The RTAS call ibm,physical-attestation is used to retrieve
information about the trusted boot state of the firmware and
hypervisor on the system, and also Trusted Platform Modules (TPM)
data if the system is TCG 2.0 compliant.
This RTAS interface expects the caller to define different command
structs such as RetrieveTPMLog, RetrievePlatformCertificat and etc,
in a work area with a maximum size of 4K bytes and the response
buffer will be returned in the same work area.
The current implementation of this RTAS function is in the user
space but allocation of the work area is restricted with the system
lockdown. So this patch implements this RTAS function in the kernel
and expose to the user space with open/ioctl/read interfaces.
PAPR (2.13+ 21.3 ibm,physical-attestation) defines RTAS function:
- Pass the command struct to obtain the response buffer for the
specific command.
- This RTAS function is sequence RTAS call and has to issue RTAS
call multiple times to get the complete response buffer (max 64K).
The hypervisor expects the first RTAS call with the sequence 1 and
the subsequent calls with the sequence number returned from the
previous calls.
Expose these interfaces to user space with a
/dev/papr-physical-attestation character device using the following
programming model:
int devfd = open("/dev/papr-physical-attestation");
int fd = ioctl(devfd, PAPR_PHY_ATTEST_IOC_HANDLE,
struct papr_phy_attest_io_block);
- The user space defines the command struct and requests the
response for any command.
- Obtain the complete response buffer and returned the buffer as
blob to the command specific FD.
size = read(fd, buf, len);
- Can retrieve the response buffer once or multiple times until the
end of BLOB buffer.
Implemented this new kernel ABI support in librtas library for
system lockdown
Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250416225743.596462-8-haren@linux.ibm.com
The RTAS call ibm,get-dynamic-sensor-state is used to get the
sensor state identified by the location code and the sensor
token. The librtas library provides an API
rtas_get_dynamic_sensor() which uses /dev/mem access for work
area allocation but is restricted under system lockdown.
This patch provides an interface with new ioctl
PAPR_DYNAMIC_SENSOR_IOC_GET to the papr-indices character
driver which executes this HCALL and copies the sensor state
in the user specified ioctl buffer.
Refer PAPR 7.3.19 ibm,get-dynamic-sensor-state for more
information on this RTAS call.
- User input parameters to the RTAS call: location code string
and the sensor token
Expose these interfaces to user space with a /dev/papr-indices
character device using the following programming model:
int fd = open("/dev/papr-indices", O_RDWR);
int ret = ioctl(fd, PAPR_DYNAMIC_SENSOR_IOC_GET,
struct papr_indices_io_block)
- The user space specifies input parameters in
papr_indices_io_block struct
- Returned state for the specified sensor is copied to
papr_indices_io_block.dynamic_param.state
Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sathvika Vasireddy <sv@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250416225743.596462-6-haren@linux.ibm.com
The RTAS call ibm,set-dynamic-indicator is used to set the new
indicator state identified by a location code. The current
implementation uses rtas_set_dynamic_indicator() API provided by
librtas library which allocates RMO buffer and issue this RTAS
call in the user space. But /dev/mem access by the user space
is prohibited under system lockdown.
This patch provides an interface with new ioctl
PAPR_DYNAMIC_INDICATOR_IOC_SET to the papr-indices character
driver and expose this interface to the user space that is
compatible with lockdown.
Refer PAPR 7.3.18 ibm,set-dynamic-indicator for more
information on this RTAS call.
- User input parameters to the RTAS call: location code
string, indicator token and new state
Expose these interfaces to user space with a /dev/papr-indices
character device using the following programming model:
int fd = open("/dev/papr-indices", O_RDWR);
int ret = ioctl(fd, PAPR_DYNAMIC_INDICATOR_IOC_SET,
struct papr_indices_io_block)
- The user space passes input parameters in papr_indices_io_block
struct
Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sathvika Vasireddy <sv@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250416225743.596462-5-haren@linux.ibm.com
The RTAS call ibm,get-indices is used to obtain indices and
location codes for a specified indicator or sensor token. The
current implementation uses rtas_get_indices() API provided by
librtas library which allocates RMO buffer and issue this RTAS
call in the user space. But writable mapping /dev/mem access by
the user space is prohibited under system lockdown.
To overcome the restricted access in the user space, the kernel
provide interfaces to collect indices data from the hypervisor.
This patch adds papr-indices character driver and expose standard
interfaces such as open / ioctl/ read to user space in ways that
are compatible with lockdown.
PAPR (2.13 7.3.17 ibm,get-indices RTAS Call) describes the
following steps to retrieve all indices data:
- User input parameters to the RTAS call: sensor or indicator,
and indice type
- ibm,get-indices is sequence RTAS call which means has to issue
multiple times to get the entire list of indicators or sensors
of a particular type. The hypervisor expects the first RTAS call
with the sequence 1 and the subsequent calls with the sequence
number returned from the previous calls.
- The OS may not interleave calls to ibm,get-indices for different
indicator or sensor types. Means other RTAS calls with different
type should not be issued while the previous type sequence is in
progress. So collect the entire list of indices and copied to
buffer BLOB during ioctl() and expose this buffer to the user
space with the file descriptor.
- The hypervisor fills the work area with a specific format but
does not return the number of bytes written to the buffer.
Instead of parsing the data for each call to determine the data
length, copy the work area size (RTAS_GET_INDICES_BUF_SIZE) to
the buffer. Return work-area size of data to the user space for
each read() call.
Expose these interfaces to user space with a /dev/papr-indices
character device using the following programming model:
int devfd = open("/dev/papr-indices", O_RDONLY);
int fd = ioctl(devfd, PAPR_INDICES_IOC_GET,
struct papr_indices_io_block)
- Collect all indices data for the specified token to the buffer
char *buf = malloc(RTAS_GET_INDICES_BUF_SIZE);
length = read(fd, buf, RTAS_GET_INDICES_BUF_SIZE)
- RTAS_GET_INDICES_BUF_SIZE of data is returned to the user
space.
- The user space retrieves the indices and their location codes
from the buffer
- Should issue multiple read() calls until reaches the end of
BLOB buffer.
The read() should use the file descriptor obtained from ioctl to
get the data that is exposed to file descriptor. Implemented
support in librtas (rtas_get_indices()) for this new ABI for
system lockdown.
Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sathvika Vasireddy <sv@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250416225743.596462-4-haren@linux.ibm.com
The IBM Cell blade support was the last user of UDBG_RTAS_CONSOLE.
Although it's still possible to build it via
PPC_EARLY_DEBUG_UDBG_RTAS_CONSOLE, AFAIK it's not useful on any
other platfoms, because only Cell and JS20 era machines provided the
RTAS get/put-term-char functions.
If anyone is using it or needs it we can always resurrect it from git.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241218105523.416573-19-mpe@ellerman.id.au
When commit 38f7b7067d ("powerpc/rtas: rtas_busy_delay() improvements")
was introduced, documentation about proper usage of sleep related functions
was outdated.
The commit message references the usage of a HZ=100 system. When using a
20ms sleep duration on such a system and therefore using msleep(), the
possible additional slack will be +10ms.
When the system is configured with HZ=100 the granularity of a jiffy and of
a bucket of the lowest timer wheel level is 10ms. To make sure a timer will
not expire early (when queueing of the timer races with an concurrent
update of jiffies), timers are always queued into the next bucket. This is
the reason for the maximal possible slack of 10ms.
fsleep() limits the maximal possible slack to 25% by making threshold
between usleep_range() and msleep() HZ dependent. As soon as the accuracy
of msleep() is sufficient, the less expensive timer list timer based
sleeping function is used instead of the more expensive hrtimer based
usleep_range() function. The udelay() will not be used in this specific
usecase as the lowest sleep length is larger than 1 millisecond.
Use fsleep() directly instead of using an own heuristic for the best
sleeping mechanism to use.
Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241014-devel-anna-maria-b4-timers-flseep-v3-13-dc8b907cb62f@linutronix.de
Smatch warns:
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:1932 __do_sys_rtas() warn: potential
spectre issue 'args.args' [r] (local cap)
The 'nargs' and 'nret' locals come directly from a user-supplied
buffer and are used as indexes into a small stack-based array and as
inputs to copy_to_user() after they are subject to bounds checks.
Use array_index_nospec() after the bounds checks to clamp these values
for speculative execution.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240530-sys_rtas-nargs-nret-v1-1-129acddd4d89@linux.ibm.com
The PAPR spec spells the function name as
"ibm,reset-pe-dma-windows"
but in practice firmware uses the singular form:
"ibm,reset-pe-dma-window"
in the device tree. Since we have the wrong spelling in the RTAS
function table, reverse lookups (token -> name) fail and warn:
unexpected failed lookup for token 86
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 545 at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:659 __do_enter_rtas_trace+0x2a4/0x2b4
CPU: 1 PID: 545 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4 #30
Hardware name: IBM,9105-22A POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NL1060_028) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP [c0000000000417f0] __do_enter_rtas_trace+0x2a4/0x2b4
LR [c0000000000417ec] __do_enter_rtas_trace+0x2a0/0x2b4
Call Trace:
__do_enter_rtas_trace+0x2a0/0x2b4 (unreliable)
rtas_call+0x1f8/0x3e0
enable_ddw.constprop.0+0x4d0/0xc84
dma_iommu_dma_supported+0xe8/0x24c
dma_set_mask+0x5c/0xd8
mlx5_pci_init.constprop.0+0xf0/0x46c [mlx5_core]
probe_one+0xfc/0x32c [mlx5_core]
local_pci_probe+0x68/0x12c
pci_call_probe+0x68/0x1ec
pci_device_probe+0xbc/0x1a8
really_probe+0x104/0x570
__driver_probe_device+0xb8/0x224
driver_probe_device+0x54/0x130
__driver_attach+0x158/0x2b0
bus_for_each_dev+0xa8/0x120
driver_attach+0x34/0x48
bus_add_driver+0x174/0x304
driver_register+0x8c/0x1c4
__pci_register_driver+0x68/0x7c
mlx5_init+0xb8/0x118 [mlx5_core]
do_one_initcall+0x60/0x388
do_init_module+0x7c/0x2a4
init_module_from_file+0xb4/0x108
idempotent_init_module+0x184/0x34c
sys_finit_module+0x90/0x114
And oopses are possible when lockdep is enabled or the RTAS
tracepoints are active, since those paths dereference the result of
the lookup.
Use the correct spelling to match firmware's behavior, adjusting the
related constants to match.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 8252b88294 ("powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups")
Reported-by: Gaurav Batra <gbatra@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240222-rtas-fix-ibm-reset-pe-dma-window-v1-1-7aaf235ac63c@linux.ibm.com
If the function descriptor has a populated lock member, then callers
are required to hold it across calls. Now that the firmware activation
sequence is appropriately guarded, we can warn when the requirement
isn't satisfied.
__do_enter_rtas_trace() gets reorganized a bit as a result of
performing the function descriptor lookup unconditionally now.
Reviewed-by: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-8-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not
enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level
serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin
lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations.
However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls
to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a
function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in
progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively
requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the
level of RTAS entry and exit.
Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through
sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the
kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately
serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually
takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.)
Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and
ibm,get-vpd.
But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and
in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites
of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of
sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially
disrupting a sequence in progress.
So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences,
they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas()
users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks
to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call
sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow.
Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent
sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control
returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these
functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for
coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which
may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than
sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing
sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas().
* Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function.
* Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call
sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the
.lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with
justifying commentary.
* In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being
called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking
rtas_lock and entering RTAS.
* Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the
appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the
ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do:
int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE);
int fwrc;
mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock);
do {
fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL);
} while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc));
mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock);
There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that
concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block
on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
The rtas system call handler sys_rtas() delegates certain input
validation steps to a helper function: block_rtas_call(). One of these
steps ensures that the user-supplied token value maps to a known RTAS
function. This is done by performing a "reverse" token-to-function
lookup via rtas_token_to_function_untrusted() to obtain an
rtas_function object.
In changes to come, sys_rtas() itself will need the function
descriptor for the token. To prepare:
* Move the lookup and validation up into sys_rtas() and pass the
resulting rtas_function pointer to block_rtas_call(), which is
otherwise unconcerned with the token value.
* Change block_rtas_call() to report the RTAS function name instead of
the token value on validation failures, since it can now rely on
having a valid function descriptor.
One behavior change is that sys_rtas() now silently errors out when
passed a bad token, before calling block_rtas_call(). So we will no
longer log "RTAS call blocked - exploit attempt?" on invalid
tokens. This is consistent with how sys_rtas() currently handles other
"metadata" (nargs and nret), while block_rtas_call() is primarily
concerned with validating the arguments to be passed to specific RTAS
functions.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-5-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
Enabling any of the powerpc:rtas_* tracepoints at boot is likely to
result in an oops on RTAS platforms. For example, booting a QEMU
pseries model with 'trace_event=powerpc:rtas_input' in the command
line leads to:
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000008
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 7 [#1]
NIP [c00000000004231c] do_enter_rtas+0x1bc/0x460
LR [c00000000004231c] do_enter_rtas+0x1bc/0x460
Call Trace:
do_enter_rtas+0x1bc/0x460 (unreliable)
rtas_call+0x22c/0x4a0
rtas_get_boot_time+0x80/0x14c
read_persistent_clock64+0x124/0x150
read_persistent_wall_and_boot_offset+0x28/0x58
timekeeping_init+0x70/0x348
start_kernel+0xa0c/0xc1c
start_here_common+0x1c/0x20
(This is preceded by a warning for the failed lookup in
rtas_token_to_function().)
This happens when __do_enter_rtas_trace() attempts a token to function
descriptor lookup before the xarray containing the mappings has been
set up.
Fall back to linear scan of the table if rtas_token_to_function_xarray
is empty.
Fixes: 24098f580e ("powerpc/rtas: add tracepoints around RTAS entry")
Reviewed-by: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-3-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
rtas_token_to_function() WARNs when passed an invalid token; it's
meant to catch bugs in kernel-based users of RTAS functions. However,
user space controls the token value passed to rtas_token_to_function()
by block_rtas_call(), so user space with sufficient privilege to use
sys_rtas() can trigger the warnings at will:
unexpected failed lookup for token 2048
WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 2247 at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:556
rtas_token_to_function+0xfc/0x110
...
NIP rtas_token_to_function+0xfc/0x110
LR rtas_token_to_function+0xf8/0x110
Call Trace:
rtas_token_to_function+0xf8/0x110 (unreliable)
sys_rtas+0x188/0x880
system_call_exception+0x268/0x530
system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
It's desirable to continue warning on bogus tokens in
rtas_token_to_function(). Currently it is used to look up RTAS
function descriptors when tracing, where we know there has to have
been a successful descriptor lookup by different means already, and it
would be a serious inconsistency for the reverse lookup to fail.
So instead of weakening rtas_token_to_function()'s contract by
removing the warnings, introduce rtas_token_to_function_untrusted(),
which has no opinion on failed lookups. Convert block_rtas_call() and
rtas_token_to_function() to use it.
Fixes: 8252b88294 ("powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-1-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
Add lockdep annotations for the following properties that must hold:
* Any error log retrieval must be atomically coupled with the prior
RTAS call, without a window for another RTAS call to occur before the
error log can be retrieved.
* All users of the core rtas_args parameter block must hold rtas_lock.
Move the definitions of rtas_lock and rtas_args up in the file so that
__do_enter_rtas_trace() can refer to them.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230220-rtas-queue-for-6-4-v1-6-010e4416f13f@linux.ibm.com
Using memcpy() isn't safe when buf is identical to rtas_err_buf, which
can happen during boot before slab is up. Full context which may not
be obvious from the diff:
if (altbuf) {
buf = altbuf;
} else {
buf = rtas_err_buf;
if (slab_is_available())
buf = kmalloc(RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
if (buf)
memcpy(buf, rtas_err_buf, RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX);
This was found by inspection and I'm not aware of it causing problems
in practice. It appears to have been introduced by commit
033ef338b6 ("powerpc: Merge rtas.c into arch/powerpc/kernel"); the
old ppc64 version of this code did not have this problem.
Use memmove() instead.
Fixes: 033ef338b6 ("powerpc: Merge rtas.c into arch/powerpc/kernel")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230220-rtas-queue-for-6-4-v1-2-010e4416f13f@linux.ibm.com
With the tokens for all implemented RTAS functions now available via
rtas_function_token(), which is optimal and safe for arbitrary
contexts, there is no need to use rtas_token() or cache its result.
Most conversions are trivial, but a few are worth describing in more
detail:
* Error injection token comparisons for lockdown purposes are
consolidated into a simple predicate: token_is_restricted_errinjct().
* A couple of special cases in block_rtas_call() do not use
rtas_token() but perform string comparisons against names in the
function table. These are converted to compare against token values
instead, which is logically equivalent but less expensive.
* The lookup for the ibm,os-term token can be deferred until needed,
instead of caching it at boot to avoid device tree traversal during
panic.
* Since rtas_function_token() accesses a read-only data structure
without taking any locks, xmon's lookup of set-indicator can be
performed as needed instead of cached at startup.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-20-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
