When tls_set_device_offload_rx() fails at tls_dev_add(), the error path
calls tls_sw_free_resources_rx() to clean up the SW context that was
initialized by tls_set_sw_offload(). This function calls
tls_sw_release_resources_rx() (which stops the strparser via
tls_strp_stop()) and tls_sw_free_ctx_rx() (which kfrees the context),
but never frees the anchor skb that was allocated by alloc_skb(0) in
tls_strp_init().
Note that tls_sw_free_resources_rx() is exclusively used for this
"failed to start offload" code path, there's no other caller.
The leak did not exist before commit 84c61fe1a7 ("tls: rx: do not use
the standard strparser"), because the standard strparser doesn't try
to pre-allocate an skb.
The normal close path in tls_sk_proto_close() handles cleanup by calling
tls_sw_strparser_done() (which calls tls_strp_done()) after dropping
the socket lock, because tls_strp_done() does cancel_work_sync() and
the strparser work handler takes the socket lock.
Fixes: 84c61fe1a7 ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260428231559.1358502-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Remove unused flexible-array member in struct tls_rec and, with this,
fix the following warning:
net/tls/tls.h:131:29: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
Also, add a comment to prevent people from adding any members
after struct aead_request, which is a flexible structure --this is
a structure that ends in a flexible-array member.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aNMG1lyXw4XEAVaE@kspp
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Normally we wait for the socket to buffer up the whole record
before we service it. If the socket has a tiny buffer, however,
we read out the data sooner, to prevent connection stalls.
Make sure that we abort the connection when we find out late
that the record is actually invalid. Retrying the parsing is
fine in itself but since we copy some more data each time
before we parse we can overflow the allocated skb space.
Constructing a scenario in which we're under pressure without
enough data in the socket to parse the length upfront is quite
hard. syzbot figured out a way to do this by serving us the header
in small OOB sends, and then filling in the recvbuf with a large
normal send.
Make sure that tls_rx_msg_size() aborts strp, if we reach
an invalid record there's really no way to recover.
Reported-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Fixes: 84c61fe1a7 ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917002814.1743558-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
TLS expects that it owns the receive queue of the TCP socket.
This cannot be guaranteed in case the reader of the TCP socket
entered before the TLS ULP was installed, or uses some non-standard
read API (eg. zerocopy ones). Replace the WARN_ON() and a buggy
early exit (which leaves anchor pointing to a freed skb) with real
error handling. Wipe the parsing state and tell the reader to retry.
We already reload the anchor every time we (re)acquire the socket lock,
so the only condition we need to avoid is an out of bounds read
(not having enough bytes in the socket for previously parsed record len).
If some data was read from under TLS but there's enough in the queue
we'll reload and decrypt what is most likely not a valid TLS record.
Leading to some undefined behavior from TLS perspective (corrupting
a stream? missing an alert? missing an attack?) but no kernel crash
should take place.
Reported-by: William Liu <will@willsroot.io>
Reported-by: Savino Dicanosa <savy@syst3mfailure.io>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/tFjq_kf7sWIG3A7CrCg_egb8CVsT_gsmHAK0_wxDPJXfIzxFAMxqmLwp3MlU5EHiet0AwwJldaaFdgyHpeIUCS-3m3llsmRzp9xIOBR4lAI=@syst3mfailure.io
Fixes: 84c61fe1a7 ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250807232907.600366-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
This adds the possibility to change the key and IV when using
TLS1.3. Changing the cipher or TLS version is not supported.
Once we have updated the RX key, we can unblock the receive side. If
the rekey fails, the context is unmodified and userspace is free to
retry the update or close the socket.
This change only affects tls_sw, since 1.3 offload isn't supported.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Prior to commit 1a074f7618 ("tls: also use init_prot_info in
tls_set_device_offload"), setting TLS_HW on TX didn't touch
prot->aad_size and prot->tail_size. They are set to 0 during context
allocation (tls_prot_info is embedded in tls_context, kzalloc'd by
tls_ctx_create).
When the RX key is configured, tls_set_sw_offload is called (for both
TLS_SW and TLS_HW). If the TX key is configured in TLS_HW mode after
the RX key has been installed, init_prot_info will now overwrite the
correct values of aad_size and tail_size, breaking SW decryption and
causing -EBADMSG errors to be returned to userspace.
Since TLS_HW doesn't use aad_size and tail_size at all (for TLS1.2,
tail_size is always 0, and aad_size is equal to TLS_HEADER_SIZE +
rec_seq_size), we can simply drop this hunk.
Fixes: 1a074f7618 ("tls: also use init_prot_info in tls_set_device_offload")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Ran Rozenstein <ranro@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/979d2f89a6a994d5bb49cae49a80be54150d094d.1697653889.git.sd@queasysnail.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
It's not really needed since we end up refetching it as tls_ctx. We
can also remove the NULL check, since we have already dereferenced ctx
in do_tls_setsockopt_conf.
While at it, fix up the reverse xmas tree ordering.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
It's not really needed since we end up refetching it as tls_ctx. We
can also remove the NULL check, since we have already dereferenced ctx
in do_tls_setsockopt_conf.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Most values are shared. Nonce size turns out to be equal to IV size
for all offloadable ciphers.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
It's defined in include/net/tls.h, avoid using an overly generic name.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
tls_cipher_size_desc indexes ciphers by their type, but we're not
using indices 0..50 of the array. Each struct tls_cipher_size_desc is
20B, so that's a lot of unused memory. We can reindex the array
starting at the lowest used cipher_type.
Introduce the get_cipher_size_desc helper to find the right item and
avoid out-of-bounds accesses, and make tls_cipher_size_desc's size
explicit so that gcc reminds us to update TLS_CIPHER_MIN/MAX when we
add a new cipher.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5e054e370e240247a5d37881a1cd93a67c15f4ca.1692977948.git.sd@queasysnail.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Chuck Lever says:
====================
In-kernel support for the TLS Alert protocol
IMO the kernel doesn't need user space (ie, tlshd) to handle the TLS
Alert protocol. Instead, a set of small helper functions can be used
to handle sending and receiving TLS Alerts for in-kernel TLS
consumers.
====================
Merged on top of a tag in case it's needed in the NFS tree.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/169047923706.5241.1181144206068116926.stgit@oracle-102.nfsv4bat.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
When receive buffer is small we try to copy out the data from
TCP into a skb maintained by TLS to prevent connection from
stalling. Unfortunately if a single record is made up of a mix
of decrypted and non-decrypted skbs combining them into a single
skb leads to loss of decryption status, resulting in decryption
errors or data corruption.
Similarly when trying to use TCP receive queue directly we need
to make sure that all the skbs within the record have the same
status. If we don't the mixed status will be detected correctly
but we'll CoW the anchor, again collapsing it into a single paged
skb without decrypted status preserved. So the "fixup" code will
not know which parts of skb to re-encrypt.
Fixes: 84c61fe1a7 ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
Tested-by: Shai Amiram <samiram@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The crypto_async_request passed to the completion is not guaranteed
to be the original request object. Only the data field can be relied
upon.
Fix this by storing the socket pointer with the AEAD request.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
