diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/02/GHSA-52xq-j7v9-v4v2/GHSA-52xq-j7v9-v4v2.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/02/GHSA-52xq-j7v9-v4v2/GHSA-52xq-j7v9-v4v2.json
index 71039f7e58f..42af384d808 100644
--- a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/02/GHSA-52xq-j7v9-v4v2/GHSA-52xq-j7v9-v4v2.json
+++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/02/GHSA-52xq-j7v9-v4v2/GHSA-52xq-j7v9-v4v2.json
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-52xq-j7v9-v4v2",
-  "modified": "2024-02-15T14:55:45Z",
+  "modified": "2024-06-18T15:15:29Z",
   "published": "2024-02-07T17:27:58Z",
   "aliases": [
     "CVE-2024-24563"
   ],
-  "summary": "Vyper array negative index vulnerability",
-  "details": "### Summary\nArrays can be keyed by a signed integer, while they are defined for unsigned integers only. The typechecker doesn't throw when spotting the usage of an `int` as an index for an array. Typically, negative integers are filtered out at runtime by the bounds checker, but small enough (i.e. large in magnitude, ex. `-2**255 + 5`) quantities combined with large enough arrays (at least `2**255` in length) can pass the bounds checker, resulting in unexpected behavior.\n\nA contract search was performed, and no production contracts were found to be impacted. \n\n### Details\nThe typechecker allows the usage of signed integers to be used as indexes to arrays. The vulnerability is present in different forms in all versions. Here is an example from `0.3.10`:\nhttps://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/c150fc49ee9375a930d177044559b83cb95f7963/vyper/semantics/types/subscriptable.py#L127-L137\n\nAs can be seen, the validation is performed against `IntegerT.any()`.\n\n### PoC\nIf the array is sufficiently large, it can be indexed with a negative value:\n```python\narr: public(uint256[MAX_UINT256])\n\n@external\ndef set(idx: int256, num: uint256):\n    self.arr[idx] = num\n```\nFor signed integers, the 2's complement representation is used. Because the array was declared very large, the bounds checking will pass (negative values will simply be represented as very large numbers):\nhttps://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/a1fd228cb9936c3e4bbca6f3ee3fb4426ef45490/vyper/codegen/core.py#L534-L541\n\n\n### Impact\nThere are two potential vulnerability classes: unpredictable behavior and accessing inaccessible elements.\n\n1. If it is possible to index an array with a negative integer without reverting, this is most likely not anticipated by the developer and such accesses can cause unpredictable behavior for the contract.\n\n2. If a contract has an invariant in the form `assert index < x` where both `index` and `x` are signed integers, the developer might suppose that no elements on indexes `y | y >= x` are accessible. However, by using negative indexes this can be bypassed.\n\nThe contract search found no production contracts impacted by these two classes of issues.",
+  "summary": "Vyper negative array indexes",
+  "details": "### Summary\nArrays can be keyed by a signed integer, while they are defined for unsigned integers only. The typechecker doesn't throw when spotting the usage of an `int` as an index for an array. Typically, negative integers are filtered out at runtime by the bounds checker, but small enough (i.e. large in magnitude, ex. `-2**255 + 5`) quantities combined with large enough arrays (at least `2**255` in length) can pass the bounds checker, resulting in unexpected behavior.\n\nA contract search was performed, and no production contracts were found to be impacted.\n\n### Details\nThe typechecker allows the usage of signed integers to be used as indexes to arrays. The vulnerability is present in different forms in all versions. Here is an example from `0.3.10`:\nhttps://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/c150fc49ee9375a930d177044559b83cb95f7963/vyper/semantics/types/subscriptable.py#L127-L137\n\nAs can be seen, the validation is performed against `IntegerT.any()`.\n\n### PoC\nIf the array is sufficiently large, it can be indexed with a negative value:\n```python\narr: public(uint256[MAX_UINT256])\n\n@external\ndef set(idx: int256, num: uint256):\n    self.arr[idx] = num\n```\nFor signed integers, the 2's complement representation is used. Because the array was declared very large, the bounds checking will pass (negative values will simply be represented as very large numbers):\nhttps://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/a1fd228cb9936c3e4bbca6f3ee3fb4426ef45490/vyper/codegen/core.py#L534-L541\n\n### Patches\nPatched in https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/pull/3817.\n\n### Impact\nThere are two potential vulnerability classes: unpredictable behavior and accessing inaccessible elements.\n\n1. If it is possible to index an array with a negative integer without reverting, this is most likely not anticipated by the developer and such accesses can cause unpredictable behavior for the contract.\n\n2. If a contract has an invariant in the form `assert index < x` where both `index` and `x` are signed integers, the developer might suppose that no elements on indexes `y | y >= x` are accessible. However, by using negative indexes this can be bypassed.\n\nThe contract search found no production contracts impacted by these two classes of issues.",
   "severity": [
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V3",
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
               "introduced": "0"
             },
             {
-              "last_affected": "0.3.10"
+              "fixed": "0.4.0"
             }
           ]
         }
diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/02/GHSA-6845-xw22-ffxv/GHSA-6845-xw22-ffxv.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/02/GHSA-6845-xw22-ffxv/GHSA-6845-xw22-ffxv.json
index 3d6c55452e1..b9e415434d4 100644
--- a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/02/GHSA-6845-xw22-ffxv/GHSA-6845-xw22-ffxv.json
+++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/02/GHSA-6845-xw22-ffxv/GHSA-6845-xw22-ffxv.json
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-6845-xw22-ffxv",
-  "modified": "2024-06-03T18:39:12Z",
+  "modified": "2024-06-18T15:14:29Z",
   "published": "2024-02-05T19:21:52Z",
   "aliases": [
     "CVE-2024-24559"
   ],
   "summary": "Vyper sha3 codegen bug",
-  "details": "### Summary\nThere is an error in the stack management when compiling the `IR` for `sha3_64`. Concretely, the `height` variable is miscalculated.\nThe vulnerability can't be triggered without writing the `IR` by hand. That is, it cannot be triggered from regular vyper code, it can only be triggered by using the `fang` binary directly (this binary used to be called `vyper-ir` prior to v0.3.4).\n\n### Details\nTo compile `sha3_64`, the `arg[0]` and `arg[1]` have to be compiled:\nhttps://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/c150fc49ee9375a930d177044559b83cb95f7963/vyper/ir/compile_ir.py#L585-L586\n\nAs can be seen, after compiling the 0th arg, the `height` variable isn't increased. If new `withargs` are defined in the inner scope, they are manipulated correctly, because both their `height` is off and also the global `height` is off and thus their placement on the stack is computed correctly.\n\n`sha3_64` is used for retrieval in mappings. No flow that would cache the `key` was found, the issue shouldn't be possible to trigger when compiling the compiler-generated `IR`.\n\n### PoC\nSuppose the following hand-written IR:\n```lisp\n(with _loc\n\t(with val 1 \n\t\t(with key 2 \n\t\t\t(sha3_64 val key))) \n\t\t\t\t(seq \n\t\t\t\t\t(sstore _loc \n\t\t\t\t\t(with x (sload _loc) \n\t\t\t\t\t\t(with ans (add x 1) (seq (assert (ge ans x)) ans))))))\n```\nafter compilation:\n```\nthe generated bytecode: 6001600281806020525f5260405f2090509050805460018101818110610026579050815550005b5f80fd\n\n0000    60  PUSH1 0x01\n0002    60  PUSH1 0x02\n0004    81  DUP2\n0005    80  DUP1       *********** bad code here!!!!!!\n0006    60  PUSH1 0x20\n0008    52  MSTORE\n```\n\nIt can be seen that the second `DUP` will dup the item on the top of the stack which is incorrect.\n\ntracking in https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/issues/4062\n\n### Impact\nVersions v0.2.0-v0.3.10 were evaluated, and access of the variable with the invalid height is not reachable from IR generated by the vyper front-end. Because the issue isn't triggered during normal compilation of vyper code, the impact is considered low.\n",
+  "details": "### Summary\nThere is an error in the stack management when compiling the `IR` for `sha3_64`. Concretely, the `height` variable is miscalculated.\nThe vulnerability can't be triggered without writing the `IR` by hand. That is, it cannot be triggered from regular vyper code, it can only be triggered by using the `fang` binary directly (this binary used to be called `vyper-ir` prior to v0.3.4).\n\n### Details\nTo compile `sha3_64`, the `arg[0]` and `arg[1]` have to be compiled:\nhttps://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/c150fc49ee9375a930d177044559b83cb95f7963/vyper/ir/compile_ir.py#L585-L586\n\nAs can be seen, after compiling the 0th arg, the `height` variable isn't increased. If new `withargs` are defined in the inner scope, they are manipulated correctly, because both their `height` is off and also the global `height` is off and thus their placement on the stack is computed correctly.\n\n`sha3_64` is used for retrieval in mappings. No flow that would cache the `key` was found, the issue shouldn't be possible to trigger when compiling the compiler-generated `IR`.\n\n### PoC\nSuppose the following hand-written IR:\n```lisp\n(with _loc\n\t(with val 1 \n\t\t(with key 2 \n\t\t\t(sha3_64 val key))) \n\t\t\t\t(seq \n\t\t\t\t\t(sstore _loc \n\t\t\t\t\t(with x (sload _loc) \n\t\t\t\t\t\t(with ans (add x 1) (seq (assert (ge ans x)) ans))))))\n```\nafter compilation:\n```\nthe generated bytecode: 6001600281806020525f5260405f2090509050805460018101818110610026579050815550005b5f80fd\n\n0000    60  PUSH1 0x01\n0002    60  PUSH1 0x02\n0004    81  DUP2\n0005    80  DUP1       *********** bad code here!!!!!!\n0006    60  PUSH1 0x20\n0008    52  MSTORE\n```\n\nIt can be seen that the second `DUP` will dup the item on the top of the stack which is incorrect.\n\n### Patches\nPatched in https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/pull/4063.\n\n### Impact\nVersions v0.2.0-v0.3.10 were evaluated, and access of the variable with the invalid height is not reachable from IR generated by the vyper front-end. Because the issue isn't triggered during normal compilation of vyper code, the impact is considered low.\n",
   "severity": [
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V3",
@@ -32,10 +32,7 @@
             }
           ]
         }
-      ],
-      "database_specific": {
-        "last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 0.3.10"
-      }
+      ]
     }
   ],
   "references": [