Commit Graph

944 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Lennart Poettering
79d956db34 namespace: make setup_namespace() less crazy
Let's replace the ridiculous number of arguments with a structure, to
make this function less weird.

No change in behaviour, just some refactoring.
2023-10-11 12:39:30 +09:00
Mike Yuan
854eca4a95 core/execute: always set $USER and introduce SetLoginEnvironment=
Before this commit, $USER, $HOME, $LOGNAME and $SHELL are only
set when User= is set for the unit. For system service, this
results in different behaviors depending on whether User=root is set.

$USER always makes sense on its own, so let's set it unconditionally.
Ideally $HOME should be set too, but it causes trouble when e.g. getty
passes '-p' to login(1), which then doesn't override $HOME. $LOGNAME and
$SHELL are more like "login environments", and are generally not
suitable for system services. Therefore, a new option SetLoginEnvironment=
is also added to control the latter three variables.

Fixes #23438

Replaces #8227
2023-10-10 00:00:26 +08:00
Mike Yuan
1c9433559a core/execute: modernize get_fixed_{user,group}
No functional change, preparation for later commit.
2023-10-09 23:40:58 +08:00
Mike Yuan
59026bccd0 core/execute: use FOREACH_ARRAY in one more place 2023-10-09 23:40:57 +08:00
Daan De Meyer
cd7f3702eb core: Use a subdirectory of /run/ for PrivateDevices=
When we're starting early boot services such as systemd-userdbd.service,
/tmp might not yet be mounted, so let's use a directory in /run instead
which is guaranteed to be available.
2023-10-02 12:23:13 +02:00
Luca Boccassi
0213162743 core: use structured initialization in exec_context_init 2023-09-10 22:57:19 +01:00
Lennart Poettering
c9e120e06f manager: move various fields that declare unit defaults into a new structure UnitDefaults
This adds a new structure UnitDefaults which embedds the various default
settings for units we maintain. We so far maintained two sets of
variables for this, one in main.c as static variables and one in the
Manager structure. This moves them into a common structure.

This is most just search/replace, i.e. very dumb refactoring.

The fact that we now use a common structure for this allows us further
refactorings later.

Inspired by the discussions on #27890
2023-09-08 14:19:45 +02:00
Yu Watanabe
133e4de23f core/exec-credential: introduce exec_context_get_credential_directory() helper function
No functional change, just refactoring.
2023-09-07 00:53:28 +09:00
Yu Watanabe
43962c30fb core: rename credential.[ch] -> exec-credential.[ch]
Also rename setup_credentials() -> exec_setup_credentials().

Addresses the post-merge review
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/28787#pullrequestreview-1592065048.
2023-09-07 00:53:28 +09:00
Yu Watanabe
73ff4d48de Revert "core: do not leak mount for credentials directory if mount namespace is enabled"
This reverts commits
- 9ae3624889
  "test-execute: add tests for credentials directory with mount namespace"↲
- 94fe4cf255
  "core: do not leak mount for credentials directory if mount namespace is enabled",
- 7241b9cd72
  "core/credential: make setup_credentials() return path to credentials directory",
- fbaf3b23ae
  "core: set $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY only when we set up credentials"

Before the commits, credentials directory set up on ExecStart= was kept
on e.g. ExecStop=. But, with the changes, if a service requests a
private mount namespace, the credentials directory is discarded after
ExecStart= is finished.

Let's revert the change, and find better way later.

Addresses the post-merge comment
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/28787#issuecomment-1690614202.
2023-09-07 00:53:28 +09:00
Yu Watanabe
94fe4cf255 core: do not leak mount for credentials directory if mount namespace is enabled
Since kernel v5.2, open_tree() and move_mount() are added. If a service
loads or sets credentials, then let's try to clone the mount that contains
credentials with open_tree(), then mount it after a (private) mount
namespace is initialized for the service. Then, we can setup a mount for
credentials directory without leaking it to the main shared mount
namespace.

With this change, the credentials for services that request their own
private mount namespace become much much safer. And, the number of mount
events triggered by setting up credential directories can be decreased.

Unfortunately, this does not 'fix' the original issue #25527, as the
reported service does not requests private mount namespace, but the
situation should be better now.
2023-08-22 11:50:16 +09:00
Yu Watanabe
7241b9cd72 core/credential: make setup_credentials() return path to credentials directory
Then, we can reuse the path when building environment variables and setting up
mount namespace.
No functional change, just refactoring.
2023-08-22 11:41:52 +09:00
Yu Watanabe
fbaf3b23ae core: set $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY only when we set up credentials
It is not necessary to set the environment variable on an execution step
we do not support credentials.
2023-08-22 11:39:08 +09:00
Yu Watanabe
602c74cf78 core: split out functions and definitions from execute.[ch] to credential.[ch]
The functions and definitions related to credential consume about 1000
lines in execute.c. Let's split out them to dedicated files.
2023-08-22 11:39:08 +09:00
Lennart Poettering
e2fc0a7222 tree-wide: don't ifdef seccomp-util.h, drop seccomp.h inclusion everywhere
seccomp-util.h doesn't need ifdeffing, hence don't. It has worked since
quite a while with HAVE_SECCOMP is off, hence use it everywhere.

Also drop explicit seccomp.h inclusion everywhere (which needs
HAVE_SECCOMP ifdeffery everywhere). seccomp-util.h includes it anyway,
automatically, which we can just rely on, and it deals with HAVE_SECCOMP
at one central place.
2023-08-21 18:50:29 +02:00
David Tardon
52e3671bf7 tree-wide: use LIST_POP() 2023-08-17 09:48:17 +02:00
Luca Boccassi
1c693730ef Merge pull request #28758 from keszybz/negative-errno-macro
Use macros to reduce indentation in errno error handling
2023-08-16 17:18:45 +01:00
Luca Boccassi
663e27564f core: stage /run/host/os-release with a symlink to avoid possible race condition
If someone reads /run/host/os-release at the exact same time it is being updated, and it
is large enough, they might read a half-written file. This is very unlikely as
os-release is typically small and very rarely changes, but it is not
impossible.

Bind mount a staging directory instead of the file, and symlink the file
into into, so that we can do atomic file updates and close this gap.
Atomic replacement creates a new inode, so existing bind mounts would
continue to see the old file, and only new services would see the new file.
The indirection via the directory allows to work around this, as the
directory is fixed and never changes so the bind mount is always valid,
and its content is shared with all existing services.

Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/28794

Follow-up for 3f37a82545
2023-08-16 16:17:41 +01:00
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
5fa01ac036 manager: fix error handling after failure to set up child
exec_child() is supposed to set *exit_status when returning failure.
Unfortunately, we didn't do that in two cases. The result would be:
- a bogus error message "Failed at step SUCCESS spawning foo: …",
- a bogus success exit status.

Bugs introduced in 390902012c and
ad21e542b2.

The code is reworked to add some asserts and not set exit_status in the caller
so that it's clearer (also to the compiler) that it needs to be set.
2023-08-16 12:52:56 +02:00
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
bb44fd0734 various: use _NEG_ macros to reduce indentation
No functional change intended.
2023-08-16 12:52:56 +02:00
Daan De Meyer
3a78b0e9c4 execute: Chown credentials files and directories to service group
For a userns root user to be able to access the credentials, both
the uid and gid of the credentials directory have to be mapped into
the userns. Currently, the credentials directory group is root, which
we obviously do not want to map in to a userns, so let's make sure
that the credentials directory and files are owned by the service
group instead, which can generally be safely mapped into the userns.

Since we use permissions mode 0600, this shouldn't cause any change
in who is able to access the credentials.

Fixes #28747
2023-08-10 14:36:26 +02:00
Khem Raj
ac8db36cbc include missing sys/file.h for LOCK_EX 2023-08-02 14:45:27 -07:00
Luca Boccassi
167338529b Merge pull request #28428 from ldv-alt/ERRNO_IS
treewide: cleanup use of ERRNO_IS_*(r)
2023-07-30 16:31:16 +01:00
Dmitry V. Levin
5cf4c468a4 execute: cleanup use of ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE()
Given that ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE() also matches positive values,
make sure this macro is not called with arguments that do not have
errno semantics.

In this case the arguments passed to ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE() are the values
returned by set_oom_score_adjust() and set_coredump_filter() which are
not expected to return any positive values, but let's be consistent
anyway and move the ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE() invocations to the branches
where the return values are known to be negative.
2023-07-28 12:28:35 +00:00
Frantisek Sumsal
9b412709f2 core: free the strings in the set as well during unit cleanup
Spotted while fuzzing #27890.

=================================================================
==908098==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

Direct leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f4efe6d81f5 in __interceptor_realloc.part.0 (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xd81f5) (BuildId: dc689b05ca2577037af24700212bb5cce1f91c8a)
    #1 0x7f4efb8e3ace in greedy_realloc ../src/basic/alloc-util.c:70
    #2 0x7f4efb93b713 in extract_first_word ../src/basic/extract-word.c:62
    #3 0x7f4efb970d50 in set_put_strsplit ../src/basic/hashmap.c:1902
    #4 0x7f4efd76c27e in exec_context_deserialize ../src/core/execute-serialize.c:3341
    #5 0x7f4efd778dcb in exec_deserialize ../src/core/execute-serialize.c:4122
    #6 0x4032c0 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput ../src/core/fuzz-execute-serialize.c:60
    #7 0x403c58 in main ../src/fuzz/fuzz-main.c:50
    #8 0x7f4efecccb49 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b49) (BuildId: 245240a31888ad5c11bbc55b18e02d87388f59a9)
    #9 0x7f4efecccc0a in __libc_start_main_alias_2 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27c0a) (BuildId: 245240a31888ad5c11bbc55b18e02d87388f59a9)
    #10 0x402344 in _start (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-san/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x402344) (BuildId: 195f382cf1e39b9ba48d6dcf5a90f786d72837a8)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 64 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
Aborted (core dumped)

==911550==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

Direct leak of 17 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x4df281 in strdup (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x4df281) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6)
    #1 0x7fe4ae2b38fc in _set_put_strndup_full /home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/../src/basic/hashmap.c:1868:21
    #2 0x7fe4b0bad897 in exec_context_deserialize /home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/../src/core/execute-serialize.c:3914:29
    #3 0x7fe4b0b80592 in exec_deserialize /home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/../src/core/execute-serialize.c:4109:13
    #4 0x531d0f in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/../src/core/fuzz-execute-serialize.c:59:16
    #5 0x440594 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x440594) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6)
    #6 0x43f9b9 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool, bool*) (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x43f9b9) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6)
    #7 0x440fd5 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x440fd5) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6)
    #8 0x441955 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, std::allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile>>&) (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x441955) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6)
    #9 0x42e151 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x42e151) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6)
    #10 0x45a916 in main (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x45a916) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6)
    #11 0x7fe4ac449b49 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b49) (BuildId: 245240a31888ad5c11bbc55b18e02d87388f59a9)
    #12 0x7fe4ac449c0a in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27c0a) (BuildId: 245240a31888ad5c11bbc55b18e02d87388f59a9)
    #13 0x422b74 in _start (/home/mrc0mmand/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-libfuzz/fuzz-execute-serialize+0x422b74) (BuildId: 4e58706e607b8be7972d83c421bc0b625d509ec6)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 17 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
2023-07-28 12:59:11 +02:00