FMODE_EXEC is a constant type of fmode_t but was used with normal integer
constants. This results in following warnings from sparse. Fix it using
new macro __FMODE_EXEC.
fs/exec.c:116:58: warning: restricted fmode_t degrades to integer
fs/exec.c:689:58: warning: restricted fmode_t degrades to integer
fs/fcntl.c:777:9: warning: restricted fmode_t degrades to integer
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the
vdso) skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local
attacker to bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting
the available pages for special mappings.
bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, and although I don't think this can
be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not to have
the security check.
$ uname -m
x86_64
$ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
65536
$ cat install_special_mapping.s
section .bss
resb BSS_SIZE
section .text
global _start
_start:
mov eax, __NR_pause
int 0x80
$ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s
$ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o
$ ./install_special_mapping &
[1] 14303
$ cat /proc/14303/maps
0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665 /home/taviso/install_special_mapping
00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to
4096.
Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Robert Swiecki <swiecki@google.com>
[ Changed to not drop the error code - akpm ]
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Note: this patch targets 2.6.37 and tries to be as simple as possible.
That is why it adds more copy-and-paste horror into fs/compat.c and
uglifies fs/exec.c, this will be cleanuped later.
compat_copy_strings() plays with bprm->vma/mm directly and thus has
two problems: it lacks the RLIMIT_STACK check and argv/envp memory
is not visible to oom killer.
Export acct_arg_size() and get_arg_page(), change compat_copy_strings()
to use get_arg_page(), change compat_do_execve() to do acct_arg_size(0)
as do_execve() does.
Add the fatal_signal_pending/cond_resched checks into compat_count() and
compat_copy_strings(), this matches the code in fs/exec.c and certainly
makes sense.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Brad Spengler published a local memory-allocation DoS that
evades the OOM-killer (though not the virtual memory RLIMIT):
http://www.grsecurity.net/~spender/64bit_dos.c
execve()->copy_strings() can allocate a lot of memory, but
this is not visible to oom-killer, nobody can see the nascent
bprm->mm and take it into account.
With this patch get_arg_page() increments current's MM_ANONPAGES
counter every time we allocate the new page for argv/envp. When
do_execve() succeds or fails, we change this counter back.
Technically this is not 100% correct, we can't know if the new
page is swapped out and turn MM_ANONPAGES into MM_SWAPENTS, but
I don't think this really matters and everything becomes correct
once exec changes ->mm or fails.
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Reviewed-and-discussed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Presently do_execve() turns PF_KTHREAD off before search_binary_handler().
THis has a theorical risk of PF_KTHREAD getting lost. We don't have to
turn PF_KTHREAD off in the ENOEXEC case.
This patch moves this flag modification to after the finding of the
executable file.
This is only a theorical issue because kthreads do not call do_execve()
directly. But fixing would be better.
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We met a parameter truncated issue, consider following:
> echo "|/root/core_pattern_pipe_test %p /usr/libexec/blah-blah-blah \
%s %c %p %u %g 11 12345678901234567890123456789012345678 %t" > \
/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
This is okay because the strings is less than CORENAME_MAX_SIZE. "cat
/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern" shows the whole string. but after we run
core_pattern_pipe_test in man page, we found last parameter was truncated
like below:
argc[10]=<12807486>
The root cause is core_pattern allows % specifiers, which need to be
replaced during parse time, but the replace may expand the strings to
larger than CORENAME_MAX_SIZE. So if the last parameter is % specifiers,
the replace code is using snprintf(out_ptr, out_end - out_ptr, ...), this
will write out of corename array.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Xiaotian Feng <dfeng@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Oleg Nesterov pointed out we have to prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec
itself and we can reuse ->cred_guard_mutex for it. Yes, concurrent
execve() has no worth.
Let's move ->cred_guard_mutex from task_struct to signal_struct. It
naturally prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec.
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It's pointless to kill a task if another thread sharing its mm cannot be
killed to allow future memory freeing. A subsequent patch will prevent
kills in such cases, but first it's necessary to have a way to flag a task
that shares memory with an OOM_DISABLE task that doesn't incur an
additional tasklist scan, which would make select_bad_process() an O(n^2)
function.
This patch adds an atomic counter to struct mm_struct that follows how
many threads attached to it have an oom_score_adj of OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN.
They cannot be killed by the kernel, so their memory cannot be freed in
oom conditions.
This only requires task_lock() on the task that we're operating on, it
does not require mm->mmap_sem since task_lock() pins the mm and the
operation is atomic.
[rientjes@google.com: changelog and sys_unshare() code]
[rientjes@google.com: protect oom_disable_count with task_lock in fork]
[rientjes@google.com: use old_mm for oom_disable_count in exec]
Signed-off-by: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Tony Luck reports that the addition of the access_ok() check in commit
0eead9ab41 ("Don't dump task struct in a.out core-dumps") broke the
ia64 compile due to missing the necessary header file includes.
Rather than add yet another include (<asm/unistd.h>) to make everything
happy, just uninline the silly core dump helper functions and move the
bodies to fs/exec.c where they make a lot more sense.
dump_seek() in particular was too big to be an inline function anyway,
and none of them are in any way performance-critical. And we really
don't need to mess up our include file headers more than they already
are.
Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
An execve with a very large total of argument/environment strings
can take a really long time in the execve system call. It runs
uninterruptibly to count and copy all the strings. This change
makes it abort the exec quickly if sent a SIGKILL.
Note that this is the conservative change, to interrupt only for
SIGKILL, by using fatal_signal_pending(). It would be perfectly
correct semantics to let any signal interrupt the string-copying in
execve, i.e. use signal_pending() instead of fatal_signal_pending().
We'll save that change for later, since it could have user-visible
consequences, such as having a timer set too quickly make it so that
an execve can never complete, though it always happened to work before.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This adds a preemption point during the copying of the argument and
environment strings for execve, in copy_strings(). There is already
a preemption point in the count() loop, so this doesn't add any new
points in the abstract sense.
When the total argument+environment strings are very large, the time
spent copying them can be much more than a normal user time slice.
So this change improves the interactivity of the rest of the system
when one process is doing an execve with very large arguments.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The CONFIG_STACK_GROWSDOWN variant of setup_arg_pages() does not
check the size of the argument/environment area on the stack.
When it is unworkably large, shift_arg_pages() hits its BUG_ON.
This is exploitable with a very large RLIMIT_STACK limit, to
create a crash pretty easily.
Check that the initial stack is not too large to make it possible
to map in any executable. We're not checking that the actual
executable (or intepreter, for binfmt_elf) will fit. So those
mappings might clobber part of the initial stack mapping. But
that is just userland lossage that userland made happen, not a
kernel problem.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
fs: brlock vfsmount_lock
fs: scale files_lock
lglock: introduce special lglock and brlock spin locks
tty: fix fu_list abuse
fs: cleanup files_lock locking
fs: remove extra lookup in __lookup_hash
fs: fs_struct rwlock to spinlock
apparmor: use task path helpers
fs: dentry allocation consolidation
fs: fix do_lookup false negative
mbcache: Limit the maximum number of cache entries
hostfs ->follow_link() braino
hostfs: dumb (and usually harmless) tpyo - strncpy instead of strlcpy
remove SWRITE* I/O types
kill BH_Ordered flag
vfs: update ctime when changing the file's permission by setfacl
cramfs: only unlock new inodes
fix reiserfs_evict_inode end_writeback second call
fs: fs_struct rwlock to spinlock
struct fs_struct.lock is an rwlock with the read-side used to protect root and
pwd members while taking references to them. Taking a reference to a path
typically requires just 2 atomic ops, so the critical section is very small.
Parallel read-side operations would have cacheline contention on the lock, the
dentry, and the vfsmount cachelines, so the rwlock is unlikely to ever give a
real parallelism increase.
Replace it with a spinlock to avoid one or two atomic operations in typical
path lookup fastpath.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer so that kernel_execve() compiles
correctly on ARM:
arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:88: warning: passing argument 1 of 'do_execve' discards qualifiers from pointer target type
This also requires the argv and envp arguments to be consted twice, once for
the pointer array and once for the strings the array points to. This is
because do_execve() passes a pointer to the filename (now const) to
copy_strings_kernel(). A simpler alternative would be to cast the filename
pointer in do_execve() when it's passed to copy_strings_kernel().
do_execve() may not change any of the strings it is passed as part of the argv
or envp lists as they are some of them in .rodata, so marking these strings as
const should be fine.
Further kernel_execve() and sys_execve() need to be changed to match.
This has been test built on x86_64, frv, arm and mips.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/notify: (132 commits)
fanotify: use both marks when possible
fsnotify: pass both the vfsmount mark and inode mark
fsnotify: walk the inode and vfsmount lists simultaneously
fsnotify: rework ignored mark flushing
fsnotify: remove global fsnotify groups lists
fsnotify: remove group->mask
fsnotify: remove the global masks
fsnotify: cleanup should_send_event
fanotify: use the mark in handler functions
audit: use the mark in handler functions
dnotify: use the mark in handler functions
inotify: use the mark in handler functions
fsnotify: send fsnotify_mark to groups in event handling functions
fsnotify: Exchange list heads instead of moving elements
fsnotify: srcu to protect read side of inode and vfsmount locks
fsnotify: use an explicit flag to indicate fsnotify_destroy_mark has been called
fsnotify: use _rcu functions for mark list traversal
fsnotify: place marks on object in order of group memory address
vfs/fsnotify: fsnotify_close can delay the final work in fput
fsnotify: store struct file not struct path
...
Fix up trivial delete/modify conflict in fs/notify/inotify/inotify.c.
* 'bkl/core' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/frederic/random-tracing:
do_coredump: Do not take BKL
init: Remove the BKL from startup code
fanotify, the upcoming notification system actually needs a struct path so it can
do opens in the context of listeners, and it needs a file so it can get f_flags
from the original process. Close was the only operation that already was passing
a struct file to the notification hook. This patch passes a file for access,
modify, and open as well as they are easily available to these hooks.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
core_pattern is not actually protected and hasn't been
ever since we introduced procfs support for sysctl -- a
_long_ time. Don't take it here either.
Also nothing inside do_coredump appears to require bkl
protection.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
[ remove smp_lock.h headers ]
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
de_thread() and __exit_signal() use signal_struct->count/notify_count for
synchronization. We can simplify the code and use ->notify_count only.
Instead of comparing these two counters, we can change de_thread() to set
->notify_count = nr_of_sub_threads, then change __exit_signal() to
dec-and-test this counter and notify group_exit_task.
Note that __exit_signal() checks "notify_count > 0" just for symmetry with
exit_notify(), we could just check it is != 0.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- kill "int dump_count", argv_split(argcp) accepts argcp == NULL.
- move "int dump_count" under " if (ispipe)" branch, fail_dropcount
can check ispipe.
- move "char **helper_argv" as well, change the code to do argv_free()
right after call_usermodehelper_fns().
- If call_usermodehelper_fns() fails goto close_fail label instead
of closing the file by hand.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
