Commit 654102df2a ("kbuild: add generic support for built-in
boot DTBs") introduced generic support for built-in DTBs.
Select GENERIC_BUILTIN_DTB when built-in DTB support is enabled.
To keep consistency across architectures, this commit also renames
CONFIG_USE_BUILTIN_DTB to CONFIG_BUILTIN_DTB, and
CONFIG_BUILTIN_DTB_SOURCE to CONFIG_BUILTIN_DTB_NAME.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
On a system with n CPUs and m interrupts, there will be n*m decimal
values yielded via seq_printf(.."%10u "..) which has significant costs
parsing format string and is less efficient than seq_put_decimal_ull_width().
Stress reading /proc/interrupts indicates ~30% performance improvement with
this patch.
Signed-off-by: David Wang <00107082@163.com>
Reviewed-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Pull sh updates from John Paul Adrian Glaubitz:
"Two small fixes.
The first one by Huacai Chen addresses a runtime warning when
CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK and CONFIG_DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS are selected
which occurs because the cpuinfo code on sh incorrectly uses NR_CPUS
when iterating CPUs instead of the runtime limit nr_cpu_ids.
A second fix by Dan Carpenter fixes a use-after-free bug in
register_intc_controller() which occurred as a result of improper
error handling in the interrupt controller driver code when
registering an interrupt controller during plat_irq_setup() on sh"
* tag 'sh-for-v6.13-tag1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/glaubitz/sh-linux:
sh: intc: Fix use-after-free bug in register_intc_controller()
sh: cpuinfo: Fix a warning for CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK
Pull devicetree updates from Rob Herring:
"Bindings:
- Enable dtc "interrupt_provider" warnings for binding examples. Fix
the warnings in fsl,mu-msi and ti,sci-inta due to this.
- Convert zii,rave-sp-wdt, zii,rave-sp-pwrbutton, and
altr,fpga-passive-serial to DT schema format
- Add some documentation on the different forms of YAML text blocks
which are a constant source of review comments
- Fix some schema errors in constraints for arrays
- Add compatibles for qcom,sar2130p-pdc and onnn,adt7462
DT core:
- Allow overlay kunit tests to run CONFIG_OF_OVERLAY=n
- Add some warnings on deprecated address handling
- Rework early_init_dt_scan() so the arch can pass in the phys
address of the DTB as __pa() is not always valid to use. This fixes
a warning for arm64 with kexec.
- Add and use some new DT graph iterators for iterating over ports
and endpoints
- Rework reserved-memory handling to be sized dynamically for fixed
regions
- Optimize of_modalias() to avoid a strlen() call
- Constify struct device_node and property pointers where ever
possible"
* tag 'devicetree-for-6.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/robh/linux: (36 commits)
of: Allow overlay kunit tests to run CONFIG_OF_OVERLAY=n
dt-bindings: interrupt-controller: qcom,pdc: Add SAR2130P compatible
of/address: Rework bus matching to avoid warnings
of: WARN on deprecated #address-cells/#size-cells handling
of/fdt: Don't use default address cell sizes for address translation
dt-bindings: Enable dtc "interrupt_provider" warnings
of/fdt: add dt_phys arg to early_init_dt_scan and early_init_dt_verify
dt-bindings: cache: qcom,llcc: Fix X1E80100 reg entries
dt-bindings: watchdog: convert zii,rave-sp-wdt.txt to yaml format
dt-bindings: input: convert zii,rave-sp-pwrbutton.txt to yaml
media: xilinx-tpg: use new of_graph functions
fbdev: omapfb: use new of_graph functions
gpu: drm: omapdrm: use new of_graph functions
ASoC: audio-graph-card2: use new of_graph functions
ASoC: audio-graph-card: use new of_graph functions
ASoC: test-component: use new of_graph functions
of: property: use new of_graph functions
of: property: add of_graph_get_next_port_endpoint()
of: property: add of_graph_get_next_port()
of: module: remove strlen() call in of_modalias()
...
Pull xattr updates from Al Viro:
"Sanitize xattr and io_uring interactions with it, add *xattrat()
syscalls, sanitize struct filename handling in there"
* tag 'pull-xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
xattr: remove redundant check on variable err
fs/xattr: add *at family syscalls
new helpers: file_removexattr(), filename_removexattr()
new helpers: file_listxattr(), filename_listxattr()
replace do_getxattr() with saner helpers.
replace do_setxattr() with saner helpers.
new helper: import_xattr_name()
fs: rename struct xattr_ctx to kernel_xattr_ctx
xattr: switch to CLASS(fd)
io_[gs]etxattr_prep(): just use getname()
io_uring: IORING_OP_F[GS]ETXATTR is fine with REQ_F_FIXED_FILE
getname_maybe_null() - the third variant of pathname copy-in
teach filename_lookup() to treat NULL filename as ""
__pa() is only intended to be used for linear map addresses and using
it for initial_boot_params which is in fixmap for arm64 will give an
incorrect value. Hence save the physical address when it is known at
boot time when calling early_init_dt_scan for arm64 and use it at kexec
time instead of converting the virtual address using __pa().
Note that arm64 doesn't need the FDT region reserved in the DT as the
kernel explicitly reserves the passed in FDT. Therefore, only a debug
warning is fixed with this change.
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Usama Arif <usamaarif642@gmail.com>
Fixes: ac10be5cdb ("arm64: Use common of_kexec_alloc_and_setup_fdt()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241023171426.452688-1-usamaarif642@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
asm/unaligned.h is always an include of asm-generic/unaligned.h;
might as well move that thing to linux/unaligned.h and include
that - there's nothing arch-specific in that header.
auto-generated by the following:
for i in `git grep -l -w asm/unaligned.h`; do
sed -i -e "s/asm\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
for i in `git grep -l -w asm-generic/unaligned.h`; do
sed -i -e "s/asm-generic\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
git mv include/asm-generic/unaligned.h include/linux/unaligned.h
git mv tools/include/asm-generic/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
sed -i -e "/unaligned.h/d" include/asm-generic/Kbuild
sed -i -e "s/__ASM_GENERIC/__LINUX/" include/linux/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
The unusual function calling conventions on SuperH ended up causing
sync_file_range to have the wrong argument order, with the 'flags'
argument getting sorted before 'nbytes' by the compiler.
In userspace, I found that musl, glibc, uclibc and strace all expect the
normal calling conventions with 'nbytes' last, so changing the kernel
to match them should make all of those work.
In order to be able to also fix libc implementations to work with existing
kernels, they need to be able to tell which ABI is used. An easy way
to do this is to add yet another system call using the sync_file_range2
ABI that works the same on all architectures.
Old user binaries can now work on new kernels, and new binaries can
try the new sync_file_range2() to work with new kernels or fall back
to the old sync_file_range() version if that doesn't exist.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 75c92acdd5 ("sh: Wire up new syscalls.")
Acked-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10.
This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel.
In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range
against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits.
Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and
no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel
version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves
the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot
simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory
must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur.
Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data
structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the
VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type.
Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example,
such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable
or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be
applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and
applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A
similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall
[4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and
this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case.
Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal().
The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:
int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.
mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.
1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
via mremap().
3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.
5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
memset(0) for anonymous memory.
The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in
V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this
API.
Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing,
which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the
case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute
(RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from
becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime
of the process.
Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed
by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively
but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM
permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not
tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is
sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory.
For example, with madvise(DONTNEED).
However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security
risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the
second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros
and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard
operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case,
the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write
permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow
integrity.
Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome
browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions
that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a
complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases.
The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and
sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to
glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all
non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all
applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new
protections.
In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable
contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in
shaping this patch:
Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.
MM perf benchmarks
==================
This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to
check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made,
when any segment within the given memory range is sealed.
To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed.
[8]
The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call,
by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using
PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have
similar results.
The tests have roughly below sequence:
for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++)
create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA)
start the sampling
for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++)
mprotect one mapping
stop and save the sample
delete 1000 mappings
calculates all samples.
Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz,
4G memory, Chromebook.
Based on the latest upstream code:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104%
munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107%
munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106%
munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107%
munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104%
munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105%
mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106%
mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105%
mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104%
mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103%
mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103%
mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104%
madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109%
madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121%
madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121%
madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119%
madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115%
madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106%
munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108%
munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106%
munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106%
munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108%
munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107%
mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107%
mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106%
mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107%
mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105%
mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105%
mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105%
madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115%
madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120%
madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115%
madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116%
madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113%
madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111%
Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds
20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA.
In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109%
munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105%
munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103%
munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112%
munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114%
munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99%
mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97%
mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94%
mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103%
mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100%
mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101%
mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103%
madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109%
madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108%
madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105%
madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107%
madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108%
madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105%
munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104%
munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104%
munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102%
munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99%
munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103%
mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112%
mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107%
mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103%
mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103%
mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99%
mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103%
madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108%
madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109%
madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107%
madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109%
madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108%
madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114%
For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30
CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases.
It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254%
munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316%
munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398%
munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396%
munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352%
munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287%
mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187%
mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335%
mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506%
mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471%
mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465%
mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433%
madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125%
madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122%
madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138%
madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147%
madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145%
madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262%
munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327%
munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419%
munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413%
munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341%
munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303%
mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228%
mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409%
mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504%
mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423%
mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412%
mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415%
madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123%
madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133%
madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151%
madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151%
madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140%
madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142%
From 5.10 to 6.8
munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma.
mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma.
madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma.
In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the
increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times
greater for munmap and mprotect.
When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked
on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance
benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may
not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database
service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data
from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to
take this data with a grain of salt.
This patch (of 5):
Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2]
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- Avoid 'constexpr', which is a keyword in C23
- Allow 'dtbs_check' and 'dt_compatible_check' run independently of
'dt_binding_check'
- Fix weak references to avoid GOT entries in position-independent code
generation
- Convert the last use of 'optional' property in arch/sh/Kconfig
- Remove support for the 'optional' property in Kconfig
- Remove support for Clang's ThinLTO caching, which does not work with
the .incbin directive
- Change the semantics of $(src) so it always points to the source
directory, which fixes Makefile inconsistencies between upstream and
downstream
- Fix 'make tar-pkg' for RISC-V to produce a consistent package
- Provide reasonable default coverage for objtool, sanitizers, and
profilers
- Remove redundant OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD, KASAN_SANITIZE, etc.
- Remove the last use of tristate choice in drivers/rapidio/Kconfig
- Various cleanups and fixes in Kconfig
* tag 'kbuild-v6.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (46 commits)
kconfig: use sym_get_choice_menu() in sym_check_prop()
rapidio: remove choice for enumeration
kconfig: lxdialog: remove initialization with A_NORMAL
kconfig: m/nconf: merge two item_add_str() calls
kconfig: m/nconf: remove dead code to display value of bool choice
kconfig: m/nconf: remove dead code to display children of choice members
kconfig: gconf: show checkbox for choice correctly
kbuild: use GCOV_PROFILE and KCSAN_SANITIZE in scripts/Makefile.modfinal
Makefile: remove redundant tool coverage variables
kbuild: provide reasonable defaults for tool coverage
modules: Drop the .export_symbol section from the final modules
kconfig: use menu_list_for_each_sym() in sym_check_choice_deps()
kconfig: use sym_get_choice_menu() in conf_write_defconfig()
kconfig: add sym_get_choice_menu() helper
kconfig: turn defaults and additional prompt for choice members into error
kconfig: turn missing prompt for choice members into error
kconfig: turn conf_choice() into void function
kconfig: use linked list in sym_set_changed()
kconfig: gconf: use MENU_CHANGED instead of SYMBOL_CHANGED
kconfig: gconf: remove debug code
...
These are generated files. Prefix them with $(obj)/ instead of $(src)/.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
arch/sh/kernel/cpu/init.c:99:29: warning: no previous prototype for 'l2_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
arch/sh/kernel/cpu/sh4a/setup-sh7723.c:422:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'l2_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
arch/sh/kernel/cpu/sh4a/setup-sh7724.c:842:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'l2_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
arch/sh/mm/cache-j2.c:48:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'j2_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
arch/sh/mm/cache-sh2.c:85:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'sh2_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
arch/sh/mm/cache-sh2a.c:181:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'sh2a_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
arch/sh/mm/cache-sh3.c:90:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'sh3_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
arch/sh/mm/cache-sh4.c:384:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'sh4_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
arch/sh/mm/cache-shx3.c:18:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'shx3_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
arch/sh/mm/flush-sh4.c:106:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'sh4__flush_region_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
arch/sh/mm/cache-sh7705.c:190:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'sh7705_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
Fix this by moving all cache-related forward declarations to
<asm/cacheflush.h>, and by including the latter where needed.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Reviewed-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f47ab87636d16db4c47bebe1bf62650045f61989.1709579038.git.geert+renesas@glider.be
Signed-off-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
