42 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Arnd BergmannandDave Kleikamp dad98c5b2a jfs: avoid -Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare warning again
The comparison of an __s8 value against DTPAGEMAXSLOT is still trivially
true, causing a harmless (default disabled) warning with clang:

fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:4419:25: error: result of comparison of constant 128 with expression of type 's8' (aka 'signed char') is always false [-Werror,-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare]
 4419 |                                         p->header.freelist >= DTPAGEMAXSLOT)) {
      |                                         ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I previously worked around two of these in commit 7833570dae ("jfs: avoid
-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare warning"), but now a new one has
come up, so address the same way by dropping the redundant range check.

Fixes: 119e448bb5 ("jfs: add dtpage integrity check to prevent index/pointer overflows")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2026-03-16 10:20:47 -05:00
Yun ZhouandDave Kleikamp 119e448bb5 jfs: add dtpage integrity check to prevent index/pointer overflows
Add check_dtpage() to validate dtpage_t integrity, focusing on
preventing index/pointer overflows from on-disk corruption.

Key checks:
- maxslot must be exactly DTPAGEMAXSLOT (128) as defined for dtpage
  slot array.
- freecnt bounded by [0, DTPAGEMAXSLOT-1] (slot[0] reserved for header).
- freelist validity: -1 when freecnt=0; 1~DTPAGEMAXSLOT-1 when non-zero,
  with linked list checks (no duplicates, proper termination via next=-1).
- stblindex bounds: must be within range that avoids overlapping with
  stbl itself (stblindex < DTPAGEMAXSLOT - stblsize).
- nextindex bounded by stbl size (stblsize << L2DTSLOTSIZE). stbl entries
  validity: within 1~DTPAGEMAXSLOT-1, no duplicates(excluding invalid
  entries marked as -1).

Invoked when loading dtpage (in BT_GETPAGE macro context) to catch
corruption early before directory operations trigger out-of-bounds access.

Signed-off-by: Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2026-03-11 10:57:52 -05:00
Yun ZhouandDave Kleikamp c83abc766a jfs: add dtroot integrity check to prevent index out-of-bounds
Add check_dtroot() to validate dtroot_t integrity, focusing on preventing
index/pointer overflows from on-disk corruption.

Key checks:
 - freecnt bounded by [0, DTROOTMAXSLOT-1] (slot[0] reserved for header).
 - freelist validity: -1 when freecnt=0; 1~DTROOTMAXSLOT-1 when non-zero,
   with linked list checks (no duplicates, proper termination via next=-1).
 - stbl bounds: nextindex within stbl array size; entries within 0~8, no
   duplicates (excluding idx=0).

Invoked in copy_from_dinode() when loading directory inodes, catching
corruption early before directory operations trigger out-of-bounds access.

This fixes the following UBSAN warning.

[  101.832754][ T5960] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  101.832762][ T5960] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3713:8
[  101.832792][ T5960] index -1 is out of range for type 'struct dtslot[128]'
[  101.832807][ T5960] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 5960 Comm: 5f7f0caf9979e9d Tainted: G            E       6.18.0-rc4-00250-g2603eb907f03 #119 PREEMPT_{RT,(full
[  101.832817][ T5960] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[  101.832819][ T5960] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[  101.832823][ T5960] Call Trace:
[  101.832833][ T5960]  <TASK>
[  101.832838][ T5960]  dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250
[  101.832909][ T5960]  ? __pfx_dump_stack_lvl+0x10/0x10
[  101.832925][ T5960]  ? __pfx__printk+0x10/0x10
[  101.832934][ T5960]  ? rt_mutex_slowunlock+0x493/0x8a0
[  101.832959][ T5960]  ubsan_epilogue+0xa/0x40
[  101.832966][ T5960]  __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xe9/0xf0
[  101.833007][ T5960]  dtInsertEntry+0x936/0x1430 [jfs]
[  101.833094][ T5960]  dtSplitPage+0x2c8b/0x3ed0 [jfs]
[  101.833177][ T5960]  ? __pfx_rt_mutex_slowunlock+0x10/0x10
[  101.833193][ T5960]  dtInsert+0x109b/0x6000 [jfs]
[  101.833283][ T5960]  ? rt_mutex_slowunlock+0x493/0x8a0
[  101.833296][ T5960]  ? __pfx_rt_mutex_slowunlock+0x10/0x10
[  101.833307][ T5960]  ? rt_spin_unlock+0x161/0x200
[  101.833315][ T5960]  ? __pfx_dtInsert+0x10/0x10 [jfs]
[  101.833391][ T5960]  ? txLock+0xaf9/0x1cb0 [jfs]
[  101.833477][ T5960]  ? dtInitRoot+0x22a/0x670 [jfs]
[  101.833556][ T5960]  jfs_mkdir+0x6ec/0xa70 [jfs]
[  101.833636][ T5960]  ? __pfx_jfs_mkdir+0x10/0x10 [jfs]
[  101.833721][ T5960]  ? generic_permission+0x2e5/0x690
[  101.833760][ T5960]  ? bpf_lsm_inode_mkdir+0x9/0x20
[  101.833776][ T5960]  vfs_mkdir+0x306/0x510
[  101.833786][ T5960]  do_mkdirat+0x247/0x590
[  101.833795][ T5960]  ? __pfx_do_mkdirat+0x10/0x10
[  101.833804][ T5960]  ? getname_flags+0x1e5/0x540
[  101.833815][ T5960]  __x64_sys_mkdir+0x6c/0x80
[  101.833823][ T5960]  do_syscall_64+0xfa/0xfa0
[  101.833832][ T5960]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x9c/0x150
[  101.833840][ T5960]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[  101.833847][ T5960]  ? exc_page_fault+0xab/0x100
[  101.833856][ T5960]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Signed-off-by: Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2026-03-11 10:57:21 -05:00
Arnd BergmannandDave Kleikamp 7833570dae jfs: avoid -Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare warning
A recent change for the range check started triggering a clang warning:

fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:2906:31: error: result of comparison of constant 128 with expression of type 's8' (aka 'signed char') is always false [-Werror,-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare]
 2906 |                         if (stbl[i] < 0 || stbl[i] >= DTPAGEMAXSLOT) {
      |                                            ~~~~~~~ ^  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3111:30: error: result of comparison of constant 128 with expression of type 's8' (aka 'signed char') is always false [-Werror,-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare]
 3111 |                 if (stbl[0] < 0 || stbl[0] >= DTPAGEMAXSLOT) {
      |                                    ~~~~~~~ ^  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Both the old and the new check were useless, but the previous version
apparently did not lead to the warning.

Remove the extraneous range check for simplicity.

Fixes: cafc667982 ("jfs: replace hardcoded magic number with DTPAGEMAXSLOT constant")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2026-02-02 14:47:12 -06:00
Zheng YuandDave Kleikamp cafc667982 jfs: replace hardcoded magic number with DTPAGEMAXSLOT constant
Replace hardcoded value 127 with DTPAGEMAXSLOT constant in boundary
checks within jfs_readdir() and dtReadFirst(). This improves code
maintainability and ensures consistency with the defined maximum
slot value.

Signed-off-by: Zheng Yu <zheng.yu@northwestern.edu>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2025-09-18 09:09:21 -05:00
Aditya DuttandDave Kleikamp 5dff41a863 jfs: fix array-index-out-of-bounds read in add_missing_indices
stbl is s8 but it must contain offsets into slot which can go from 0 to
127.

Added a bound check for that error and return -EIO if the check fails.
Also make jfs_readdir return with error if add_missing_indices returns
with an error.

Reported-by: syzbot+b974bd41515f770c608b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com./bug?extid=b974bd41515f770c608b
Signed-off-by: Aditya Dutt <duttaditya18@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2025-04-03 09:11:43 -05:00
Roman SmirnovandDave Kleikamp a8dfb21689 jfs: add index corruption check to DT_GETPAGE()
If the file system is corrupted, the header.stblindex variable
may become greater than 127. Because of this, an array access out
of bounds may occur:

------------[ cut here ]------------
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3096:10
index 237 is out of range for type 'struct dtslot[128]'
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5822 Comm: syz-executor740 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00110-g4099a71718b0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline]
 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x121/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:429
 dtReadFirst+0x622/0xc50 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3096
 dtReadNext fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3147 [inline]
 jfs_readdir+0x9aa/0x3c50 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:2862
 wrap_directory_iterator+0x91/0xd0 fs/readdir.c:65
 iterate_dir+0x571/0x800 fs/readdir.c:108
 __do_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:403 [inline]
 __se_sys_getdents64+0x1e2/0x4b0 fs/readdir.c:389
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
 </TASK>
---[ end trace ]---

Add a stblindex check for corruption.

Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+9120834fc227768625ba@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9120834fc227768625ba
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2025-03-11 11:53:40 -05:00
Ghanshyam AgrawalandDave Kleikamp 839f102efb jfs: fix array-index-out-of-bounds in jfs_readdir
The stbl might contain some invalid values. Added a check to
return error code in that case.

Reported-by: syzbot+0315f8fe99120601ba88@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0315f8fe99120601ba88
Signed-off-by: Ghanshyam Agrawal <ghanshyam1898@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2024-10-29 17:03:41 -05:00
Ghanshyam AgrawalandDave Kleikamp ca84a2c9be jfs: array-index-out-of-bounds fix in dtReadFirst
The value of stbl can be sometimes out of bounds due
to a bad filesystem. Added a check with appopriate return
of error code in that case.

Reported-by: syzbot+65fa06e29859e41a83f3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=65fa06e29859e41a83f3
Signed-off-by: Ghanshyam Agrawal <ghanshyam1898@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2024-10-29 16:13:36 -05:00
Edward Adam DavisandDave Kleikamp ce6dede912 jfs: fix null ptr deref in dtInsertEntry
[syzbot reported]
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 PID: 5061 Comm: syz-executor404 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
RIP: 0010:dtInsertEntry+0xd0c/0x1780 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3713
...
[Analyze]
In dtInsertEntry(), when the pointer h has the same value as p, after writing
name in UniStrncpy_to_le(), p->header.flag will be cleared. This will cause the
previously true judgment "p->header.flag & BT-LEAF" to change to no after writing
the name operation, this leads to entering an incorrect branch and accessing the
uninitialized object ih when judging this condition for the second time.

[Fix]
After got the page, check freelist first, if freelist == 0 then exit dtInsert()
and return -EINVAL.

Reported-by: syzbot+bba84aef3a26fb93deb9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2024-06-26 12:27:33 -05:00
Manas GhandatandDave Kleikamp fa5492ee89 jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds Read in dtSearch
Currently while searching for current page in the sorted entry table
of the page there is a out of bound access. Added a bound check to fix
the error.

Dave:
Set return code to -EIO

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202310241724.Ed02yUz9-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Manas Ghandat <ghandatmanas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2023-11-21 15:26:33 -06:00
Osama MuhammadandDave Kleikamp 27e56f59ba UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in dtSplitRoot
Syzkaller reported the following issue:

oop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 32768

UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:1971:9
index -2 is out of range for type 'struct dtslot [128]'
CPU: 0 PID: 3613 Comm: syz-executor270 Not tainted 6.0.0-syzkaller-09423-g493ffd6605b2 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/22/2022
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106
 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:151 [inline]
 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xdb/0x130 lib/ubsan.c:283
 dtSplitRoot+0x8d8/0x1900 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:1971
 dtSplitUp fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:985 [inline]
 dtInsert+0x1189/0x6b80 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:863
 jfs_mkdir+0x757/0xb00 fs/jfs/namei.c:270
 vfs_mkdir+0x3b3/0x590 fs/namei.c:4013
 do_mkdirat+0x279/0x550 fs/namei.c:4038
 __do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4053 [inline]
 __se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4051 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mkdirat+0x85/0x90 fs/namei.c:4051
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7fcdc0113fd9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffeb8bc67d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000102
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fcdc0113fd9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000340 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fcdc00d37a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fcdc00d37a0
R10: 00005555559a72c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000f8008000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00083878000000f8 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

The issue is caused when the value of fsi becomes less than -1.
The check to break the loop when fsi value becomes -1 is present
but syzbot was able to produce value less than -1 which cause the error.
This patch simply add the change for the values less than 0.

The patch is tested via syzbot.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+d4b1df2e9d4ded6488ec@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d4b1df2e9d4ded6488ec
Signed-off-by: Osama Muhammad <osmtendev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2023-11-21 15:26:33 -06:00
Dave Kleikamp e471e5942c fs/jfs: Remove dead code
Since the JFS code was first added to Linux, there has been code hidden
in ifdefs  for some potential future features such as defragmentation
and supporting block sizes other than 4KB. There has been no ongoing
development on JFS for many years, so it's past time to remove this dead
code from the source.

Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2022-04-25 14:00:33 -05:00
Gustavo A. R. SilvaandDave Kleikamp 7aba5dcc23 jfs: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array member
The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language
extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare
variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2],
introduced in C99:

struct foo {
        int stuff;
        struct boo array[];
};

By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning
in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which
will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being
inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on.

Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by
this change:

"Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator
may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of
zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1]

This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle.

[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
[3] commit 7649773293 ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour")

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2020-03-09 15:18:51 -05:00
Thomas GleixnerandGreg Kroah-Hartman 1a59d1b8e0 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 156
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version this program is distributed in the
  hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
  the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
  purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
  should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
  with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc
  59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.113240726@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-30 11:26:35 -07:00
Kees Cook 6da2ec5605 treewide: kmalloc() -> kmalloc_array()
The kmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kmalloc_array(). This
patch replaces cases of:

        kmalloc(a * b, gfp)

with:
        kmalloc_array(a * b, gfp)

as well as handling cases of:

        kmalloc(a * b * c, gfp)

with:

        kmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)

as it's slightly less ugly than:

        kmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)

This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:

        kmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)

though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.

Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.

The tools/ directory was manually excluded, since it has its own
implementation of kmalloc().

The Coccinelle script used for this was:

// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	(sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+	sizeof(TYPE) * E
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(sizeof(THING)) * E
+	sizeof(THING) * E
  , ...)
)

// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@

(
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@

- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	SIZE * COUNT
+	COUNT, SIZE
  , ...)

// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
)

// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	E1 * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
)

// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
  kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
  kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kmalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	(E1) * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	(E1) * (E2)
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	E1 * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-12 16:19:22 -07:00
Joe PerchesandDave Kleikamp 6ed71e9819 jfs: Coalesce some formats
Formats are better kept as a single line for easier grep.

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2016-03-30 10:48:28 -05:00
Al ViroandDave Kleikamp e1f1fe798d jfs: get rid of homegrown endianness helpers
Get rid of le24 stuff, along with the bitfields use - all that stuff
can be done with standard stuff, in sparse-verifiable manner.  Moreover,
that way (shift-and-mask) often generates better code - gcc optimizer
sucks on bitfields...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
----
2014-12-23 17:01:24 -06:00
Dave Kleikamp 44512449c0 jfs: fix readdir cookie incompatibility with NFSv4
NFSv4 reserves readdir cookie values 0-2 for special entries (. and ..),
but jfs allows a value of 2 for a non-special entry. This incompatibility
can result in the nfs client reporting a readdir loop.

This patch doesn't change the value stored internally, but adds one to
the value exposed to the iterate method.

Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
2013-08-15 17:22:29 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 9db019278c Merge tag 'jfs-3.11' of git://github.com/kleikamp/linux-shaggy
Pull jfs update from Dave Kleikamp:
 "A couple cleanups to JFS for 3.11"

* tag 'jfs-3.11' of git://github.com/kleikamp/linux-shaggy:
  jfs: Update jfs_error
  jfs: fix sparse warning in fs/jfs/xattr.c
2013-07-11 10:19:34 -07:00
Al Viro 070a0ebf42 [readdir] convert jfs
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-06-29 12:56:42 +04:00
Joe PerchesandDave Kleikamp eb8630d7d2 jfs: Update jfs_error
Use a more current logging style.

Add __printf format and argument verification.

Remove embedded function names from formats.
Add %pf, __builtin_return_address(0) to jfs_error.
Add newlines to formats for kernel style consistency.
(One format already had an erroneous newline)
Coalesce formats and align arguments.

Object size reduced ~1KiB.

$ size fs/jfs/built-in.o*
   text	   data	    bss	    dec	    hex	filename
 201891	  35488	  63936	 301315	  49903	fs/jfs/built-in.o.new
 202821	  35488	  64192	 302501	  49da5	fs/jfs/built-in.o.old

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
2013-06-05 14:47:19 -05:00
Al Viro 496ad9aa8e new helper: file_inode(file)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-02-22 23:31:31 -05:00
Tejun Heo 5a0e3ad6af include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files.  percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.

percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed.  Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability.  As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.

  http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py

The script does the followings.

* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
  only the necessary includes are there.  ie. if only gfp is used,
  gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.

* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
  blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
  to its surrounding.  It's put in the include block which contains
  core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
  alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
  doesn't seem to be any matching order.

* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
  because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
  an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
  file.

The conversion was done in the following steps.

1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
   over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
   and ~3000 slab.h inclusions.  The script emitted errors for ~400
   files.

2. Each error was manually checked.  Some didn't need the inclusion,
   some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
   embedding .c file was more appropriate for others.  This step added
   inclusions to around 150 files.

3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
   from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.

4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
   e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
   APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.

5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
   editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
   files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell.  Most gfp.h
   inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
   wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros.  Each
   slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
   necessary.

6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.

7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
   were fixed.  CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
   distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
   more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
   build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).

   * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
   * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * ia64 SMP allmodconfig
   * s390 SMP allmodconfig
   * alpha SMP allmodconfig
   * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig

8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
   a separate patch and serve as bisection point.

Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-30 22:02:32 +09:00
Christoph HellwigandJan Kara 5dd4056db8 dquot: cleanup space allocation / freeing routines
Get rid of the alloc_space, free_space, reserve_space, claim_space and
release_rsv dquot operations - they are always called from the filesystem
and if a filesystem really needs their own (which none currently does)
it can just call into it's own routine directly.

Move shared logic into the common __dquot_alloc_space,
dquot_claim_space_nodirty and __dquot_free_space low-level methods,
and rationalize the wrappers around it to move as much as possible
code into the common block for CONFIG_QUOTA vs not.  Also rename
all these helpers to be named dquot_* instead of vfs_dq_*.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
2010-03-05 00:20:28 +01:00