diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/11/GHSA-xq3w-v528-46rv/GHSA-xq3w-v528-46rv.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/11/GHSA-xq3w-v528-46rv/GHSA-xq3w-v528-46rv.json index 647576701fe..a0ded8838d8 100644 --- a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/11/GHSA-xq3w-v528-46rv/GHSA-xq3w-v528-46rv.json +++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/11/GHSA-xq3w-v528-46rv/GHSA-xq3w-v528-46rv.json @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ { "schema_version": "1.4.0", "id": "GHSA-xq3w-v528-46rv", - "modified": "2024-12-04T18:06:16Z", + "modified": "2025-02-18T15:57:45Z", "published": "2024-11-12T19:53:17Z", "aliases": [ "CVE-2024-47535" ], "summary": "Denial of Service attack on windows app using netty", - "details": "### Summary\n\nAn unsafe reading of environment file could potentially cause a denial of service in Netty.\nWhen loaded on an Windows application, Netty attemps to load a file that does not exist. If an attacker creates such a large file, the Netty application crash.\n\n\n### Details\n\nWhen the library netty is loaded in a java windows application, the library tries to identify the system environnement in which it is executed.\n\nAt this stage, Netty tries to load both `/etc/os-release` and `/usr/lib/os-release` even though it is in a Windows environment. \n\n\"1\"\n\nIf netty finds this files, it reads them and loads them into memory.\n\nBy default :\n\n- The JVM maximum memory size is set to 1 GB,\n- A non-privileged user can create a directory at `C:\\` and create files within it.\n\n\"2\"\n\n\"3\"\n\nthe source code identified :\nhttps://github.com/netty/netty/blob/4.1/common/src/main/java/io/netty/util/internal/PlatformDependent.java\n\nDespite the implementation of the function `normalizeOs()` the source code not verify the OS before reading `C:\\etc\\os-release` and `C:\\usr\\lib\\os-release`.\n\n### PoC\n\nCreate a file larger than 1 GB of data in `C:\\etc\\os-release` or `C:\\usr\\lib\\os-release` on a Windows environnement and start your Netty application.\n\nTo observe what the application does with the file, the security analyst used \"Process Monitor\" from the \"Windows SysInternals\" suite. (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/)\n\n```\ncd C:\\etc\nfsutil file createnew os-release 3000000000\n```\n\n\"4\"\n\n\"5\"\n\nThe source code used is the Netty website code example : [Echo ‐ the very basic client and server](https://netty.io/4.1/xref/io/netty/example/echo/package-summary.html).\n\nThe vulnerability was tested on the 4.1.112.Final version.\n\nThe security analyst tried the same technique for `C:\\proc\\sys\\net\\core\\somaxconn` with a lot of values to impact Netty but the only things that works is the \"larger than 1 GB file\" technique. https://github.com/netty/netty/blob/c0fdb8e9f8f256990e902fcfffbbe10754d0f3dd/common/src/main/java/io/netty/util/NetUtil.java#L186\n\n### Impact\n\nBy loading the \"file larger than 1 GB\" into the memory, the Netty library exceeds the JVM memory limit and causes a crash in the java Windows application.\n\nThis behaviour occurs 100% of the time in both Server mode and Client mode if the large file exists.\n\nClient mode :\n\n\"6\"\n\nServer mode :\n\n\"7\"\n\nsomaxconn :\n\n\"8\"\n\n### Severity\n\n- Attack vector : \"Local\" because the attacker needs to be on the system where the Netty application is running.\n- Attack complexity : \"Low\" because the attacker only need to create a massive file (regardless of its contents).\n- Privileges required : \"Low\" because the attacker requires a user account to exploit the vulnerability.\n- User intercation : \"None\" because the administrator don't need to accidentally click anywhere to trigger the vulnerability. Furthermore, the exploitation works with defaults windows/AD settings.\n- Scope : \"Unchanged\" because only Netty is affected by the vulnerability.\n- Confidentiality : \"None\" because no data is exposed through exploiting the vulnerability.\n- Integrity : \"None\" because the explotation of the vulnerability does not allow editing, deleting or adding data elsewhere.\n- Availability : \"High\" because the exploitation of this vulnerability crashes the entire java application.\n", + "details": "### Summary\n\nAn unsafe reading of environment file could potentially cause a denial of service in Netty.\nWhen loaded on an Windows application, Netty attemps to load a file that does not exist. If an attacker creates such a large file, the Netty application crash.\n\n\n### Details\n\nWhen the library netty is loaded in a java windows application, the library tries to identify the system environnement in which it is executed.\n\nAt this stage, Netty tries to load both `/etc/os-release` and `/usr/lib/os-release` even though it is in a Windows environment. \n\n\"1\"\n\nIf netty finds this files, it reads them and loads them into memory.\n\nBy default :\n\n- The JVM maximum memory size is set to 1 GB,\n- A non-privileged user can create a directory at `C:\\` and create files within it.\n\n\"2\"\n\n\"3\"\n\nthe source code identified :\nhttps://github.com/netty/netty/blob/4.1/common/src/main/java/io/netty/util/internal/PlatformDependent.java\n\nDespite the implementation of the function `normalizeOs()` the source code not verify the OS before reading `C:\\etc\\os-release` and `C:\\usr\\lib\\os-release`.\n\n### PoC\n\nCreate a file larger than 1 GB of data in `C:\\etc\\os-release` or `C:\\usr\\lib\\os-release` on a Windows environnement and start your Netty application.\n\nTo observe what the application does with the file, the security analyst used \"Process Monitor\" from the \"Windows SysInternals\" suite. (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/)\n\n```\ncd C:\\etc\nfsutil file createnew os-release 3000000000\n```\n\n\"4\"\n\n\"5\"\n\nThe source code used is the Netty website code example : [Echo ‐ the very basic client and server](https://netty.io/4.1/xref/io/netty/example/echo/package-summary.html).\n\nThe vulnerability was tested on the 4.1.112.Final version.\n\nThe security analyst tried the same technique for `C:\\proc\\sys\\net\\core\\somaxconn` with a lot of values to impact Netty but the only things that works is the \"larger than 1 GB file\" technique. https://github.com/netty/netty/blob/c0fdb8e9f8f256990e902fcfffbbe10754d0f3dd/common/src/main/java/io/netty/util/NetUtil.java#L186\n\n### Impact\n\nBy loading the \"file larger than 1 GB\" into the memory, the Netty library exceeds the JVM memory limit and causes a crash in the java Windows application.\n\nThis behaviour occurs 100% of the time in both Server mode and Client mode if the large file exists.\n\nClient mode :\n\n\"6\"\n\nServer mode :\n\n\"7\"\n\nsomaxconn :\n\n\"8\"\n\n### Severity\n\n- Attack vector : \"Local\" because the attacker needs to be on the system where the Netty application is running.\n- Attack complexity : \"Low\" because the attacker only need to create a massive file (regardless of its contents).\n- Privileges required : \"Low\" because the attacker requires a user account to exploit the vulnerability.\n- User intercation : \"None\" because the administrator don't need to accidentally click anywhere to trigger the vulnerability. Furthermore, the exploitation works with defaults windows/AD settings.\n- Scope : \"Unchanged\" because only Netty is affected by the vulnerability.\n- Confidentiality : \"None\" because no data is exposed through exploiting the vulnerability.\n- Integrity : \"None\" because the explotation of the vulnerability does not allow editing, deleting or adding data elsewhere.\n- Availability : \"High\" because the exploitation of this vulnerability crashes the entire java application.", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", @@ -32,13 +32,13 @@ "introduced": "0" }, { - "fixed": "4.1.115" + "fixed": "4.1.115.Final" } ] } ], "database_specific": { - "last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 4.1.114" + "last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 4.1.114.Final" } } ],