetworkHeaderParams{
|
|
Protocol: header.ICMPv6ProtocolNumber,
|
|
TTL: r.DefaultTTL(),
|
|
// Even though RFC 4443 does not mention anything about it, Linux uses the
|
|
// TrafficClass of the received echo request when replying.
|
|
// https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/0280e3c58f9/net/ipv6/icmp.c#L797
|
|
TOS: replyTClass,
|
|
}, replyPkt); err != nil {
|
|
sent.dropped.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
sent.echoReply.Increment()
|
|
|
|
case header.ICMPv6EchoReply:
|
|
received.echoReply.Increment()
|
|
if len(h) < header.ICMPv6EchoMinimumSize {
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
e.dispatcher.DeliverTransportPacket(header.ICMPv6ProtocolNumber, pkt)
|
|
|
|
case header.ICMPv6TimeExceeded:
|
|
received.timeExceeded.Increment()
|
|
|
|
case header.ICMPv6ParamProblem:
|
|
received.paramProblem.Increment()
|
|
|
|
case header.ICMPv6RouterSolicit:
|
|
received.routerSolicit.Increment()
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
// Validate the RS as per RFC 4861 section 6.1.1.
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Is the NDP payload of sufficient size to hold a Router Solictation?
|
|
if !isNDPValid() || len(h)-header.ICMPv6HeaderSize < header.NDPRSMinimumSize {
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !e.Forwarding() {
|
|
received.routerOnlyPacketsDroppedByHost.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rs := header.NDPRouterSolicit(h.MessageBody())
|
|
it, err := rs.Options().Iter(false /* check */)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Options are not valid as per the wire format, silently drop the packet.
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sourceLinkAddr, ok := getSourceLinkAddr(it)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the RS message has the source link layer option, update the link
|
|
// address cache with the link address for the source of the message.
|
|
if len(sourceLinkAddr) != 0 {
|
|
// As per RFC 4861 section 4.1, the Source Link-Layer Address Option MUST
|
|
// NOT be included when the source IP address is the unspecified address.
|
|
// Otherwise, it SHOULD be included on link layers that have addresses.
|
|
if srcAddr == header.IPv6Any {
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A RS with a specified source IP address modifies the neighbor table
|
|
// in the same way a regular probe would.
|
|
switch err := e.nic.HandleNeighborProbe(ProtocolNumber, srcAddr, sourceLinkAddr); err.(type) {
|
|
case nil:
|
|
case *tcpip.ErrNotSupported:
|
|
// The stack may support ICMPv6 but the NIC may not need link resolution.
|
|
default:
|
|
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected error when informing NIC of neighbor probe message: %s", err))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case header.ICMPv6RouterAdvert:
|
|
received.routerAdvert.Increment()
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
// Validate the RA as per RFC 4861 section 6.1.2.
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Is the NDP payload of sufficient size to hold a Router Advertisement?
|
|
if !isNDPValid() || len(h)-header.ICMPv6HeaderSize < header.NDPRAMinimumSize {
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
routerAddr := srcAddr
|
|
|
|
// Is the IP Source Address a link-local address?
|
|
if !header.IsV6LinkLocalUnicastAddress(routerAddr) {
|
|
// ...No, silently drop the packet.
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ra := header.NDPRouterAdvert(h.MessageBody())
|
|
it, err := ra.Options().Iter(false /* check */)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Options are not valid as per the wire format, silently drop the packet.
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sourceLinkAddr, ok := getSourceLinkAddr(it)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
// At this point, we have a valid Router Advertisement, as far
|
|
// as RFC 4861 section 6.1.2 is concerned.
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// If the RA has the source link layer option, update the link address
|
|
// cache with the link address for the advertised router.
|
|
if len(sourceLinkAddr) != 0 {
|
|
switch err := e.nic.HandleNeighborProbe(ProtocolNumber, routerAddr, sourceLinkAddr); err.(type) {
|
|
case nil:
|
|
case *tcpip.ErrNotSupported:
|
|
// The stack may support ICMPv6 but the NIC may not need link resolution.
|
|
default:
|
|
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected error when informing NIC of neighbor probe message: %s", err))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
e.mu.Lock()
|
|
e.mu.ndp.handleRA(routerAddr, ra)
|
|
e.mu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
case header.ICMPv6RedirectMsg:
|
|
// TODO(gvisor.dev/issue/2285): Call `e.nud.HandleProbe` after validating
|
|
// this redirect message, as per RFC 4871 section 7.3.3:
|
|
//
|
|
// "A Neighbor Cache entry enters the STALE state when created as a
|
|
// result of receiving packets other than solicited Neighbor
|
|
// Advertisements (i.e., Router Solicitations, Router Advertisements,
|
|
// Redirects, and Neighbor Solicitations). These packets contain the
|
|
// link-layer address of either the sender or, in the case of Redirect,
|
|
// the redirection target. However, receipt of these link-layer
|
|
// addresses does not confirm reachability of the forward-direction path
|
|
// to that node. Placing a newly created Neighbor Cache entry for which
|
|
// the link-layer address is known in the STALE state provides assurance
|
|
// that path failures are detected quickly. In addition, should a cached
|
|
// link-layer address be modified due to receiving one of the above
|
|
// messages, the state SHOULD also be set to STALE to provide prompt
|
|
// verification that the path to the new link-layer address is working."
|
|
received.redirectMsg.Increment()
|
|
if !isNDPValid() {
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case header.ICMPv6MulticastListenerQuery,
|
|
header.ICMPv6MulticastListenerReport,
|
|
header.ICMPv6MulticastListenerV2Report,
|
|
header.ICMPv6MulticastListenerDone:
|
|
icmpBody := h.MessageBody()
|
|
switch icmpType {
|
|
case header.ICMPv6MulticastListenerQuery:
|
|
received.multicastListenerQuery.Increment()
|
|
case header.ICMPv6MulticastListenerReport:
|
|
received.multicastListenerReport.Increment()
|
|
case header.ICMPv6MulticastListenerV2Report:
|
|
received.multicastListenerReportV2.Increment()
|
|
case header.ICMPv6MulticastListenerDone:
|
|
received.multicastListenerDone.Increment()
|
|
default:
|
|
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unrecognized MLD message = %d", icmpType))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !isMLDValid(pkt, iph, routerAlert) {
|
|
received.invalid.Increment()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch icmpType {
|
|
case header.ICMPv6MulticastListenerQuery:
|
|
e.mu.Lock()
|
|
if len(icmpBody) >= header.MLDv2QueryMinimumSize {
|
|
e.mu.mld.handleMulticastListenerQueryV2(header.MLDv2Query(icmpBody))
|
|
} else {
|
|
e.mu.mld.handleMulticastListenerQuery(header.MLD(icmpBody))
|
|
}
|
|
e.mu.Unlock()
|
|
case header.ICMPv6MulticastListenerReport:
|
|
e.mu.Lock()
|
|
e.mu.mld.handleMulticastListenerReport(header.MLD(icmpBody))
|
|
e.mu.Unlock()
|
|
case header.ICMPv6MulticastListenerDone, header.ICMPv6MulticastListenerV2Report:
|
|
default:
|
|
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unrecognized MLD message = %d", icmpType))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
received.unrecognized.Increment()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// LinkAddressProtocol implements stack.LinkAddressResolver.
|
|
func (*endpoint) LinkAddressProtocol() tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber {
|
|
return header.IPv6ProtocolNumber
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// LinkAddressRequest implements stack.LinkAddressResolver.
|
|
func (e *endpoint) LinkAddressRequest(targetAddr, localAddr tcpip.Address, remoteLinkAddr tcpip.LinkAddress) tcpip.Error {
|
|
remoteAddr := targetAddr
|
|
if len(remoteLinkAddr) == 0 {
|
|
remoteAddr = header.SolicitedNodeAddr(targetAddr)
|
|
remoteLinkAddr = header.EthernetAddressFromMulticastIPv6Address(remoteAddr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if localAddr.BitLen() == 0 {
|
|
// Find an address that we can use as our source address.
|
|
addressEndpoint := e.AcquireOutgoingPrimaryAddress(remoteAddr, tcpip.Address{} /* srcHint */, false /* allowExpired */)
|
|
if addressEndpoint == nil {
|
|
return &tcpip.ErrNetworkUnreachable{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
localAddr = addressEndpoint.AddressWithPrefix().Address
|
|
addressEndpoint.DecRef()
|
|
} else if !e.checkLocalAddress(localAddr) {
|
|
// The provided local address is not assigned to us.
|
|
return &tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return e.sendNDPNS(localAddr, remoteAddr, targetAddr, remoteLinkAddr, header.NDPOptionsSerializer{
|
|
header.NDPSourceLinkLayerAddressOption(e.nic.LinkAddress()),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ResolveStaticAddress implements stack.LinkAddressResolver.
|
|
func (*endpoint) ResolveStaticAddress(addr tcpip.Address) (tcpip.LinkAddress, bool) {
|
|
if header.IsV6MulticastAddress(addr) {
|
|
return header.EthernetAddressFromMulticastIPv6Address(addr), true
|
|
}
|
|
return tcpip.LinkAddress([]byte(nil)), false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ======= ICMP Error packet generation =========
|
|
|
|
// icmpReason is a marker interface for IPv6 specific ICMP errors.
|
|
type icmpReason interface {
|
|
isICMPReason()
|
|
// respondToMulticast indicates whether this error falls under the exception
|
|
// outlined by RFC 4443 section 2.4 point e.3 exception 2:
|
|
//
|
|
// (e.3) A packet destined to an IPv6 multicast address. (There are two
|
|
// exceptions to this rule: (1) the Packet Too Big Message (Section 3.2) to
|
|
// allow Path MTU discovery to work for IPv6 multicast, and (2) the Parameter
|
|
// Problem Message, Code 2 (Section 3.4) reporting an unrecognized IPv6
|
|
// option (see Section 4.2 of [IPv6]) that has the Option Type highest-
|
|
// order two bits set to 10).
|
|
respondsToMulticast() bool
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// icmpReasonParameterProblem is an error during processing of extension headers
|
|
// or the fixed header defined in RFC 4443 section 3.4.
|
|
type icmpReasonParameterProblem struct {
|
|
code header.ICMPv6Code
|
|
|
|
// pointer is defined in the RFC 4443 section 3.4 which reads:
|
|
//
|
|
// Pointer Identifies the octet offset within the invoking packet
|
|
// where the error was detected.
|
|
//
|
|
// The pointer will point beyond the end of the ICMPv6
|
|
// packet if the field in error is beyond what can fit
|
|
// in the maximum size of an ICMPv6 error message.
|
|
pointer uint32
|
|
|
|
respondToMulticast bool
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonParameterProblem) isICMPReason() {}
|
|
|
|
func (p *icmpReasonParameterProblem) respondsToMulticast() bool {
|
|
return p.respondToMulticast
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// icmpReasonAdministrativelyProhibited is an error where the destination is
|
|
// administratively prohibited.
|
|
type icmpReasonAdministrativelyProhibited struct{}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonAdministrativelyProhibited) isICMPReason() {}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonAdministrativelyProhibited) respondsToMulticast() bool {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// icmpReasonPortUnreachable is an error where the transport protocol has no
|
|
// listener and no alternative means to inform the sender.
|
|
type icmpReasonPortUnreachable struct{}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonPortUnreachable) isICMPReason() {}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonPortUnreachable) respondsToMulticast() bool {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// icmpReasonNetUnreachable is an error where no route can be found to the
|
|
// network of the final destination.
|
|
type icmpReasonNetUnreachable struct{}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonNetUnreachable) isICMPReason() {}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonNetUnreachable) respondsToMulticast() bool {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// icmpReasonHostUnreachable is an error in which the host specified in the
|
|
// internet destination field of the datagram is unreachable.
|
|
type icmpReasonHostUnreachable struct{}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonHostUnreachable) isICMPReason() {}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonHostUnreachable) respondsToMulticast() bool {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// icmpReasonFragmentationNeeded is an error where a packet is to big to be sent
|
|
// out through the outgoing MTU, as per RFC 4443 page 9, Packet Too Big Message.
|
|
type icmpReasonPacketTooBig struct{}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonPacketTooBig) isICMPReason() {}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonPacketTooBig) respondsToMulticast() bool {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// icmpReasonHopLimitExceeded is an error where a packet's hop limit exceeded in
|
|
// transit to its final destination, as per RFC 4443 section 3.3.
|
|
type icmpReasonHopLimitExceeded struct{}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonHopLimitExceeded) isICMPReason() {}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonHopLimitExceeded) respondsToMulticast() bool {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// icmpReasonReassemblyTimeout is an error where insufficient fragments are
|
|
// received to complete reassembly of a packet within a configured time after
|
|
// the reception of the first-arriving fragment of that packet.
|
|
type icmpReasonReassemblyTimeout struct{}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonReassemblyTimeout) isICMPReason() {}
|
|
|
|
func (*icmpReasonReassemblyTimeout) respondsToMulticast() bool {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// returnError takes an error descriptor and generates the appropriate ICMP
|
|
// error packet for IPv6 and sends it.
|
|
func (p *protocol) returnError(reason icmpReason, pkt *stack.PacketBuffer, deliveredLocally bool) tcpip.Error {
|
|
origIPHdr := header.IPv6(pkt.NetworkHeader().Slice())
|
|
origIPHdrSrc := origIPHdr.SourceAddress()
|
|
origIPHdrDst := origIPHdr.DestinationAddress()
|
|
|
|
// Only send ICMP error if the address is not a multicast v6
|
|
// address and the source is not the unspecified address.
|
|
//
|
|
// There are exceptions to this rule.
|
|
// See: point e.3) RFC 4443 section-2.4
|
|
//
|
|
// (e) An ICMPv6 error message MUST NOT be originated as a result of
|
|
// receiving the following:
|
|
//
|
|
// (e.1) An ICMPv6 error message.
|
|
//
|
|
// (e.2) An ICMPv6 redirect message [IPv6-DISC].
|
|
//
|
|
// (e.3) A packet destined to an IPv6 multicast address. (There are
|
|
// two exceptions to this rule: (1) the Packet Too Big Message
|
|
// (Section 3.2) to allow Path MTU discovery to work for IPv6
|
|
// multicast, and (2) the Parameter Problem Message, Code 2
|
|
// (Section 3.4) reporting an unrecognized IPv6 option (see
|
|
// Section 4.2 of [IPv6]) that has the Option Type highest-
|
|
// order two bits set to 10).
|
|
//
|
|
allowResponseToMulticast := reason.respondsToMulticast()
|
|
isOrigDstMulticast := header.IsV6MulticastAddress(origIPHdrDst)
|
|
if (!allowResponseToMulticast && isOrigDstMulticast) || origIPHdrSrc == header.IPv6Any {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the packet wasn't delivered locally, do not use the packet's destination
|
|
// address as the response's source address as we should not own the
|
|
// destination address of a packet we are forwarding.
|
|
//
|
|
// If the packet was originally destined to a multicast address, then do not
|
|
// use the packet's destination address as the source for the response ICMP
|
|
// packet as "multicast addresses must not be used as source addresses in IPv6
|
|
// packets", as per RFC 4291 section 2.7.
|
|
localAddr := origIPHdrDst
|
|
if !deliveredLocally || isOrigDstMulticast {
|
|
localAddr = tcpip.Address{}
|
|
}
|
|
// Even if we were able to receive a packet from some remote, we may not have
|
|
// a route to it - the remote may be blocked via routing rules. We must always
|
|
// consult our routing table and find a route to the remote before sending any
|
|
// packet.
|
|
route, err := p.stack.FindRoute(pkt.NICID, localAddr, origIPHdrSrc, ProtocolNumber, false /* multicastLoop */)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
defer route.Release()
|
|
|
|
p.mu.Lock()
|
|
// We retrieve an endpoint using the newly constructed route's NICID rather
|
|
// than the packet's NICID. The packet's NICID corresponds to the NIC on
|
|
// which it arrived, which isn't necessarily the same as the NIC on which it
|
|
// will be transmitted. On the other hand, the route's NIC *is* guaranteed
|
|
// to be the NIC on which the packet will be transmitted.
|
|
netEP, ok := p.mu.eps[route.NICID()]
|
|
p.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return &tcpip.ErrNotConnected{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if pkt.TransportProtocolNumber == header.ICMPv6ProtocolNumber {
|
|
if typ := header.ICMPv6(pkt.TransportHeader().Slice()).Type(); typ.IsErrorType() || typ == header.ICMPv6RedirectMsg {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sent := netEP.stats.icmp.packetsSent
|
|
icmpType, icmpCode, counter, typeSpecific := func() (header.ICMPv6Type, header.ICMPv6Code, tcpip.MultiCounterStat, uint32) {
|
|
switch reason := reason.(type) {
|
|
case *icmpReasonParameterProblem:
|
|
return header.ICMPv6ParamProblem, reason.code, sent.paramProblem, reason.pointer
|
|
case *icmpReasonAdministrativelyProhibited:
|
|
return header.ICMPv6DstUnreachable, header.ICMPv6Prohibited, sent.dstUnreachable, 0
|
|
case *icmpReasonPortUnreachable:
|
|
return header.ICMPv6DstUnreachable, header.ICMPv6PortUnreachable, sent.dstUnreachable, 0
|
|
case *icmpReasonNetUnreachable:
|
|
return header.ICMPv6DstUnreachable, header.ICMPv6NetworkUnreachable, sent.dstUnreachable, 0
|
|
case *icmpReasonHostUnreachable:
|
|
return header.ICMPv6DstUnreachable, header.ICMPv6AddressUnreachable, sent.dstUnreachable, 0
|
|
case *icmpReasonPacketTooBig:
|
|
return header.ICMPv6PacketTooBig, header.ICMPv6UnusedCode, sent.packetTooBig, 0
|
|
case *icmpReasonHopLimitExceeded:
|
|
return header.ICMPv6TimeExceeded, header.ICMPv6HopLimitExceeded, sent.timeExceeded, 0
|
|
case *icmpReasonReassemblyTimeout:
|
|
return header.ICMPv6TimeExceeded, header.ICMPv6ReassemblyTimeout, sent.timeExceeded, 0
|
|
default:
|
|
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unsupported ICMP type %T", reason))
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
if !p.allowICMPReply(icmpType) {
|
|
sent.rateLimited.Increment()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
network, transport := pkt.NetworkHeader().View(), pkt.TransportHeader().View()
|
|
|
|
// As per RFC 4443 section 2.4
|
|
//
|
|
// (c) Every ICMPv6 error message (type < 128) MUST include
|
|
// as much of the IPv6 offending (invoking) packet (the
|
|
// packet that caused the error) as possible without making
|
|
// the error message packet exceed the minimum IPv6 MTU
|
|
// [IPv6].
|
|
mtu := int(route.MTU())
|
|
const maxIPv6Data = header.IPv6MinimumMTU - header.IPv6FixedHeaderSize
|
|
if mtu > maxIPv6Data {
|
|
mtu = maxIPv6Data
|
|
}
|
|
available := mtu - header.ICMPv6ErrorHeaderSize
|
|
if available < header.IPv6MinimumSize {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
payloadLen := network.Size() + transport.Size() + pkt.Data().Size()
|
|
if payloadLen > available {
|
|
payloadLen = available
|
|
}
|
|
payload := buffer.MakeWithView(network)
|
|
payload.Append(transport)
|
|
dataBuf := pkt.Data().ToBuffer()
|
|
payload.Merge(&dataBuf)
|
|
payload.Truncate(int64(payloadLen))
|
|
|
|
newPkt := stack.NewPacketBuffer(stack.PacketBufferOptions{
|
|
ReserveHeaderBytes: int(route.MaxHeaderLength()) + header.ICMPv6ErrorHeaderSize,
|
|
Payload: payload,
|
|
})
|
|
defer newPkt.DecRef()
|
|
newPkt.TransportProtocolNumber = header.ICMPv6ProtocolNumber
|
|
|
|
icmpHdr := header.ICMPv6(newPkt.TransportHeader().Push(header.ICMPv6DstUnreachableMinimumSize))
|
|
icmpHdr.SetType(icmpType)
|
|
icmpHdr.SetCode(icmpCode)
|
|
icmpHdr.SetTypeSpecific(typeSpecific)
|
|
|
|
pktData := newPkt.Data()
|
|
icmpHdr.SetChecksum(header.ICMPv6Checksum(header.ICMPv6ChecksumParams{
|
|
Header: icmpHdr,
|
|
Src: route.LocalAddress(),
|
|
Dst: route.RemoteAddress(),
|
|
PayloadCsum: pktData.Checksum(),
|
|
PayloadLen: pktData.Size(),
|
|
}))
|
|
if err := route.WritePacket(
|
|
stack.NetworkHeaderParams{
|
|
Protocol: header.ICMPv6ProtocolNumber,
|
|
TTL: route.DefaultTTL(),
|
|
TOS: stack.DefaultTOS,
|
|
},
|
|
newPkt,
|
|
); err != nil {
|
|
sent.dropped.Increment()
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
counter.Increment()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// OnReassemblyTimeout implements fragmentation.TimeoutHandler.
|
|
func (p *protocol) OnReassemblyTimeout(pkt *stack.PacketBuffer) {
|
|
// OnReassemblyTimeout sends a Time Exceeded Message as per RFC 2460 Section
|
|
// 4.5:
|
|
//
|
|
// If the first fragment (i.e., the one with a Fragment Offset of zero) has
|
|
// been received, an ICMP Time Exceeded -- Fragment Reassembly Time Exceeded
|
|
// message should be sent to the source of that fragment.
|
|
if pkt != nil {
|
|
p.returnError(&icmpReasonReassemblyTimeout{}, pkt, true /* deliveredLocally */)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|