diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/08/GHSA-9w8w-34vr-65j2/GHSA-9w8w-34vr-65j2.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/08/GHSA-9w8w-34vr-65j2/GHSA-9w8w-34vr-65j2.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cb4de9fada6 --- /dev/null +++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/08/GHSA-9w8w-34vr-65j2/GHSA-9w8w-34vr-65j2.json @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +{ + "schema_version": "1.4.0", + "id": "GHSA-9w8w-34vr-65j2", + "modified": "2024-08-02T21:12:54Z", + "published": "2024-08-02T21:12:54Z", + "aliases": [ + "CVE-2024-36115" + ], + "summary": "Reposilite artifacts vulnerable to Stored Cross-site Scripting", + "details": "### Summary\nReposilite v3.5.10 is affected by Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) when displaying artifact's content in the browser.\n\n### Details\nAs a Maven repository manager, Reposilite provides the ability to view the artifacts content in the browser, as well as perform administrative tasks via API. The problem lies in the fact that the artifact's content is served via the same origin (protocol/host/port) as the Admin UI. If the artifact contains HTML content with javascript inside, the javascript is executed within the same origin. Therefore, if an authenticated user is viewing the artifacts content, the javascript inside can access the browser's local storage where the user's password (aka 'token-secret') is stored.\nIt is especially dangerous in scenarios where Reposilite is configured to mirror third party repositories, like the Maven Central Repository. Since anyone can publish an artifact to Maven Central under its own name, such malicious packages can be used to attack the Reposilite instance.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\nTo demonstrate this vulnerability, we can start Reposilite with default settings at localhost:8080 and configure its 'release' repository to mirror https://artsploit.com/maven. This is my own website intended to emulate http://repo1.maven.org/, but it also contains a proof-of-concept payload for this vulnerability. Technically I could publish this payload to Maven Central Repository, but I don't want to clutter it.\n\nThen, as an administrator or authenticated Reposilite user, navigate to http://localhost:8080/releases/com/artsploit/reposilite-xss/1.0/reposilite-xss-1.0.pom in the browser.\nThis file contains the basic `application/xml` payload:\n\n```xml\n\n\n alert(`Secret key: ${localStorage.getItem('token-secret')}`)\n\n```\n\nThe script will be executed within the http://localhost:8080/ origin and the leaked token is displayed.\n\n![image](https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/assets/44605151/e6324fc8-fa7f-485c-90b3-19640c179773)\n\n### Impact\nThis issue may lead to the full Reposilite instance compromise. If this attack is performed against the admin user, it's possible to use the admin API to modify settings and artifacts on the instance. In the worst case scenario, an attacker would be able to obtain the Remote code execution on all systems that use artifacts from Reposilite.\n\nIt's important to note that the attacker does not need to lure a victim user to use a malicious artifact, but just open a link in the browser. This link can be silently loaded among the other HTML content, making this attack unnoticeable.\n\nEven if the Reposilite instance is located in an isolated environment, such as behind a VPN or in the local network, this attack is still possible as it can be performed from the admin browser.\n\n### Remediation\n\nWhen serving artifact's content via HTTPS, it's important to understand that this content might be potentially untrusted HTML code, so the javascript execution should be restricted.\nConsider the following options to remediate this vulnerability:\n* [preferred] Use the \"Content-Security-Policy: sandbox;\" header when serving artifact's content. This makes the resource treated as being from a special origin that always fails the same-origin policy (potentially preventing access to data storage/cookies and some JavaScript APIs).\n* [not preferred, but also works] Use the \"Content-Disposition: attachment\" header. This will prevent the browser from displaying the content entirely, so it just saves it to the local filesystem.\n\nAdditionally, we strongly recommend reconsidering how the website authentication works for Reposilite. Storing user's passwords in plaintext in the browser's local storage is not an ideal option. The more robust and secure option would be to issue a one time session ID or a token to the browser after checking the login/password on the server. These session IDs or tokens should have limited validity time, so their compromise would be trickier to exploit.", + "severity": [ + { + "type": "CVSS_V3", + "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H" + }, + { + "type": "CVSS_V4", + "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N" + } + ], + "affected": [ + { + "package": { + "ecosystem": "Maven", + "name": "com.reposilite:reposilite-backend" + }, + "ranges": [ + { + "type": "ECOSYSTEM", + "events": [ + { + "introduced": "3.3.0" + }, + { + "fixed": "3.5.12" + } + ] + } + ] + } + ], + "references": [ + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/security/advisories/GHSA-9w8w-34vr-65j2" + }, + { + "type": "ADVISORY", + "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36115" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/commit/279a472015ec675c1da449d902dc82e4dd578484" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/commit/d11609f427aba255e0f6f54b1105d5d20ab043cf" + }, + { + "type": "PACKAGE", + "url": "https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/releases/tag/3.5.12" + } + ], + "database_specific": { + "cwe_ids": [ + "CWE-79" + ], + "severity": "HIGH", + "github_reviewed": true, + "github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-02T21:12:54Z", + "nvd_published_at": null + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/08/GHSA-frvj-cfq4-3228/GHSA-frvj-cfq4-3228.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/08/GHSA-frvj-cfq4-3228/GHSA-frvj-cfq4-3228.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7b21d439c52 --- /dev/null +++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/08/GHSA-frvj-cfq4-3228/GHSA-frvj-cfq4-3228.json @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +{ + "schema_version": "1.4.0", + "id": "GHSA-frvj-cfq4-3228", + "modified": "2024-08-02T21:13:14Z", + "published": "2024-08-02T21:13:13Z", + "aliases": [ + "CVE-2024-36116" + ], + "summary": "Path traversal in Reposilite javadoc file expansion (arbitrary file creation/overwrite) (`GHSL-2024-073`)", + "details": "### Summary\nReposilite v3.5.10 is affected by an Arbitrary File Upload vulnerability via path traversal in expanding of Javadoc archives.\n\n### Details\nReposilite provides support for JavaDocs files, which are archives that contain documentation for artifacts. Specifically, [JavadocEndpoints.kt](https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/blob/68b73f19dc9811ccf10936430cf17f7b0e622bd6/reposilite-backend/src/main/kotlin/com/reposilite/javadocs/infrastructure/JavadocEndpoints.kt#L28) controller allows to expand the javadoc archive into the server's file system and return its content. The problem is in the way how the archives are expanded, specifically how the new filename is created:\n\n[JavadocContainerService.kt#L127-L136](https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/blob/68b73f19dc9811ccf10936430cf17f7b0e622bd6/reposilite-backend/src/main/kotlin/com/reposilite/javadocs/JavadocContainerService.kt#L127-L136)\n\n```kotlin\njarFile.entries().asSequence().forEach { file ->\n if (file.isDirectory) {\n return@forEach\n }\n\n val path = Paths.get(javadocUnpackPath.toString() + \"/\" + file.name)\n\n path.parent?.also { parent -> Files.createDirectories(parent) }\n jarFile.getInputStream(file).copyToAndClose(path.outputStream())\n}.asSuccess()\n```\n\nThe `file.name` taken from the archive can contain path traversal characters, such as '/../../../anything.txt', so the resulting extraction path can be outside the target directory.\n\n### Impact\n\nIf the archive is taken from an untrusted source, such as Maven Central or JitPack for example, an attacker can craft a special archive to overwrite any local file on Reposilite instance. This could lead to remote code execution, for example by placing a new plugin into the '$workspace$/plugins' directory. Alternatively, an attacker can overwrite the content of any other package.\n\nNote that the attacker can use its own malicious package from Maven Central to overwrite any other package on Reposilite.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Create a malicious javadoc archive that contains filenames with path traversal characters:\n```bash\nzip test-1.0-javadoc.jar ../../../../../../../../tmp/evil.txt index.html\n```\nMake sure that `../../../../../../../../tmp/evil.txt` and `index.html` files exist on the system where you create this archive.\n\n2. Publish this archive to the repository which Reposilite is mirroring, such as Maven Central or JitPack. For the test purposes, I used my own server that imitates the upstream maven repository:\nhttp://artsploit.com/maven/com/artsploit/reposilite-zipslip/1.0/reposilite-zipslip-1.0-javadoc.jar\n\n3. Start Reposilite with 'releases' repository mirroring to 'http://artsploit.com/maven/'\n\n4. Now, if the attacker send the request to http://localhost:8080/javadoc/releases/com/artsploit/reposilite-zipslip/1.0, the aforementioned archive will be obtained from the http://artsploit.com/maven/com/artsploit/reposilite-zipslip/1.0/reposilite-zipslip-1.0-javadoc.jar address and its 'evil.txt' file will be expanded to '$workspace$/tmp/evil.txt'. Note that to perform this action, an attacker does not need to provide any credentials, as fetching from the mirrored repository does not require authentication.\n\n6. Confirm that '$workspace$/tmp/evil.txt' is created on the server where Reposilite is running.\n\n### Remediation\n\nNormalize (remove all occurrences of `/../`) the `file.name` variable before concatenating it with `javadocUnpackPath`. E.g.:\n\n```kotlin\nval path = Paths.get(javadocUnpackPath.toString() + \"/\" + Paths.get(file.name).normalize().toString())\n```\n\n", + "severity": [ + { + "type": "CVSS_V3", + "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H" + }, + { + "type": "CVSS_V4", + "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N" + } + ], + "affected": [ + { + "package": { + "ecosystem": "Maven", + "name": "com.dzikoysk:reposilite-backend" + }, + "ranges": [ + { + "type": "ECOSYSTEM", + "events": [ + { + "introduced": "3.3.0" + }, + { + "fixed": "3.5.12" + } + ] + } + ] + } + ], + "references": [ + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/security/advisories/GHSA-frvj-cfq4-3228" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/commit/848173738e4375482c70365db5cebae29f125eaa" + }, + { + "type": "PACKAGE", + "url": "https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite" + }, + { + "type": "WEB", + "url": "https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/releases/tag/3.5.12" + } + ], + "database_specific": { + "cwe_ids": [ + "CWE-22" + ], + "severity": "HIGH", + "github_reviewed": true, + "github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-02T21:13:13Z", + "nvd_published_at": null + } +} \ No newline at end of file