Commit Graph

36751 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Linus Torvalds
cceb634774 Merge tag 'timers-urgent-2021-08-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer fix from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A single timer fix:

   - Prevent a memory ordering issue in the timer expiry code which
     makes it possible to observe falsely that the callback has been
     executed already while that's not the case, which violates the
     guarantee of del_timer_sync()"

* tag 'timers-urgent-2021-08-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  timers: Move clearing of base::timer_running under base:: Lock
2021-08-08 11:53:30 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
713f0f37e8 Merge tag 'sched-urgent-2021-08-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler fix from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A single scheduler fix:

   - Prevent a double enqueue caused by rt_effective_prio() being
     invoked twice in __sched_setscheduler()"

* tag 'sched-urgent-2021-08-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  sched/rt: Fix double enqueue caused by rt_effective_prio
2021-08-08 11:50:07 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
74eedeba45 Merge tag 'perf-urgent-2021-08-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A set of perf fixes:

   - Correct the permission checks for perf event which send SIGTRAP to
     a different process and clean up that code to be more readable.

   - Prevent an out of bound MSR access in the x86 perf code which
     happened due to an incomplete limiting to the actually available
     hardware counters.

   - Prevent access to the AMD64_EVENTSEL_HOSTONLY bit when running
     inside a guest.

   - Handle small core counter re-enabling correctly by issuing an ACK
     right before reenabling it to prevent a stale PEBS record being
     kept around"

* tag 'perf-urgent-2021-08-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  perf/x86/intel: Apply mid ACK for small core
  perf/x86/amd: Don't touch the AMD64_EVENTSEL_HOSTONLY bit inside the guest
  perf/x86: Fix out of bound MSR access
  perf: Refactor permissions check into perf_check_permission()
  perf: Fix required permissions if sigtrap is requested
2021-08-08 11:46:13 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
2c4b1ec683 Merge tag 'trace-v5.14-rc4-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
 "Fix tracepoint race between static_call and callback data

  As callbacks to a tracepoint are paired with the data that is passed
  in when the callback is registered to the tracepoint, it must have
  that data passed to the callback when the tracepoint is triggered,
  else bad things will happen. To keep the two together, they are both
  assigned to a tracepoint structure and added to an array. The
  tracepoint call site will dereference the structure (via RCU) and call
  the callback in that structure along with the data in that structure.
  This keeps the callback and data tightly coupled.

  Because of the overhead that retpolines have on tracepoint callbacks,
  if there's only one callback attached to a tracepoint (a common case),
  then it is called via a static call (code modified to do a direct call
  instead of an indirect call). But to implement this, the data had to
  be decoupled from the callback, as now the callback is implemented via
  a direct call from the static call and not an indirect call from the
  dereferenced structure.

  Note, the static call only calls a callback used when there's a single
  callback attached to the tracepoint. If more than one callback is
  attached to the same tracepoint, then the static call will call an
  iterator function that goes back to dereferencing the structure
  keeping the callback and its data tightly coupled again.

  Issues can arise when going from 0 callbacks to one, as the static
  call is assigned to the callback, and it must take care that the data
  passed to it is loaded before the static call calls the callback.
  Going from 1 to 2 callbacks is not an issue, as long as the static
  call is updated to the iterator before the tracepoint structure array
  is updated via RCU. Going from 2 to more or back down to 2 is not an
  issue as the iterator can handle all theses cases. But going from 2 to
  1, care must be taken as the static call is now calling a callback and
  the data that is loaded must be the data for that callback.

  Care was taken to ensure the callback and data would be in-sync, but
  after a bug was reported, it became clear that not enough was done to
  make sure that was the case. These changes address this.

  The first change is to compare the old and new data instead of the old
  and new callback, as it's the data that can corrupt the callback, even
  if the callback is the same (something getting freed).

  The next change is to convert these transitions into states, to make
  it easier to know when a synchronization is needed, and to perform
  those synchronizations. The problem with this patch is that it slows
  down disabling all events from under a second, to making it take over
  10 seconds to do the same work. But that is addressed in the final
  patch.

  The final patch uses the RCU state functions to keep track of the RCU
  state between the transitions, and only needs to perform the
  synchronization if an RCU synchronization hasn't been done already.
  This brings the performance of disabling all events back to its
  original value. That's because no synchronization is required between
  disabling tracepoints but is required when enabling a tracepoint after
  its been disabled. If an RCU synchronization happens after the
  tracepoint is disabled, and before it is re-enabled, there's no need
  to do the synchronization again.

  Both the second and third patch have subtle complexities that they are
  separated into two patches. But because the second patch causes such a
  regression in performance, the third patch adds a "Fixes" tag to the
  second patch, such that the two must be backported together and not
  just the second patch"

* tag 'trace-v5.14-rc4-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
  tracepoint: Use rcu get state and cond sync for static call updates
  tracepoint: Fix static call function vs data state mismatch
  tracepoint: static call: Compare data on transition from 2->1 callees
2021-08-06 12:36:46 -07:00
Mathieu Desnoyers
7b40066c97 tracepoint: Use rcu get state and cond sync for static call updates
State transitions from 1->0->1 and N->2->1 callbacks require RCU
synchronization. Rather than performing the RCU synchronization every
time the state change occurs, which is quite slow when many tracepoints
are registered in batch, instead keep a snapshot of the RCU state on the
most recent transitions which belong to a chain, and conditionally wait
for a grace period on the last transition of the chain if one g.p. has
not elapsed since the last snapshot.

This applies to both RCU and SRCU.

This brings the performance regression caused by commit 231264d692
("Fix: tracepoint: static call function vs data state mismatch") back to
what it was originally.

Before this commit:

  # trace-cmd start -e all
  # time trace-cmd start -p nop

  real	0m10.593s
  user	0m0.017s
  sys	0m0.259s

After this commit:

  # trace-cmd start -e all
  # time trace-cmd start -p nop

  real	0m0.878s
  user	0m0.000s
  sys	0m0.103s

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210805192954.30688-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/4ebea8f0-58c9-e571-fd30-0ce4f6f09c70@samba.org/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Fixes: 231264d692 ("Fix: tracepoint: static call function vs data state mismatch")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2021-08-06 10:54:41 -04:00
Mathieu Desnoyers
231264d692 tracepoint: Fix static call function vs data state mismatch
On a 1->0->1 callbacks transition, there is an issue with the new
callback using the old callback's data.

Considering __DO_TRACE_CALL:

        do {                                                            \
                struct tracepoint_func *it_func_ptr;                    \
                void *__data;                                           \
                it_func_ptr =                                           \
                        rcu_dereference_raw((&__tracepoint_##name)->funcs); \
                if (it_func_ptr) {                                      \
                        __data = (it_func_ptr)->data;                   \

----> [ delayed here on one CPU (e.g. vcpu preempted by the host) ]

                        static_call(tp_func_##name)(__data, args);      \
                }                                                       \
        } while (0)

It has loaded the tp->funcs of the old callback, so it will try to use the old
data. This can be fixed by adding a RCU sync anywhere in the 1->0->1
transition chain.

On a N->2->1 transition, we need an rcu-sync because you may have a
sequence of 3->2->1 (or 1->2->1) where the element 0 data is unchanged
between 2->1, but was changed from 3->2 (or from 1->2), which may be
observed by the static call. This can be fixed by adding an
unconditional RCU sync in transition 2->1.

Note, this fixes a correctness issue at the cost of adding a tremendous
performance regression to the disabling of tracepoints.

Before this commit:

  # trace-cmd start -e all
  # time trace-cmd start -p nop

  real	0m0.778s
  user	0m0.000s
  sys	0m0.061s

After this commit:

  # trace-cmd start -e all
  # time trace-cmd start -p nop

  real	0m10.593s
  user	0m0.017s
  sys	0m0.259s

A follow up fix will introduce a more lightweight scheme based on RCU
get_state and cond_sync, that will return the performance back to what it
was. As both this change and the lightweight versions are complex on their
own, for bisecting any issues that this may cause, they are kept as two
separate changes.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210805132717.23813-3-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/4ebea8f0-58c9-e571-fd30-0ce4f6f09c70@samba.org/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Fixes: d25e37d89d ("tracepoint: Optimize using static_call()")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2021-08-05 15:42:08 -04:00
Mathieu Desnoyers
f7ec412125 tracepoint: static call: Compare data on transition from 2->1 callees
On transition from 2->1 callees, we should be comparing .data rather
than .func, because the same callback can be registered twice with
different data, and what we care about here is that the data of array
element 0 is unchanged to skip rcu sync.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210805132717.23813-2-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/4ebea8f0-58c9-e571-fd30-0ce4f6f09c70@samba.org/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Fixes: 547305a646 ("tracepoint: Fix out of sync data passing by static caller")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2021-08-05 15:40:41 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
6209049ecf Merge branch 'for-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull ucounts fix from Eric Biederman:
 "Fix a subtle locking versus reference counting bug in the ucount
  changes, found by syzbot"

* 'for-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  ucounts: Fix race condition between alloc_ucounts and put_ucounts
2021-08-05 12:00:00 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
3c3e902707 Merge tag 'trace-v5.14-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
 "Various tracing fixes:

   - Fix NULL pointer dereference caused by an error path

   - Give histogram calculation fields a size, otherwise it breaks
     synthetic creation based on them.

   - Reject strings being used for number calculations.

   - Fix recordmcount.pl warning on llvm building RISC-V allmodconfig

   - Fix the draw_functrace.py script to handle the new trace output

   - Fix warning of smp_processor_id() in preemptible code"

* tag 'trace-v5.14-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
  tracing: Quiet smp_processor_id() use in preemptable warning in hwlat
  scripts/tracing: fix the bug that can't parse raw_trace_func
  scripts/recordmcount.pl: Remove check_objcopy() and $can_use_local
  tracing: Reject string operand in the histogram expression
  tracing / histogram: Give calculation hist_fields a size
  tracing: Fix NULL pointer dereference in start_creating
2021-08-05 11:53:34 -07:00
Steven Rostedt (VMware)
51397dc6f2 tracing: Quiet smp_processor_id() use in preemptable warning in hwlat
The hardware latency detector (hwlat) has a mode that it runs one thread
across CPUs. The logic to move from the currently running CPU to the next
one in the list does a smp_processor_id() to find where it currently is.
Unfortunately, it's done with preemption enabled, and this triggers a
warning for using smp_processor_id() in a preempt enabled section.

As it is only using smp_processor_id() to get information on where it
currently is in order to simply move it to the next CPU, it doesn't really
care if it got moved in the mean time. It will simply balance out later if
such a case arises.

Switch smp_processor_id() to raw_smp_processor_id() to quiet that warning.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210804141848.79edadc0@oasis.local.home

Acked-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Fixes: 8fa826b734 ("trace/hwlat: Implement the mode config option")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2021-08-05 09:27:31 -04:00
Masami Hiramatsu
a9d10ca498 tracing: Reject string operand in the histogram expression
Since the string type can not be the target of the addition / subtraction
operation, it must be rejected. Without this fix, the string type silently
converted to digits.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/162742654278.290973.1523000673366456634.stgit@devnote2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 100719dcef ("tracing: Add simple expression support to hist triggers")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2021-08-04 17:49:26 -04:00
Steven Rostedt (VMware)
2c05caa7ba tracing / histogram: Give calculation hist_fields a size
When working on my user space applications, I found a bug in the synthetic
event code where the automated synthetic event field was not matching the
event field calculation it was attached to. Looking deeper into it, it was
because the calculation hist_field was not given a size.

The synthetic event fields are matched to their hist_fields either by
having the field have an identical string type, or if that does not match,
then the size and signed values are used to match the fields.

The problem arose when I tried to match a calculation where the fields
were "unsigned int". My tool created a synthetic event of type "u32". But
it failed to match. The string was:

  diff=field1-field2:onmatch(event).trace(synth,$diff)

Adding debugging into the kernel, I found that the size of "diff" was 0.
And since it was given "unsigned int" as a type, the histogram fallback
code used size and signed. The signed matched, but the size of u32 (4) did
not match zero, and the event failed to be created.

This can be worse if the field you want to match is not one of the
acceptable fields for a synthetic event. As event fields can have any type
that is supported in Linux, this can cause an issue. For example, if a
type is an enum. Then there's no way to use that with any calculations.

Have the calculation field simply take on the size of what it is
calculating.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210730171951.59c7743f@oasis.local.home

Cc: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 100719dcef ("tracing: Add simple expression support to hist triggers")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2021-08-04 17:48:41 -04:00
Peter Zijlstra
f558c2b834 sched/rt: Fix double enqueue caused by rt_effective_prio
Double enqueues in rt runqueues (list) have been reported while running
a simple test that spawns a number of threads doing a short sleep/run
pattern while being concurrently setscheduled between rt and fair class.

  WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2825 at kernel/sched/rt.c:1294 enqueue_task_rt+0x355/0x360
  CPU: 3 PID: 2825 Comm: setsched__13
  RIP: 0010:enqueue_task_rt+0x355/0x360
  Call Trace:
   __sched_setscheduler+0x581/0x9d0
   _sched_setscheduler+0x63/0xa0
   do_sched_setscheduler+0xa0/0x150
   __x64_sys_sched_setscheduler+0x1a/0x30
   do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

  list_add double add: new=ffff9867cb629b40, prev=ffff9867cb629b40,
		       next=ffff98679fc67ca0.
  kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:31!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT_RT SMP PTI
  CPU: 3 PID: 2825 Comm: setsched__13
  RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x41/0x50
  Call Trace:
   enqueue_task_rt+0x291/0x360
   __sched_setscheduler+0x581/0x9d0
   _sched_setscheduler+0x63/0xa0
   do_sched_setscheduler+0xa0/0x150
   __x64_sys_sched_setscheduler+0x1a/0x30
   do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

__sched_setscheduler() uses rt_effective_prio() to handle proper queuing
of priority boosted tasks that are setscheduled while being boosted.
rt_effective_prio() is however called twice per each
__sched_setscheduler() call: first directly by __sched_setscheduler()
before dequeuing the task and then by __setscheduler() to actually do
the priority change. If the priority of the pi_top_task is concurrently
being changed however, it might happen that the two calls return
different results. If, for example, the first call returned the same rt
priority the task was running at and the second one a fair priority, the
task won't be removed by the rt list (on_list still set) and then
enqueued in the fair runqueue. When eventually setscheduled back to rt
it will be seen as enqueued already and the WARNING/BUG be issued.

Fix this by calling rt_effective_prio() only once and then reusing the
return value. While at it refactor code as well for clarity. Concurrent
priority inheritance handling is still safe and will eventually converge
to a new state by following the inheritance chain(s).

Fixes: 0782e63bc6 ("sched: Handle priority boosted tasks proper in setscheduler()")
[squashed Peterz changes; added changelog]
Reported-by: Mark Simmons <msimmons@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210803104501.38333-1-juri.lelli@redhat.com
2021-08-04 15:16:31 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
c7d1022326 Merge tag 'net-5.14-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Pull networking fixes from Jakub Kicinski:
 "Networking fixes for 5.14-rc4, including fixes from bpf, can, WiFi
  (mac80211) and netfilter trees.

  Current release - regressions:

   - mac80211: fix starting aggregation sessions on mesh interfaces

  Current release - new code bugs:

   - sctp: send pmtu probe only if packet loss in Search Complete state

   - bnxt_en: add missing periodic PHC overflow check

   - devlink: fix phys_port_name of virtual port and merge error

   - hns3: change the method of obtaining default ptp cycle

   - can: mcba_usb_start(): add missing urb->transfer_dma initialization

  Previous releases - regressions:

   - set true network header for ECN decapsulation

   - mlx5e: RX, avoid possible data corruption w/ relaxed ordering and
     LRO

   - phy: re-add check for PHY_BRCM_DIS_TXCRXC_NOENRGY on the BCM54811
     PHY

   - sctp: fix return value check in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup

  Previous releases - always broken:

   - bpf:
       - more spectre corner case fixes, introduce a BPF nospec
         instruction for mitigating Spectre v4
       - fix OOB read when printing XDP link fdinfo
       - sockmap: fix cleanup related races

   - mac80211: fix enabling 4-address mode on a sta vif after assoc

   - can:
       - raw: raw_setsockopt(): fix raw_rcv panic for sock UAF
       - j1939: j1939_session_deactivate(): clarify lifetime of session
         object, avoid UAF
       - fix number of identical memory leaks in USB drivers

   - tipc:
       - do not blindly write skb_shinfo frags when doing decryption
       - fix sleeping in tipc accept routine"

* tag 'net-5.14-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (91 commits)
  gve: Update MAINTAINERS list
  can: esd_usb2: fix memory leak
  can: ems_usb: fix memory leak
  can: usb_8dev: fix memory leak
  can: mcba_usb_start(): add missing urb->transfer_dma initialization
  can: hi311x: fix a signedness bug in hi3110_cmd()
  MAINTAINERS: add Yasushi SHOJI as reviewer for the Microchip CAN BUS Analyzer Tool driver
  bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation
  bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction for mitigating Spectre v4
  sis900: Fix missing pci_disable_device() in probe and remove
  net: let flow have same hash in two directions
  nfc: nfcsim: fix use after free during module unload
  tulip: windbond-840: Fix missing pci_disable_device() in probe and remove
  sctp: fix return value check in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup
  nfc: s3fwrn5: fix undefined parameter values in dev_err()
  net/mlx5: Fix mlx5_vport_tbl_attr chain from u16 to u32
  net/mlx5e: Fix nullptr in mlx5e_hairpin_get_mdev()
  net/mlx5: Unload device upon firmware fatal error
  net/mlx5e: Fix page allocation failure for ptp-RQ over SF
  net/mlx5e: Fix page allocation failure for trap-RQ over SF
  ...
2021-07-30 16:01:36 -07:00
Kamal Agrawal
ff41c28c4b tracing: Fix NULL pointer dereference in start_creating
The event_trace_add_tracer() can fail. In this case, it leads to a crash
in start_creating with below call stack. Handle the error scenario
properly in trace_array_create_dir.

Call trace:
down_write+0x7c/0x204
start_creating.25017+0x6c/0x194
tracefs_create_file+0xc4/0x2b4
init_tracer_tracefs+0x5c/0x940
trace_array_create_dir+0x58/0xb4
trace_array_create+0x1bc/0x2b8
trace_array_get_by_name+0xdc/0x18c

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1627651386-21315-1-git-send-email-kamaagra@codeaurora.org

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4114fbfd02 ("tracing: Enable creating new instance early boot")
Signed-off-by: Kamal Agrawal <kamaagra@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2021-07-30 18:45:11 -04:00
David S. Miller
fc16a5322e Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf
Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
pull-request: bpf 2021-07-29

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.

We've added 9 non-merge commits during the last 14 day(s) which contain
a total of 20 files changed, 446 insertions(+), 138 deletions(-).

The main changes are:

1) Fix UBSAN out-of-bounds splat for showing XDP link fdinfo, from Lorenz Bauer.

2) Fix insufficient Spectre v4 mitigation in BPF runtime, from Daniel Borkmann,
   Piotr Krysiuk and Benedict Schlueter.

3) Batch of fixes for BPF sockmap found under stress testing, from John Fastabend.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-07-29 00:53:32 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann
2039f26f3a bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation
Spectre v4 gadgets make use of memory disambiguation, which is a set of
techniques that execute memory access instructions, that is, loads and
stores, out of program order; Intel's optimization manual, section 2.4.4.5:

  A load instruction micro-op may depend on a preceding store. Many
  microarchitectures block loads until all preceding store addresses are
  known. The memory disambiguator predicts which loads will not depend on
  any previous stores. When the disambiguator predicts that a load does
  not have such a dependency, the load takes its data from the L1 data
  cache. Eventually, the prediction is verified. If an actual conflict is
  detected, the load and all succeeding instructions are re-executed.

af86ca4e30 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") tried to mitigate
this attack by sanitizing the memory locations through preemptive "fast"
(low latency) stores of zero prior to the actual "slow" (high latency) store
of a pointer value such that upon dependency misprediction the CPU then
speculatively executes the load of the pointer value and retrieves the zero
value instead of the attacker controlled scalar value previously stored at
that location, meaning, subsequent access in the speculative domain is then
redirected to the "zero page".

The sanitized preemptive store of zero prior to the actual "slow" store is
done through a simple ST instruction based on r10 (frame pointer) with
relative offset to the stack location that the verifier has been tracking
on the original used register for STX, which does not have to be r10. Thus,
there are no memory dependencies for this store, since it's only using r10
and immediate constant of zero; hence af86ca4e30 /assumed/ a low latency
operation.

However, a recent attack demonstrated that this mitigation is not sufficient
since the preemptive store of zero could also be turned into a "slow" store
and is thus bypassed as well:

  [...]
  // r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
  // r7 = pointer to map value
  31: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
  // r9 will remain "fast" register, r10 will become "slow" register below
  32: (bf) r9 = r10
  // JIT maps BPF reg to x86 reg:
  //  r9  -> r15 (callee saved)
  //  r10 -> rbp
  // train store forward prediction to break dependency link between both r9
  // and r10 by evicting them from the predictor's LRU table.
  33: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24576)
  34: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
  35: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24580)
  36: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
  37: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24584)
  38: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
  39: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24588)
  40: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
  [...]
  543: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
  544: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
  // prepare call to bpf_ringbuf_output() helper. the latter will cause rbp
  // to spill to stack memory while r13/r14/r15 (all callee saved regs) remain
  // in hardware registers. rbp becomes slow due to push/pop latency. below is
  // disasm of bpf_ringbuf_output() helper for better visual context:
  //
  // ffffffff8117ee20: 41 54                 push   r12
  // ffffffff8117ee22: 55                    push   rbp
  // ffffffff8117ee23: 53                    push   rbx
  // ffffffff8117ee24: 48 f7 c1 fc ff ff ff  test   rcx,0xfffffffffffffffc
  // ffffffff8117ee2b: 0f 85 af 00 00 00     jne    ffffffff8117eee0 <-- jump taken
  // [...]
  // ffffffff8117eee0: 49 c7 c4 ea ff ff ff  mov    r12,0xffffffffffffffea
  // ffffffff8117eee7: 5b                    pop    rbx
  // ffffffff8117eee8: 5d                    pop    rbp
  // ffffffff8117eee9: 4c 89 e0              mov    rax,r12
  // ffffffff8117eeec: 41 5c                 pop    r12
  // ffffffff8117eeee: c3                    ret
  545: (18) r1 = map[id:4]
  547: (bf) r2 = r7
  548: (b7) r3 = 0
  549: (b7) r4 = 4
  550: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_output#194288
  // instruction 551 inserted by verifier    \
  551: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0            | /both/ are now slow stores here
  // storing map value pointer r7 at fp-16   | since value of r10 is "slow".
  552: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7           /
  // following "fast" read to the same memory location, but due to dependency
  // misprediction it will speculatively execute before insn 551/552 completes.
  553: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r9 -16)
  // in speculative domain contains attacker controlled r2. in non-speculative
  // domain this contains r7, and thus accesses r7 +0 below.
  554: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
  // leak r3

As can be seen, the current speculative store bypass mitigation which the
verifier inserts at line 551 is insufficient since /both/, the write of
the zero sanitation as well as the map value pointer are a high latency
instruction due to prior memory access via push/pop of r10 (rbp) in contrast
to the low latency read in line 553 as r9 (r15) which stays in hardware
registers. Thus, architecturally, fp-16 is r7, however, microarchitecturally,
fp-16 can still be r2.

Initial thoughts to address this issue was to track spilled pointer loads
from stack and enforce their load via LDX through r10 as well so that /both/
the preemptive store of zero /as well as/ the load use the /same/ register
such that a dependency is created between the store and load. However, this
option is not sufficient either since it can be bypassed as well under
speculation. An updated attack with pointer spill/fills now _all_ based on
r10 would look as follows:

  [...]
  // r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
  // r7 = pointer to map value
  [...]
  // longer store forward prediction training sequence than before.
  2062: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25588)
  2063: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30708) = r0
  2064: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25592)
  2065: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30712) = r0
  2066: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
  2067: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
  // store the speculative load address (scalar) this time after the store
  // forward prediction training.
  2068: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
  // preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
  2069: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
  2070: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
  2071: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
  2072: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
  2073: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29712) = r0
  2074: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29716) = r0
  2075: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29720) = r0
  2076: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29724) = r0
  2077: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29728) = r0
  2078: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29732) = r0
  2079: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29736) = r0
  2080: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29740) = r0
  2081: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29744) = r0
  2082: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29748) = r0
  2083: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29752) = r0
  2084: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29756) = r0
  2085: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29760) = r0
  2086: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29764) = r0
  2087: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29768) = r0
  2088: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29772) = r0
  2089: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29776) = r0
  2090: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29780) = r0
  2091: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29784) = r0
  2092: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29788) = r0
  2093: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29792) = r0
  2094: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
  2095: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
  2096: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
  2097: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
  2098: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
  // overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; same as before, also including the
  // sanitation store with 0 from the current mitigation by the verifier.
  2099: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0         | /both/ are now slow stores here
  2100: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7        | since store unit is still busy.
  // load from stack intended to bypass stores.
  2101: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
  2102: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
  // leak r3
  [...]

Looking at the CPU microarchitecture, the scheduler might issue loads (such
as seen in line 2101) before stores (line 2099,2100) because the load execution
units become available while the store execution unit is still busy with the
sequence of dummy stores (line 2069-2098). And so the load may use the prior
stored scalar from r2 at address r10 -16 for speculation. The updated attack
may work less reliable on CPU microarchitectures where loads and stores share
execution resources.

This concludes that the sanitizing with zero stores from af86ca4e30 ("bpf:
Prevent memory disambiguation attack") is insufficient. Moreover, the detection
of stack reuse from af86ca4e30 where previously data (STACK_MISC) has been
written to a given stack slot where a pointer value is now to be stored does
not have sufficient coverage as precondition for the mitigation either; for
several reasons outlined as follows:

 1) Stack content from prior program runs could still be preserved and is
    therefore not "random", best example is to split a speculative store
    bypass attack between tail calls, program A would prepare and store the
    oob address at a given stack slot and then tail call into program B which
    does the "slow" store of a pointer to the stack with subsequent "fast"
    read. From program B PoV such stack slot type is STACK_INVALID, and
    therefore also must be subject to mitigation.

 2) The STACK_SPILL must not be coupled to register_is_const(&stack->spilled_ptr)
    condition, for example, the previous content of that memory location could
    also be a pointer to map or map value. Without the fix, a speculative
    store bypass is not mitigated in such precondition and can then lead to
    a type confusion in the speculative domain leaking kernel memory near
    these pointer types.

While brainstorming on various alternative mitigation possibilities, we also
stumbled upon a retrospective from Chrome developers [0]:

  [...] For variant 4, we implemented a mitigation to zero the unused memory
  of the heap prior to allocation, which cost about 1% when done concurrently
  and 4% for scavenging. Variant 4 defeats everything we could think of. We
  explored more mitigations for variant 4 but the threat proved to be more
  pervasive and dangerous than we anticipated. For example, stack slots used
  by the register allocator in the optimizing compiler could be subject to
  type confusion, leading to pointer crafting. Mitigating type confusion for
  stack slots alone would have required a complete redesign of the backend of
  the optimizing compiler, perhaps man years of work, without a guarantee of
  completeness. [...]

From BPF side, the problem space is reduced, however, options are rather
limited. One idea that has been explored was to xor-obfuscate pointer spills
to the BPF stack:

  [...]
  // preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
  [...]
  2106: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
  2107: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
  2108: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
  2109: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
  2110: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
  // overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; xored with random 'secret' value
  // of 943576462 before store ...
  2111: (b4) w11 = 943576462
  2112: (af) r11 ^= r7
  2113: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r11
  2114: (79) r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
  2115: (b4) w2 = 943576462
  2116: (af) r2 ^= r11
  // ... and restored with the same 'secret' value with the help of AX reg.
  2117: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
  [...]

While the above would not prevent speculation, it would make data leakage
infeasible by directing it to random locations. In order to be effective
and prevent type confusion under speculation, such random secret would have
to be regenerated for each store. The additional complexity involved for a
tracking mechanism that prevents jumps such that restoring spilled pointers
would not get corrupted is not worth the gain for unprivileged. Hence, the
fix in here eventually opted for emitting a non-public BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
instruction which the x86 JIT translates into a lfence opcode. Inserting the
latter in between the store and load instruction is one of the mitigations
options [1]. The x86 instruction manual notes:

  [...] An LFENCE that follows an instruction that stores to memory might
  complete before the data being stored have become globally visible. [...]

The latter meaning that the preceding store instruction finished execution
and the store is at minimum guaranteed to be in the CPU's store queue, but
it's not guaranteed to be in that CPU's L1 cache at that point (globally
visible). The latter would only be guaranteed via sfence. So the load which
is guaranteed to execute after the lfence for that local CPU would have to
rely on store-to-load forwarding. [2], in section 2.3 on store buffers says:

  [...] For every store operation that is added to the ROB, an entry is
  allocated in the store buffer. This entry requires both the virtual and
  physical address of the target. Only if there is no free entry in the store
  buffer, the frontend stalls until there is an empty slot available in the
  store buffer again. Otherwise, the CPU can immediately continue adding
  subsequent instructions to the ROB and execute them out of order. On Intel
  CPUs, the store buffer has up to 56 entries. [...]

One small upside on the fix is that it lifts constraints from af86ca4e30
where the sanitize_stack_off relative to r10 must be the same when coming
from different paths. The BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC gets emitted after a BPF_STX
or BPF_ST instruction. This happens either when we store a pointer or data
value to the BPF stack for the first time, or upon later pointer spills.
The former needs to be enforced since otherwise stale stack data could be
leaked under speculation as outlined earlier. For non-x86 JITs the BPF_ST |
BPF_NOSPEC mapping is currently optimized away, but others could emit a
speculation barrier as well if necessary. For real-world unprivileged
programs e.g. generated by LLVM, pointer spill/fill is only generated upon
register pressure and LLVM only tries to do that for pointers which are not
used often. The program main impact will be the initial BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
sanitation for the STACK_INVALID case when the first write to a stack slot
occurs e.g. upon map lookup. In future we might refine ways to mitigate
the latter cost.

  [0] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.05178.pdf
  [1] https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2018/05/21/analysis-and-mitigation-of-speculative-store-bypass-cve-2018-3639/
  [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.05725.pdf

Fixes: af86ca4e30 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack")
Fixes: f7cf25b202 ("bpf: track spill/fill of constants")
Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2021-07-29 00:27:52 +02:00
Daniel Borkmann
f5e81d1117 bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction for mitigating Spectre v4
In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF nospec instruction
/either/ to a machine instruction which emits a speculation barrier /or/ to
/no/ machine instruction in case the underlying architecture is not affected
by Speculative Store Bypass or has different mitigations in place already.

This covers both x86 and (implicitly) arm64: In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
instruction for mitigation. In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation
as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled,
it works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any additional
instructions here (hence only comment in arm64 JIT). Other archs can follow
as needed. The BPF nospec instruction is specifically targeting Spectre v4
since i) we don't use a serialization barrier for the Spectre v1 case, and
ii) mitigation instructions for v1 and v4 might be different on some archs.

The BPF nospec is required for a future commit, where the BPF verifier does
annotate intermediate BPF programs with speculation barriers.

Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2021-07-29 00:20:56 +02:00
Alexey Gladkov
345daff2e9 ucounts: Fix race condition between alloc_ucounts and put_ucounts
The race happens because put_ucounts() doesn't use spinlock and
get_ucounts is not under spinlock:

CPU0                    CPU1
----                    ----
alloc_ucounts()         put_ucounts()

spin_lock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
ucounts = find_ucounts(ns, uid, hashent);

                        atomic_dec_and_test(&ucounts->count))

spin_unlock_irq(&ucounts_lock);

                        spin_lock_irqsave(&ucounts_lock, flags);
                        hlist_del_init(&ucounts->node);
                        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ucounts_lock, flags);
                        kfree(ucounts);

ucounts = get_ucounts(ucounts);

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:101 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_add_negative include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:556 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in get_ucounts kernel/ucount.c:152 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in get_ucounts kernel/ucount.c:150 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in alloc_ucounts+0x19b/0x5b0 kernel/ucount.c:188
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88802821e41c by task syz-executor.4/16785

CPU: 1 PID: 16785 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc1-next-20210712-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:105
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x6c/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:233
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:436
 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
 kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:101 [inline]
 atomic_add_negative include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:556 [inline]
 get_ucounts kernel/ucount.c:152 [inline]
 get_ucounts kernel/ucount.c:150 [inline]
 alloc_ucounts+0x19b/0x5b0 kernel/ucount.c:188
 set_cred_ucounts+0x171/0x3a0 kernel/cred.c:684
 __sys_setuid+0x285/0x400 kernel/sys.c:623
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x4665d9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fde54097188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000069
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf80 RCX: 00000000004665d9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000000000ff
RBP: 00000000004bfcb9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf80
R13: 00007ffc8655740f R14: 00007fde54097300 R15: 0000000000022000

Allocated by task 16784:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline]
 set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:434 [inline]
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline]
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:472 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x9b/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:522
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:591 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:721 [inline]
 alloc_ucounts+0x23d/0x5b0 kernel/ucount.c:169
 set_cred_ucounts+0x171/0x3a0 kernel/cred.c:684
 __sys_setuid+0x285/0x400 kernel/sys.c:623
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Freed by task 16785:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:46
 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:360
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:366 [inline]
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:328 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x130 mm/kasan/common.c:374
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:229 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1650 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook+0xdf/0x240 mm/slub.c:1675
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3235 [inline]
 kfree+0xeb/0x650 mm/slub.c:4295
 put_ucounts kernel/ucount.c:200 [inline]
 put_ucounts+0x117/0x150 kernel/ucount.c:192
 put_cred_rcu+0x27a/0x520 kernel/cred.c:124
 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2550 [inline]
 rcu_core+0x7ab/0x1380 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2785
 __do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558

Last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xe5/0x110 mm/kasan/generic.c:348
 insert_work+0x48/0x370 kernel/workqueue.c:1332
 __queue_work+0x5c1/0xed0 kernel/workqueue.c:1498
 queue_work_on+0xee/0x110 kernel/workqueue.c:1525
 queue_work include/linux/workqueue.h:507 [inline]
 call_usermodehelper_exec+0x1f0/0x4c0 kernel/umh.c:435
 kobject_uevent_env+0xf8f/0x1650 lib/kobject_uevent.c:618
 netdev_queue_add_kobject net/core/net-sysfs.c:1621 [inline]
 netdev_queue_update_kobjects+0x374/0x450 net/core/net-sysfs.c:1655
 register_queue_kobjects net/core/net-sysfs.c:1716 [inline]
 netdev_register_kobject+0x35a/0x430 net/core/net-sysfs.c:1959
 register_netdevice+0xd33/0x1500 net/core/dev.c:10331
 nsim_init_netdevsim drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c:317 [inline]
 nsim_create+0x381/0x4d0 drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c:364
 __nsim_dev_port_add+0x32e/0x830 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1295
 nsim_dev_port_add_all+0x53/0x150 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1355
 nsim_dev_probe+0xcb5/0x1190 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1496
 call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:517 [inline]
 really_probe+0x23c/0xcd0 drivers/base/dd.c:595
 __driver_probe_device+0x338/0x4d0 drivers/base/dd.c:747
 driver_probe_device+0x4c/0x1a0 drivers/base/dd.c:777
 __device_attach_driver+0x20b/0x2f0 drivers/base/dd.c:894
 bus_for_each_drv+0x15f/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:427
 __device_attach+0x228/0x4a0 drivers/base/dd.c:965
 bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:487
 device_add+0xc2f/0x2180 drivers/base/core.c:3356
 nsim_bus_dev_new drivers/net/netdevsim/bus.c:431 [inline]
 new_device_store+0x436/0x710 drivers/net/netdevsim/bus.c:298
 bus_attr_store+0x72/0xa0 drivers/base/bus.c:122
 sysfs_kf_write+0x110/0x160 fs/sysfs/file.c:139
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x342/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:296
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2152 [inline]
 new_sync_write+0x426/0x650 fs/read_write.c:518
 vfs_write+0x75a/0xa40 fs/read_write.c:605
 ksys_write+0x12d/0x250 fs/read_write.c:658
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Second to last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xe5/0x110 mm/kasan/generic.c:348
 insert_work+0x48/0x370 kernel/workqueue.c:1332
 __queue_work+0x5c1/0xed0 kernel/workqueue.c:1498
 queue_work_on+0xee/0x110 kernel/workqueue.c:1525
 queue_work include/linux/workqueue.h:507 [inline]
 call_usermodehelper_exec+0x1f0/0x4c0 kernel/umh.c:435
 kobject_uevent_env+0xf8f/0x1650 lib/kobject_uevent.c:618
 kobject_synth_uevent+0x701/0x850 lib/kobject_uevent.c:208
 uevent_store+0x20/0x50 drivers/base/core.c:2371
 dev_attr_store+0x50/0x80 drivers/base/core.c:2072
 sysfs_kf_write+0x110/0x160 fs/sysfs/file.c:139
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x342/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:296
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2152 [inline]
 new_sync_write+0x426/0x650 fs/read_write.c:518
 vfs_write+0x75a/0xa40 fs/read_write.c:605
 ksys_write+0x12d/0x250 fs/read_write.c:658
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802821e400
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of
 192-byte region [ffff88802821e400, ffff88802821e4c0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0000a08780 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x2821e
flags: 0xfff00000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888010841a00
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 1, ts 12874702440, free_ts 12637793385
 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2433 [inline]
 get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f80 mm/page_alloc.c:4166
 __alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5374
 alloc_page_interleave+0x1e/0x200 mm/mempolicy.c:2119
 alloc_pages+0x238/0x2a0 mm/mempolicy.c:2242
 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1713 [inline]
 allocate_slab+0x32b/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:1853
 new_slab mm/slub.c:1916 [inline]
 new_slab_objects mm/slub.c:2662 [inline]
 ___slab_alloc+0x4ba/0x820 mm/slub.c:2825
 __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0xa7/0xf0 mm/slub.c:2865
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2947 [inline]
 slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2989 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x312/0x330 mm/slub.c:4133
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:596 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:721 [inline]
 __register_sysctl_table+0x112/0x1090 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1318
 rds_tcp_init_net+0x1db/0x4f0 net/rds/tcp.c:551
 ops_init+0xaf/0x470 net/core/net_namespace.c:140
 __register_pernet_operations net/core/net_namespace.c:1137 [inline]
 register_pernet_operations+0x35a/0x850 net/core/net_namespace.c:1214
 register_pernet_device+0x26/0x70 net/core/net_namespace.c:1301
 rds_tcp_init+0x77/0xe0 net/rds/tcp.c:717
 do_one_initcall+0x103/0x650 init/main.c:1285
 do_initcall_level init/main.c:1360 [inline]
 do_initcalls init/main.c:1376 [inline]
 do_basic_setup init/main.c:1396 [inline]
 kernel_init_freeable+0x6b8/0x741 init/main.c:1598
page last free stack trace:
 reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
 free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1343 [inline]
 free_pcp_prepare+0x312/0x7d0 mm/page_alloc.c:1394
 free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3329 [inline]
 free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3408
 __vunmap+0x783/0xb70 mm/vmalloc.c:2587
 free_work+0x58/0x70 mm/vmalloc.c:82
 process_one_work+0x98d/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:2276
 worker_thread+0x658/0x11f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2422
 kthread+0x3e5/0x4d0 kernel/kthread.c:319
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88802821e300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff88802821e380: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88802821e400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                            ^
 ffff88802821e480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88802821e500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

- The race fix has two parts.
  * Changing the code to guarantee that ucounts->count is only decremented
    when ucounts_lock is held.  This guarantees that find_ucounts
    will never find a structure with a zero reference count.
  * Changing alloc_ucounts to increment ucounts->count while
    ucounts_lock is held.  This guarantees the reference count on the
    found data structure will not be decremented to zero (and the data
    structure freed) before the reference count is incremented.
  -- Eric Biederman

Reported-by: syzbot+01985d7909f9468f013c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+59dd63761094a80ad06d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6cd79f45bb8fa1c9eeae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+b6e65bd125a05f803d6b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b6c3365289 ("Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting")
Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7b2ace1759b281cdd2d66101d6b305deef722efb.1627397820.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-07-28 12:31:51 -05:00
Linus Torvalds
51bbe7ebac Merge branch 'for-5.14-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup fix from Tejun Heo:
 "Fix leak of filesystem context root which is triggered by LTP.

  Not too likely to be a problem in non-testing environments"

* 'for-5.14-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
  cgroup1: fix leaked context root causing sporadic NULL deref in LTP
2021-07-27 14:02:57 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
82d712f6d1 Merge branch 'for-5.14-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq
Pull workqueue fix from Tejun Heo:
 "Fix a use-after-free in allocation failure handling path"

* 'for-5.14-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq:
  workqueue: fix UAF in pwq_unbound_release_workfn()
2021-07-27 13:55:30 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner
bb7262b295 timers: Move clearing of base::timer_running under base:: Lock
syzbot reported KCSAN data races vs. timer_base::timer_running being set to
NULL without holding base::lock in expire_timers().

This looks innocent and most reads are clearly not problematic, but
Frederic identified an issue which is:

 int data = 0;

 void timer_func(struct timer_list *t)
 {
    data = 1;
 }

 CPU 0                                            CPU 1
 ------------------------------                   --------------------------
 base = lock_timer_base(timer, &flags);           raw_spin_unlock(&base->lock);
 if (base->running_timer != timer)                call_timer_fn(timer, fn, baseclk);
   ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true);    base->running_timer = NULL;
 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base->lock, flags);  raw_spin_lock(&base->lock);

 x = data;

If the timer has previously executed on CPU 1 and then CPU 0 can observe
base->running_timer == NULL and returns, assuming the timer has completed,
but it's not guaranteed on all architectures. The comment for
del_timer_sync() makes that guarantee. Moving the assignment under
base->lock prevents this.

For non-RT kernel it's performance wise completely irrelevant whether the
store happens before or after taking the lock. For an RT kernel moving the
store under the lock requires an extra unlock/lock pair in the case that
there is a waiter for the timer, but that's not the end of the world.

Reported-by: syzbot+aa7c2385d46c5eba0b89@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+abea4558531bae1ba9fe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 030dcdd197 ("timers: Prepare support for PREEMPT_RT")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87lfea7gw8.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2021-07-27 20:57:44 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
a1833a5403 smpboot: fix duplicate and misplaced inlining directive
gcc doesn't care, but clang quite reasonably pointed out that the recent
commit e9ba16e68c ("smpboot: Mark idle_init() as __always_inlined to
work around aggressive compiler un-inlining") did some really odd
things:

    kernel/smpboot.c:50:20: warning: duplicate 'inline' declaration specifier [-Wduplicate-decl-specifier]
    static inline void __always_inline idle_init(unsigned int cpu)
                       ^

which not only has that duplicate inlining specifier, but the new
__always_inline was put in the wrong place of the function definition.

We put the storage class specifiers (ie things like "static" and
"extern") first, and the type information after that.  And while the
compiler may not care, we put the inline specifier before the types.

So it should be just

    static __always_inline void idle_init(unsigned int cpu)

instead.

Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-25 11:06:37 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
12e9bd168c Merge tag 'timers-urgent-2021-07-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A small set of timer related fixes:

   - Plug a race between rearm and process tick in the posix CPU timers
     code

   - Make the optimization to avoid recalculation of the next timer
     interrupt work correctly when there are no timers pending"

* tag 'timers-urgent-2021-07-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  timers: Fix get_next_timer_interrupt() with no timers pending
  posix-cpu-timers: Fix rearm racing against process tick
2021-07-25 10:27:44 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
9041a4d2ee Merge tag 'core-urgent-2021-07-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull core fix from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A single update for the boot code to prevent aggressive un-inlining
  which causes a section mismatch"

* tag 'core-urgent-2021-07-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  smpboot: Mark idle_init() as __always_inlined to work around aggressive compiler un-inlining
2021-07-25 09:52:48 -07:00