Files
linux/kernel
Kees Cook 631792ffa5 futex: Do not leak robust list to unprivileged process
commit bdbb776f88 upstream.

It was possible to extract the robust list head address from a setuid
process if it had used set_robust_list(), allowing an ASLR info leak. This
changes the permission checks to be the same as those used for similar
info that comes out of /proc.

Running a setuid program that uses robust futexes would have had:
  cred->euid != pcred->euid
  cred->euid == pcred->uid
so the old permissions check would allow it. I'm not aware of any setuid
programs that use robust futexes, so this is just a preventative measure.

(This patch is based on changes from grsecurity.)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: spender@grsecurity.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120319231253.GA20893@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-04-22 16:21:45 -07:00
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