Commit a72bbec70d ("crash: hotplug support for kexec_load()")
introduced a new kexec flag, `KEXEC_UPDATE_ELFCOREHDR`. Kexec tool uses
this flag to indicate to the kernel that it is safe to modify the
elfcorehdr of the kdump image loaded using the kexec_load system call.
However, it is possible that architectures may need to update kexec
segments other then elfcorehdr. For example, FDT (Flatten Device Tree)
on PowerPC. Introducing a new kexec flag for every new kexec segment
may not be a good solution. Hence, a generic kexec flag bit,
`KEXEC_CRASH_HOTPLUG_SUPPORT`, is introduced to share the CPU/Memory
hotplug support intent between the kexec tool and the kernel for the
kexec_load system call.
Now we have two kexec flags that enables crash hotplug support for
kexec_load system call. First is KEXEC_UPDATE_ELFCOREHDR (only used in
x86), and second is KEXEC_CRASH_HOTPLUG_SUPPORT (for all architectures).
To simplify the process of finding and reporting the crash hotplug
support the following changes are introduced.
1. Define arch specific function to process the kexec flags and
determine crash hotplug support
2. Rename the @update_elfcorehdr member of struct kimage to
@hotplug_support and populate it for both kexec_load and
kexec_file_load syscalls, because architecture can update more than
one kexec segment
3. Let generic function crash_check_hotplug_support report hotplug
support for loaded kdump image based on value of @hotplug_support
To bring the x86 crash hotplug support in line with the above points,
the following changes have been made:
- Introduce the arch_crash_hotplug_support function to process kexec
flags and determine crash hotplug support
- Remove the arch_crash_hotplug_[cpu|memory]_support functions
Signed-off-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240326055413.186534-3-sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com
Currently, KEXEC_CORE select CRASH_CORE automatically because crash codes
need be built in to avoid compiling error when building kexec code even
though the crash dumping functionality is not enabled. E.g
--------------------
CONFIG_CRASH_CORE=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE=y
CONFIG_KEXEC=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE=y
---------------------
After splitting out crashkernel reservation code and vmcoreinfo exporting
code, there's only crash related code left in kernel/crash_core.c. Now
move crash related codes from kexec_core.c to crash_core.c and only build it
in when CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y.
And also wrap up crash codes inside CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP ifdeffery scope,
or replace inappropriate CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE ifdef with CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
ifdef in generic kernel files.
With these changes, crash_core codes are abstracted from kexec codes and
can be disabled at all if only kexec reboot feature is wanted.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240124051254.67105-5-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <piliu@redhat.com>
Cc: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "kexec_file: print out debugging message if required", v4.
Currently, specifying '-d' on kexec command will print a lot of debugging
informationabout kexec/kdump loading with kexec_load interface.
However, kexec_file_load prints nothing even though '-d' is specified.
It's very inconvenient to debug or analyze the kexec/kdump loading when
something wrong happened with kexec/kdump itself or develper want to check
the kexec/kdump loading.
In this patchset, a kexec_file flag is KEXEC_FILE_DEBUG added and checked
in code. If it's passed in, debugging message of kexec_file code will be
printed out and can be seen from console and dmesg. Otherwise, the
debugging message is printed like beofre when pr_debug() is taken.
Note:
****
=====
1) The code in kexec-tools utility also need be changed to support
passing KEXEC_FILE_DEBUG to kernel when 'kexec -s -d' is specified.
The patch link is here:
=========
[PATCH] kexec_file: add kexec_file flag to support debug printing
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/kexec/2023-November/028505.html
2) s390 also has kexec_file code, while I am not sure what debugging
information is necessary. So leave it to s390 developer.
Test:
****
====
Testing was done in v1 on x86_64 and arm64. For v4, tested on x86_64
again. And on x86_64, the printed messages look like below:
--------------------------------------------------------------
kexec measurement buffer for the loaded kernel at 0x207fffe000.
Loaded purgatory at 0x207fff9000
Loaded boot_param, command line and misc at 0x207fff3000 bufsz=0x1180 memsz=0x1180
Loaded 64bit kernel at 0x207c000000 bufsz=0xc88200 memsz=0x3c4a000
Loaded initrd at 0x2079e79000 bufsz=0x2186280 memsz=0x2186280
Final command line is: root=/dev/mapper/fedora_intel--knightslanding--lb--02-root ro
rd.lvm.lv=fedora_intel-knightslanding-lb-02/root console=ttyS0,115200N81 crashkernel=256M
E820 memmap:
0000000000000000-000000000009a3ff (1)
000000000009a400-000000000009ffff (2)
00000000000e0000-00000000000fffff (2)
0000000000100000-000000006ff83fff (1)
000000006ff84000-000000007ac50fff (2)
......
000000207fff6150-000000207fff615f (128)
000000207fff6160-000000207fff714f (1)
000000207fff7150-000000207fff715f (128)
000000207fff7160-000000207fff814f (1)
000000207fff8150-000000207fff815f (128)
000000207fff8160-000000207fffffff (1)
nr_segments = 5
segment[0]: buf=0x000000004e5ece74 bufsz=0x211 mem=0x207fffe000 memsz=0x1000
segment[1]: buf=0x000000009e871498 bufsz=0x4000 mem=0x207fff9000 memsz=0x5000
segment[2]: buf=0x00000000d879f1fe bufsz=0x1180 mem=0x207fff3000 memsz=0x2000
segment[3]: buf=0x000000001101cd86 bufsz=0xc88200 mem=0x207c000000 memsz=0x3c4a000
segment[4]: buf=0x00000000c6e38ac7 bufsz=0x2186280 mem=0x2079e79000 memsz=0x2187000
kexec_file_load: type:0, start:0x207fff91a0 head:0x109e004002 flags:0x8
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This patch (of 7):
When specifying 'kexec -c -d', kexec_load interface will print loading
information, e.g the regions where kernel/initrd/purgatory/cmdline are
put, the memmap passed to 2nd kernel taken as system RAM ranges, and
printing all contents of struct kexec_segment, etc. These are very
helpful for analyzing or positioning what's happening when kexec/kdump
itself failed. The debugging printing for kexec_load interface is made in
user space utility kexec-tools.
Whereas, with kexec_file_load interface, 'kexec -s -d' print nothing.
Because kexec_file code is mostly implemented in kernel space, and the
debugging printing functionality is missed. It's not convenient when
debugging kexec/kdump loading and jumping with kexec_file_load interface.
Now add KEXEC_FILE_DEBUG to kexec_file flag to control the debugging
message printing. And add global variable kexec_file_dbg_print and macro
kexec_dprintk() to facilitate the printing.
This is a preparation, later kexec_dprintk() will be used to replace the
existing pr_debug(). Once 'kexec -s -d' is specified, it will print out
kexec/kdump loading information. If '-d' is not specified, it regresses
to pr_debug().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231213055747.61826-1-bhe@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231213055747.61826-2-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Conor Dooley <conor@kernel.org>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "kexec_file: Load kernel at top of system RAM if required".
Justification:
==============
Kexec_load interface has been doing top down searching and loading
kernel/initrd/purgtory etc to prepare for kexec reboot. In that way, the
benefits are that it avoids to consume and fragment limited low memory
which satisfy DMA buffer allocation and big chunk of continuous memory
during system init; and avoids to stir with BIOS/FW reserved or occupied
areas, or corner case handling/work around/quirk occupied areas when doing
system init. By the way, the top-down searching and loading of kexec-ed
kernel is done in user space utility code.
For kexec_file loading, even if kexec_buf.top_down is 'true', it's simply
ignored. It calls walk_system_ram_res() directly to go through all
resources of System RAM bottom up, to find an available memory region,
then call locate_mem_hole_callback() to allocate memory in that found
memory region from top to down. This is not expected and inconsistent
with kexec_load.
Implementation
===============
In patch 1, introduce a new function walk_system_ram_res_rev() which is a
variant of walk_system_ram_res(), it walks through a list of all the
resources of System RAM in reversed order, i.e., from higher to lower.
In patch 2, check if kexec_buf.top_down is 'true' in
kexec_walk_resources(), if yes, call walk_system_ram_res_rev() to find
memory region of system RAM from top to down to load kernel/initrd etc.
Background information: ======================= And I ever tried this in
the past in a different way, please see below link. In the post, I tried
to adjust struct sibling linking code, replace the the singly linked list
with list_head so that walk_system_ram_res_rev() can be implemented in a
much easier way. Finally I failed.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20180718024944.577-4-bhe@redhat.com/
This time, I picked up the patch from AKASHI Takahiro's old post and made
some change to take as the current patch 1:
https://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2017-September/531456.html
This patch (of 2):
Kexec_load interface has been doing top down searching and loading
kernel/initrd/purgtory etc to prepare for kexec reboot. In that way, the
benefits are that it avoids to consume and fragment limited low memory
which satisfy DMA buffer allocation and big chunk of continuous memory
during system init; and avoids to stir with BIOS/FW reserved or occupied
areas, or corner case handling/work around/quirk occupied areas when doing
system init. By the way, the top-down searching and loading of kexec-ed
kernel is done in user space utility code.
For kexec_file loading, even if kexec_buf.top_down is 'true', it's simply
ignored. It calls walk_system_ram_res() directly to go through all
resources of System RAM bottom up, to find an available memory region,
then call locate_mem_hole_callback() to allocate memory in that found
memory region from top to down. This is not expected and inconsistent
with kexec_load.
Here check if kexec_buf.top_down is 'true' in kexec_walk_resources(), if
yes, call the newly added walk_system_ram_res_rev() to find memory region
of system RAM from top to down to load kernel/initrd etc.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231114091658.228030-1-bhe@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231114091658.228030-3-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
- With commit 099f26f22f ("integrity: machine keyring CA
configuration") certificates may be loaded onto the IMA keyring,
directly or indirectly signed by keys on either the "builtin" or the
"machine" keyrings.
With the ability for the system/machine owner to sign the IMA policy
itself without needing to recompile the kernel, update the IMA
architecture specific policy rules to require the IMA policy itself
be signed.
[ As commit 099f26f22f was upstreamed in linux-6.4, updating the
IMA architecture specific policy now to require signed IMA policies
may break userspace expectations. ]
- IMA only checked the file data hash was not on the system blacklist
keyring for files with an appended signature (e.g. kernel modules,
Power kernel image).
Check all file data hashes regardless of how it was signed
- Code cleanup, and a kernel-doc update
* tag 'integrity-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
kexec_lock: Replace kexec_mutex() by kexec_lock() in two comments
ima: require signed IMA policy when UEFI secure boot is enabled
integrity: Always reference the blacklist keyring with appraisal
ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig
Patch series "crash: Kernel handling of CPU and memory hot un/plug", v28.
Once the kdump service is loaded, if changes to CPUs or memory occur,
either by hot un/plug or off/onlining, the crash elfcorehdr must also be
updated.
The elfcorehdr describes to kdump the CPUs and memory in the system, and
any inaccuracies can result in a vmcore with missing CPU context or memory
regions.
The current solution utilizes udev to initiate an unload-then-reload of
the kdump image (eg. kernel, initrd, boot_params, purgatory and
elfcorehdr) by the userspace kexec utility. In the original post I
outlined the significant performance problems related to offloading this
activity to userspace.
This patchset introduces a generic crash handler that registers with the
CPU and memory notifiers. Upon CPU or memory changes, from either hot
un/plug or off/onlining, this generic handler is invoked and performs
important housekeeping, for example obtaining the appropriate lock, and
then invokes an architecture specific handler to do the appropriate
elfcorehdr update.
Note the description in patch 'crash: change crash_prepare_elf64_headers()
to for_each_possible_cpu()' and 'x86/crash: optimize CPU changes' that
enables further optimizations related to CPU plug/unplug/online/offline
performance of elfcorehdr updates.
In the case of x86_64, the arch specific handler generates a new
elfcorehdr, and overwrites the old one in memory; thus no involvement with
userspace needed.
To realize the benefits/test this patchset, one must make a couple
of minor changes to userspace:
- Prevent udev from updating kdump crash kernel on hot un/plug changes.
Add the following as the first lines to the RHEL udev rule file
/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/98-kexec.rules:
# The kernel updates the crash elfcorehdr for CPU and memory changes
SUBSYSTEM=="cpu", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end"
SUBSYSTEM=="memory", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end"
With this changeset applied, the two rules evaluate to false for
CPU and memory change events and thus skip the userspace
unload-then-reload of kdump.
- Change to the kexec_file_load for loading the kdump kernel:
Eg. on RHEL: in /usr/bin/kdumpctl, change to:
standard_kexec_args="-p -d -s"
which adds the -s to select kexec_file_load() syscall.
This kernel patchset also supports kexec_load() with a modified kexec
userspace utility. A working changeset to the kexec userspace utility is
posted to the kexec-tools mailing list here:
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/kexec/2023-May/027049.html
To use the kexec-tools patch, apply, build and install kexec-tools, then
change the kdumpctl's standard_kexec_args to replace the -s with
--hotplug. The removal of -s reverts to the kexec_load syscall and the
addition of --hotplug invokes the changes put forth in the kexec-tools
patch.
This patch (of 8):
The crash hotplug support leans on the work for the kexec_file_load()
syscall. To also support the kexec_load() syscall, a few bits of code
need to be move outside of CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE. As such, these bits are
moved out of kexec_file.c and into a common location crash_core.c.
In addition, struct crash_mem and crash_notes were moved to new locales so
that PROC_KCORE, which sets CRASH_CORE alone, builds correctly.
No functionality change intended.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814214446.6659-1-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814214446.6659-2-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Akhil Raj <lf32.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
kexec_mutex is replaced by an atomic variable
in 05c6257433 (panic, kexec: make __crash_kexec() NMI safe).
But there are still two comments that referenced kexec_mutex,
replace them by kexec_lock.
Signed-off-by: Wenyu Liu <liuwenyu7@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull non-mm updates from Andrew Morton:
- Arnd Bergmann has fixed a bunch of -Wmissing-prototypes in top-level
directories
- Douglas Anderson has added a new "buddy" mode to the hardlockup
detector. It permits the detector to work on architectures which
cannot provide the required interrupts, by having CPUs periodically
perform checks on other CPUs
- Zhen Lei has enhanced kexec's ability to support two crash regions
- Petr Mladek has done a lot of cleanup on the hard lockup detector's
Kconfig entries
- And the usual bunch of singleton patches in various places
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-06-24-19-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (72 commits)
kernel/time/posix-stubs.c: remove duplicated include
ocfs2: remove redundant assignment to variable bit_off
watchdog/hardlockup: fix typo in config HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PREFER_BUDDY
powerpc: move arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace from nmi.h to irq.h
devres: show which resource was invalid in __devm_ioremap_resource()
watchdog/hardlockup: define HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH
watchdog/sparc64: define HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_SPARC64
watchdog/hardlockup: make HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG sparc64-specific
watchdog/hardlockup: declare arch_touch_nmi_watchdog() only in linux/nmi.h
watchdog/hardlockup: make the config checks more straightforward
watchdog/hardlockup: sort hardlockup detector related config values a logical way
watchdog/hardlockup: move SMP barriers from common code to buddy code
watchdog/buddy: simplify the dependency for HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PREFER_BUDDY
watchdog/buddy: don't copy the cpumask in watchdog_next_cpu()
watchdog/buddy: cleanup how watchdog_buddy_check_hardlockup() is called
watchdog/hardlockup: remove softlockup comment in touch_nmi_watchdog()
watchdog/hardlockup: in watchdog_hardlockup_check() use cpumask_copy()
watchdog/hardlockup: don't use raw_cpu_ptr() in watchdog_hardlockup_kick()
watchdog/hardlockup: HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG must implement watchdog_hardlockup_probe()
watchdog/hardlockup: keep kernel.nmi_watchdog sysctl as 0444 if probe fails
...
kexec allows replacing the current kernel with a different one. This is
usually a source of concerns for sysadmins that want to harden a system.
Linux already provides a way to disable loading new kexec kernel via
kexec_load_disabled, but that control is very coard, it is all or nothing
and does not make distinction between a panic kexec and a normal kexec.
This patch introduces new sysctl parameters, with finer tuning to specify
how many times a kexec kernel can be loaded. The sysadmin can set
different limits for kexec panic and kexec reboot kernels. The value can
be modified at runtime via sysctl, but only with a stricter value.
With these new parameters on place, a system with loadpin and verity
enabled, using the following kernel parameters:
sysctl.kexec_load_limit_reboot=0 sysct.kexec_load_limit_panic=1 can have a
good warranty that if initrd tries to load a panic kernel, a malitious
user will have small chances to replace that kernel with a different one,
even if they can trigger timeouts on the disk where the panic kernel
lives.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v6-3-6a8531a09b9a@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> # Steam Deck
Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <zwisler@kernel.org>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Attempting to get a crash dump out of a debug PREEMPT_RT kernel via an NMI
panic() doesn't work. The cause of that lies in the PREEMPT_RT definition
of mutex_trylock():
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_RT_MUTEXES) && WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task()))
return 0;
This prevents an nmi_panic() from executing the main body of
__crash_kexec() which does the actual kexec into the kdump kernel. The
warning and return are explained by:
6ce47fd961 ("rtmutex: Warn if trylock is called from hard/softirq context")
[...]
The reasons for this are:
1) There is a potential deadlock in the slowpath
2) Another cpu which blocks on the rtmutex will boost the task
which allegedly locked the rtmutex, but that cannot work
because the hard/softirq context borrows the task context.
Furthermore, grabbing the lock isn't NMI safe, so do away with kexec_mutex
and replace it with an atomic variable. This is somewhat overzealous as
*some* callsites could keep using a mutex (e.g. the sysfs-facing ones
like crash_shrink_memory()), but this has the benefit of involving a
single unified lock and preventing any future NMI-related surprises.
Tested by triggering NMI panics via:
$ echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_unrecovered_nmi
$ echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/unknown_nmi_panic
$ echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/panic
$ ipmitool power diag
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220630223258.4144112-3-vschneid@redhat.com
Fixes: 6ce47fd961 ("rtmutex: Warn if trylock is called from hard/softirq context")
Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Juri Lelli <jlelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Luis Claudio R. Goncalves <lgoncalv@redhat.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Pull misc updates from Andrew Morton:
"Updates to various subsystems which I help look after. lib, ocfs2,
fatfs, autofs, squashfs, procfs, etc. A relatively small amount of
material this time"
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2022-08-06-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (72 commits)
scripts/gdb: ensure the absolute path is generated on initial source
MAINTAINERS: kunit: add David Gow as a maintainer of KUnit
mailmap: add linux.dev alias for Brendan Higgins
mailmap: update Kirill's email
profile: setup_profiling_timer() is moslty not implemented
ocfs2: fix a typo in a comment
ocfs2: use the bitmap API to simplify code
ocfs2: remove some useless functions
lib/mpi: fix typo 'the the' in comment
proc: add some (hopefully) insightful comments
bdi: remove enum wb_congested_state
kernel/hung_task: fix address space of proc_dohung_task_timeout_secs
lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c: replace ternary operator with min() and min_t()
squashfs: support reading fragments in readahead call
squashfs: implement readahead
squashfs: always build "file direct" version of page actor
Revert "squashfs: provide backing_dev_info in order to disable read-ahead"
fs/ocfs2: Fix spelling typo in comment
ia64: old_rr4 added under CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
proc: fix test for "vsyscall=xonly" boot option
...
commit 278311e417 ("kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for
signature verify") adds platform keyring support on x86 kexec but not
arm64.
The code in bzImage64_verify_sig uses the keys on the
.builtin_trusted_keys, .machine, if configured and enabled,
.secondary_trusted_keys, also if configured, and .platform keyrings
to verify the signed kernel image as PE file.
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Before commit 105e10e2cf1c ("kexec_file: drop weak attribute from
functions"), there was already no arch-specific implementation
of arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig. With weak attribute dropped by that
commit, arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig is completely useless. So clean it
up.
Note later patches are dependent on this patch so it should be backported
to the stable tree as well.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: reworded patch description "Note"]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20220714134027.394370-1-coxu@redhat.com/
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
As requested
(http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ee0q7b92.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org),
this series converts weak functions in kexec to use the #ifdef approach.
Quoting the 3e35142ef9 ("kexec_file: drop weak attribute from
arch_kexec_apply_relocations[_add]") changelog:
: Since commit d1bcae833b32f1 ("ELF: Don't generate unused section symbols")
: [1], binutils (v2.36+) started dropping section symbols that it thought
: were unused. This isn't an issue in general, but with kexec_file.c, gcc
: is placing kexec_arch_apply_relocations[_add] into a separate
: .text.unlikely section and the section symbol ".text.unlikely" is being
: dropped. Due to this, recordmcount is unable to find a non-weak symbol in
: .text.unlikely to generate a relocation record against.
This patch (of 2);
Drop __weak attribute from functions in kexec_file.c:
- arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe()
- arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup()
- arch_kexec_kernel_image_load()
- arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole()
- arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig()
arch_kexec_kernel_image_load() calls into kexec_image_load_default(), so
drop the static attribute for the latter.
arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() is not overridden by any architecture, so
drop the __weak attribute.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1656659357.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2cd7ca1fe4d6bb6ca38e3283c717878388ed6788.1656659357.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
