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Imported Upstream version 4.8.0.309

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Former-commit-id: 5f9c6ae75f295e057a7d2971f3a6df4656fa8850
This commit is contained in:
Xamarin Public Jenkins (auto-signing)
2016-11-10 13:04:39 +00:00
parent ee1447783b
commit 94b2861243
4912 changed files with 390737 additions and 49310 deletions
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24
external/boringssl/crypto/ecdsa/CMakeLists.txt vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
include_directories(../../include)
add_library(
ecdsa
OBJECT
ecdsa.c
ecdsa_asn1.c
)
if(ENABLE_TESTS)
add_executable(
ecdsa_test
ecdsa_test.cc
$<TARGET_OBJECTS:test_support>
)
target_link_libraries(ecdsa_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests ecdsa_test)
endif()

487
external/boringssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.c vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,487 @@
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include "../ec/internal.h"
int ECDSA_sign(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, uint8_t *sig,
unsigned int *sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey) {
if (eckey->ecdsa_meth && eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign) {
return eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign(digest, digest_len, sig, sig_len, eckey);
}
return ECDSA_sign_ex(type, digest, digest_len, sig, sig_len, NULL, NULL,
eckey);
}
int ECDSA_verify(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey) {
ECDSA_SIG *s;
int ret = 0;
uint8_t *der = NULL;
/* Decode the ECDSA signature. */
s = ECDSA_SIG_from_bytes(sig, sig_len);
if (s == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Defend against potential laxness in the DER parser. */
size_t der_len;
if (!ECDSA_SIG_to_bytes(&der, &der_len, s) ||
der_len != sig_len || memcmp(sig, der, sig_len) != 0) {
/* This should never happen. crypto/bytestring is strictly DER. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, s, eckey);
err:
OPENSSL_free(der);
ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
return ret;
}
/* digest_to_bn interprets |digest_len| bytes from |digest| as a big-endian
* number and sets |out| to that value. It then truncates |out| so that it's,
* at most, as long as |order|. It returns one on success and zero otherwise. */
static int digest_to_bn(BIGNUM *out, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const BIGNUM *order) {
size_t num_bits;
num_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
/* Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole
* bytes. */
if (8 * digest_len > num_bits) {
digest_len = (num_bits + 7) / 8;
}
if (!BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, out)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
return 0;
}
/* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
if ((8 * digest_len > num_bits) &&
!BN_rshift(out, out, 8 - (num_bits & 0x7))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
EC_KEY *key) {
return ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, NULL, NULL, key);
}
int ECDSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey) {
int ret = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx;
BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *m, *X;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *group;
const EC_POINT *pub_key;
/* check input values */
if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL ||
(pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL ||
sig == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (!ctx) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (u1 == NULL || u2 == NULL || m == NULL || X == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) ||
BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
ret = 0; /* signature is invalid */
goto err;
}
/* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */
if (!BN_mod_inverse(u2, sig->s, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!digest_to_bn(m, digest, digest_len, order)) {
goto err;
}
/* u1 = m * tmp mod order */
if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* u2 = r * w mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
point = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (point == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */
ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0);
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
EC_POINT_free(point);
return ret;
}
static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
BIGNUM **rp, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len) {
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *X = NULL;
EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *group;
int ret = 0;
if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
if (ctx_in == NULL) {
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
} else {
ctx = ctx_in;
}
k = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */
r = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *rp */
X = BN_new();
if (k == NULL || r == NULL || X == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (tmp_point == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
do {
/* If possible, we'll include the private key and message digest in the k
* generation. The |digest| argument is only empty if |ECDSA_sign_setup| is
* being used. */
do {
int ok;
if (digest_len > 0) {
ok = BN_generate_dsa_nonce(k, order, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey),
digest, digest_len, ctx);
} else {
ok = BN_rand_range(k, order);
}
if (!ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(k));
/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
* so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
* bit-length. */
if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order)) {
if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) {
goto err;
}
}
/* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(r));
/* compute the inverse of k */
if (ec_group_get_mont_data(group) != NULL) {
/* We want inverse in constant time, therefore we use that the order must
* be prime and thus we can use Fermat's Little Theorem. */
if (!BN_set_word(X, 2) ||
!BN_sub(X, order, X)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
BN_set_flags(X, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(k, k, X, order, ctx,
ec_group_get_mont_data(group))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
} else if (!BN_mod_inverse(k, k, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* clear old values if necessary */
BN_clear_free(*rp);
BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
/* save the pre-computed values */
*rp = r;
*kinvp = k;
ret = 1;
err:
if (!ret) {
BN_clear_free(k);
BN_clear_free(r);
}
if (ctx_in == NULL) {
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
BN_clear_free(X);
return ret;
}
int ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinv, BIGNUM **rp) {
return ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, kinv, rp, NULL, 0);
}
ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r,
EC_KEY *eckey) {
int ok = 0;
BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
const BIGNUM *ckinv;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *group;
ECDSA_SIG *ret;
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
if (eckey->ecdsa_meth && eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
return NULL;
}
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey);
if (group == NULL || priv_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return NULL;
}
ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
if (!ret) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
s = ret->s;
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
(tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
if (!digest_to_bn(m, digest, digest_len, order)) {
goto err;
}
for (;;) {
if (in_kinv == NULL || in_r == NULL) {
if (!ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, digest, digest_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
ckinv = kinv;
} else {
ckinv = in_kinv;
if (BN_copy(ret->r, in_r) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
/* if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller
* don't to generate new kinv and r values */
if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
goto err;
}
} else {
/* s != 0 => we have a valid signature */
break;
}
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_clear_free(m);
BN_clear_free(tmp);
BN_clear_free(kinv);
return ret;
}
int ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
uint8_t *sig, unsigned int *sig_len, const BIGNUM *kinv,
const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey) {
int ret = 0;
ECDSA_SIG *s = NULL;
if (eckey->ecdsa_meth && eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
*sig_len = 0;
goto err;
}
s = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, kinv, r, eckey);
if (s == NULL) {
*sig_len = 0;
goto err;
}
CBB cbb;
CBB_zero(&cbb);
size_t len;
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, sig, ECDSA_size(eckey)) ||
!ECDSA_SIG_marshal(&cbb, s) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
*sig_len = 0;
goto err;
}
*sig_len = (unsigned)len;
ret = 1;
err:
ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
return ret;
}

227
external/boringssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_asn1.c vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
#include "../ec/internal.h"
size_t ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *key) {
if (key == NULL) {
return 0;
}
size_t group_order_size;
if (key->ecdsa_meth && key->ecdsa_meth->group_order_size) {
group_order_size = key->ecdsa_meth->group_order_size(key);
} else {
const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key);
if (group == NULL) {
return 0;
}
group_order_size = BN_num_bytes(EC_GROUP_get0_order(group));
}
return ECDSA_SIG_max_len(group_order_size);
}
ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void) {
ECDSA_SIG *sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ECDSA_SIG));
if (sig == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
sig->r = BN_new();
sig->s = BN_new();
if (sig->r == NULL || sig->s == NULL) {
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
return NULL;
}
return sig;
}
void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig) {
if (sig == NULL) {
return;
}
BN_free(sig->r);
BN_free(sig->s);
OPENSSL_free(sig);
}
ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_parse(CBS *cbs) {
ECDSA_SIG *ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
CBS child;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!BN_parse_asn1_unsigned(&child, ret->r) ||
!BN_parse_asn1_unsigned(&child, ret->s) ||
CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
ECDSA_SIG *ret = ECDSA_SIG_parse(&cbs);
if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
int ECDSA_SIG_marshal(CBB *cbb, const ECDSA_SIG *sig) {
CBB child;
if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!BN_marshal_asn1(&child, sig->r) ||
!BN_marshal_asn1(&child, sig->s) ||
!CBB_flush(cbb)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ECDSA_SIG_to_bytes(uint8_t **out_bytes, size_t *out_len,
const ECDSA_SIG *sig) {
CBB cbb;
CBB_zero(&cbb);
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
!ECDSA_SIG_marshal(&cbb, sig) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, out_bytes, out_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* der_len_len returns the number of bytes needed to represent a length of |len|
* in DER. */
static size_t der_len_len(size_t len) {
if (len < 0x80) {
return 1;
}
size_t ret = 1;
while (len > 0) {
ret++;
len >>= 8;
}
return ret;
}
size_t ECDSA_SIG_max_len(size_t order_len) {
/* Compute the maximum length of an |order_len| byte integer. Defensively
* assume that the leading 0x00 is included. */
size_t integer_len = 1 /* tag */ + der_len_len(order_len + 1) + 1 + order_len;
if (integer_len < order_len) {
return 0;
}
/* An ECDSA signature is two INTEGERs. */
size_t value_len = 2 * integer_len;
if (value_len < integer_len) {
return 0;
}
/* Add the header. */
size_t ret = 1 /* tag */ + der_len_len(value_len) + value_len;
if (ret < value_len) {
return 0;
}
return ret;
}
ECDSA_SIG *d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
if (len < 0) {
return NULL;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
ECDSA_SIG *ret = ECDSA_SIG_parse(&cbs);
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (out != NULL) {
ECDSA_SIG_free(*out);
*out = ret;
}
*inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
return ret;
}
int i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, uint8_t **outp) {
CBB cbb;
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
!ECDSA_SIG_marshal(&cbb, sig)) {
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return -1;
}
return CBB_finish_i2d(&cbb, outp);
}

363
external/boringssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_test.cc vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <vector>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/nid.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "../test/scoped_types.h"
enum Api {
kEncodedApi,
kRawApi,
};
// VerifyECDSASig returns true on success, false on failure.
static bool VerifyECDSASig(Api api, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len, const ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig,
EC_KEY *eckey, int expected_result) {
int actual_result;
switch (api) {
case kEncodedApi: {
uint8_t *der;
size_t der_len;
if (!ECDSA_SIG_to_bytes(&der, &der_len, ecdsa_sig)) {
return false;
}
ScopedOpenSSLBytes delete_der(der);
actual_result = ECDSA_verify(0, digest, digest_len, der, der_len, eckey);
break;
}
case kRawApi:
actual_result = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, ecdsa_sig, eckey);
break;
default:
return false;
}
return expected_result == actual_result;
}
// TestTamperedSig verifies that signature verification fails when a valid
// signature is tampered with. |ecdsa_sig| must be a valid signature, which will
// be modified. TestTamperedSig returns true on success, false on failure.
static bool TestTamperedSig(FILE *out, Api api, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len, ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig,
EC_KEY *eckey, const BIGNUM *order) {
// Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't
// garble the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and
// modify a byte in one of the bignums directly.
// Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf.
size_t r_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->r);
size_t s_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->s);
size_t bn_len = BN_num_bytes(order);
if (r_len > bn_len || s_len > bn_len) {
return false;
}
size_t buf_len = 2 * bn_len;
std::vector<uint8_t> raw_buf(buf_len);
// Pad the bignums with leading zeroes.
if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(raw_buf.data(), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) ||
!BN_bn2bin_padded(raw_buf.data() + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s)) {
return false;
}
// Modify a single byte in the buffer.
size_t offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len;
uint8_t dirt = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1;
raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
// Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf.
if (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data(), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL ||
BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data() + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL ||
!VerifyECDSASig(api, digest, digest_len, ecdsa_sig, eckey, 0)) {
return false;
}
// Sanity check: Undo the modification and verify signature.
raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
if (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data(), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL ||
BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data() + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL ||
!VerifyECDSASig(api, digest, digest_len, ecdsa_sig, eckey, 1)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
static bool TestBuiltin(FILE *out) {
// Fill digest values with some random data.
uint8_t digest[20], wrong_digest[20];
if (!RAND_bytes(digest, 20) || !RAND_bytes(wrong_digest, 20)) {
fprintf(out, "ERROR: unable to get random data\n");
return false;
}
static const struct {
int nid;
const char *name;
} kCurves[] = {
{ NID_secp224r1, "secp224r1" },
{ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "secp256r1" },
{ NID_secp384r1, "secp384r1" },
{ NID_secp521r1, "secp521r1" },
{ NID_undef, NULL }
};
// Create and verify ECDSA signatures with every available curve.
fputs("\ntesting ECDSA_sign(), ECDSA_verify(), ECDSA_do_sign(), and "
"ECDSA_do_verify() with some internal curves:\n", out);
for (size_t n = 0; kCurves[n].nid != NID_undef; n++) {
fprintf(out, "%s: ", kCurves[n].name);
int nid = kCurves[n].nid;
ScopedEC_GROUP group(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid));
if (!group) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group.get());
if (BN_num_bits(order) < 160) {
// Too small to test.
fprintf(out, " skipped\n");
continue;
}
// Create a new ECDSA key.
ScopedEC_KEY eckey(EC_KEY_new());
if (!eckey || !EC_KEY_set_group(eckey.get(), group.get()) ||
!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey.get())) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
// Create a second key.
ScopedEC_KEY wrong_eckey(EC_KEY_new());
if (!wrong_eckey || !EC_KEY_set_group(wrong_eckey.get(), group.get()) ||
!EC_KEY_generate_key(wrong_eckey.get())) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
fprintf(out, ".");
fflush(out);
// Check the key.
if (!EC_KEY_check_key(eckey.get())) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
fprintf(out, ".");
fflush(out);
// Test ASN.1-encoded signatures.
// Create a signature.
unsigned sig_len = ECDSA_size(eckey.get());
std::vector<uint8_t> signature(sig_len);
if (!ECDSA_sign(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), &sig_len, eckey.get())) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
signature.resize(sig_len);
fprintf(out, ".");
fflush(out);
// Verify the signature.
if (!ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size(),
eckey.get())) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
fprintf(out, ".");
fflush(out);
// Verify the signature with the wrong key.
if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size(),
wrong_eckey.get())) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
fprintf(out, ".");
fflush(out);
// Verify the signature using the wrong digest.
if (ECDSA_verify(0, wrong_digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size(),
eckey.get())) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
fprintf(out, ".");
fflush(out);
// Verify a truncated signature.
if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size() - 1,
eckey.get())) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
fprintf(out, ".");
fflush(out);
// Verify a tampered signature.
ScopedECDSA_SIG ecdsa_sig(ECDSA_SIG_from_bytes(
signature.data(), signature.size()));
if (!ecdsa_sig ||
!TestTamperedSig(out, kEncodedApi, digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(),
eckey.get(), order)) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
fprintf(out, ".");
fflush(out);
// Test ECDSA_SIG signing and verification.
// Create a signature.
ecdsa_sig.reset(ECDSA_do_sign(digest, 20, eckey.get()));
if (!ecdsa_sig) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
fprintf(out, ".");
fflush(out);
// Verify the signature using the correct key.
if (!ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(), eckey.get())) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
fprintf(out, ".");
fflush(out);
// Verify the signature with the wrong key.
if (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(), wrong_eckey.get())) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
fprintf(out, ".");
fflush(out);
// Verify the signature using the wrong digest.
if (ECDSA_do_verify(wrong_digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(), eckey.get())) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
fprintf(out, ".");
fflush(out);
// Verify a tampered signature.
if (!TestTamperedSig(out, kRawApi, digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(), eckey.get(),
order)) {
fprintf(out, " failed\n");
return false;
}
fprintf(out, ".");
fflush(out);
fprintf(out, " ok\n");
// Clear bogus errors.
ERR_clear_error();
}
return true;
}
static bool TestECDSA_SIG_max_len(size_t order_len) {
/* Create the largest possible |ECDSA_SIG| of the given constraints. */
ScopedECDSA_SIG sig(ECDSA_SIG_new());
if (!sig) {
return false;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> bytes(order_len, 0xff);
if (!BN_bin2bn(bytes.data(), bytes.size(), sig->r) ||
!BN_bin2bn(bytes.data(), bytes.size(), sig->s)) {
return false;
}
/* Serialize it. */
uint8_t *der;
size_t der_len;
if (!ECDSA_SIG_to_bytes(&der, &der_len, sig.get())) {
return false;
}
ScopedOpenSSLBytes delete_der(der);
size_t max_len = ECDSA_SIG_max_len(order_len);
if (max_len != der_len) {
fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA_SIG_max_len(%u) returned %u, wanted %u\n",
static_cast<unsigned>(order_len), static_cast<unsigned>(max_len),
static_cast<unsigned>(der_len));
return false;
}
return true;
}
static size_t BitsToBytes(size_t bits) {
return (bits / 8) + (7 + (bits % 8)) / 8;
}
int main(void) {
CRYPTO_library_init();
if (!TestBuiltin(stdout) ||
!TestECDSA_SIG_max_len(BitsToBytes(224)) ||
!TestECDSA_SIG_max_len(BitsToBytes(256)) ||
!TestECDSA_SIG_max_len(BitsToBytes(384)) ||
!TestECDSA_SIG_max_len(BitsToBytes(521)) ||
!TestECDSA_SIG_max_len(BitsToBytes(10000))) {
printf("\nECDSA test failed\n");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
return 1;
}
printf("\nPASS\n");
return 0;
}