commit 56f91aad69 upstream.
If the length of data to be read in readpage() is exactly
PAGE_CACHE_SIZE, the original code does not flush d-cache
for data consistency after finishing reading. This patches fixes
this.
Signed-off-by: Li Wang <liwang@ubuntukylin.com>
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8f9ff18920 upstream.
When using FITRIM ioctl on a file system without journal it will
only trim the block group once, no matter how many times you invoke
FITRIM ioctl and how many block you release from the block group.
It is because we only clear EXT4_GROUP_INFO_WAS_TRIMMED_BIT in journal
callback. Fix this by clearing the bit in no journal mode as well.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Jorge Fábregas <jorge.fabregas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f5a44db5d2 upstream.
The missing casts can cause the high 64-bits of the physical blocks to
be lost. Set up new macros which allows us to make sure the right
thing happen, even if at some point we end up supporting larger
logical block numbers.
Thanks to the Emese Revfy and the PaX security team for reporting this
issue.
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Reported-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 34cf865d54 upstream.
Akira-san has been reporting rare deadlocks of his machine when running
xfstests test 269 on ext4 filesystem. The problem turned out to be in
ext4_da_reserve_metadata() and ext4_da_reserve_space() which called
ext4_should_retry_alloc() while holding i_data_sem. Since
ext4_should_retry_alloc() can force a transaction commit, this is a
lock ordering violation and leads to deadlocks.
Fix the problem by just removing the retry loops. These functions should
just report ENOSPC to the caller (e.g. ext4_da_write_begin()) and that
function must take care of retrying after dropping all necessary locks.
Reported-and-tested-by: Akira Fujita <a-fujita@rs.jp.nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 30fac0f75d upstream.
When the filesystem doesn't support extents (like in ext2/3
compatibility modes), there is no need to reserve any clusters. Space
estimates for writing are exact, hole punching doesn't need new
metadata, and there are no unwritten extents to convert.
This fixes a problem when filesystem still having some free space when
accessed with a native ext2/3 driver suddently reports ENOSPC when
accessed with ext4 driver.
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5946d08937 upstream.
A corrupted ext4 may have out of order leaf extents, i.e.
extent: lblk 0--1023, len 1024, pblk 9217, flags: LEAF UNINIT
extent: lblk 1000--2047, len 1024, pblk 10241, flags: LEAF UNINIT
^^^^ overlap with previous extent
Reading such extent could hit BUG_ON() in ext4_es_cache_extent().
BUG_ON(end < lblk);
The problem is that __read_extent_tree_block() tries to cache holes as
well but assumes 'lblk' is greater than 'prev' and passes underflowed
length to ext4_es_cache_extent(). Fix it by checking for overlapping
extents in ext4_valid_extent_entries().
I hit this when fuzz testing ext4, and am able to reproduce it by
modifying the on-disk extent by hand.
Also add the check for (ee_block + len - 1) in ext4_valid_extent() to
make sure the value is not overflow.
Ran xfstests on patched ext4 and no regression.
Cc: Lukáš Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ae1495b12d upstream.
While it's true that errors can only happen if there is a bug in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata(), if a bug does happen, we need to halt
the kernel or remount the file system read-only in order to avoid
further data loss. The ext4_journal_abort_handle() function doesn't
do any of this, and while it's likely that this call (since it doesn't
adjust refcounts) will likely result in the file system eventually
deadlocking since the current transaction will never be able to close,
it's much cleaner to call let ext4's error handling system deal with
this situation.
There's a separate bug here which is that if certain jbd2 errors
errors occur and file system is mounted errors=continue, the file
system will probably eventually end grind to a halt as described
above. But things have been this way in a long time, and usually when
we have these sorts of errors it's pretty much a disaster --- and
that's why the jbd2 layer aggressively retries memory allocations,
which is the most likely cause of these jbd2 errors.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fc55d2c944 upstream.
We also need to wake up 'safe' waiters if error occurs or request
aborted. Otherwise sync(2)/fsync(2) may hang forever.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zheng.z.yan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eb1b8af33c upstream.
Aborted requests usually get cleared when the reply is received.
If MDS crashes, no reply will be received. So we need to cleanup
aborted requests when re-sending requests.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zheng.z.yan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Farnum <greg@inktank.com>
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6f519564d7 upstream.
If something wrong happens in write endio, running snapshot-aware defragment
can end up with undefined results, maybe a crash, so we should avoid it.
In order to share similar code, this also adds a helper to free the struct for
snapshot-aware defrag.
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8185554d3e upstream.
When a directory has a default ACL and a subdirectory is created
under that directory, btrfs_init_acl() is called when the
subdirectory's inode is created to initialize the inode's ACL
(inherited from the parent directory) but it was clearing the ACL
from the inode after setting it if posix_acl_create() returned
success, instead of clearing it only if it returned an error.
To reproduce this issue:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/loop0
$ mount /dev/loop0 /mnt
$ mkdir /mnt/acl
$ setfacl -d --set u::rwx,g::rwx,o::- /mnt/acl
$ getfacl /mnt/acl
user::rwx
group::rwx
other::r-x
default:user::rwx
default:group::rwx
default:other::---
$ mkdir /mnt/acl/dir1
$ getfacl /mnt/acl/dir1
user::rwx
group::rwx
other::---
After unmounting and mounting again the filesystem, fgetacl returned the
expected ACL:
$ umount /mnt/acl
$ mount /dev/loop0 /mnt
$ getfacl /mnt/acl/dir1
user::rwx
group::rwx
other::---
default:user::rwx
default:group::rwx
default:other::---
Meaning that the underlying xattr was persisted.
Reported-by: Giuseppe Fierro <giuseppe@fierro.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe David Borba Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ed9e8af88e upstream.
I added an assert to make sure we were looking up aligned offsets for csums and
I tripped it when running xfstests. This is because log_one_extent was checking
if block_start == 0 for a hole instead of EXTENT_MAP_HOLE. This worked out fine
in practice it seems, but it adds a lot of extra work that is uneeded. With
this fix I'm no longer tripping my assert. Thanks,
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4a82fd7c4e upstream.
When the state manager is processing the NFS4CLNT_DELEGRETURN flag, session
draining is off, but DELEGRETURN can still get a session error.
The async handler calls nfs4_schedule_session_recovery returns -EAGAIN, and
the DELEGRETURN done then restarts the RPC task in the prepare state.
With the state manager still processing the NFS4CLNT_DELEGRETURN flag with
session draining off, these DELEGRETURNs will cycle with errors filling up the
session slots.
This prevents OPEN reclaims (from nfs_delegation_claim_opens) required by the
NFS4CLNT_DELEGRETURN state manager processing from completing, hanging the
state manager in the __rpc_wait_for_completion_task in nfs4_run_open_task
as seen in this kernel thread dump:
kernel: 4.12.32.53-ma D 0000000000000000 0 3393 2 0x00000000
kernel: ffff88013995fb60 0000000000000046 ffff880138cc5400 ffff88013a9df140
kernel: ffff8800000265c0 ffffffff8116eef0 ffff88013fc10080 0000000300000001
kernel: ffff88013a4ad058 ffff88013995ffd8 000000000000fbc8 ffff88013a4ad058
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff8116eef0>] ? cache_alloc_refill+0x1c0/0x240
kernel: [<ffffffffa0358110>] ? rpc_wait_bit_killable+0x0/0xa0 [sunrpc]
kernel: [<ffffffffa0358152>] rpc_wait_bit_killable+0x42/0xa0 [sunrpc]
kernel: [<ffffffff8152914f>] __wait_on_bit+0x5f/0x90
kernel: [<ffffffffa0358110>] ? rpc_wait_bit_killable+0x0/0xa0 [sunrpc]
kernel: [<ffffffff815291f8>] out_of_line_wait_on_bit+0x78/0x90
kernel: [<ffffffff8109b520>] ? wake_bit_function+0x0/0x50
kernel: [<ffffffffa035810d>] __rpc_wait_for_completion_task+0x2d/0x30 [sunrpc]
kernel: [<ffffffffa040d44c>] nfs4_run_open_task+0x11c/0x160 [nfs]
kernel: [<ffffffffa04114e7>] nfs4_open_recover_helper+0x87/0x120 [nfs]
kernel: [<ffffffffa0411646>] nfs4_open_recover+0xc6/0x150 [nfs]
kernel: [<ffffffffa040cc6f>] ? nfs4_open_recoverdata_alloc+0x2f/0x60 [nfs]
kernel: [<ffffffffa0414e1a>] nfs4_open_delegation_recall+0x6a/0xa0 [nfs]
kernel: [<ffffffffa0424020>] nfs_end_delegation_return+0x120/0x2e0 [nfs]
kernel: [<ffffffff8109580f>] ? queue_work+0x1f/0x30
kernel: [<ffffffffa0424347>] nfs_client_return_marked_delegations+0xd7/0x110 [nfs]
kernel: [<ffffffffa04225d8>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x548/0x620 [nfs]
kernel: [<ffffffffa0422090>] ? nfs4_run_state_manager+0x0/0x620 [nfs]
kernel: [<ffffffff8109b0f6>] kthread+0x96/0xa0
kernel: [<ffffffff8100c20a>] child_rip+0xa/0x20
kernel: [<ffffffff8109b060>] ? kthread+0x0/0xa0
kernel: [<ffffffff8100c200>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20
The state manager can not therefore process the DELEGRETURN session errors.
Change the async handler to wait for recovery on session errors.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3873d064b8 upstream.
When compiling a 32bit kernel with CONFIG_LBDAF=n the compiler complains like
shown below. Fix this warning by instead using sector_div() which is provided
by the kernel.h header file.
fs/nfs/blocklayout/extents.c: In function ‘normalize’:
include/asm-generic/div64.h:43:28: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast [enabled by default]
fs/nfs/blocklayout/extents.c:47:13: note: in expansion of macro ‘do_div’
nfs/blocklayout/extents.c:47:2: warning: right shift count >= width of type [enabled by default]
fs/nfs/blocklayout/extents.c:47:2: warning: passing argument 1 of ‘__div64_32’ from incompatible pointer type [enabled by default]
include/asm-generic/div64.h:35:17: note: expected ‘uint64_t *’ but argument is of type ‘sector_t *’
extern uint32_t __div64_32(uint64_t *dividend, uint32_t divisor);
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e43f998e47 upstream.
If btrfs_ioctl_snap_destroy blocks on the mutex and the process is
killed, mnt_write count is unbalanced and leads to unmountable
filesystem.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 700ff4f095 upstream.
The closing parenthesis is in the wrong place. We want to check
"sizeof(*arg->clone_sources) * arg->clone_sources_count" instead of
"sizeof(*arg->clone_sources * arg->clone_sources_count)".
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 781c2a5a5f upstream.
The DRC code will attempt to reuse an existing, expired cache entry in
preference to allocating a new one. It'll then search the cache, and if
it gets a hit it'll then free the cache entry that it was going to
reuse.
The cache code doesn't unhash the entry that it's going to reuse
however, so it's possible for it end up designating an entry for reuse
and then subsequently freeing the same entry after it finds it. This
leads it to a later use-after-free situation and usually some list
corruption warnings or an oops.
Fix this by simply unhashing the entry that we intend to reuse. That
will mean that it's not findable via a search and should prevent this
situation from occurring.
Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Reported-by: g. artim <gartim@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 31978b5cc6 upstream.
If we allocate less than sizeof(struct attrlist) then we end up
corrupting memory or doing a ZERO_PTR_SIZE dereference.
This can only be triggered with CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f94c44573e upstream.
This loop in xfs_growfs_data_private() is incorrect for V4
superblocks filesystems:
for (bucket = 0; bucket < XFS_AGFL_SIZE(mp); bucket++)
agfl->agfl_bno[bucket] = cpu_to_be32(NULLAGBLOCK);
For V4 filesystems, we don't have a agfl header structure, and so
XFS_AGFL_SIZE() returns an entire sector's worth of entries, which
we then index from an offset into the sector. Hence: buffer overrun.
This problem was introduced in 3.10 by commit 77c95bba ("xfs: add
CRC checks to the AGFL") which changed the AGFL structure but failed
to update the growfs code to handle the different structures.
Fix it by using the correct offset into the buffer for both V4 and
V5 filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c97cf606e4 upstream.
If the DELEGRETURN errors out with something like NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID
then there is no recovery possible. Just quit without returning an error.
Also, note that the client must not assume that the NFSv4 lease has been
renewed when it sees an error on DELEGRETURN.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b0d8d22921 upstream.
The pipe code was trying (and failing) to be very careful about freeing
the pipe info only after the last access, with a pattern like:
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
if (!--pipe->files) {
inode->i_pipe = NULL;
kill = 1;
}
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
__pipe_unlock(pipe);
if (kill)
free_pipe_info(pipe);
where the final freeing is done last.
HOWEVER. The above is actually broken, because while the freeing is
done at the end, if we have two racing processes releasing the pipe
inode info, the one that *doesn't* free it will decrement the ->files
count, and unlock the inode i_lock, but then still use the
"pipe_inode_info" afterwards when it does the "__pipe_unlock(pipe)".
This is *very* hard to trigger in practice, since the race window is
very small, and adding debug options seems to just hide it by slowing
things down.
Simon originally reported this way back in July as an Oops in
kmem_cache_allocate due to a single bit corruption (due to the final
"spin_unlock(pipe->mutex.wait_lock)" incrementing a field in a different
allocation that had re-used the free'd pipe-info), it's taken this long
to figure out.
Since the 'pipe->files' accesses aren't even protected by the pipe lock
(we very much use the inode lock for that), the simple solution is to
just drop the pipe lock early. And since there were two users of this
pattern, create a helper function for it.
Introduced commit ba5bb14733 ("pipe: take allocation and freeing of
pipe_inode_info out of ->i_mutex").
Reported-by: Simon Kirby <sim@hostway.ca>
Reported-by: Ian Applegate <ia@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit 36f5588905
"aio: refcounting cleanup" resulted in ioctx_lock not being held
during ctx removal, leaving the list susceptible to corruptions.
In mainline kernel the issue went away as a side effect of
db446a08c2 "aio: convert the ioctx list to
table lookup v3".
Fix the problem by restoring appropriate locking.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Eryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Acked-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8c567a7fab upstream.
Check for CAP_SYS_ADMIN since the caller can truncate preallocated
blocks from files they do not own nor have write access to. A more
fine grained access check was considered: require the caller to
specify their own uid/gid and to use inode_permission to check for
write, but this would not catch the case of an inode not reachable
via path traversal from the callers mount namespace.
Add check for read-only filesystem to free eofblocks ioctl.
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Dwight Engen <dwight.engen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
