39 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
John Johansen 3d28e2397a apparmor: add support loading per permission tagging
Add support for the per permission tag index for a given permission
set. This will be used by both meta-data tagging, to allow annotating
accept states with context and debug information. As well as by rule
tainting and triggers to specify the taint or trigger to be applied.

Since these are low frequency ancillary data items they are stored
in a tighter packed format to that allows for sharing and reuse of the
strings between permissions and accept states. Reducing the amount of
kernel memory use at the cost of having to go through a couple if
index based indirections.

The tags are just strings that has no meaning with out context. When
used as meta-data for auditing and debugging its entirely information
for userspace, but triggers, and tainting can be used to affect the
domain. However they all exist in the same packed data set and can
be shared between different uses.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-01-29 01:27:47 -08:00
John Johansen a30a9fdb66 apparmor: fix af_unix auditing to include all address information
The auditing of addresses currently doesn't include the source address
and mixes source and foreign/peer under the same audit name. Fix this
so source is always addr, and the foreign/peer is peer_addr.

Fixes: c05e705812 ("apparmor: add fine grained af_unix mediation")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-15 22:39:43 -07:00
John Johansen bc6e5f6933 apparmor: Remove use of the double lock
The use of the double lock is not necessary and problematic. Instead
pull the bits that need locks into their own sections and grab the
needed references.

Fixes: c05e705812 ("apparmor: add fine grained af_unix mediation")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-15 22:39:43 -07:00
Casey SchauflerandPaul Moore 870b7fdc66 lsm: use lsm_prop in security_audit_rule_match
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsm_prop structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsm_prop structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.

Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsm_prop instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmprop_init()
fills the structure with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the lsm_prop structure later in the series.
At that point the use of lsmprop_init() is dropped.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-10-11 14:34:12 -04:00
GUO ZihuaandPaul Moore 9a95c5bfbf ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section
A panic happens in ima_match_policy:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
PGD 42f873067 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh
Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
               BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450
Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39
      7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d
      f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea
      44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f
RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200
RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739
R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970
R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f5195b51740(0000)
GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 ima_get_action+0x22/0x30
 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830
 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170
 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0
 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140
 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0
 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0
 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90
 path_openat+0x571/0x1720
 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0
 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60
 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250
 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca

Commit c7423dbdbc ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by
ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a
RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL.
This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side
critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems.

Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause
synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a
UAF to happen.

The root cause of this issue could be described as follows:
|	Thread A	|	Thread B	|
|			|ima_match_policy	|
|			|  rcu_read_lock	|
|ima_lsm_update_rule	|			|
|  synchronize_rcu	|			|
|			|    kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)|
|			|      sleep		|
==> synchronize_rcu returns early
|  kfree(entry)		|			|
|			|    entry = entry->next|
==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything).
|			|    entry->action	|
==> Accessing entry might cause panic.

To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within
RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC.

Fixes: c7423dbdbc ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-06-13 14:26:50 -04:00
Georgia GarciaandJohn Johansen c4371d9063 apparmor: add io_uring mediation
For now, the io_uring mediation is limited to sqpoll and
override_creds.

Signed-off-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2023-10-18 15:58:49 -07:00
John Johansen fa9b63adab apparmor: add user namespace creation mediation
Unprivileged user namespace creation is often used as a first step
in privilege escalation attacks. Instead of disabling it at the
sysrq level, which blocks its legitimate use as for setting up a sandbox,
allow control on a per domain basis.

This allows an admin to quickly lock down a system while also still
allowing legitimate use.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2023-10-18 15:49:02 -07:00
John Johansen 90c436a64a apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.
The cred is needed to properly audit some messages, and will be needed
in the future for uid conditional mediation. So pass it through to
where the apparmor_audit_data struct gets defined.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2023-10-18 15:30:38 -07:00
John Johansen d20f5a1a6e apparmor: rename audit_data->label to audit_data->subj_label
rename audit_data's label field to subj_label to better reflect its
use. Also at the same time drop unneeded assignments to ->subj_label
as the later call to aa_check_perms will do the assignment if needed.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2023-10-18 15:30:34 -07:00
John Johansen bd7bd201ca apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data
Everywhere where common_audit_data is used apparmor audit_data is also
used. We can simplify the code and drop the use of the aad macro
everywhere by combining the two structures.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2023-10-18 15:30:29 -07:00
John Johansen 8c4b785a86 apparmor: add mediation class information to auditing
Audit messages currently don't contain the mediation class which can
make them less clear than they should be in some circumstances. With
newer mediation classes coming this potential confusion will become
worse.

Fix this by adding the mediatin class to the messages.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-10-03 14:49:03 -07:00
Thomas GleixnerandGreg Kroah-Hartman b886d83c5b treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2 of the license

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-05 17:37:17 +02:00
Richard Guy BriggsandPaul Moore 90462a5bd3 audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).

The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.

It was part of commit 03d37d25e0 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.

Remove it.

Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-01-31 23:00:15 -05:00
Matthew GarrettandJohn Johansen e79c26d040 apparmor: Add support for audit rule filtering
This patch adds support to Apparmor for integrating with audit rule
filtering. Right now it only handles SUBJ_ROLE, interpreting it as a
single component of a label. This is sufficient to get Apparmor working
with IMA's appraisal rules without any modifications on the IMA side.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-06-07 01:50:47 -07:00
John Johansen 56974a6fcf apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation
version 2 - Force an abi break. Network mediation will only be
            available in v8 abi complaint policy.

Provide a basic mediation of sockets. This is not a full net mediation
but just whether a spcific family of socket can be used by an
application, along with setting up some basic infrastructure for
network mediation to follow.

the user space rule hav the basic form of
  NETWORK RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'network' [ DOMAIN ]
                 [ TYPE | PROTOCOL ]

  DOMAIN = ( 'inet' | 'ax25' | 'ipx' | 'appletalk' | 'netrom' |
             'bridge' | 'atmpvc' | 'x25' | 'inet6' | 'rose' |
	     'netbeui' | 'security' | 'key' | 'packet' | 'ash' |
	     'econet' | 'atmsvc' | 'sna' | 'irda' | 'pppox' |
	     'wanpipe' | 'bluetooth' | 'netlink' | 'unix' | 'rds' |
	     'llc' | 'can' | 'tipc' | 'iucv' | 'rxrpc' | 'isdn' |
	     'phonet' | 'ieee802154' | 'caif' | 'alg' | 'nfc' |
	     'vsock' | 'mpls' | 'ib' | 'kcm' ) ','

  TYPE = ( 'stream' | 'dgram' | 'seqpacket' |  'rdm' | 'raw' |
           'packet' )

  PROTOCOL = ( 'tcp' | 'udp' | 'icmp' )

eg.
  network,
  network inet,

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2018-03-13 17:25:48 -07:00
John Johansen 3acfd5f54c apparmor: audit unknown signal numbers
Allow apparmor to audit the number of a signal that it does not
provide a mapping for and is currently being reported only as
unknown.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-02-09 11:30:01 -08:00
John Johansen b5beb07ad3 apparmor: fix resource audit messages when auditing peer
Resource auditing is using the peer field which is not available
when the rlim data struct is used, because it is a different element
of the same union. Accessing peer during resource auditing could
cause garbage log entries or even oops the kernel.

Move the rlim data block into the same struct as the peer field
so they can be used together.

CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 86b92cb782 ("apparmor: move resource checks to using labels")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-02-09 11:30:00 -08:00
John Johansen b12cbb2158 apparmor: fix oops in audit_signal_cb hook
The apparmor_audit_data struct ordering got messed up during a merge
conflict, resulting in the signal integer and peer pointer being in
a union instead of a struct.

For most of the 4.13 and 4.14 life cycle, this was hidden by
commit 651e28c553 ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket
mediation") which fixed the apparmor_audit_data struct when its data
was added. When that commit was reverted in -rc7 the signal audit bug
was exposed, and unfortunately it never showed up in any of the
testing until after 4.14 was released. Shaun Khan, Zephaniah
E. Loss-Cutler-Hull filed nearly simultaneous bug reports (with
different oopes, the smaller of which is included below).

Full credit goes to Tetsuo Handa for jumping on this as well and
noticing the audit data struct problem and reporting it.

[   76.178568] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
ffffffff0eee3bc0
[   76.178579] IP: audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0
[   76.178581] PGD 1a640a067 P4D 1a640a067 PUD 0
[   76.178586] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[   76.178589] Modules linked in: fuse rfcomm bnep usblp uvcvideo btusb
btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ip6table_filter ip6_tables
xt_tcpudp nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack
iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables intel_rapl joydev wmi_bmof serio_raw
iwldvm iwlwifi shpchp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass autofs4 algif_skcipher
nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel
[   76.178620] CPU: 0 PID: 10675 Comm: pidgin Not tainted
4.14.0-f1-dirty #135
[   76.178623] Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP EliteBook Folio
9470m/18DF, BIOS 68IBD Ver. F.62 10/22/2015
[   76.178625] task: ffff9c7a94c31dc0 task.stack: ffffa09b02a4c000
[   76.178628] RIP: 0010:audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0
[   76.178631] RSP: 0018:ffffa09b02a4fc08 EFLAGS: 00010292
[   76.178634] RAX: ffffa09b02a4fd60 RBX: ffff9c7aee0741f8 RCX:
0000000000000000
[   76.178636] RDX: ffffffffee012290 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI:
ffff9c7a9493d800
[   76.178638] RBP: ffffa09b02a4fd40 R08: 000000000000004d R09:
ffffa09b02a4fc46
[   76.178641] R10: ffffa09b02a4fcb8 R11: ffff9c7ab44f5072 R12:
ffffa09b02a4fd40
[   76.178643] R13: ffffffff9e447be0 R14: ffff9c7a94c31dc0 R15:
0000000000000001
[   76.178646] FS:  00007f8b11ba2a80(0000) GS:ffff9c7afea00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[   76.178648] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   76.178650] CR2: ffffffff0eee3bc0 CR3: 00000003d5209002 CR4:
00000000001606f0
[   76.178652] Call Trace:
[   76.178660]  common_lsm_audit+0x1da/0x780
[   76.178665]  ? d_absolute_path+0x60/0x90
[   76.178669]  ? aa_check_perms+0xcd/0xe0
[   76.178672]  aa_check_perms+0xcd/0xe0
[   76.178675]  profile_signal_perm.part.0+0x90/0xa0
[   76.178679]  aa_may_signal+0x16e/0x1b0
[   76.178686]  apparmor_task_kill+0x51/0x120
[   76.178690]  security_task_kill+0x44/0x60
[   76.178695]  group_send_sig_info+0x25/0x60
[   76.178699]  kill_pid_info+0x36/0x60
[   76.178703]  SYSC_kill+0xdb/0x180
[   76.178707]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x92/0xd0
[   76.178712]  ? _raw_write_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30
[   76.178716]  ? task_work_run+0x6a/0x90
[   76.178720]  ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x80/0xa0
[   76.178723]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94
[   76.178727] RIP: 0033:0x7f8b0e58b767
[   76.178729] RSP: 002b:00007fff19efd4d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000003e
[   76.178732] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557f3e3c2050 RCX:
00007f8b0e58b767
[   76.178735] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:
000000000000263b
[   76.178737] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000557f3e3c2270 R09:
0000000000000001
[   76.178739] R10: 000000000000022d R11: 0000000000000206 R12:
0000000000000000
[   76.178741] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000557f3e3c13c0 R15:
0000000000000000
[   76.178745] Code: 48 8b 55 18 48 89 df 41 b8 20 00 08 01 5b 5d 48 8b
42 10 48 8b 52 30 48 63 48 4c 48 8b 44 c8 48 31 c9 48 8b 70 38 e9 f4 fd
00 00 <48> 8b 14 d5 40 27 e5 9e 48 c7 c6 7d 07 19 9f 48 89 df e8 fd 35
[   76.178794] RIP: audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0 RSP: ffffa09b02a4fc08
[   76.178796] CR2: ffffffff0eee3bc0
[   76.178799] ---[ end trace 514af9529297f1a3 ]---

Fixes: cd1dbf76b2 ("apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals")
Reported-by: Zephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull <warp-spam_kernel@aehallh.com>
Reported-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Tested-by: Ivan Kozik <ivan@ludios.org>
Tested-by: Zephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull <warp-spam_kernel@aehallh.com>
Tested-by: Christian Boltz <apparmor@cboltz.de>
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-11-27 14:38:15 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 80c094a47d Revert "apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation"
This reverts commit 651e28c553.

This caused a regression:
 "The specific problem is that dnsmasq refuses to start on openSUSE Leap
  42.2.  The specific cause is that and attempt to open a PF_LOCAL socket
  gets EACCES.  This means that networking doesn't function on a system
  with a 4.14-rc2 system."

Sadly, the developers involved seemed to be in denial for several weeks
about this, delaying the revert.  This has not been a good release for
the security subsystem, and this area needs to change development
practices.

Reported-and-bisected-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Tracked-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <regressions@leemhuis.info>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-10-26 19:35:35 +02:00
John Johansen 651e28c553 apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation
Provide a basic mediation of sockets. This is not a full net mediation
but just whether a spcific family of socket can be used by an
application, along with setting up some basic infrastructure for
network mediation to follow.

the user space rule hav the basic form of
  NETWORK RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'network' [ DOMAIN ]
                 [ TYPE | PROTOCOL ]

  DOMAIN = ( 'inet' | 'ax25' | 'ipx' | 'appletalk' | 'netrom' |
             'bridge' | 'atmpvc' | 'x25' | 'inet6' | 'rose' |
	     'netbeui' | 'security' | 'key' | 'packet' | 'ash' |
	     'econet' | 'atmsvc' | 'sna' | 'irda' | 'pppox' |
	     'wanpipe' | 'bluetooth' | 'netlink' | 'unix' | 'rds' |
	     'llc' | 'can' | 'tipc' | 'iucv' | 'rxrpc' | 'isdn' |
	     'phonet' | 'ieee802154' | 'caif' | 'alg' | 'nfc' |
	     'vsock' | 'mpls' | 'ib' | 'kcm' ) ','

  TYPE = ( 'stream' | 'dgram' | 'seqpacket' |  'rdm' | 'raw' |
           'packet' )

  PROTOCOL = ( 'tcp' | 'udp' | 'icmp' )

eg.
  network,
  network inet,

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2017-09-22 13:00:58 -07:00
John Johansen 2410aa96d6 apparmor: make policy_unpack able to audit different info messages
Switch unpack auditing to using the generic name field in the audit
struct and make it so we can start adding new info messages about
why an unpack failed.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2017-09-22 13:00:58 -07:00
John Johansen 2ea3ffb778 apparmor: add mount mediation
Add basic mount mediation. That allows controlling based on basic
mount parameters. It does not include special mount parameters for
apparmor, super block labeling, or any triggers for apparmor namespace
parameter modifications on pivot root.

default userspace policy rules have the form of
  MOUNT RULE = ( MOUNT | REMOUNT | UMOUNT )

  MOUNT = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'mount' [ MOUNT CONDITIONS ] [ SOURCE FILEGLOB ]
          [ '->' MOUNTPOINT FILEGLOB ]

  REMOUNT = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'remount' [ MOUNT CONDITIONS ]
            MOUNTPOINT FILEGLOB

  UMOUNT = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'umount' [ MOUNT CONDITIONS ] MOUNTPOINT FILEGLOB

  MOUNT CONDITIONS = [ ( 'fstype' | 'vfstype' ) ( '=' | 'in' )
                       MOUNT FSTYPE EXPRESSION ]
		       [ 'options' ( '=' | 'in' ) MOUNT FLAGS EXPRESSION ]

  MOUNT FSTYPE EXPRESSION = ( MOUNT FSTYPE LIST | MOUNT EXPRESSION )

  MOUNT FSTYPE LIST = Comma separated list of valid filesystem and
                      virtual filesystem types (eg ext4, debugfs, etc)

  MOUNT FLAGS EXPRESSION = ( MOUNT FLAGS LIST | MOUNT EXPRESSION )

  MOUNT FLAGS LIST = Comma separated list of MOUNT FLAGS.

  MOUNT FLAGS = ( 'ro' | 'rw' | 'nosuid' | 'suid' | 'nodev' | 'dev' |
                  'noexec' | 'exec' | 'sync' | 'async' | 'remount' |
		  'mand' | 'nomand' | 'dirsync' | 'noatime' | 'atime' |
		  'nodiratime' | 'diratime' | 'bind' | 'rbind' | 'move' |
		  'verbose' | 'silent' | 'loud' | 'acl' | 'noacl' |
		  'unbindable' | 'runbindable' | 'private' | 'rprivate' |
		  'slave' | 'rslave' | 'shared' | 'rshared' |
		  'relatime' | 'norelatime' | 'iversion' | 'noiversion' |
		  'strictatime' | 'nouser' | 'user' )

  MOUNT EXPRESSION = ( ALPHANUMERIC | AARE ) ...

  PIVOT ROOT RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] pivot_root [ oldroot=OLD PUT FILEGLOB ]
                    [ NEW ROOT FILEGLOB ]

  SOURCE FILEGLOB = FILEGLOB

  MOUNTPOINT FILEGLOB = FILEGLOB

eg.
  mount,
  mount /dev/foo,
  mount options=ro /dev/foo -> /mnt/,
  mount options in (ro,atime) /dev/foo -> /mnt/,
  mount options=ro options=atime,

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2017-09-22 13:00:57 -07:00
John Johansen cd1dbf76b2 apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals
Add signal mediation where the signal can be mediated based on the
signal, direction, or the label or the peer/target. The signal perms
are verified on a cross check to ensure policy consistency in the case
of incremental policy load/replacement.

The optimization of skipping the cross check when policy is guaranteed
to be consistent (single compile unit) remains to be done.

policy rules have the form of
  SIGNAL_RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'signal' [ SIGNAL ACCESS PERMISSIONS ]
                [ SIGNAL SET ] [ SIGNAL PEER ]

  SIGNAL ACCESS PERMISSIONS = SIGNAL ACCESS | SIGNAL ACCESS LIST

  SIGNAL ACCESS LIST = '(' Comma or space separated list of SIGNAL
                           ACCESS ')'

  SIGNAL ACCESS = ( 'r' | 'w' | 'rw' | 'read' | 'write' | 'send' |
                    'receive' )

  SIGNAL SET = 'set' '=' '(' SIGNAL LIST ')'

  SIGNAL LIST = Comma or space separated list of SIGNALS

  SIGNALS = ( 'hup' | 'int' | 'quit' | 'ill' | 'trap' | 'abrt' |
              'bus' | 'fpe' | 'kill' | 'usr1' | 'segv' | 'usr2' |
	      'pipe' | 'alrm' | 'term' | 'stkflt' | 'chld' | 'cont' |
	      'stop' | 'stp' | 'ttin' | 'ttou' | 'urg' | 'xcpu' |
	      'xfsz' | 'vtalrm' | 'prof' | 'winch' | 'io' | 'pwr' |
	      'sys' | 'emt' | 'exists' | 'rtmin+0' ... 'rtmin+32'
            )

  SIGNAL PEER = 'peer' '=' AARE

eg.
  signal,                                 # allow all signals
  signal send set=(hup, kill) peer=foo,

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2017-09-22 13:00:57 -07:00
John Johansen 40cde7fcc3 apparmor: add domain label stacking info to apparmorfs
Now that the domain label transition is complete advertise it to
userspace.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-10 17:11:47 -07:00
John Johansen 064dc9472f apparmor: mediate files when they are received
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-10 17:11:45 -07:00