From 7b0390164da89aa27a43d9a88ad32377619f9f34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "advisory-database[bot]" <45398580+advisory-database[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 2 May 2025 12:55:07 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Publish Advisories GHSA-gw5p-q8mj-p7gh GHSA-7qmx-3fpx-r45m GHSA-q8hx-mm92-4wvg GHSA-c2f5-jxjv-2hh8 GHSA-8x27-jwjr-8545 --- .../2023/09/GHSA-gw5p-q8mj-p7gh/GHSA-gw5p-q8mj-p7gh.json | 8 ++++++-- .../2024/10/GHSA-7qmx-3fpx-r45m/GHSA-7qmx-3fpx-r45m.json | 8 ++++++-- .../2024/10/GHSA-q8hx-mm92-4wvg/GHSA-q8hx-mm92-4wvg.json | 8 ++++++-- .../2024/11/GHSA-c2f5-jxjv-2hh8/GHSA-c2f5-jxjv-2hh8.json | 8 ++++++-- .../2025/05/GHSA-8x27-jwjr-8545/GHSA-8x27-jwjr-8545.json | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2023/09/GHSA-gw5p-q8mj-p7gh/GHSA-gw5p-q8mj-p7gh.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2023/09/GHSA-gw5p-q8mj-p7gh/GHSA-gw5p-q8mj-p7gh.json index 16c5d93ada0..5b0f2576931 100644 --- a/advisories/github-reviewed/2023/09/GHSA-gw5p-q8mj-p7gh/GHSA-gw5p-q8mj-p7gh.json +++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2023/09/GHSA-gw5p-q8mj-p7gh/GHSA-gw5p-q8mj-p7gh.json @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ { "schema_version": "1.4.0", "id": "GHSA-gw5p-q8mj-p7gh", - "modified": "2023-09-14T19:33:17Z", + "modified": "2025-05-02T12:53:12Z", "published": "2023-09-14T19:33:17Z", "aliases": [ "CVE-2023-41880" ], "summary": "Miscompilation of wasm `i64x2.shr_s` instruction with constant input on x86_64", - "details": "### Impact\n\nWasmtime versions from 10.0.0 to 12.0.1 contain a miscompilation of the WebAssembly `i64x2.shr_s` instruction on x86_64 platforms when the shift amount is a constant value that is larger than 32. Only x86_64 is affected so all other targets are not affected by this. The miscompilation results in the instruction producing an incorrect result, namely the low 32-bits of the second lane of the vector are derived from the low 32-bits of the second lane of the input vector instead of the high 32-bits. The primary impact of this issue is that any WebAssembly program using the `i64x2.shr_s` with a constant shift amount larger than 32 may produce an incorrect result.\n\nThis issue is not an escape from the WebAssembly sandbox. Execution of WebAssembly guest programs will still behave correctly with respect to memory sandboxing and isolation from the host. Wasmtime considers non-spec-compliant behavior as a security issue nonetheless.\n\nThis issue was discovered through fuzzing of Wasmtime's code generator Cranelift.\n\n### Patches\n\nWasmtime versions 10.0.2, 11.0.2, and 12.0.2 are all patched to no longer have this miscompilation.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThis issue only affects x86_64 hosts and the only workaround is to either scan for this pattern in wasm modules which is nontrivial or to [disable the SIMD proposal for WebAssembly](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Config.html#method.wasm_simd). Users prior to 10.0.0 are unaffected by this vulnerability.\n\n### References\n\n* [PR which introduced this bug to Wasmtime](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/6372)\n* [Mailing list announcement](https://groups.google.com/a/bytecodealliance.org/g/sec-announce/c/B8PJgg6bEdg)\n", + "details": "### Impact\n\nWasmtime versions from 10.0.0 to 12.0.1 contain a miscompilation of the WebAssembly `i64x2.shr_s` instruction on x86_64 platforms when the shift amount is a constant value that is larger than 32. Only x86_64 is affected so all other targets are not affected by this. The miscompilation results in the instruction producing an incorrect result, namely the low 32-bits of the second lane of the vector are derived from the low 32-bits of the second lane of the input vector instead of the high 32-bits. The primary impact of this issue is that any WebAssembly program using the `i64x2.shr_s` with a constant shift amount larger than 32 may produce an incorrect result.\n\nThis issue is not an escape from the WebAssembly sandbox. Execution of WebAssembly guest programs will still behave correctly with respect to memory sandboxing and isolation from the host. Wasmtime considers non-spec-compliant behavior as a security issue nonetheless.\n\nThis issue was discovered through fuzzing of Wasmtime's code generator Cranelift.\n\n### Patches\n\nWasmtime versions 10.0.2, 11.0.2, and 12.0.2 are all patched to no longer have this miscompilation.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThis issue only affects x86_64 hosts and the only workaround is to either scan for this pattern in wasm modules which is nontrivial or to [disable the SIMD proposal for WebAssembly](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Config.html#method.wasm_simd). Users prior to 10.0.0 are unaffected by this vulnerability.\n\n### References\n\n* [PR which introduced this bug to Wasmtime](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/6372)\n* [Mailing list announcement](https://groups.google.com/a/bytecodealliance.org/g/sec-announce/c/B8PJgg6bEdg)", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", @@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0091.html" } ], "database_specific": { diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/10/GHSA-7qmx-3fpx-r45m/GHSA-7qmx-3fpx-r45m.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/10/GHSA-7qmx-3fpx-r45m/GHSA-7qmx-3fpx-r45m.json index cce03059d3e..3abac4bf223 100644 --- a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/10/GHSA-7qmx-3fpx-r45m/GHSA-7qmx-3fpx-r45m.json +++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/10/GHSA-7qmx-3fpx-r45m/GHSA-7qmx-3fpx-r45m.json @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ { "schema_version": "1.4.0", "id": "GHSA-7qmx-3fpx-r45m", - "modified": "2024-10-09T19:14:35Z", + "modified": "2025-05-02T12:54:18Z", "published": "2024-10-09T19:14:35Z", "aliases": [ "CVE-2024-47813" ], "summary": "Wasmtime race condition could lead to WebAssembly control-flow integrity and type safety violations", - "details": "### Impact\n\nUnder certain concurrent event orderings, a `wasmtime::Engine`'s internal type registry was susceptible to double-unregistration bugs due to a race condition, leading to panics and potentially type registry corruption. That registry corruption could, following an additional and particular sequence of concurrent events, lead to violations of WebAssembly's control-flow integrity (CFI) and type safety. Users that do not use `wasmtime::Engine` across multiple threads are not affected. Users that only create new modules across threads over time are additionally not affected.\n\nReproducing this bug requires creating and dropping multiple type instances (such as `wasmtime::FuncType` or `wasmtime::ArrayType`) concurrently on multiple threads, where all types are associated with the same `wasmtime::Engine`. **Wasm guests cannot trigger this bug.** See the \"References\" section below for a list of Wasmtime types-related APIs that are affected.\n\nWasmtime maintains an internal registry of types within a `wasmtime::Engine` and an engine is shareable across threads. Types can be created and referenced through creation of a `wasmtime::Module`, creation of `wasmtime::FuncType`, or a number of other APIs where the host creates a function (see \"References\" below). Each of these cases interacts with an engine to deduplicate type information and manage type indices that are used to implement type checks in WebAssembly's `call_indirect` function, for example. This bug is a race condition in this management where the internal type registry could be corrupted to trigger an assert or contain invalid state.\n\nWasmtime's internal representation of a type has individual types (e.g. one-per-host-function) maintain a registration count of how many time it's been used. Types additionally have state within an engine behind a read-write lock such as lookup/deduplication information. The race here is a time-of-check versus time-of-use (TOCTOU) bug where one thread atomically decrements a type entry's registration count, observes zero registrations, and then acquires a lock in order to unregister that entry. However, between when this first thread observed the zero-registration count and when it acquires that lock, another thread could perform the following sequence of events: re-register another copy of the type, which deduplicates to that same entry, resurrecting it and incrementing its registration count; then drop the type and decrement its registration count; observe that the registration count is now zero; acquire the type registry lock; and finally unregister the type. Now, when the original thread finally acquires the lock and unregisters the entry, it is the second time this entry has been unregistered.\n\n| Thread A | Thread B |\n|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|\n| `acquire(type registry lock)` | |\n| | `decref(E) --> 0` |\n| | `block_on(type registry lock)` |\n| `register(E') == incref(E) --> 1` | |\n| `release(type registry lock)` | |\n| `decref(E) --> 0` | |\n| `acquire(type registry lock)` | |\n| `unregister(E)` | |\n| `release(type registry lock)` | |\n| | `acquire(type registry lock)` |\n| | `unregister(E)` |\n\n\nThis double-unregistration could then lead to a WebAssembly CFI violation under the following conditions: a new WebAssembly module `X` was loaded into the engine before the second, buggy unregistration occurs; `X` defined a function type `F` that was allocated in the same type registry slot where the original entry was allocated; the second, buggy unregistration incorrectly unregistered `F`; another new WebAssembly module `Y` was loaded into the engine; `Y` defined a function type `G`, different from `F`, but which is also allocated in the same type registry slot; a `funcref` of type `G` is created, either by the host or by Wasm; that `funcref` is passed to a WebAssembly instance of module `X`; that instance performs a `call_indirect` to that `funcref`; the `call_indirect`'s dynamic type check, which preserves CFI, could incorrectly pass in this case, because `F` and `G` were assigned the same type registry slot. This would, ultimately, allow calling a function with too many, too few, or wrongly-typed arguments, violating CFI and type safety.\n\nWe were not able to reproduce this CFI violation in a vanilla Wasmtime build, although it remains theoretically possible. However, by modifying Wasmtime's source code to make losing the races described above more likely (by disabling certain assertions, inserting panic catches, and adding retry loops in a few places if we did *not* lose the race) we were able to incorrectly get a `funcref` to pass a type check that it should have failed, which would allow the CFI violation.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis bug was originally introduced in Wasmtime 19's development of the WebAssembly GC proposal. This bug affects users who are not using the GC proposal, however, and affects Wasmtime in its default configuration even when the GC proposal is disabled. Wasmtime users using 19.0.0 and after are all affected by this issue. We have released the following Wasmtime versions, all of which have a fix for this bug:\n\n* 21.0.2\n* 22.0.1\n* 23.0.3\n* 24.0.1\n* 25.0.2\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf your application creates and drops Wasmtime types on multiple threads concurrently, there are no known workarounds. Users are encouraged to upgrade to a patched release. \n\n### References\n\nThe following APIs create or drop types, and therefore are affected by this race condition if performed on multiple threads concurrently and are all associated with the same `wasmtime::Engine`:\n\n* [`wasmtime::FuncType::new`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.FuncType.html#method.new)\n * Also reachable from creation of [`wasmtime::Func`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Func.html)\n * Also reachable from [`wasmtime::Linker::func_*`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Linker.html#method.func_new)\n* [`wasmtime::ArrayType::new`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ArrayType.html#method.new)\n* [`wasmtime::StructType::new`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.StructType.html#method.new)\n* [`wasmtime::Func::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Func.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::Global::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Global.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::Table::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Table.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::Extern::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Extern.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::Export::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Export.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::UnknownImportError::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.UnknownImportError.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::ImportType::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ImportType.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::ExportType::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ExportType.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::Val::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Val.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::Ref::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Ref.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::AnyRef::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.AnyRef.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::EqRef::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.EqRef.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::ArrayRef::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ArrayRef.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::StructRef::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.StructRef.html#method.ty)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::FuncType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.FuncType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::ArrayType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ArrayType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::StructType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.StructType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::ExternType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ExternType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::GlobalType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.GlobalType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::TableType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.TableType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::ValType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ValType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::RefType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.RefType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::HeapType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.HeapType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::UnknownImportError`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.UnknownImportError.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::Linker`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Linker.html)\n\nThe change which introduced this bug was [#7969](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/7969)\n", + "details": "### Impact\n\nUnder certain concurrent event orderings, a `wasmtime::Engine`'s internal type registry was susceptible to double-unregistration bugs due to a race condition, leading to panics and potentially type registry corruption. That registry corruption could, following an additional and particular sequence of concurrent events, lead to violations of WebAssembly's control-flow integrity (CFI) and type safety. Users that do not use `wasmtime::Engine` across multiple threads are not affected. Users that only create new modules across threads over time are additionally not affected.\n\nReproducing this bug requires creating and dropping multiple type instances (such as `wasmtime::FuncType` or `wasmtime::ArrayType`) concurrently on multiple threads, where all types are associated with the same `wasmtime::Engine`. **Wasm guests cannot trigger this bug.** See the \"References\" section below for a list of Wasmtime types-related APIs that are affected.\n\nWasmtime maintains an internal registry of types within a `wasmtime::Engine` and an engine is shareable across threads. Types can be created and referenced through creation of a `wasmtime::Module`, creation of `wasmtime::FuncType`, or a number of other APIs where the host creates a function (see \"References\" below). Each of these cases interacts with an engine to deduplicate type information and manage type indices that are used to implement type checks in WebAssembly's `call_indirect` function, for example. This bug is a race condition in this management where the internal type registry could be corrupted to trigger an assert or contain invalid state.\n\nWasmtime's internal representation of a type has individual types (e.g. one-per-host-function) maintain a registration count of how many time it's been used. Types additionally have state within an engine behind a read-write lock such as lookup/deduplication information. The race here is a time-of-check versus time-of-use (TOCTOU) bug where one thread atomically decrements a type entry's registration count, observes zero registrations, and then acquires a lock in order to unregister that entry. However, between when this first thread observed the zero-registration count and when it acquires that lock, another thread could perform the following sequence of events: re-register another copy of the type, which deduplicates to that same entry, resurrecting it and incrementing its registration count; then drop the type and decrement its registration count; observe that the registration count is now zero; acquire the type registry lock; and finally unregister the type. Now, when the original thread finally acquires the lock and unregisters the entry, it is the second time this entry has been unregistered.\n\n| Thread A | Thread B |\n|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|\n| `acquire(type registry lock)` | |\n| | `decref(E) --> 0` |\n| | `block_on(type registry lock)` |\n| `register(E') == incref(E) --> 1` | |\n| `release(type registry lock)` | |\n| `decref(E) --> 0` | |\n| `acquire(type registry lock)` | |\n| `unregister(E)` | |\n| `release(type registry lock)` | |\n| | `acquire(type registry lock)` |\n| | `unregister(E)` |\n\n\nThis double-unregistration could then lead to a WebAssembly CFI violation under the following conditions: a new WebAssembly module `X` was loaded into the engine before the second, buggy unregistration occurs; `X` defined a function type `F` that was allocated in the same type registry slot where the original entry was allocated; the second, buggy unregistration incorrectly unregistered `F`; another new WebAssembly module `Y` was loaded into the engine; `Y` defined a function type `G`, different from `F`, but which is also allocated in the same type registry slot; a `funcref` of type `G` is created, either by the host or by Wasm; that `funcref` is passed to a WebAssembly instance of module `X`; that instance performs a `call_indirect` to that `funcref`; the `call_indirect`'s dynamic type check, which preserves CFI, could incorrectly pass in this case, because `F` and `G` were assigned the same type registry slot. This would, ultimately, allow calling a function with too many, too few, or wrongly-typed arguments, violating CFI and type safety.\n\nWe were not able to reproduce this CFI violation in a vanilla Wasmtime build, although it remains theoretically possible. However, by modifying Wasmtime's source code to make losing the races described above more likely (by disabling certain assertions, inserting panic catches, and adding retry loops in a few places if we did *not* lose the race) we were able to incorrectly get a `funcref` to pass a type check that it should have failed, which would allow the CFI violation.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis bug was originally introduced in Wasmtime 19's development of the WebAssembly GC proposal. This bug affects users who are not using the GC proposal, however, and affects Wasmtime in its default configuration even when the GC proposal is disabled. Wasmtime users using 19.0.0 and after are all affected by this issue. We have released the following Wasmtime versions, all of which have a fix for this bug:\n\n* 21.0.2\n* 22.0.1\n* 23.0.3\n* 24.0.1\n* 25.0.2\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf your application creates and drops Wasmtime types on multiple threads concurrently, there are no known workarounds. Users are encouraged to upgrade to a patched release. \n\n### References\n\nThe following APIs create or drop types, and therefore are affected by this race condition if performed on multiple threads concurrently and are all associated with the same `wasmtime::Engine`:\n\n* [`wasmtime::FuncType::new`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.FuncType.html#method.new)\n * Also reachable from creation of [`wasmtime::Func`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Func.html)\n * Also reachable from [`wasmtime::Linker::func_*`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Linker.html#method.func_new)\n* [`wasmtime::ArrayType::new`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ArrayType.html#method.new)\n* [`wasmtime::StructType::new`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.StructType.html#method.new)\n* [`wasmtime::Func::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Func.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::Global::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Global.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::Table::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Table.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::Extern::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Extern.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::Export::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Export.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::UnknownImportError::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.UnknownImportError.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::ImportType::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ImportType.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::ExportType::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ExportType.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::Val::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Val.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::Ref::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Ref.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::AnyRef::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.AnyRef.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::EqRef::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.EqRef.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::ArrayRef::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ArrayRef.html#method.ty)\n* [`wasmtime::StructRef::ty`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.StructRef.html#method.ty)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::FuncType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.FuncType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::ArrayType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ArrayType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::StructType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.StructType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::ExternType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ExternType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::GlobalType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.GlobalType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::TableType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.TableType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::ValType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.ValType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::RefType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.RefType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::HeapType`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.HeapType.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::UnknownImportError`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.UnknownImportError.html)\n* Dropping a [`wasmtime::Linker`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Linker.html)\n\nThe change which introduced this bug was [#7969](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/7969)", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", @@ -135,6 +135,10 @@ { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0439.html" } ], "database_specific": { diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/10/GHSA-q8hx-mm92-4wvg/GHSA-q8hx-mm92-4wvg.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/10/GHSA-q8hx-mm92-4wvg/GHSA-q8hx-mm92-4wvg.json index 28bdbea1cf8..2cdc852d92d 100644 --- a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/10/GHSA-q8hx-mm92-4wvg/GHSA-q8hx-mm92-4wvg.json +++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/10/GHSA-q8hx-mm92-4wvg/GHSA-q8hx-mm92-4wvg.json @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ { "schema_version": "1.4.0", "id": "GHSA-q8hx-mm92-4wvg", - "modified": "2024-10-09T19:14:03Z", + "modified": "2025-05-02T12:54:33Z", "published": "2024-10-09T19:14:03Z", "aliases": [ "CVE-2024-47763" ], "summary": "wasmtime has a runtime crash when combining tail calls with trapping imports", - "details": "### Impact\n\nWasmtime's implementation of WebAssembly tail calls combined with stack traces can result in a runtime crash in certain WebAssembly modules. The runtime crash may be undefined behavior if Wasmtime was compiled with Rust 1.80 or prior. The runtime crash is a deterministic process abort when Wasmtime is compiled with Rust 1.81 and later.\n\n[WebAssembly tail calls](https://github.com/webassembly/tail-call) are a proposal which relatively recently reached stage 4 in the [standardization process](https://github.com/WebAssembly/proposals/). Wasmtime first enabled support for tail calls by default [in Wasmtime 21.0.0](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/8540), although that release contained a bug where it was only on-by-default for some configurations. In [Wasmtime 22.0.0](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/8682) tail calls were enabled by default for all configurations.\n\nThe specific crash happens when an exported function in a WebAssembly module (or component) performs a `return_call` (or `return_call_indirect` or `return_call_ref`) to an imported host function which captures a stack trace (for example, the host function raises a trap). In this situation, the stack-walking code previously assumed there was always at least one WebAssembly frame on the stack but with tail calls that is no longer true. With the tail-call proposal it's possible to have an entry trampoline appear as if it directly called the exit trampoline. This situation triggers an internal assert in the stack-walking code which raises a Rust `panic!()`.\n\nWhen Wasmtime is compiled with Rust versions 1.80 and prior this means that an `extern \"C\"` function in Rust is raising a `panic!()`. This is technically undefined behavior and typically manifests as a process abort when the unwinder fails to unwind Cranelift-generated frames. When Wasmtime is compiled with Rust versions 1.81 and later this panic becomes a deterministic process abort.\n\nOverall the impact of this issue is that this is a denial-of-service vector where a malicious WebAssembly module or component can cause the host to crash. There is no other impact at this time other than availability of a service as the result of the crash is always a crash and no more.\n\nThis issue was discovered by routine fuzzing performed by the Wasmtime project via Google's OSS-Fuzz infrastructure. We have no evidence that it has ever been exploited by an attacker in the wild.\n\n### Patches\n\nAll versions of Wasmtime which have tail calls enabled by default have been patched:\n\n* 21.0.x - patched in 21.0.2\n* 22.0.x - patched in 22.0.1\n* 23.0.x - patched in 23.0.3 \n* 24.0.x - patched in 24.0.1\n* 25.0.x - patched in 25.0.2\n\nWasmtime versions from 12.0.x (the first release with experimental tail call support) to 20.0.x (the last release with tail-calls off-by-default) have support for tail calls but the support is disabled by default. These versions are not affected in their default configurations, but users who explicitly enabled tail call support will need to either disable tail call support or upgrade to a patched version of Wasmtime.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe main workaround for this issue is to disable tail support for tail calls in Wasmtime, for example with [`Config::wasm_tail_call(false)`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Config.html#method.wasm_tail_call). Users are otherwise encouraged to upgrade to patched versions.\n\n### References\n\n* [Wasmtime's initial implementation of tail calls](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/6774)\n* [Enabling of tail calls in 21.0.0](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/8540)\n* [Fully enabling tail calls in 22.0.0](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/8682)\n* [The WebAssembly's `tail-call` proposal](https://github.com/webassembly/tail-call)\n", + "details": "### Impact\n\nWasmtime's implementation of WebAssembly tail calls combined with stack traces can result in a runtime crash in certain WebAssembly modules. The runtime crash may be undefined behavior if Wasmtime was compiled with Rust 1.80 or prior. The runtime crash is a deterministic process abort when Wasmtime is compiled with Rust 1.81 and later.\n\n[WebAssembly tail calls](https://github.com/webassembly/tail-call) are a proposal which relatively recently reached stage 4 in the [standardization process](https://github.com/WebAssembly/proposals/). Wasmtime first enabled support for tail calls by default [in Wasmtime 21.0.0](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/8540), although that release contained a bug where it was only on-by-default for some configurations. In [Wasmtime 22.0.0](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/8682) tail calls were enabled by default for all configurations.\n\nThe specific crash happens when an exported function in a WebAssembly module (or component) performs a `return_call` (or `return_call_indirect` or `return_call_ref`) to an imported host function which captures a stack trace (for example, the host function raises a trap). In this situation, the stack-walking code previously assumed there was always at least one WebAssembly frame on the stack but with tail calls that is no longer true. With the tail-call proposal it's possible to have an entry trampoline appear as if it directly called the exit trampoline. This situation triggers an internal assert in the stack-walking code which raises a Rust `panic!()`.\n\nWhen Wasmtime is compiled with Rust versions 1.80 and prior this means that an `extern \"C\"` function in Rust is raising a `panic!()`. This is technically undefined behavior and typically manifests as a process abort when the unwinder fails to unwind Cranelift-generated frames. When Wasmtime is compiled with Rust versions 1.81 and later this panic becomes a deterministic process abort.\n\nOverall the impact of this issue is that this is a denial-of-service vector where a malicious WebAssembly module or component can cause the host to crash. There is no other impact at this time other than availability of a service as the result of the crash is always a crash and no more.\n\nThis issue was discovered by routine fuzzing performed by the Wasmtime project via Google's OSS-Fuzz infrastructure. We have no evidence that it has ever been exploited by an attacker in the wild.\n\n### Patches\n\nAll versions of Wasmtime which have tail calls enabled by default have been patched:\n\n* 21.0.x - patched in 21.0.2\n* 22.0.x - patched in 22.0.1\n* 23.0.x - patched in 23.0.3 \n* 24.0.x - patched in 24.0.1\n* 25.0.x - patched in 25.0.2\n\nWasmtime versions from 12.0.x (the first release with experimental tail call support) to 20.0.x (the last release with tail-calls off-by-default) have support for tail calls but the support is disabled by default. These versions are not affected in their default configurations, but users who explicitly enabled tail call support will need to either disable tail call support or upgrade to a patched version of Wasmtime.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe main workaround for this issue is to disable tail support for tail calls in Wasmtime, for example with [`Config::wasm_tail_call(false)`](https://docs.rs/wasmtime/latest/wasmtime/struct.Config.html#method.wasm_tail_call). Users are otherwise encouraged to upgrade to patched versions.\n\n### References\n\n* [Wasmtime's initial implementation of tail calls](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/6774)\n* [Enabling of tail calls in 21.0.0](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/8540)\n* [Fully enabling tail calls in 22.0.0](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/8682)\n* [The WebAssembly's `tail-call` proposal](https://github.com/webassembly/tail-call)", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", @@ -155,6 +155,10 @@ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/webassembly/tail-call" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0440.html" } ], "database_specific": { diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/11/GHSA-c2f5-jxjv-2hh8/GHSA-c2f5-jxjv-2hh8.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/11/GHSA-c2f5-jxjv-2hh8/GHSA-c2f5-jxjv-2hh8.json index 781d784b788..f5838f2ffe7 100644 --- a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/11/GHSA-c2f5-jxjv-2hh8/GHSA-c2f5-jxjv-2hh8.json +++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/11/GHSA-c2f5-jxjv-2hh8/GHSA-c2f5-jxjv-2hh8.json @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ { "schema_version": "1.4.0", "id": "GHSA-c2f5-jxjv-2hh8", - "modified": "2024-11-06T14:28:16Z", + "modified": "2025-05-02T12:53:57Z", "published": "2024-11-05T22:18:49Z", "aliases": [ "CVE-2024-51745" ], "summary": "Wasmtime doesn't fully sandbox all the Windows device filenames", - "details": "### Impact\n\nWasmtime's filesystem sandbox implementation on Windows blocks access to special device filenames such as \"COM1\", \"COM2\", \"LPT0\", \"LPT1\", and so on, however it did not block access to the special device filenames which use superscript digits, such as \"COM¹\", \"COM²\", \"LPT⁰\", \"LPT¹\", and so on. Untrusted Wasm programs that are given access to any filesystem directory could bypass the sandbox and access devices through those special device filenames with superscript digits, and through them gain access peripheral devices connected to the computer, or network resources mapped to those devices. This can include modems, printers, network printers, and any other device connected to a serial or parallel port, including emulated USB serial ports.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatch releases for Wasmtime have been issued as 24.0.2, 25.0.3, and 26.0.1. Users of Wasmtime 23.0.x and prior are recommended to upgrade to one of these patched versions.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no known workarounds for this issue. Affected Windows users are recommended to upgrade.\n\n### References\n\n - [Microsoft's documentation](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#naming-conventions) of the special device filenames\n - [ISO-8859-1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO/IEC_8859-1)\n - [The original PR reporting the issue](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/pull/371)\n", + "details": "### Impact\n\nWasmtime's filesystem sandbox implementation on Windows blocks access to special device filenames such as \"COM1\", \"COM2\", \"LPT0\", \"LPT1\", and so on, however it did not block access to the special device filenames which use superscript digits, such as \"COM¹\", \"COM²\", \"LPT⁰\", \"LPT¹\", and so on. Untrusted Wasm programs that are given access to any filesystem directory could bypass the sandbox and access devices through those special device filenames with superscript digits, and through them gain access peripheral devices connected to the computer, or network resources mapped to those devices. This can include modems, printers, network printers, and any other device connected to a serial or parallel port, including emulated USB serial ports.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatch releases for Wasmtime have been issued as 24.0.2, 25.0.3, and 26.0.1. Users of Wasmtime 23.0.x and prior are recommended to upgrade to one of these patched versions.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no known workarounds for this issue. Affected Windows users are recommended to upgrade.\n\n### References\n\n - [Microsoft's documentation](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#naming-conventions) of the special device filenames\n - [ISO-8859-1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO/IEC_8859-1)\n - [The original PR reporting the issue](https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/pull/371)", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V4", @@ -100,6 +100,10 @@ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#naming-conventions" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0438.html" } ], "database_specific": { diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/05/GHSA-8x27-jwjr-8545/GHSA-8x27-jwjr-8545.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/05/GHSA-8x27-jwjr-8545/GHSA-8x27-jwjr-8545.json index 91e658de171..2d8e63d8c59 100644 --- a/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/05/GHSA-8x27-jwjr-8545/GHSA-8x27-jwjr-8545.json +++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/05/GHSA-8x27-jwjr-8545/GHSA-8x27-jwjr-8545.json @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ { "schema_version": "1.4.0", "id": "GHSA-8x27-jwjr-8545", - "modified": "2025-05-01T13:59:51Z", + "modified": "2025-05-02T12:53:39Z", "published": "2025-05-01T13:59:51Z", "aliases": [ "CVE-2025-46337" ], "summary": "SQL injection in ADOdb PostgreSQL driver pg_insert_id() method", - "details": "Improper escaping of a query parameter may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary SQL statements when the code using ADOdb connects to a PostgreSQL database and calls pg_insert_id() with user-supplied data.\n\nNote that the indicated Severity corresponds to a worst-case usage scenario.\n\n### Impact\nPostgreSQL drivers (postgres64, postgres7, postgres8, postgres9).\n\n### Patches\nVulnerability is fixed in ADOdb 5.22.9 (11107d6d6e5160b62e05dff8a3a2678cf0e3a426).\n\n### Workarounds\nOnly pass controlled data to pg_insert_id() method's $fieldname parameter, or escape it with pg_escape_identifier() first.\n\n### Credits\nThanks to Marco Nappi (@mrcnpp) for reporting this vulnerability.", + "details": "Improper escaping of a query parameter may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary SQL statements when the code using ADOdb connects to a PostgreSQL database and calls pg_insert_id() with user-supplied data.\n\nNote that the indicated Severity corresponds to a worst-case usage scenario.\n\n### Impact\nPostgreSQL drivers (postgres64, postgres7, postgres8, postgres9).\n\n### Patches\nVulnerability is fixed in ADOdb 5.22.9 (11107d6d6e5160b62e05dff8a3a2678cf0e3a426).\n\n### Workarounds\nOnly pass controlled data to pg_insert_id() method's $fieldname parameter, or escape it with pg_escape_identifier() first.\n\n### References\n- Issue https://github.com/ADOdb/ADOdb/issues/1070\n- [Blog post](https://xaliom.blogspot.com/2025/05/from-sast-to-cve-2025-46337.html) by Marco Nappi\n\n### Credits\nThanks to Marco Nappi (@mrcnpp) for reporting this vulnerability.", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3",