From bcf04e9b279b39fb7b44e42257dee078f5e76207 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yu Watanabe Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 03:24:45 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] tree-wide: fix typo --- TODO | 2 +- src/boot/efi/secure-boot.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/TODO b/TODO index 3b79730e34..048680a68a 100644 --- a/TODO +++ b/TODO @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ Features: these signatures into one object, and then include the result in the UKI. Then, if you bind a LUKS volume to public key X it really only can be unlocked during early boot, and you bind a LUKS volume to public key Y it - realy only can be unlocked during later boot, and so on. + really only can be unlocked during later boot, and so on. * dissection policy should enforce that unlocking can only take place by certain means, i.e. only via pw, only via tpm2, or only via fido, or a diff --git a/src/boot/efi/secure-boot.c b/src/boot/efi/secure-boot.c index 6a5c2a9bea..171b2c96b3 100644 --- a/src/boot/efi/secure-boot.c +++ b/src/boot/efi/secure-boot.c @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static EFI_STATUS install_security_override_one(EFI_GUID guid, SecurityOverride /* This replaces the platform provided security arch protocols (defined in the UEFI Platform Initialization * Specification) with the provided override instances. If not running in secure boot or the protocols are - * not available nothing happens. The override instances are provided with the neccessary info to undo this + * not available nothing happens. The override instances are provided with the necessary info to undo this * in uninstall_security_override(). */ void install_security_override(SecurityOverride *override, SecurityOverride *override2) { assert(override);