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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Christian Göttsche
|
6140be90ec |
fs/xattr: add *at family syscalls
Add the four syscalls setxattrat(), getxattrat(), listxattrat() and
removexattrat(). Those can be used to operate on extended attributes,
especially security related ones, either relative to a pinned directory
or on a file descriptor without read access, avoiding a
/proc/<pid>/fd/<fd> detour, requiring a mounted procfs.
One use case will be setfiles(8) setting SELinux file contexts
("security.selinux") without race conditions and without a file
descriptor opened with read access requiring SELinux read permission.
Use the do_{name}at() pattern from fs/open.c.
Pass the value of the extended attribute, its length, and for
setxattrat(2) the command (XATTR_CREATE or XATTR_REPLACE) via an added
struct xattr_args to not exceed six syscall arguments and not
merging the AT_* and XATTR_* flags.
[AV: fixes by Christian Brauner folded in, the entire thing rebased on
top of {filename,file}_...xattr() primitives, treatment of empty
pathnames regularized. As the result, AT_EMPTY_PATH+NULL handling
is cheap, so f...(2) can use it]
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240426162042.191916-1-cgoettsche@seltendoof.de
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
CC: x86@kernel.org
CC: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
CC: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
CC: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
CC: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
CC: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org
CC: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
CC: audit@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
CC: selinux@vger.kernel.org
[brauner: slight tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
||
 Uwe Kleine-König
|
6d89ead199 |
UAPI/ioctl: Improve parameter name of ioctl request definition helpers
The third parameter to _IOR et al is a type name, not a size. So the parameter being named "size" is irritating. Rename it to "argtype" instead to reduce confusion. There is a very minor chance that this breaks stuff. It only hurts however if there is a variable (or macro) in userspace that is called "argtype" *and* it's used in the parameters of _IOR and friends. IMHO this is negligible because usually definitions making use of these macros are provided by kernel headers (i.e. us) or if they are replicated in userspace code, they are replicated and so supposed to match the kernel definitions (e.g. to make them usable by programs without the need to update the kernel headers used to compile the program). Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@baylibre.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> |
||
 Vadim Fedorenko
|
4aecca4c76 |
net_tstamp: add SCM_TS_OPT_ID to provide OPT_ID in control message
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID socket option flag gives a way to correlate TX timestamps and packets sent via socket. Unfortunately, there is no way to reliably predict socket timestamp ID value in case of error returned by sendmsg. For UDP sockets it's impossible because of lockless nature of UDP transmit, several threads may send packets in parallel. In case of RAW sockets MSG_MORE option makes things complicated. More details are in the conversation [1]. This patch adds new control message type to give user-space software an opportunity to control the mapping between packets and values by providing ID with each sendmsg for UDP sockets. The documentation is also added in this patch. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CALCETrU0jB+kg0mhV6A8mrHfTE1D1pr1SD_B9Eaa9aDPfgHdtA@mail.gmail.com/ Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadfed@meta.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241001125716.2832769-2-vadfed@meta.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
||
 Mark Brown
|
3630e82ab6 |
mman: Add map_shadow_stack() flags
In preparation for adding arm64 GCS support make the map_shadow_stack() SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN flag generic and add _SET_MARKER. The existing flag indicates that a token usable for stack switch should be added to the top of the newly mapped GCS region while the new flag indicates that a top of stack marker suitable for use by unwinders should be added above that. For arm64 the top of stack marker is all bits 0. Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241001-arm64-gcs-v13-5-222b78d87eee@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> |
||
 Mina Almasry
|
678f6e28b5 |
net: add SO_DEVMEM_DONTNEED setsockopt to release RX frags
Add an interface for the user to notify the kernel that it is done reading the devmem dmabuf frags returned as cmsg. The kernel will drop the reference on the frags to make them available for reuse. Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kaiyuan Zhang <kaiyuanz@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240910171458.219195-11-almasrymina@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
||
|
Mina Almasry
|
8f0b3cc9a4 |
tcp: RX path for devmem TCP
In tcp_recvmsg_locked(), detect if the skb being received by the user is a devmem skb. In this case - if the user provided the MSG_SOCK_DEVMEM flag - pass it to tcp_recvmsg_devmem() for custom handling. tcp_recvmsg_devmem() copies any data in the skb header to the linear buffer, and returns a cmsg to the user indicating the number of bytes returned in the linear buffer. tcp_recvmsg_devmem() then loops over the unaccessible devmem skb frags, and returns to the user a cmsg_devmem indicating the location of the data in the dmabuf device memory. cmsg_devmem contains this information: 1. the offset into the dmabuf where the payload starts. 'frag_offset'. 2. the size of the frag. 'frag_size'. 3. an opaque token 'frag_token' to return to the kernel when the buffer is to be released. The pages awaiting freeing are stored in the newly added sk->sk_user_frags, and each page passed to userspace is get_page()'d. This reference is dropped once the userspace indicates that it is done reading this page. All pages are released when the socket is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kaiyuan Zhang <kaiyuanz@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240910171458.219195-10-almasrymina@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
||
 Arnd Bergmann
|
54233a4254 |
uretprobe: change syscall number, again
Despite multiple attempts to get the syscall number assignment right for the newly added uretprobe syscall, we ended up with a bit of a mess: - The number is defined as 467 based on the assumption that the xattrat family of syscalls would use 463 through 466, but those did not make it into 6.11. - The include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h file still lists the number 463, but the new scripts/syscall.tbl that was supposed to have the same data lists 467 instead as the number for arc, arm64, csky, hexagon, loongarch, nios2, openrisc and riscv. None of these architectures actually provide a uretprobe syscall. - All the other architectures (powerpc, arm, mips, ...) don't list this syscall at all. There are two ways to make it consistent again: either list it with the same syscall number on all architectures, or only list it on x86 but not in scripts/syscall.tbl and asm-generic/unistd.h. Based on the most recent discussion, it seems like we won't need it anywhere else, so just remove the inconsistent assignment and instead move the x86 number to the next available one in the architecture specific range, which is 335. Fixes: |
||
 Linus Torvalds
|
91bd008d4e |
Merge tag 'probes-v6.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace
Pull probes updates from Masami Hiramatsu:
"Uprobes:
- x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack
- Add uretprobe syscall which speeds up the uretprobe 10-30% faster.
This syscall is automatically used from user-space trampolines
which are generated by the uretprobe. If this syscall is used by
normal user program, it will cause SIGILL. Note that this is
currently only implemented on x86_64.
(This also has two fixes for adjusting the syscall number to avoid
conflict with new *attrat syscalls.)
- uprobes/perf: fix user stack traces in the presence of pending
uretprobe. This corrects the uretprobe's trampoline address in the
stacktrace with correct return address
- selftests/x86: Add a return uprobe with shadow stack test
- selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall related tests.
- test case for register integrity check
- test case with register changing case
- test case for uretprobe syscall without uprobes (expected to fail)
- test case for uretprobe with shadow stack
- selftests/bpf: add test validating uprobe/uretprobe stack traces
- MAINTAINERS: Add uprobes entry. This does not specify the tree but
to clarify who maintains and reviews the uprobes
Kprobes:
- tracing/kprobes: Test case cleanups.
Replace redundant WARN_ON_ONCE() + pr_warn() with WARN_ONCE() and
remove unnecessary code from selftest
- tracing/kprobes: Add symbol counting check when module loads.
This checks the uniqueness of the probed symbol on modules. The
same check has already done for kernel symbols
(This also has a fix for build error with CONFIG_MODULES=n)
Cleanup:
- Add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros for fprobe and kprobe examples"
* tag 'probes-v6.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
MAINTAINERS: Add uprobes entry
selftests/bpf: Change uretprobe syscall number in uprobe_syscall test
uprobe: Change uretprobe syscall scope and number
tracing/kprobes: Fix build error when find_module() is not available
tracing/kprobes: Add symbol counting check when module loads
selftests/bpf: add test validating uprobe/uretprobe stack traces
perf,uprobes: fix user stack traces in the presence of pending uretprobes
tracing/kprobe: Remove cleanup code unrelated to selftest
tracing/kprobe: Integrate test warnings into WARN_ONCE
selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe shadow stack test
selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall call from user space test
selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs changes
selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs integrity
selftests/x86: Add return uprobe shadow stack test
uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe
uprobe: Wire up uretprobe system call
x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack
samples: kprobes: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros
fprobe: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macro
|
||
|
Arnd Bergmann
|
505d66d1ab |
clone3: drop __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 macro
When clone3() was introduced, it was not obvious how each architecture deals with setting up the stack and keeping the register contents in a fork()-like system call, so this was left for the architecture maintainers to implement, with __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 defined by those that already implement it. Five years later, we still have a few architectures left that are missing clone3(), and the macro keeps getting in the way as it's fundamentally different from all the other __ARCH_WANT_SYS_* macros that are meant to provide backwards-compatibility with applications using older syscalls that are no longer provided by default. Address this by reversing the polarity of the macro, adding an __ARCH_BROKEN_SYS_CLONE3 macro to all architectures that don't already provide the syscall, and remove __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 from all the other ones. Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> |
||
|
Arnd Bergmann
|
d3882564a7 |
syscalls: fix compat_sys_io_pgetevents_time64 usage
Using sys_io_pgetevents() as the entry point for compat mode tasks works almost correctly, but misses the sign extension for the min_nr and nr arguments. This was addressed on parisc by switching to compat_sys_io_pgetevents_time64() in commit |
||
 Jiri Olsa
|
190fec72df |
uprobe: Wire up uretprobe system call
Wiring up uretprobe system call, which comes in following changes. We need to do the wiring before, because the uretprobe implementation needs the syscall number. Note at the moment uretprobe syscall is supported only for native 64-bit process. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240611112158.40795-3-jolsa@kernel.org/ Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> |
||
 Jeff Xu
|
ff388fe5c4 |
mseal: wire up mseal syscall
Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10.
This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel.
In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range
against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits.
Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and
no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel
version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves
the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot
simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory
must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur.
Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data
structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the
VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type.
Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example,
such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable
or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be
applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and
applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A
similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall
[4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and
this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case.
Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal().
The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:
int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.
mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.
1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
via mremap().
3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.
5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
memset(0) for anonymous memory.
The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in
V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this
API.
Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing,
which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the
case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute
(RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from
becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime
of the process.
Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed
by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively
but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM
permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not
tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is
sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory.
For example, with madvise(DONTNEED).
However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security
risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the
second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros
and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard
operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case,
the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write
permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow
integrity.
Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome
browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions
that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a
complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases.
The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and
sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to
glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all
non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all
applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new
protections.
In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable
contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in
shaping this patch:
Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.
MM perf benchmarks
==================
This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to
check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made,
when any segment within the given memory range is sealed.
To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed.
[8]
The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call,
by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using
PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have
similar results.
The tests have roughly below sequence:
for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++)
create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA)
start the sampling
for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++)
mprotect one mapping
stop and save the sample
delete 1000 mappings
calculates all samples.
Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz,
4G memory, Chromebook.
Based on the latest upstream code:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104%
munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107%
munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106%
munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107%
munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104%
munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105%
mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106%
mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105%
mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104%
mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103%
mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103%
mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104%
madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109%
madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121%
madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121%
madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119%
madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115%
madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106%
munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108%
munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106%
munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106%
munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108%
munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107%
mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107%
mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106%
mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107%
mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105%
mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105%
mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105%
madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115%
madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120%
madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115%
madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116%
madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113%
madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111%
Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds
20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA.
In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109%
munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105%
munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103%
munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112%
munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114%
munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99%
mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97%
mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94%
mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103%
mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100%
mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101%
mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103%
madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109%
madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108%
madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105%
madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107%
madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108%
madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105%
munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104%
munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104%
munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102%
munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99%
munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103%
mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112%
mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107%
mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103%
mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103%
mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99%
mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103%
madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108%
madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109%
madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107%
madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109%
madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108%
madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114%
For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30
CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases.
It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254%
munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316%
munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398%
munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396%
munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352%
munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287%
mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187%
mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335%
mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506%
mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471%
mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465%
mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433%
madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125%
madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122%
madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138%
madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147%
madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145%
madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262%
munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327%
munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419%
munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413%
munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341%
munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303%
mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228%
mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409%
mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504%
mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423%
mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412%
mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415%
madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123%
madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133%
madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151%
madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151%
madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140%
madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142%
From 5.10 to 6.8
munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma.
mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma.
madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma.
In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the
increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times
greater for munmap and mprotect.
When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked
on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance
benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may
not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database
service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data
from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to
take this data with a grain of salt.
This patch (of 5):
Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2]
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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||
 Paolo Bonzini
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3c7a8e190b |
uapi: introduce uapi-friendly macros for GENMASK
Move __GENMASK and __GENMASK_ULL from include/ to include/uapi/ so that they can be used to define masks in userspace API headers. Compared to what is already in include/linux/bits.h, the definitions need to use the uglified versions of UL(), ULL(), BITS_PER_LONG and BITS_PER_LONG_LONG (which did not even exist), but otherwise expand to the same content. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> |
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Linus Torvalds
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063a7ce32d |
Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull security module updates from Paul Moore: - Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and lsm_set_self_attr(). The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under /proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple, simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current /proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM was allowed to be active at a given time. We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls. Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g. syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain. My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of their concerns. - Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit ioctls on 64-bit systems problem. This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes. - Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled at boot. While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense. Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like the best fit. - Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc. I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role; hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to look after it. - Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits) lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass() selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user() lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx() lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr() lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr() lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls SELinux: Add selfattr hooks AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks ... |
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 Miklos Szeredi
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d8b0f54650 |
wire up syscalls for statmount/listmount
Wire up all archs. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231025140205.3586473-7-mszeredi@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> |
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 Casey Schaufler
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5f42375904 |
LSM: wireup Linux Security Module syscalls
Wireup lsm_get_self_attr, lsm_set_self_attr and lsm_list_modules system calls. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
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Linus Torvalds
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1e0c505e13 |
Merge tag 'asm-generic-6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic
Pull ia64 removal and asm-generic updates from Arnd Bergmann: - The ia64 architecture gets its well-earned retirement as planned, now that there is one last (mostly) working release that will be maintained as an LTS kernel. - The architecture specific system call tables are updated for the added map_shadow_stack() syscall and to remove references to the long-gone sys_lookup_dcookie() syscall. * tag 'asm-generic-6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic: hexagon: Remove unusable symbols from the ptrace.h uapi asm-generic: Fix spelling of architecture arch: Reserve map_shadow_stack() syscall number for all architectures syscalls: Cleanup references to sys_lookup_dcookie() Documentation: Drop or replace remaining mentions of IA64 lib/raid6: Drop IA64 support Documentation: Drop IA64 from feature descriptions kernel: Drop IA64 support from sig_fault handlers arch: Remove Itanium (IA-64) architecture |
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 Sohil Mehta
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2fd0ebad27 |
arch: Reserve map_shadow_stack() syscall number for all architectures
commit
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Sohil Mehta
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ccab211af3 |
syscalls: Cleanup references to sys_lookup_dcookie()
commit 'be65de6b03aa ("fs: Remove dcookies support")' removed the
syscall definition for lookup_dcookie. However, syscall tables still
point to the old sys_lookup_dcookie() definition. Update syscall tables
of all architectures to directly point to sys_ni_syscall() instead.
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> # for perf
Acked-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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 peterz@infradead.org
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0f4b5f9722 |
futex: Add sys_futex_requeue()
Finish off the 'simple' futex2 syscall group by adding
sys_futex_requeue(). Unlike sys_futex_{wait,wake}() its arguments are
too numerous to fit into a regular syscall. As such, use struct
futex_waitv to pass the 'source' and 'destination' futexes to the
syscall.
This syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
and uses {val, uaddr, flags} for source and {uaddr, flags} for
destination.
This design explicitly allows requeueing between different types of
futex by having a different flags word per uaddr.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105248.511860556@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
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peterz@infradead.org
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cb8c4312af |
futex: Add sys_futex_wait()
To complement sys_futex_waitv()/wake(), add sys_futex_wait(). This syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET except it uses 'unsigned long' for the value and bitmask arguments, takes timespec and clockid_t arguments for the absolute timeout and uses FUTEX2 flags. The 'unsigned long' allows FUTEX2_SIZE_U64 on 64bit platforms. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105248.164324363@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net |
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peterz@infradead.org
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9f6c532f59 |
futex: Add sys_futex_wake()
To complement sys_futex_waitv() add sys_futex_wake(). This syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET except it uses 'unsigned long' for the bitmask and takes FUTEX2 flags. The 'unsigned long' allows FUTEX2_SIZE_U64 on 64bit platforms. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105247.936205525@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net |
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 Ard Biesheuvel
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f5e836884d |
kernel: Drop IA64 support from sig_fault handlers
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> |
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Linus Torvalds
|
df57721f9a |
Merge tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen: "This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack part of this feature, and just for userspace. The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction, the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy. For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier versions of this patch set" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ * tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits) x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support ... |
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 Rick Edgecombe
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a5f6c2ace9 |
x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler
A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack. There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c. Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it. Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable. The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com |