Add KVM_CAP_S390_HPAGE_2G to signal to userspace that 2G hugepages may
be used to back the guest; restrictions apply similar to 1M hugepages.
Enable the (for now still ignored) GMAP_FLAG_ALLOW_HPAGE_2G flag for
the guest gmap, and propagate / disable it as necessary.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <20260609150930.665370-3-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
KVM/arm64 updates for 7.1
* New features:
- Add support for tracing in the standalone EL2 hypervisor code,
which should help both debugging and performance analysis.
This comes with a full infrastructure for 'remote' trace buffers
that can be exposed by non-kernel entities such as firmware.
- Add support for GICv5 Per Processor Interrupts (PPIs), as the
starting point for supporting the new GIC architecture in KVM.
- Finally add support for pKVM protected guests, with anonymous
memory being used as a backing store. About time!
* Improvements and bug fixes:
- Rework the dreaded user_mem_abort() function to make it more
maintainable, reducing the amount of state being exposed to
the various helpers and rendering a substantial amount of
state immutable.
- Expand the Stage-2 page table dumper to support NV shadow
page tables on a per-VM basis.
- Tidy up the pKVM PSCI proxy code to be slightly less hard
to follow.
- Fix both SPE and TRBE in non-VHE configurations so that they
do not generate spurious, out of context table walks that
ultimately lead to very bad HW lockups.
- A small set of patches fixing the Stage-2 MMU freeing in error
cases.
- Tighten-up accepted SMC immediate value to be only #0 for host
SMCCC calls.
- The usual cleanups and other selftest churn.
LoongArch KVM changes for v7.1
1. Use CSR_CRMD_PLV in kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel().
2. Let vcpu_is_preempted() a macro & some enhanments.
3. Add DMSINTC irqchip in kernel support.
4. Add KVM PMU test cases for tools/selftests.
Add device model for DMSINTC interrupt controller, implement basic
create/destroy/set_attr interfaces, and register device model to kvm
device table.
Reviewed-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Song Gao <gaosong@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
* kvm-arm64/pkvm-protected-guest: (41 commits)
: .
: pKVM support for protected guests, implementing the very long
: awaited support for anonymous memory, as the elusive guestmem
: has failed to deliver on its promises despite a multi-year
: effort. Patches courtesy of Will Deacon. From the initial cover
: letter:
:
: "[...] this patch series implements support for protected guest
: memory with pKVM, where pages are unmapped from the host as they are
: faulted into the guest and can be shared back from the guest using pKVM
: hypercalls. Protected guests are created using a new machine type
: identifier and can be booted to a shell using the kvmtool patches
: available at [2], which finally means that we are able to test the pVM
: logic in pKVM. Since this is an incremental step towards full isolation
: from the host (for example, the CPU register state and DMA accesses are
: not yet isolated), creating a pVM requires a developer Kconfig option to
: be enabled in addition to booting with 'kvm-arm.mode=protected' and
: results in a kernel taint."
: .
KVM: arm64: Don't hold 'vm_table_lock' across guest page reclaim
KVM: arm64: Allow get_pkvm_hyp_vm() to take a reference to a dying VM
KVM: arm64: Prevent teardown finalisation of referenced 'hyp_vm'
drivers/virt: pkvm: Add Kconfig dependency on DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL
KVM: arm64: Rename PKVM_PAGE_STATE_MASK
KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover guest hvcs
KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover forced reclaim
KVM: arm64: Register 'selftest_vm' in the VM table
KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover guest donation
KVM: arm64: Add some initial documentation for pKVM
KVM: arm64: Allow userspace to create protected VMs when pKVM is enabled
KVM: arm64: Implement the MEM_UNSHARE hypercall for protected VMs
KVM: arm64: Implement the MEM_SHARE hypercall for protected VMs
KVM: arm64: Add hvc handler at EL2 for hypercalls from protected VMs
KVM: arm64: Return -EFAULT from VCPU_RUN on access to a poisoned pte
KVM: arm64: Reclaim faulting page from pKVM in spurious fault handler
KVM: arm64: Introduce hypercall to force reclaim of a protected page
KVM: arm64: Annotate guest donations with handle and gfn in host stage-2
KVM: arm64: Change 'pkvm_handle_t' to u16
KVM: arm64: Introduce host_stage2_set_owner_metadata_locked()
...
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Now that all the bits are properly addressed, provide a mechanism
for testing ESA mode guests in nested configurations.
Signed-off-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com>
[farman@us.ibm.com: Updated commit message]
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Farman <farman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Commit 94dfc73e7c ("treewide: uapi: Replace zero-length arrays with
flexible-array members") broke the userspace API for C++.
These structures ending in VLAs are typically a *header*, which can be
followed by an arbitrary number of entries. Userspace typically creates
a larger structure with some non-zero number of entries, for example in
QEMU's kvm_arch_get_supported_msr_feature():
struct {
struct kvm_msrs info;
struct kvm_msr_entry entries[1];
} msr_data = {};
While that works in C, it fails in C++ with an error like:
flexible array member 'kvm_msrs::entries' not at end of 'struct msr_data'
Fix this by using __DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY() for the VLA, which uses [0]
for C++ compilation.
Fixes: 94dfc73e7c ("treewide: uapi: Replace zero-length arrays with flexible-array members")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3abaf6aefd6e5efeff3b860ac38421d9dec908db.camel@infradead.org
[sean: tag for stable@]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
KVM generic changes for 7.0
- Remove a subtle pseudo-overlay of kvm_stats_desc, which, aside from being
unnecessary and confusing, triggered compiler warnings due to
-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end.
- Document that vcpu->mutex is take outside of kvm->slots_lock and
kvm->slots_arch_lock, which is intentional and desirable despite being
rather unintuitive.
- gmap rewrite: completely new memory management for kvm/s390
- vSIE improvement
- maintainership change for s390 vfio-pci
- small quality of life improvement for protected guests
KVM SVM changes for 6.20
- Drop a user-triggerable WARN on nested_svm_load_cr3() failure.
- Add support for virtualizing ERAPS. Note, correct virtualization of ERAPS
relies on an upcoming, publicly announced change in the APM to reduce the
set of conditions where hardware (i.e. KVM) *must* flush the RAP.
- Ignore nSVM intercepts for instructions that are not supported according to
L1's virtual CPU model.
- Add support for expedited writes to the fast MMIO bus, a la VMX's fastpath
for EPT Misconfig.
- Don't set GIF when clearing EFER.SVME, as GIF exists independently of SVM,
and allow userspace to restore nested state with GIF=0.
- Treat exit_code as an unsigned 64-bit value through all of KVM.
- Add support for fetching SNP certificates from userspace.
- Fix a bug where KVM would use vmcb02 instead of vmcb01 when emulating VMLOAD
or VMSAVE on behalf of L2.
- Misc fixes and cleanups.
The newly added structure causes a warning about implied padding:
./usr/include/linux/kvm.h:1247:1: error: padding struct size to alignment boundary with 6 bytes [-Werror=padded]
The padding can lead to leaking kernel data and ABI incompatibilies
when used on x86. Neither of these is a problem in this specific
patch, but it's best to avoid it and use explicit padding fields
in general.
Fixes: 0ee4ddc164 ("KVM: s390: Storage key manipulation IOCTL")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Add a new IOCTL to allow userspace to manipulate storage keys directly.
This will make it easier to write selftests related to storage keys.
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
For SEV-SNP, the host can optionally provide a certificate table to the
guest when it issues an attestation request to firmware (see GHCB 2.0
specification regarding "SNP Extended Guest Requests"). This certificate
table can then be used to verify the endorsement key used by firmware to
sign the attestation report.
While it is possible for guests to obtain the certificates through other
means, handling it via the host provides more flexibility in being able
to keep the certificate data in sync with the endorsement key throughout
host-side operations that might resulting in the endorsement key
changing.
In the case of KVM, userspace will be responsible for fetching the
certificate table and keeping it in sync with any modifications to the
endorsement key by other userspace management tools. Define a new
KVM_EXIT_SNP_REQ_CERTS event where userspace is provided with the GPA of
the buffer the guest has provided as part of the attestation request so
that userspace can write the certificate data into it while relying on
filesystem-based locking to keep the certificates up-to-date relative to
the endorsement keys installed/utilized by firmware at the time the
certificates are fetched.
[Melody: Update the documentation scheme about how file locking is
expected to happen.]
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Melody Wang <huibo.wang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260109231732.1160759-2-michael.roth@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
The main use of {LD,ST}64B* is to talk to a device, which is hopefully
directly assigned to the guest and requires no additional handling.
However, this does not preclude a VMM from exposing a virtual device
to the guest, and to allow 64 byte accesses as part of the programming
interface. A direct consequence of this is that we need to be able
to forward such access to userspace.
Given that such a contraption is very unlikely to ever exist, we choose
to offer a limited service: userspace gets (as part of a new exit reason)
the ESR, the IPA, and that's it. It is fully expected to handle the full
semantics of the instructions, deal with ACCDATA, the return values and
increment PC. Much fun.
A canonical implementation can also simply inject an abort and be done
with it. Frankly, don't try to do anything else unless you have time
to waste.
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Remove KVM's internal pseudo-overlay of kvm_stats_desc, which subtly
aliases the flexible name[] in the uAPI definition with a fixed-size array
of the same name. The unusual embedded structure results in compiler
warnings due to -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end, and also necessitates an
extra level of dereferencing in KVM. To avoid the "overlay", define the
uAPI structure to have a fixed-size name when building for the kernel.
Opportunistically clean up the indentation for the stats macros, and
replace spaces with tabs.
No functional change intended.
Reported-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aPfNKRpLfhmhYqfP@kspp
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
[..]
Acked-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Reviewed-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Acked-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251205232655.445294-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Setting KVM_CAP_S390_USER_OPEREXEC will forward all operation
exceptions to user space. This also includes the 0x0000 instructions
managed by KVM_CAP_S390_USER_INSTR0. It's helpful if user space wants
to emulate instructions which do not (yet) have an opcode.
While we're at it refine the documentation for
KVM_CAP_S390_USER_INSTR0.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
When APEI fails to handle a stage-2 synchronous external abort (SEA),
today KVM injects an asynchronous SError to the VCPU then resumes it,
which usually results in unpleasant guest kernel panic.
One major situation of guest SEA is when vCPU consumes recoverable
uncorrected memory error (UER). Although SError and guest kernel panic
effectively stops the propagation of corrupted memory, guest may
re-use the corrupted memory if auto-rebooted; in worse case, guest
boot may run into poisoned memory. So there is room to recover from
an UER in a more graceful manner.
Alternatively KVM can redirect the synchronous SEA event to VMM to
- Reduce blast radius if possible. VMM can inject a SEA to VCPU via
KVM's existing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS API. If the memory poison
consumption or fault is not from guest kernel, blast radius can be
limited to the triggering thread in guest userspace, so VM can
keep running.
- Allow VMM to protect from future memory poison consumption by
unmapping the page from stage-2, or to interrupt guest of the
poisoned page so guest kernel can unmap it from stage-1 page table.
- Allow VMM to track SEA events that VM customers care about, to restart
VM when certain number of distinct poison events have happened,
to provide observability to customers in log management UI.
Introduce an userspace-visible feature to enable VMM handle SEA:
- KVM_CAP_ARM_SEA_TO_USER. As the alternative fallback behavior
when host APEI fails to claim a SEA, userspace can opt in this new
capability to let KVM exit to userspace during SEA if it is not
owned by host.
- KVM_EXIT_ARM_SEA. A new exit reason is introduced for this.
KVM fills kvm_run.arm_sea with as much as possible information about
the SEA, enabling VMM to emulate SEA to guest by itself.
- Sanitized ESR_EL2. The general rule is to keep only the bits
useful for userspace and relevant to guest memory.
- Flags indicating if faulting guest physical address is valid.
- Faulting guest physical and virtual addresses if valid.
Signed-off-by: Jiaqi Yan <jiaqiyan@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://msgid.link/20251013185903.1372553-2-jiaqiyan@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Add a guest_memfd flag to allow userspace to state that the underlying
memory should be configured to be initialized as shared, and reject user
page faults if the guest_memfd instance's memory isn't shared. Because
KVM doesn't yet support in-place private<=>shared conversions, all
guest_memfd memory effectively follows the initial state.
Alternatively, KVM could deduce the initial state based on MMAP, which for
all intents and purposes is what KVM currently does. However, implicitly
deriving the default state based on MMAP will result in a messy ABI when
support for in-place conversions is added.
For x86 CoCo VMs, which don't yet support MMAP, memory is currently private
by default (otherwise the memory would be unusable). If MMAP implies
memory is shared by default, then the default state for CoCo VMs will vary
based on MMAP, and from userspace's perspective, will change when in-place
conversion support is added. I.e. to maintain guest<=>host ABI, userspace
would need to immediately convert all memory from shared=>private, which
is both ugly and inefficient. The inefficiency could be avoided by adding
a flag to state that memory is _private_ by default, irrespective of MMAP,
but that would lead to an equally messy and hard to document ABI.
Bite the bullet and immediately add a flag to control the default state so
that the effective behavior is explicit and straightforward.
Fixes: 3d3a04fad2 ("KVM: Allow and advertise support for host mmap() on guest_memfd files")
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Tested-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251003232606.4070510-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Rework the not-yet-released KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP into a more generic
KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_FLAGS capability so that adding new flags doesn't
require a new capability, and so that developers aren't tempted to bundle
multiple flags into a single capability.
Note, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic() can only return a 32-bit
value, but that limitation can be easily circumvented by adding e.g.
KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_FLAGS2 in the unlikely event guest_memfd supports more
than 32 flags.
Reviewed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Tested-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251003232606.4070510-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Now that all the x86 and arm64 plumbing for mmap() on guest_memfd is in
place, allow userspace to set GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP and advertise support
via a new capability, KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP.
The availability of this capability is determined per architecture, and
its enablement for a specific guest_memfd instance is controlled by the
GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP flag at creation time.
Update the KVM API documentation to detail the KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP
capability, the associated GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP, and provide essential
information regarding support for mmap in guest_memfd.
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250729225455.670324-22-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM/arm64 changes for 6.17, round #1
- Host driver for GICv5, the next generation interrupt controller for
arm64, including support for interrupt routing, MSIs, interrupt
translation and wired interrupts.
- Use FEAT_GCIE_LEGACY on GICv5 systems to virtualize GICv3 VMs on
GICv5 hardware, leveraging the legacy VGIC interface.
- Userspace control of the 'nASSGIcap' GICv3 feature, allowing
userspace to disable support for SGIs w/o an active state on hardware
that previously advertised it unconditionally.
- Map supporting endpoints with cacheable memory attributes on systems
with FEAT_S2FWB and DIC where KVM no longer needs to perform cache
maintenance on the address range.
- Nested support for FEAT_RAS and FEAT_DoubleFault2, allowing the guest
hypervisor to inject external aborts into an L2 VM and take traps of
masked external aborts to the hypervisor.
- Convert more system register sanitization to the config-driven
implementation.
- Fixes to the visibility of EL2 registers, namely making VGICv3 system
registers accessible through the VGIC device instead of the ONE_REG
vCPU ioctls.
- Various cleanups and minor fixes.
Claudio Imbrenda
Paolo Bonzini
Song GaoandHuacai Chen
Marc Zyngier
Hendrik BruecknerandJanosch Frank
Will DeaconandMarc Zyngier
Sascha BischoffandMarc Zyngier
David WoodhouseandSean Christopherson
Arnd BergmannandClaudio Imbrenda
Michael RothandSean Christopherson
Jiaqi YanandOliver Upton
Fuad TabbaandPaolo Bonzini