Commit Graph
43 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Christian Brauner 576ee5dfd4 fs: add immutable rootfs
Currently pivot_root() doesn't work on the real rootfs because it
cannot be unmounted. Userspace has to do a recursive removal of the
initramfs contents manually before continuing the boot.

Really all we want from the real rootfs is to serve as the parent mount
for anything that is actually useful such as the tmpfs or ramfs for
initramfs unpacking or the rootfs itself. There's no need for the real
rootfs to actually be anything meaningful or useful. Add a immutable
rootfs called "nullfs" that can be selected via the "nullfs_rootfs"
kernel command line option.

The kernel will mount a tmpfs/ramfs on top of it, unpack the initramfs
and fire up userspace which mounts the rootfs and can then just do:

  chdir(rootfs);
  pivot_root(".", ".");
  umount2(".", MNT_DETACH);

and be done with it. (Ofc, userspace can also choose to retain the
initramfs contents by using something like pivot_root(".", "/initramfs")
without unmounting it.)

Technically this also means that the rootfs mount in unprivileged
namespaces doesn't need to become MNT_LOCKED anymore as it's guaranteed
that the immutable rootfs remains permanently empty so there cannot be
anything revealed by unmounting the covering mount.

In the future this will also allow us to create completely empty mount
namespaces without risking to leak anything.

systemd already handles this all correctly as it tries to pivot_root()
first and falls back to MS_MOVE only when that fails.

This goes back to various discussion in previous years and a LPC 2024
presentation about this very topic.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260112-work-immutable-rootfs-v2-3-88dd1c34a204@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2026-01-12 16:52:09 +01:00
Ackerley TngandSean Christopherson a63ca4236e KVM: guest_memfd: Use guest mem inodes instead of anonymous inodes
guest_memfd's inode represents memory the guest_memfd is
providing. guest_memfd's file represents a struct kvm's view of that
memory.

Using a custom inode allows customization of the inode teardown
process via callbacks. For example, ->evict_inode() allows
customization of the truncation process on file close, and
->destroy_inode() and ->free_inode() allow customization of the inode
freeing process.

Customizing the truncation process allows flexibility in management of
guest_memfd memory and customization of the inode freeing process
allows proper cleanup of memory metadata stored on the inode.

Memory metadata is more appropriately stored on the inode (as opposed
to the file), since the metadata is for the memory and is not unique
to a specific binding and struct kvm.

Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Tested-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
[sean: drop helpers, open code logic in __kvm_gmem_create()]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251016172853.52451-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2025-10-20 06:30:40 -07:00
Petr VorelandKent Overstreet e2f48c4809 bcachefs: Move BCACHEFS_STATFS_MAGIC value to UAPI magic.h
Move BCACHEFS_STATFS_MAGIC value to UAPI <linux/magic.h> under
BCACHEFS_SUPER_MAGIC definition (use common approach for name) and reuse the
definition in bcachefs_format.h BCACHEFS_STATFS_MAGIC.

There are other bcachefs magic definitions: BCACHE_MAGIC, BCHFS_MAGIC,
which use UUID_INIT() and are used only in libbcachefs. Therefore move
only BCACHEFS_STATFS_MAGIC value, which can be used outside of
libbcachefs for f_type field in struct statfs in statfs() or fstatfs().

Suggested-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
2024-05-08 17:29:24 -04:00
Christian Brauner cb12fd8e0d pidfd: add pidfs
This moves pidfds from the anonymous inode infrastructure to a tiny
pseudo filesystem. This has been on my todo for quite a while as it will
unblock further work that we weren't able to do simply because of the
very justified limitations of anonymous inodes. Moving pidfds to a tiny
pseudo filesystem allows:

* statx() on pidfds becomes useful for the first time.
* pidfds can be compared simply via statx() and then comparing inode
  numbers.
* pidfds have unique inode numbers for the system lifetime.
* struct pid is now stashed in inode->i_private instead of
  file->private_data. This means it is now possible to introduce
  concepts that operate on a process once all file descriptors have been
  closed. A concrete example is kill-on-last-close.
* file->private_data is freed up for per-file options for pidfds.
* Each struct pid will refer to a different inode but the same struct
  pid will refer to the same inode if it's opened multiple times. In
  contrast to now where each struct pid refers to the same inode. Even
  if we were to move to anon_inode_create_getfile() which creates new
  inodes we'd still be associating the same struct pid with multiple
  different inodes.

The tiny pseudo filesystem is not visible anywhere in userspace exactly
like e.g., pipefs and sockfs. There's no lookup, there's no complex
inode operations, nothing. Dentries and inodes are always deleted when
the last pidfd is closed.

We allocate a new inode for each struct pid and we reuse that inode for
all pidfds. We use iget_locked() to find that inode again based on the
inode number which isn't recycled. We allocate a new dentry for each
pidfd that uses the same inode. That is similar to anonymous inodes
which reuse the same inode for thousands of dentries. For pidfds we're
talking way less than that. There usually won't be a lot of concurrent
openers of the same struct pid. They can probably often be counted on
two hands. I know that systemd does use separate pidfd for the same
struct pid for various complex process tracking issues. So I think with
that things actually become way simpler. Especially because we don't
have to care about lookup. Dentries and inodes continue to be always
deleted.

The code is entirely optional and fairly small. If it's not selected we
fallback to anonymous inodes. Heavily inspired by nsfs which uses a
similar stashing mechanism just for namespaces.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213-vfs-pidfd_fs-v1-2-f863f58cfce1@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 12:23:37 +01:00
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 68f2736a85 mm: Convert all PageMovable users to movable_operations
These drivers are rather uncomfortably hammered into the
address_space_operations hole.  They aren't filesystems and don't behave
like filesystems.  They just need their own movable_operations structure,
which we can point to directly from page->mapping.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
2022-08-02 12:34:03 -04:00
Jeff LaytonandMiklos Szeredi c086df4902 fuse: move FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC definition to magic.h
...to help userland apps that need to identify FUSE mounts.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2022-02-21 14:57:26 +01:00
Linus Torvalds 64f29d8856 Merge tag 'ceph-for-5.17-rc1' of git://github.com/ceph/ceph-client
Pull ceph updates from Ilya Dryomov:
 "The highlight is the new mount "device" string syntax implemented by
  Venky Shankar. It solves some long-standing issues with using
  different auth entities and/or mounting different CephFS filesystems
  from the same cluster, remounting and also misleading /proc/mounts
  contents. The existing syntax of course remains to be maintained.

  On top of that, there is a couple of fixes for edge cases in quota and
  a new mount option for turning on unbuffered I/O mode globally instead
  of on a per-file basis with ioctl(CEPH_IOC_SYNCIO)"

* tag 'ceph-for-5.17-rc1' of git://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
  ceph: move CEPH_SUPER_MAGIC definition to magic.h
  ceph: remove redundant Lsx caps check
  ceph: add new "nopagecache" option
  ceph: don't check for quotas on MDS stray dirs
  ceph: drop send metrics debug message
  rbd: make const pointer spaces a static const array
  ceph: Fix incorrect statfs report for small quota
  ceph: mount syntax module parameter
  doc: document new CephFS mount device syntax
  ceph: record updated mon_addr on remount
  ceph: new device mount syntax
  libceph: rename parse_fsid() to ceph_parse_fsid() and export
  libceph: generalize addr/ip parsing based on delimiter
2022-01-20 13:46:20 +02:00
Linus Torvalds 0c947b893d Merge tag '5.17-rc-part1-smb3-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6
Pull cifs updates from Steve French:

 - multichannel patches mostly related to improving reconnect behavior

 - minor cleanup patches

* tag '5.17-rc-part1-smb3-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
  cifs: fix FILE_BOTH_DIRECTORY_INFO definition
  cifs: move superblock magic defitions to magic.h
  cifs: Fix smb311_update_preauth_hash() kernel-doc comment
  cifs: avoid race during socket reconnect between send and recv
  cifs: maintain a state machine for tcp/smb/tcon sessions
  cifs: fix hang on cifs_get_next_mid()
  cifs: take cifs_tcp_ses_lock for status checks
  cifs: reconnect only the connection and not smb session where possible
  cifs: add WARN_ON for when chan_count goes below minimum
  cifs: adjust DebugData to use chans_need_reconnect for conn status
  cifs: use the chans_need_reconnect bitmap for reconnect status
  cifs: track individual channel status using chans_need_reconnect
  cifs: remove redundant assignment to pointer p
2022-01-17 09:53:21 +02:00
Jeff LaytonandSteve French dea2903719 cifs: move superblock magic defitions to magic.h
Help userland apps to identify cifs and smb2 mounts.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2022-01-15 10:08:44 -06:00
Jeff LaytonandIlya Dryomov a0b3a15eab ceph: move CEPH_SUPER_MAGIC definition to magic.h
The uapi headers are missing the ceph definition. Move it there so
userland apps can ID cephfs.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2022-01-13 13:40:07 +01:00
Namjae Jeon 1ed147e29e exfat: move super block magic number to magic.h
Move exfat superblock magic number from local definition to magic.h.
It is also needed by userspace programs that call fstatfs().

Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
2022-01-10 11:00:03 +09:00
Mike RapoportandLinus Torvalds 1507f51255 mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory
areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not
only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.

The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly
enable it at the boot time.

Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file
descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call.  The memory areas created
by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel
direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes
that have access to the file descriptor.

Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections:

* Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel
  attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks.  Seceretmem makes
  "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the
  required complexity of the attack.  Along with other protections like
  the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which
  make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive
  for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work.
  Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing
  mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert
  a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents.  That
  takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most
  standard attacks.

* Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures.  Once the
  secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the
  kernel to be transmitted somewhere.  The secreremem pages cannot be
  accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP.

* Harden against exploited kernel flaws.  In order to access secretmem,
  a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and
  create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform
  secrets exfiltration using ptrace.

The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the
"traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise().  File
descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory
areas, it allows to seal the operations.  Besides, file descriptor based
memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the
userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU.  Andy Lutomirski says:

  "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major
  work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without
  mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse."

memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to
memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more
secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to
the memory.  Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way
simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a
multiplexer or an overloaded syscall.  Moreover, the initial
implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from
memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to
begin with.  If there will be a need for code sharing between these
implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user
visible APIs.

The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess
primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory
areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the
follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that
belongs to the secret memory area.

Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the
kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user
would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel.

Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on
architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which
affects the system performance.  However, the original Kconfig text for
CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "...  can
improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e057
("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "...
although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling
evidence that it must be the only choice".  Hence, it is sufficient to
have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system
administrator to enable it at boot time.

Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid
accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page
migration.

Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed
RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.  Since these mappings are already locked independently
from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail
and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings.

However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like
long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed
by user space.  With default limits, there is no excessive use of
secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with
ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow
balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA.

A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is
freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page.

The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error
handling is omitted):

	fd = memfd_secret(0);
	ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE);
	ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
		   MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 11:48:21 -07:00
Dan WilliamsandGreg Kroah-Hartman 3234ac664a /dev/mem: Revoke mappings when a driver claims the region
Close the hole of holding a mapping over kernel driver takeover event of
a given address range.

Commit 90a545e981 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
introduced CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM with the goal of protecting the
kernel against scenarios where a /dev/mem user tramples memory that a
kernel driver owns. However, this protection only prevents *new* read(),
write() and mmap() requests. Established mappings prior to the driver
calling request_mem_region() are left alone.

Especially with persistent memory, and the core kernel metadata that is
stored there, there are plentiful scenarios for a /dev/mem user to
violate the expectations of the driver and cause amplified damage.

Teach request_mem_region() to find and shoot down active /dev/mem
mappings that it believes it has successfully claimed for the exclusive
use of the driver. Effectively a driver call to request_mem_region()
becomes a hole-punch on the /dev/mem device.

The typical usage of unmap_mapping_range() is part of
truncate_pagecache() to punch a hole in a file, but in this case the
implementation is only doing the "first half" of a hole punch. Namely it
is just evacuating current established mappings of the "hole", and it
relies on the fact that /dev/mem establishes mappings in terms of
absolute physical address offsets. Once existing mmap users are
invalidated they can attempt to re-establish the mapping, or attempt to
continue issuing read(2) / write(2) to the invalidated extent, but they
will then be subject to the CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM checking that can
block those subsequent accesses.

Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: 90a545e981 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159009507306.847224.8502634072429766747.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-05-27 11:10:05 +02:00
Damien Le Moal 8dcc1a9d90 fs: New zonefs file system
zonefs is a very simple file system exposing each zone of a zoned block
device as a file. Unlike a regular file system with zoned block device
support (e.g. f2fs), zonefs does not hide the sequential write
constraint of zoned block devices to the user. Files representing
sequential write zones of the device must be written sequentially
starting from the end of the file (append only writes).

As such, zonefs is in essence closer to a raw block device access
interface than to a full featured POSIX file system. The goal of zonefs
is to simplify the implementation of zoned block device support in
applications by replacing raw block device file accesses with a richer
file API, avoiding relying on direct block device file ioctls which may
be more obscure to developers. One example of this approach is the
implementation of LSM (log-structured merge) tree structures (such as
used in RocksDB and LevelDB) on zoned block devices by allowing SSTables
to be stored in a zone file similarly to a regular file system rather
than as a range of sectors of a zoned device. The introduction of the
higher level construct "one file is one zone" can help reducing the
amount of changes needed in the application as well as introducing
support for different application programming languages.

Zonefs on-disk metadata is reduced to an immutable super block to
persistently store a magic number and optional feature flags and
values. On mount, zonefs uses blkdev_report_zones() to obtain the device
zone configuration and populates the mount point with a static file tree
solely based on this information. E.g. file sizes come from the device
zone type and write pointer offset managed by the device itself.

The zone files created on mount have the following characteristics.
1) Files representing zones of the same type are grouped together
   under a common sub-directory:
     * For conventional zones, the sub-directory "cnv" is used.
     * For sequential write zones, the sub-directory "seq" is used.
  These two directories are the only directories that exist in zonefs.
  Users cannot create other directories and cannot rename nor delete
  the "cnv" and "seq" sub-directories.
2) The name of zone files is the number of the file within the zone
   type sub-directory, in order of increasing zone start sector.
3) The size of conventional zone files is fixed to the device zone size.
   Conventional zone files cannot be truncated.
4) The size of sequential zone files represent the file's zone write
   pointer position relative to the zone start sector. Truncating these
   files is allowed only down to 0, in which case, the zone is reset to
   rewind the zone write pointer position to the start of the zone, or
   up to the zone size, in which case the file's zone is transitioned
   to the FULL state (finish zone operation).
5) All read and write operations to files are not allowed beyond the
   file zone size. Any access exceeding the zone size is failed with
   the -EFBIG error.
6) Creating, deleting, renaming or modifying any attribute of files and
   sub-directories is not allowed.
7) There are no restrictions on the type of read and write operations
   that can be issued to conventional zone files. Buffered, direct and
   mmap read & write operations are accepted. For sequential zone files,
   there are no restrictions on read operations, but all write
   operations must be direct IO append writes. mmap write of sequential
   files is not allowed.

Several optional features of zonefs can be enabled at format time.
* Conventional zone aggregation: ranges of contiguous conventional
  zones can be aggregated into a single larger file instead of the
  default one file per zone.
* File ownership: The owner UID and GID of zone files is by default 0
  (root) but can be changed to any valid UID/GID.
* File access permissions: the default 640 access permissions can be
  changed.

The mkzonefs tool is used to format zoned block devices for use with
zonefs. This tool is available on Github at:

git@github.com:damien-lemoal/zonefs-tools.git.

zonefs-tools also includes a test suite which can be run against any
zoned block device, including null_blk block device created with zoned
mode.

Example: the following formats a 15TB host-managed SMR HDD with 256 MB
zones with the conventional zones aggregation feature enabled.

$ sudo mkzonefs -o aggr_cnv /dev/sdX
$ sudo mount -t zonefs /dev/sdX /mnt
$ ls -l /mnt/
total 0
dr-xr-xr-x 2 root root     1 Nov 25 13:23 cnv
dr-xr-xr-x 2 root root 55356 Nov 25 13:23 seq

The size of the zone files sub-directories indicate the number of files
existing for each type of zones. In this example, there is only one
conventional zone file (all conventional zones are aggregated under a
single file).

$ ls -l /mnt/cnv
total 137101312
-rw-r----- 1 root root 140391743488 Nov 25 13:23 0

This aggregated conventional zone file can be used as a regular file.

$ sudo mkfs.ext4 /mnt/cnv/0
$ sudo mount -o loop /mnt/cnv/0 /data

The "seq" sub-directory grouping files for sequential write zones has
in this example 55356 zones.

$ ls -lv /mnt/seq
total 14511243264
-rw-r----- 1 root root 0 Nov 25 13:23 0
-rw-r----- 1 root root 0 Nov 25 13:23 1
-rw-r----- 1 root root 0 Nov 25 13:23 2
...
-rw-r----- 1 root root 0 Nov 25 13:23 55354
-rw-r----- 1 root root 0 Nov 25 13:23 55355

For sequential write zone files, the file size changes as data is
appended at the end of the file, similarly to any regular file system.

$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/seq/0 bs=4K count=1 conv=notrunc oflag=direct
1+0 records in
1+0 records out
4096 bytes (4.1 kB, 4.0 KiB) copied, 0.000452219 s, 9.1 MB/s

$ ls -l /mnt/seq/0
-rw-r----- 1 root root 4096 Nov 25 13:23 /mnt/seq/0

The written file can be truncated to the zone size, preventing any
further write operation.

$ truncate -s 268435456 /mnt/seq/0
$ ls -l /mnt/seq/0
-rw-r----- 1 root root 268435456 Nov 25 13:49 /mnt/seq/0

Truncation to 0 size allows freeing the file zone storage space and
restart append-writes to the file.

$ truncate -s 0 /mnt/seq/0
$ ls -l /mnt/seq/0
-rw-r----- 1 root root 0 Nov 25 13:49 /mnt/seq/0

Since files are statically mapped to zones on the disk, the number of
blocks of a file as reported by stat() and fstat() indicates the size
of the file zone.

$ stat /mnt/seq/0
  File: /mnt/seq/0
  Size: 0       Blocks: 524288     IO Block: 4096   regular empty file
Device: 870h/2160d      Inode: 50431       Links: 1
Access: (0640/-rw-r-----)  Uid: (    0/    root)   Gid: (    0/  root)
Access: 2019-11-25 13:23:57.048971997 +0900
Modify: 2019-11-25 13:52:25.553805765 +0900
Change: 2019-11-25 13:52:25.553805765 +0900
 Birth: -

The number of blocks of the file ("Blocks") in units of 512B blocks
gives the maximum file size of 524288 * 512 B = 256 MB, corresponding
to the device zone size in this example. Of note is that the "IO block"
field always indicates the minimum IO size for writes and corresponds
to the device physical sector size.

This code contains contributions from:
* Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>,
* Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>,
* Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
* Chaitanya Kulkarni <chaitanya.kulkarni@wdc.com> and
* Ting Yao <tingyao@hust.edu.cn>.

Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
2020-02-07 14:39:38 +09:00
David HildenbrandandMichael Ellerman fe030c9b85 powerpc/pseries/cmm: Implement balloon compaction
We can now get rid of the cmm_lock and completely rely on the balloon
compaction internals, which now also manage the page list and the
lock.

Inflated/"loaned" pages are now movable. Memory blocks that contain
such pages can get offlined. Also, all such pages will be marked
PageOffline() and can therefore be excluded in memory dumps using
recent versions of makedumpfile.

Don't switch to balloon_page_alloc() yet (due to the GFP_NOIO). Will
do that separately to discuss this change in detail.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[mpe: Add isolated_pages-- in cmm_migratepage() as suggested by David]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191031142933.10779-9-david@redhat.com
2019-11-13 16:58:01 +11:00
Gao XiangandGreg Kroah-Hartman 47e4937a4a erofs: move erofs out of staging
EROFS filesystem has been merged into linux-staging for a year.

EROFS is designed to be a better solution of saving extra storage
space with guaranteed end-to-end performance for read-only files
with the help of reduced metadata, fixed-sized output compression
and decompression inplace technologies.

In the past year, EROFS was greatly improved by many people as
a staging driver, self-tested, betaed by a large number of our
internal users, successfully applied to almost all in-service
HUAWEI smartphones as the part of EMUI 9.1 and proven to be stable
enough to be moved out of staging.

EROFS is a self-contained filesystem driver. Although there are
still some TODOs to be more generic, we have a dedicated team
actively keeping on working on EROFS in order to make it better
with the evolution of Linux kernel as the other in-kernel filesystems.

As Pavel suggested, it's better to do as one commit since git
can do moves and all histories will be saved in this way.

Let's promote it from staging and enhance it more actively as
a "real" part of kernel for more wider scenarios!

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Darrick J . Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Cc: Miao Xie <miaoxie@huawei.com>
Cc: Li Guifu <bluce.liguifu@huawei.com>
Cc: Fang Wei <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <gaoxiang25@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190822213659.5501-1-hsiangkao@aol.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-08-24 14:20:10 +02:00
Linus Torvalds 933a90bf4f Merge branch 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro:
 "The first part of mount updates.

  Convert filesystems to use the new mount API"

* 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
  mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally
  constify ksys_mount() string arguments
  don't bother with registering rootfs
  init_rootfs(): don't bother with init_ramfs_fs()
  vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert openpromfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert xenfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert oprofilefs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert ibmasmfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert qib_fs/ipathfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert efivarfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert configfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount API
  convenience helper: get_tree_single()
  convenience helper get_tree_nodev()
  vfs: Kill sget_userns()
  ...
2019-07-19 10:42:02 -07:00
Greg HackmannandSumit Semwal ed63bb1d1f dma-buf: give each buffer a full-fledged inode
By traversing /proc/*/fd and /proc/*/map_files, processes with CAP_ADMIN
can get a lot of fine-grained data about how shmem buffers are shared
among processes.  stat(2) on each entry gives the caller a unique
ID (st_ino), the buffer's size (st_size), and even the number of pages
currently charged to the buffer (st_blocks / 512).

In contrast, all dma-bufs share the same anonymous inode.  So while we
can count how many dma-buf fds or mappings a process has, we can't get
the size of the backing buffers or tell if two entries point to the same
dma-buf.  On systems with debugfs, we can get a per-buffer breakdown of
size and reference count, but can't tell which processes are actually
holding the references to each buffer.

Replace the singleton inode with full-fledged inodes allocated by
alloc_anon_inode().  This involves creating and mounting a
mini-pseudo-filesystem for dma-buf, following the example in fs/aio.c.

Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190613223408.139221-2-fengc@google.com
2019-06-14 15:00:50 +05:30
David HowellsandAl Viro ea8157ab2a zsfold: Convert zsfold to use the new mount API
Convert the zsfold filesystem to the new internal mount API as the old one
will be obsoleted and removed.  This allows greater flexibility in
communication of mount parameters between userspace, the VFS and the
filesystem.

See Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt for more information.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-05-25 18:06:01 -04:00
Christian BraunerandGreg Kroah-Hartman 3ad20fe393 binder: implement binderfs
As discussed at Linux Plumbers Conference 2018 in Vancouver [1] this is the
implementation of binderfs.

/* Abstract */
binderfs is a backwards-compatible filesystem for Android's binder ipc
mechanism. Each ipc namespace will mount a new binderfs instance. Mounting
binderfs multiple times at different locations in the same ipc namespace
will not cause a new super block to be allocated and hence it will be the
same filesystem instance.
Each new binderfs mount will have its own set of binder devices only
visible in the ipc namespace it has been mounted in. All devices in a new
binderfs mount will follow the scheme binder%d and numbering will always
start at 0.

/* Backwards compatibility */
Devices requested in the Kconfig via CONFIG_ANDROID_BINDER_DEVICES for the
initial ipc namespace will work as before. They will be registered via
misc_register() and appear in the devtmpfs mount. Specifically, the
standard devices binder, hwbinder, and vndbinder will all appear in their
standard locations in /dev. Mounting or unmounting the binderfs mount in
the initial ipc namespace will have no effect on these devices, i.e. they
will neither show up in the binderfs mount nor will they disappear when the
binderfs mount is gone.

/* binder-control */
Each new binderfs instance comes with a binder-control device. No other
devices will be present at first. The binder-control device can be used to
dynamically allocate binder devices. All requests operate on the binderfs
mount the binder-control device resides in.
Assuming a new instance of binderfs has been mounted at /dev/binderfs
via mount -t binderfs binderfs /dev/binderfs. Then a request to create a
new binder device can be made as illustrated in [2].
Binderfs devices can simply be removed via unlink().

/* Implementation details */
- dynamic major number allocation:
  When binderfs is registered as a new filesystem it will dynamically
  allocate a new major number. The allocated major number will be returned
  in struct binderfs_device when a new binder device is allocated.
- global minor number tracking:
  Minor are tracked in a global idr struct that is capped at
  BINDERFS_MAX_MINOR. The minor number tracker is protected by a global
  mutex. This is the only point of contention between binderfs mounts.
- struct binderfs_info:
  Each binderfs super block has its own struct binderfs_info that tracks
  specific details about a binderfs instance:
  - ipc namespace
  - dentry of the binder-control device
  - root uid and root gid of the user namespace the binderfs instance
    was mounted in
- mountable by user namespace root:
  binderfs can be mounted by user namespace root in a non-initial user
  namespace. The devices will be owned by user namespace root.
- binderfs binder devices without misc infrastructure:
  New binder devices associated with a binderfs mount do not use the
  full misc_register() infrastructure.
  The misc_register() infrastructure can only create new devices in the
  host's devtmpfs mount. binderfs does however only make devices appear
  under its own mountpoint and thus allocates new character device nodes
  from the inode of the root dentry of the super block. This will have
  the side-effect that binderfs specific device nodes do not appear in
  sysfs. This behavior is similar to devpts allocated pts devices and
  has no effect on the functionality of the ipc mechanism itself.

[1]: https://goo.gl/JL2tfX
[2]: program to allocate a new binderfs binder device:

     #define _GNU_SOURCE
     #include <errno.h>
     #include <fcntl.h>
     #include <stdio.h>
     #include <stdlib.h>
     #include <string.h>
     #include <sys/ioctl.h>
     #include <sys/stat.h>
     #include <sys/types.h>
     #include <unistd.h>
     #include <linux/android/binder_ctl.h>

     int main(int argc, char *argv[])
     {
             int fd, ret, saved_errno;
             size_t len;
             struct binderfs_device device = { 0 };

             if (argc < 2)
                     exit(EXIT_FAILURE);

             len = strlen(argv[1]);
             if (len > BINDERFS_MAX_NAME)
                     exit(EXIT_FAILURE);

             memcpy(device.name, argv[1], len);

             fd = open("/dev/binderfs/binder-control", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
             if (fd < 0) {
                     printf("%s - Failed to open binder-control device\n",
                            strerror(errno));
                     exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
             }

             ret = ioctl(fd, BINDER_CTL_ADD, &device);
             saved_errno = errno;
             close(fd);
             errno = saved_errno;
             if (ret < 0) {
                     printf("%s - Failed to allocate new binder device\n",
                            strerror(errno));
                     exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
             }

             printf("Allocated new binder device with major %d, minor %d, and "
                    "name %s\n", device.major, device.minor,
                    device.name);

             exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
     }

Cc: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-19 09:40:13 +01:00
Adam BorowskiandDave Chinner dddde68b8f xfs: add a define for statfs magic to uapi
Needed by userspace programs that call fstatfs().

It'd be natural to publish XFS_SB_MAGIC in uapi, but while these two
have identical values, they have different semantic meaning: one is
an enum cookie meant for statfs, the other a signature of the
on-disk format.

Signed-off-by: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2018-10-18 17:20:19 +11:00
David Howells f044c8847b afs: Lay the groundwork for supporting network namespaces
Lay the groundwork for supporting network namespaces (netns) to the AFS
filesystem by moving various global features to a network-namespace struct
(afs_net) and providing an instance of this as a temporary global variable
that everything uses via accessor functions for the moment.

The following changes have been made:

 (1) Store the netns in the superblock info.  This will be obtained from
     the mounter's nsproxy on a manual mount and inherited from the parent
     superblock on an automount.

 (2) The cell list is made per-netns.  It can be viewed through
     /proc/net/afs/cells and also be modified by writing commands to that
     file.

 (3) The local workstation cell is set per-ns in /proc/net/afs/rootcell.
     This is unset by default.

 (4) The 'rootcell' module parameter, which sets a cell and VL server list
     modifies the init net namespace, thereby allowing an AFS root fs to be
     theoretically used.

 (5) The volume location lists and the file lock manager are made
     per-netns.

 (6) The AF_RXRPC socket and associated I/O bits are made per-ns.

The various workqueues remain global for the moment.

Changes still to be made:

 (1) /proc/fs/afs/ should be moved to /proc/net/afs/ and a symlink emplaced
     from the old name.

 (2) A per-netns subsys needs to be registered for AFS into which it can
     store its per-netns data.

 (3) Rather than the AF_RXRPC socket being opened on module init, it needs
     to be opened on the creation of a superblock in that netns.

 (4) The socket needs to be closed when the last superblock using it is
     destroyed and all outstanding client calls on it have been completed.
     This prevents a reference loop on the namespace.

 (5) It is possible that several namespaces will want to use AFS, in which
     case each one will need its own UDP port.  These can either be set
     through /proc/net/afs/cm_port or the kernel can pick one at random.
     The init_ns gets 7001 by default.

Other issues that need resolving:

 (1) The DNS keyring needs net-namespacing.

 (2) Where do upcalls go (eg. DNS request-key upcall)?

 (3) Need something like open_socket_in_file_ns() syscall so that AFS
     command line tools attempting to operate on an AFS file/volume have
     their RPC calls go to the right place.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-11-13 15:38:16 +00:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman 6f52b16c5b License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with no license
Many user space API headers are missing licensing information, which
makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default are files without license information under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPLV2.  Marking them GPLV2 would exclude
them from being included in non GPLV2 code, which is obviously not
intended. The user space API headers fall under the syscall exception
which is in the kernels COPYING file:

   NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel
   services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use
   of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work".

otherwise syscall usage would not be possible.

Update the files which contain no license information with an SPDX
license identifier.  The chosen identifier is 'GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note' which is the officially assigned identifier for the
Linux syscall exception.  SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.  See the previous patch in this series for the
methodology of how this patch was researched.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02 11:19:54 +01:00
Fabian FrederickandLinus Torvalds 62aa81d7c4 ocfs2: use magic.h
Filesystems generally use SUPER_MAGIC values from magic.h instead of a
local definition.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170521154217.27917-1-fabf@skynet.be
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-06 16:24:30 -07:00
John Johansen a481f4d917 apparmor: add custom apparmorfs that will be used by policy namespace files
AppArmor policy needs to be able to be resolved based on the policy
namespace a task is confined by. Add a base apparmorfs filesystem that
(like nsfs) will exist as a kern mount and be accessed via jump_link
through a securityfs file.

Setup the base apparmorfs fns and data, but don't use it yet.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-06-08 12:51:51 -07:00