It is an idea of running codespell as part of our presubmit checks.
Before enabling it for new changes, let's fix what it has found.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
This wraps the `map[uintptry]SyscallRule` into an unexported field of a struct
so that it cannot be accessed directly.
This is helpful for the `runsc` and `fsgofer` seccomp filters which are quite
complex and built across multiple files and multiple functions, where it is
not always clear which order they are executed in. By forcing mutations to be
more explicit about their intent (especially "merge with this new rule" vs
"override what happens for this syscall with this new rule"), we can crash if
that intent isn't what's actually happening.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 572361619
This replaces the `seccomp.Rule` type with the `seccomp.SyscallRule`
interface, which is an abstraction that defines how to match a syscall's
arguments and RIP.
This has the following benefits:
- The code can verify that rules are self-contained, as the
`SyscallRule.Render` contract specifies that the rule must jump to
either a "matched" or "not matched" label, and may not fall through.
It uses `ProgramBuilder`'s support for asserting unreachability to
enforce this.
- Rules that match everything are more explicit (no more implicit
"no rules means everything matches" behavior, instead you have to
explicitly specify `seccomp.MatchAll{}`).
- "OR" behavior is explicit (a disjunctive rule is marked as `seccomp.Or`
rather than the current implicit meaning of a list of rules).
- Allows the creation of more sophisticated matching rules that don't work
on a per-argument basis. This change does not do any of that yet, it
simply refactors existing rules without changing the way they work.
- Decouples rule-specific rendering code from the larger program generation
code (BST, architecture check, etc.).
Unfortunately there is no easy way to split this change into multiple
sub-changes without introducing additional complexity to support both forms
of expressing rules, so sorry if this is a large change. But note that it
is actually net-negative in line count.
Despite the size of this change, please review it carefully, as this is a
security-sensitive change.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 571459670
The syscall package has been deprecated in favor of golang.org/x/sys.
Note that syscall is still used in the following places:
- pkg/sentry/socket/hostinet/stack.go: some netlink related functionalities
are not yet available in golang.org/x/sys.
- syscall.Stat_t is still used in some places because os.FileInfo.Sys() still
returns it and not unix.Stat_t.
Updates #214
PiperOrigin-RevId: 360701387
On ARM64, when ptrace stops on a system call, it uses the x7 register to
indicate whether the stop has been signalled from syscall entry or syscall
exit. This means that we can't get a value of this register and we can't change
it. More details are in the comment for tracehook_report_syscall in
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c.
This happens only if we stop on a system call, so let's queue a signal, resume
a stub thread and catch it on a signal handling.
Fixes: #5238
PiperOrigin-RevId: 352668695
OCI configuration includes support for specifying seccomp filters. In runc,
these filter configurations are converted into seccomp BPF programs and loaded
into the kernel via libseccomp. runsc needs to be a static binary so, for
runsc, we cannot rely on a C library and need to implement the functionality
in Go.
The generator added here implements basic support for taking OCI seccomp
configuration and converting it into a seccomp BPF program with the same
behavior as a program generated by libseccomp.
- New conditional operations were added to pkg/seccomp to support operations
available in OCI.
- AllowAny and AllowValue were renamed to MatchAny and EqualTo to better reflect
that syscalls matching the conditionals result in the provided action not
simply SCMP_RET_ALLOW.
- BuildProgram in pkg/seccomp no longer panics if provided an empty list of
rules. It now builds a program with the architecture sanity check only.
- ProgramBuilder now allows adding labels that are unused. However, backwards
jumps are still not permitted.
Fixes#510
PiperOrigin-RevId: 331938697
The support of PTRACE_SYSEMU on arm64 was added in the 5.3 kernel,
so we can be sure that the current version is higher that 5.3.
And this change moves vsyscall seccomp rules to the arch specific file,
because vsyscall isn't supported on arm64.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 298696493
Right now, we need to call ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL) and wait() twice to execute
one system call in a stub process. With these changes, we will need to call
ptrace + wait only once.
In addition, this allows to workaround the kernel bug when a stub process
doesn't stop on syscall-exit-stop and starts executing the next system call.
Reported-by: syzbot+37143cafa8dc3b5008ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
PiperOrigin-RevId: 288393029
Based on the guidelines at
https://opensource.google.com/docs/releasing/authors/.
1. $ rg -l "Google LLC" | xargs sed -i 's/Google LLC.*/The gVisor Authors./'
2. Manual fixup of "Google Inc" references.
3. Add AUTHORS file. Authors may request to be added to this file.
4. Point netstack AUTHORS to gVisor AUTHORS. Drop CONTRIBUTORS.
Fixes#209
PiperOrigin-RevId: 245823212
Change-Id: I64530b24ad021a7d683137459cafc510f5ee1de9
This is a defense-in-depth measure. If the sentry is compromised, this prevents
system call injection to the stubs. There is some complexity with respect to
ptrace and seccomp interactions, so this protection is not really available
for kernel versions < 4.8; this is detected dynamically.
Note that this also solves the vsyscall emulation issue by adding in
appropriate trapping for those system calls. It does mean that a compromised
sentry could theoretically inject these into the stub (ignoring the trap and
resume, thereby allowing execution), but they are harmless.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 216647581
Change-Id: Id06c232cbac1f9489b1803ec97f83097fcba8eb8
Andrei Vagin
Etienne PerotandgVisor bot
Andrei VaginandgVisor bot
Jamie LiuandgVisor bot
Ayush RanjanandgVisor bot
Ian LewisandgVisor bot
Rahat MahmoodandgVisor bot
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Haibo Xu
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GooglerandAdin Scannell