diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/04/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/04/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq.json
index 172de4fb683..6197974170b 100644
--- a/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/04/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq.json
+++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/04/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq.json
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq",
-  "modified": "2025-04-18T20:24:08Z",
+  "modified": "2025-05-27T19:56:40Z",
   "published": "2025-04-18T20:24:07Z",
   "aliases": [],
   "summary": "youtube-dl vulnerable to file system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization",
-  "details": "#### Description\nThis advisory follows the security advisory [GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j published by the _yt-dlp/yt-dlp_ project](https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j) to aid remediation of the issue in the _ytdl-org/youtube-dl_ project.\n\n### Vulnerability\n_youtube-dl_ does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). \n\n### Impact\nSince _youtube-dl_ also reads config from the working directory (and, on Windows, executables will be executed from the _youtube-dl_ directory by default) the vulnerability could allow the unwanted execution of local code, including downloads masquerading as, eg, subtitles.\n\n### Patches\nThe versions of _youtube-dl_ listed as _Patched_ remediate this vulnerability by disallowing path separators and whitelisting allowed extensions. As a result, some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded.\n\n### Workarounds\nAny/all of the below considerations may limit exposure in case it is necessary to use a vulnerable version\n* have `.%(ext)s` at the end of the output template\n* download from websites that you trust\n* do not download to a directory within the executable search `PATH` or other sensitive locations, such as your user directory or system directories\n* in Windows versions that support it, set [`NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath`](https://stackoverflow.com/a/50118548) to prevent the _cmd_ shell's executable search adding the default directory before `PATH`\n* consider that the path traversal vulnerability as a result of resolving `non_existent_dir\\..\\..\\target` does not exist in Linux or macOS\n* ensure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/... one (use `--get-filename`)\n* omit any of the subtitle options (`--write-subs`/` --write-srt`, `--write-auto-subs`/`--write-automatic-subs`, `--all-subs`).\n\n### References\n* [GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j](https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j)\n* https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/pull/32830",
+  "details": "#### Description\nThis advisory follows the security advisory [GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j published by the _yt-dlp/yt-dlp_ project](https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j) to aid remediation of the issue in the _ytdl-org/youtube-dl_ project.\n\n### Vulnerability\n_youtube-dl_ does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). \n\n### Impact\nSince _youtube-dl_ also reads config from the working directory (and, on Windows, executables will be executed from the _youtube-dl_ directory by default) the vulnerability could allow the unwanted execution of local code, including downloads masquerading as, eg, subtitles.\n\n### Patches\nThe versions of _youtube-dl_ listed as _Patched_ remediate this vulnerability by disallowing path separators and whitelisting allowed extensions. As a result, some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded.\n\n**Master code d42a222 or later and nightly builds tagged 2024-07-03 or later** contain the remediation.\n\n### Workarounds\nAny/all of the below considerations may limit exposure in case it is necessary to use a vulnerable version\n* have `.%(ext)s` at the end of the output template\n* download from websites that you trust\n* do not download to a directory within the executable search `PATH` or other sensitive locations, such as your user directory or system directories\n* in Windows versions that support it, set [`NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath`](https://stackoverflow.com/a/50118548) to prevent the _cmd_ shell's executable search adding the default directory before `PATH`\n* consider that the path traversal vulnerability as a result of resolving `non_existent_dir\\..\\..\\target` does not exist in Linux or macOS\n* ensure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/... one (use `--get-filename`)\n* omit any of the subtitle options (`--write-subs`/` --write-srt`, `--write-auto-subs`/`--write-automatic-subs`, `--all-subs`).\n\n### References\n* [GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j](https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j)\n* https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/pull/32830",
   "severity": [
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V3",
@@ -26,14 +26,11 @@
               "introduced": "2015.01.25"
             },
             {
-              "fixed": "2024-07-03"
+              "last_affected": "2021.12.17"
             }
           ]
         }
-      ],
-      "database_specific": {
-        "last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 2021.12.17"
-      }
+      ]
     }
   ],
   "references": [