diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/01/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/01/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5ccffa06d7f --- /dev/null +++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/01/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc.json @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +{ + "schema_version": "1.4.0", + "id": "GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc", + "modified": "2024-01-02T16:42:27Z", + "published": "2024-01-02T16:42:27Z", + "aliases": [ + "CVE-2023-52137" + ], + "summary": "Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-275)", + "details": "### Summary\nThe [`tj-actions/verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.\n\n### Details\nThe [`verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution.\n\nThis could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` and \\` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal **secrets** such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`. For example on `push`.\n\n#### Proof of Concept\n\n1. Submit a pull request to the repository with a new file injecting a command. For example `$(whoami).txt` would be a valid filename.\n2. Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the `List all changed files tracked and untracked files` step.\n\n```yaml\n- name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files\n run: |\n echo \"Changed files: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}\"\n```\n\nExample output:\n\n```yaml\n##[group]Run echo \"Changed files: $(whoami).txt\"\n echo \"Changed files: $(whoami).txt\"\u001b[0m\nshell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}\n##[endgroup]\nChanged files: runner.txt\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.\n\n### Resolution\n- A new `safe_output` input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.\n\n- A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.\n\n```yaml\n- name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files\n env:\n CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}\n run: |\n echo \"Changed files: $CHANGED_FILES\"\n```\n\n\n### Resources\n\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/)\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)\n", + "severity": [ + { + "type": "CVSS_V3", + "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L" + } + ], + "affected": [ + { + "package": { + "ecosystem": "GitHub Actions", + "name": "tj-actions/verify-changed-files" + }, + "ranges": [ + { + "type": "ECOSYSTEM", + "events": [ + { + "introduced": "0" + }, + { + "fixed": "17" + } + ] + } + ] + } + ], + "references": [ + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/security/advisories/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc" + }, + { + "type": "ADVISORY", + "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52137" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/commit/498d3f316f501aa72485060e8c96fde7b2014f12" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/commit/592e305da041c09a009afa4a43c97d889bed65c3" + }, + { + "type": "PACKAGE", + "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files" + } + ], + "database_specific": { + "cwe_ids": [ + "CWE-20" + ], + "severity": "HIGH", + "github_reviewed": true, + "github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-02T16:42:27Z", + "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-29T17:16:07Z" + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/01/GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63/GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/01/GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63/GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..990ba6d6eed --- /dev/null +++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/01/GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63/GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63.json @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +{ + "schema_version": "1.4.0", + "id": "GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63", + "modified": "2024-01-02T16:41:27Z", + "published": "2024-01-02T16:41:27Z", + "aliases": [ + "CVE-2023-51664" + ], + "summary": "tj-actions/changed-files has Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-271)", + "details": "### Summary\nThe `tj-actions/changed-files` workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.\n\n### Details\nThe [`changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files) action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an `escape_json` input [enabled by default](https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/blob/94549999469dbfa032becf298d95c87a14c34394/action.yml#L136), only escapes `\"` for JSON values. \n\nThis could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` and \\` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal **secrets** such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`. For example on `push`.\n\n#### Proof of Concept\n\n1. Submit a pull request to a repository with a new file injecting a command. For example `$(whoami).txt` which is a valid filename.\n2. Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the `List all changed files` step below.\n\n```yaml\n - name: List all changed files\n run: |\n for file in ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}; do\n echo \"$file was changed\"\n done\n```\n\nExample output:\n\n```yaml\n##[group]Run for file in $(whoami).txt; do\n for file in $(whoami).txt; do\n echo \"$file was changed\"\n done\nshell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}\n##[endgroup]\nrunner.txt was changed\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.\n\n### Resolution\n- A new `safe_output` input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.\n\n- A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.\n\n```yaml\n- name: List all changed files\n env:\n ALL_CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}\n run: |\n for file in \"$ALL_CHANGED_FILES\"; do\n echo \"$file was changed\"\n done\n```\n\n### Resources\n\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/)\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)", + "severity": [ + { + "type": "CVSS_V3", + "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N" + } + ], + "affected": [ + { + "package": { + "ecosystem": "GitHub Actions", + "name": "tj-actions/changed-files" + }, + "ranges": [ + { + "type": "ECOSYSTEM", + "events": [ + { + "introduced": "0" + }, + { + "fixed": "41" + } + ] + } + ] + } + ], + "references": [ + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/security/advisories/GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63" + }, + { + "type": "ADVISORY", + "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51664" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/commit/0102c07446a3cad972f4afcbd0ee4dbc4b6d2d1b" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/commit/716b1e13042866565e00e85fd4ec490e186c4a2f" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/commit/ff2f6e6b91913a7be42be1b5917330fe442f2ede" + }, + { + "type": "PACKAGE", + "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files" + } + ], + "database_specific": { + "cwe_ids": [ + "CWE-74" + ], + "severity": "HIGH", + "github_reviewed": true, + "github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-02T16:41:27Z", + "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-27T17:15:08Z" + } +} \ No newline at end of file