This patch doesn't change current functionality, it switches the two
uses of the in_ns fns and macros into the two semantically different
cases they are used for.
xxx_in_scope for checking mediation interaction between profiles
xxx_in_view to determine which profiles are visible.The scope will
always be a subset of the view as profiles that can not see each
other can not interact.
The split can not be completely done for label_match because it has to
distinct uses matching permission against label in scope, and checking
if a transition to a profile is allowed. The transition to a profile
can include profiles that are in view but not in scope, so retain this
distinction as a parameter.
While at the moment the two uses are very similar, in the future there
will be additional differences. So make sure the semantics differences
are present in the code.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The strtable is currently limited to a single entry string on unpack
even though domain has the concept of multiple entries within it. Make
this a reality as it will be used for tags and more advanced domain
transitions.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The set of rules on a profile is not dynamically extended, instead
if a new ruleset is needed a new version of the profile is created.
This allows us to use a vector of rules instead of a list, slightly
reducing memory usage and simplifying the code.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This section of profile_transition that occurs after x_to_label only
happens if perms.allow already has the MAY_EXEC bit set, so we don't need
to set it again.
Fixes: 16916b17b4 ("apparmor: force auditing of conflicting attachment execs from confined")
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Conflicting attachment paths are an error state that result in the
binary in question executing under an unexpected ix/ux fallback. As such,
it should be audited to record the occurrence of conflicting attachments.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Instead of silently overwriting the conflicting profile attachment string,
include that information in the ix/ux fallback string that gets set as info
instead. Also add a warning print if some other info is set that would be
overwritten by the ix/ux fallback string or by the profile not found error.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Instead of having a literal, making this a constant will allow for (hacky)
detection of conflicting profile attachments from inspection of the info
pointer. This is used in the next patch to augment the information provided
through domain.c:x_to_label for ix/ux fallback.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
find_attach may set info if something unusual happens during that process
(currently only used to signal conflicting attachments, but this could be
expanded in the future). This is information that should be propagated to
userspace via an audit message.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
x_table_lookup currently does stacking during label_parse() if the
target specifies a stack but its only caller ensures that it will
never be used with stacking.
Refactor to slightly simplify the code in x_to_label(), this
also fixes a long standing problem where x_to_labels check on stacking
is only on the first element to the table option list, instead of
the element that is found and used.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This is a step towards merging the file and policy state machines.
With the switch to extended permissions the state machine's ACCEPT2
table became unused freeing it up to store state specific flags. The
first flags to be stored are FLAG_OWNER and FLAG other which paves the
way towards merging the file and policydb perms into a single
permission table.
Currently Lookups based on the objects ownership conditional will
still need separate fns, this will be address in a following patch.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
There does not need to be an explicit restriction that unconfined
can't use change_hat. Traditionally unconfined doesn't have hats
so change_hat could not be used. But newer unconfined profiles have
the potential of having hats, and even system unconfined will be
able to be replaced with a profile that allows for hats.
To remain backwards compitible with expected return codes, continue
to return -EPERM if the unconfined profile does not have any hats.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Remove another case of code duplications. Switch to using the generic
routine instead of the current custom checks.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Make it so apparmor debug output can be controlled by class flags
as well as the debug flag on labels. This provides much finer
control at what is being output so apparmor doesn't flood the
logs with information that is not needed, making it hard to find
what is important.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
the kernel test robot reports a C23 extension
warning: label followed by a declaration is a C23 extension
[-Wc23-extensions]
696 | struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
Instead of adding a null statement creating a C99 style inline var
declaration lift the label declaration out of the block so that it no
longer immediatedly follows the label.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202411101808.AI8YG6cs-lkp@intel.com/
Fixes: ee650b3820f3 ("apparmor: properly handle cx/px lookup failure for complain")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The wording of 'scrubbing environment' implied that all environment
variables would be removed, when instead secure-execution mode only
removes a small number of environment variables. This patch updates the
wording to describe what actually occurs instead: setting AT_SECURE for
ld.so's secure-execution mode.
Link: https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/merge_requests/1315 is a
merge request that does similar updating for apparmor userspace.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
mode profiles
When a cx/px lookup fails, apparmor would deny execution of the binary
even in complain mode (where it would audit as allowing execution while
actually denying it). Instead, in complain mode, create a new learning
profile, just as would have been done if the cx/px line wasn't there.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
some of those used to be needed, some had been cargo-culted for
no reason...
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fix one kernel-doc comment to silence the warnings:
security/apparmor/domain.c:46: warning: Function parameter or member 'to_cred' not described in 'may_change_ptraced_domain'
security/apparmor/domain.c:46: warning: Excess function parameter 'cred' description in 'may_change_ptraced_domain'
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=7036
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
unprivileged unconfined can use change_profile to alter the confinement
set by the mac admin.
Allow restricting unprivileged unconfined by still allowing change_profile
but stacking the change against unconfined. This allows unconfined to
still apply system policy but allows the task to enter the new confinement.
If unprivileged unconfined is required a sysctl is provided to switch
to the previous behavior.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
With the move to permission tables the dfa is no longer a stand
alone entity when used, needing a minimum of a permission table.
However it still could be shared among different pdbs each using
a different permission table.
Instead of duping the permission table when sharing a pdb, add a
refcount to the pdb so it can be easily shared.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The cred is needed to properly audit some messages, and will be needed
in the future for uid conditional mediation. So pass it through to
where the apparmor_audit_data struct gets defined.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Fix kernel-doc warnings:
security/apparmor/domain.c:279: warning: Function parameter or
member 'perms' not described in 'change_profile_perms'
security/apparmor/domain.c:380: warning: Function parameter or
member 'bprm' not described in 'find_attach'
security/apparmor/domain.c:380: warning: Function parameter or
member 'head' not described in 'find_attach'
security/apparmor/domain.c:380: warning: Function parameter or
member 'info' not described in 'find_attach'
security/apparmor/domain.c:380: warning: Function parameter or
member 'name' not described in 'find_attach'
security/apparmor/domain.c:558: warning: Function parameter or
member 'info' not described in 'x_to_label'
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
John Johansen
Ryan LeeandJohn Johansen
Tanya AgarwalandJohn Johansen
Leesoo AhnandJohn Johansen
Al Viro
Yang LiandJohn Johansen
Gaosheng CuiandJohn Johansen