10 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Jamie LiuandgVisor bot cf5841ba66 mm: implement prctl(PR_SET_VMA, PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME)
PiperOrigin-RevId: 696727156
2024-11-14 19:06:07 -08:00
William ChangandgVisor bot 7f3fdc910f Implement core tagging
Links to some possibly useful reference material on core tagging:
* LWN article: https://lwn.net/Articles/861251/
* Kernel docs: https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst

PiperOrigin-RevId: 431093418
2022-02-25 21:51:02 -08:00
Dean DengandgVisor bot acd516cfe2 Add YAMA security module restrictions on ptrace(2).
Restrict ptrace(2) according to the default configurations of the YAMA security
module (mode 1), which is a common default among various Linux distributions.
The new access checks only permit the tracer to proceed if one of the following
conditions is met:

a) The tracer is already attached to the tracee.

b) The target is a descendant of the tracer.

c) The target has explicitly given permission to the tracer through the
PR_SET_PTRACER prctl.

d) The tracer has CAP_SYS_PTRACE.

See security/yama/yama_lsm.c for more details.

Note that these checks are added to CanTrace, which is checked for
PTRACE_ATTACH as well as some other operations, e.g., checking a process'
memory layout through /proc/[pid]/mem.

Since this patch adds restrictions to ptrace, it may break compatibility for
applications run by non-root users that, for instance, rely on being able to
trace processes that are not descended from the tracer (e.g., `gdb -p`). YAMA
restrictions can be turned off by setting /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope
to 0, or exceptions can be made on a per-process basis with the PR_SET_PTRACER
prctl.

Reported-by: syzbot+622822d8bca08c99e8c8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
PiperOrigin-RevId: 359237723
2021-02-24 02:03:16 -08:00
Michael PrattandShentubot d3ed9baac0 Implement dumpability tracking and checks
We don't actually support core dumps, but some applications want to
get/set dumpability, which still has an effect in procfs.

Lack of support for set-uid binaries or fs creds simplifies things a
bit.

As-is, processes started via CreateProcess (i.e., init and sentryctl
exec) have normal dumpability. I'm a bit torn on whether sentryctl exec
tasks should be dumpable, but at least since they have no parent normal
UID/GID checks should protect them.

PiperOrigin-RevId: 251712714
2019-06-05 14:00:13 -07:00
Michael PrattandShentubot 6cdec6fadf Wrap comments and reword in common present tense
PiperOrigin-RevId: 249888234
Change-Id: Icfef32c3ed34809c34100c07e93e9581c786776e
2019-05-24 13:23:53 -07:00
Michael PrattandShentubot 4d52a55201 Change copyright notice to "The gVisor Authors"
Based on the guidelines at
https://opensource.google.com/docs/releasing/authors/.

1. $ rg -l "Google LLC" | xargs sed -i 's/Google LLC.*/The gVisor Authors./'
2. Manual fixup of "Google Inc" references.
3. Add AUTHORS file. Authors may request to be added to this file.
4. Point netstack AUTHORS to gVisor AUTHORS. Drop CONTRIBUTORS.

Fixes #209

PiperOrigin-RevId: 245823212
Change-Id: I64530b24ad021a7d683137459cafc510f5ee1de9
2019-04-29 14:26:23 -07:00
Fabricio VoznikaandShentubot b2068cf5a5 Add more unimplemented syscall events
Added events for *ctl syscalls that may have multiple different commands.
For runsc, each syscall event is only logged once. For *ctl syscalls, use
the cmd as identifier, not only the syscall number.

PiperOrigin-RevId: 218015941
Change-Id: Ie3c19131ae36124861e9b492a7dbe1765d9e5e59
2018-10-20 11:14:23 -07:00
Ian GudgerandShentubot 8fce67af24 Use correct company name in copyright header
PiperOrigin-RevId: 217951017
Change-Id: Ie08bf6987f98467d07457bcf35b5f1ff6e43c035
2018-10-19 16:35:11 -07:00
Adin ScannellandShentubot 29e00c943a Add CPUID faulting for ptrace and KVM.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 204858314
Change-Id: I8252bf8de3232a7a27af51076139b585e73276d4
2018-07-16 22:02:58 -07:00
GooglerandAdin Scannell d02b74a5dc Check in gVisor.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 194583126
Change-Id: Ica1d8821a90f74e7e745962d71801c598c652463
2018-04-28 01:44:26 -04:00