This check caused us to skip adding layout information for calls to
alloca in sspreq/sspstrong mode. We check properly for sspstrong later
on (and add the correct layout info when doing so), so removing this
shouldn't hurt.
No test is included, since testing this using lit seems to require
checking for exact offsets in asm, which is something that the lit tests
for this avoid. If someone cares deeply, I'm happy to write a unittest
or something to cover this, but that feels like overkill.
Patch by Daniel Micay.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D22714
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@282022 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
in order to make sure that its TargetMachine constructor is
registered.
This allows us to run the PEI machine pass with MIR input
(see PR30324).
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@281474 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Summary:
This patch is adding support for the MSVC buffer security check implementation
The buffer security check is turned on with the '/GS' compiler switch.
* https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/8dbf701c.aspx
* To be added to clang here: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20347
Some overview of buffer security check feature and implementation:
* https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa290051(VS.71).aspx
* http://www.ksyash.com/2011/01/buffer-overflow-protection-3/
* http://blog.osom.info/2012/02/understanding-vs-c-compilers-buffer.html
For the following example:
```
int example(int offset, int index) {
char buffer[10];
memset(buffer, 0xCC, index);
return buffer[index];
}
```
The MSVC compiler is adding these instructions to perform stack integrity check:
```
push ebp
mov ebp,esp
sub esp,50h
[1] mov eax,dword ptr [__security_cookie (01068024h)]
[2] xor eax,ebp
[3] mov dword ptr [ebp-4],eax
push ebx
push esi
push edi
mov eax,dword ptr [index]
push eax
push 0CCh
lea ecx,[buffer]
push ecx
call _memset (010610B9h)
add esp,0Ch
mov eax,dword ptr [index]
movsx eax,byte ptr buffer[eax]
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
[4] mov ecx,dword ptr [ebp-4]
[5] xor ecx,ebp
[6] call @__security_check_cookie@4 (01061276h)
mov esp,ebp
pop ebp
ret
```
The instrumentation above is:
* [1] is loading the global security canary,
* [3] is storing the local computed ([2]) canary to the guard slot,
* [4] is loading the guard slot and ([5]) re-compute the global canary,
* [6] is validating the resulting canary with the '__security_check_cookie' and performs error handling.
Overview of the current stack-protection implementation:
* lib/CodeGen/StackProtector.cpp
* There is a default stack-protection implementation applied on intermediate representation.
* The target can overload 'getIRStackGuard' method if it has a standard location for the stack protector cookie.
* An intrinsic 'Intrinsic::stackprotector' is added to the prologue. It will be expanded by the instruction selection pass (DAG or Fast).
* Basic Blocks are added to every instrumented function to receive the code for handling stack guard validation and errors handling.
* Guard manipulation and comparison are added directly to the intermediate representation.
* lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp
* lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp
* There is an implementation that adds instrumentation during instruction selection (for better handling of sibbling calls).
* see long comment above 'class StackProtectorDescriptor' declaration.
* The target needs to override 'getSDagStackGuard' to activate SDAG stack protection generation. (note: getIRStackGuard MUST be nullptr).
* 'getSDagStackGuard' returns the appropriate stack guard (security cookie)
* The code is generated by 'SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp' and 'SelectionDAGISel.cpp'.
* include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h
* Contains function to retrieve the default Guard 'Value'; should be overriden by each target to select which implementation is used and provide Guard 'Value'.
* lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp
* Contains the x86 specialisation; Guard 'Value' used by the SelectionDAG algorithm.
Function-based Instrumentation:
* The MSVC doesn't inline the stack guard comparison in every function. Instead, a call to '__security_check_cookie' is added to the epilogue before every return instructions.
* To support function-based instrumentation, this patch is
* adding a function to get the function-based check (llvm 'Value', see include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h),
* If provided, the stack protection instrumentation won't be inlined and a call to that function will be added to the prologue.
* modifying (SelectionDAGISel.cpp) do avoid producing basic blocks used for inline instrumentation,
* generating the function-based instrumentation during the ISEL pass (SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp),
* if FastISEL (not SelectionDAG), using the fallback which rely on the same function-based implemented over intermediate representation (StackProtector.cpp).
Modifications
* adding support for MSVC (lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp)
* adding support function-based instrumentation (lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp, .h)
Results
* IR generated instrumentation:
```
clang-cl /GS test.cc /Od /c -mllvm -print-isel-input
```
```
*** Final LLVM Code input to ISel ***
; Function Attrs: nounwind sspstrong
define i32 @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"(i32 %offset, i32 %index) #0 {
entry:
%StackGuardSlot = alloca i8* <<<-- Allocated guard slot
%0 = call i8* @llvm.stackguard() <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value
call void @llvm.stackprotector(i8* %0, i8** %StackGuardSlot) <<<-- Prologue intrinsic call (store to Guard slot)
%index.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%offset.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%buffer = alloca [10 x i8], align 1
store i32 %index, i32* %index.addr, align 4
store i32 %offset, i32* %offset.addr, align 4
%arraydecay = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 0
%1 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4
call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %arraydecay, i8 -52, i32 %1, i32 1, i1 false)
%2 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4
%arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 %2
%3 = load i8, i8* %arrayidx, align 1
%conv = sext i8 %3 to i32
%4 = load volatile i8*, i8** %StackGuardSlot <<<-- Loading Guard slot
call void @__security_check_cookie(i8* %4) <<<-- Epilogue function-based check
ret i32 %conv
}
```
* SelectionDAG generated instrumentation:
```
clang-cl /GS test.cc /O1 /c /FA
```
```
"?example@@YAHHH@Z": # @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"
# BB#0: # %entry
pushl %esi
subl $16, %esp
movl ___security_cookie, %eax <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value
movl 28(%esp), %esi
movl %eax, 12(%esp) <<<-- Store to Guard slot
leal 2(%esp), %eax
pushl %esi
pushl $204
pushl %eax
calll _memset
addl $12, %esp
movsbl 2(%esp,%esi), %esi
movl 12(%esp), %ecx <<<-- Loading Guard slot
calll @__security_check_cookie@4 <<<-- Epilogue function-based check
movl %esi, %eax
addl $16, %esp
popl %esi
retl
```
Reviewers: kcc, pcc, eugenis, rnk
Subscribers: majnemer, llvm-commits, hans, thakis, rnk
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20346
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@272053 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
With this change, ideally IR pass can always generate llvm.stackguard
call to get the stack guard; but for now there are still IR form stack
guard customizations around (see getIRStackGuard()). Future SSP
customization should go through LOAD_STACK_GUARD.
There is a behavior change: stack guard values are not CSEed anymore,
since we should never reuse the value in case that it has been spilled (and
corrupted). See ssp-guard-spill.ll. This also cause the change of stack
size and codegen in X86 and AArch64 test cases.
Ideally we'd like to know if the guard created in llvm.stackprotector() gets
spilled or not. If the value is spilled, discard the value and reload
stack guard; otherwise reuse the value. This can be done by teaching
register allocator to know how to rematerialize LOAD_STACK_GUARD and
force a rematerialization (which seems hard), or check for spilling in
expandPostRAPseudo. It only makes sense when the stack guard is a global
variable, which requires more instructions to load. Anyway, this seems to go out
of the scope of the current patch.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@266806 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Add StackProtector to SafeStack. This adds limited protection against
data corruption in the caller frame. Current implementation treats
all stack protector levels as -fstack-protector-all.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@266004 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
This is a cleanup patch for SSP support in LLVM. There is no functional change.
llvm.stackprotectorcheck is not needed, because SelectionDAG isn't
actually lowering it in SelectBasicBlock; rather, it adds check code in
FinishBasicBlock, ignoring the position where the intrinsic is inserted
(See FindSplitPointForStackProtector()).
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@265851 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Bionic has a defined thread-local location for the stack protector
cookie. Emit a direct load instead of going through __stack_chk_guard.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@265481 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
This patch removes all weight-related interfaces from BPI and replace
them by probability versions. With this patch, we won't use edge weight
anymore in either IR or MC passes. Edge probabilitiy is a better
representation in terms of CFG update and validation.
Differential revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D15519
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@256263 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Finish removing implicit ilist iterator conversions from LLVMCodeGen.
I'm sure there are lots more of these in lib/CodeGen/*/.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@249915 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Summary:
This change is part of a series of commits dedicated to have a single
DataLayout during compilation by using always the one owned by the
module.
Reviewers: echristo
Subscribers: llvm-commits, rafael, yaron.keren
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D11010
From: Mehdi Amini <mehdi.amini@apple.com>
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@241646 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Canonicalize access to function attributes to use the simpler API.
getAttributes().getAttribute(AttributeSet::FunctionIndex, Kind)
=> getFnAttribute(Kind)
getAttributes().hasAttribute(AttributeSet::FunctionIndex, Kind)
=> hasFnAttribute(Kind)
Also, add `Function::getFnStackAlignment()`, and canonicalize:
getAttributes().getStackAlignment(AttributeSet::FunctionIndex)
=> getFnStackAlignment()
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@229208 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
This is to be consistent with StringSet and ultimately with the standard
library's associative container insert function.
This lead to updating SmallSet::insert to return pair<iterator, bool>,
and then to update SmallPtrSet::insert to return pair<iterator, bool>,
and then to update all the existing users of those functions...
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@222334 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Windows defines NULL to 0, which when used as an argument to a variadic
function, is not a null pointer constant. As a result, Clang's
-Wsentinel fires on this code. Using '0' would be wrong on most 64-bit
platforms, but both MSVC and Clang make it work on Windows. Sidestep the
issue with nullptr.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@221940 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
define below all header includes in the lib/CodeGen/... tree. While the
current modules implementation doesn't check for this kind of ODR
violation yet, it is likely to grow support for it in the future. It
also removes one layer of macro pollution across all the included
headers.
Other sub-trees will follow.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@206837 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Previously, SSPBufferSize was assigned the value of the "stack-protector-buffer-size"
attribute after all uses of SSPBufferSize. The effect was that the default
SSPBufferSize was always used during analysis. I moved the check for the
attribute before the analysis; now --param ssp-buffer-size= works correctly again.
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D3349
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@206486 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
George Burgess IV
Silviu Baranga
Yunzhong Gao
Rafael Espindola
Etienne Bergeron
Tim Shen
Evgeniy Stepanov
Cong Hou
Duncan P. N. Exon Smith
Mehdi Amini
David Blaikie
Eric Christopher
Saleem Abdulrasool
Akira Hatanaka
Simon Pilgrim
Reid Kleckner
Chandler Carruth
Josh Magee