Some audit messages (namely configuration changes) are still emitted even if
the audit subsystem has been explicitly disabled. This patch turns those
messages off as well.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
New kind of audit rule predicates: "object is visible in given subtree".
The part that can be sanely implemented, that is. Limitations:
* if you have hardlink from outside of tree, you'd better watch
it too (or just watch the object itself, obviously)
* if you mount something under a watched tree, tell audit
that new chunk should be added to watched subtrees
* if you umount something in a watched tree and it's still mounted
elsewhere, you will get matches on events happening there. New command
tells audit to recalculate the trees, trimming such sources of false
positives.
Note that it's _not_ about path - if something mounted in several places
(multiple mount, bindings, different namespaces, etc.), the match does
_not_ depend on which one we are using for access.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Right now the audit filter can match on = != > < >= blah blah blah.
This allow the filter to also look at bitwise AND operations, &
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The sanity check in audit_match_class() is wrong. We are able to audit
2048 syscalls but in audit_match_class() we were accidentally using
sizeof(_u32) instead of number of bits in _u32 when deciding how many
syscalls were valid. On ia64 in particular we were hitting syscall
numbers over the (wrong) limit of 256. Fixing the audit_match_class
check takes care of the problem.
Signed-off-by: Klaus Weidner <klaus@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Kill this warning...
kernel/auditfilter.c: In function ‘audit_receive_filter’:
kernel/auditfilter.c:1213: warning: ‘ndw’ may be used uninitialized in this function
kernel/auditfilter.c:1213: warning: ‘ndp’ may be used uninitialized in this function
...with a simplification of the code. audit_put_nd() can accept NULL
arguments, just like kfree(). It is cleaner to init two existing vars
to NULL, remove the redundant test variable 'putnd_needed' branches, and call
audit_put_nd() directly.
As a desired side effect, the warning goes away.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
When auditing syscalls that send signals, log the pid and security
context for each target process. Optimize the data collection by
adding a counter for signal-related rules, and avoiding allocating an
aux struct unless we have more than one target process. For process
groups, collect pid/context data in blocks of 16. Move the
audit_signal_info() hook up in check_kill_permission() so we audit
attempts where permission is denied.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
I was looking at parsing some of these messages and found that I wanted what
it was doing next to an op= for the parser to key on. Also missing was the list
number and results.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
gcc emits this warning:
kernel/auditfilter.c: In function 'audit_filter_user':
kernel/auditfilter.c:1611: warning: 'state' is used uninitialized in this function
I tend to agree with gcc - there are a couple of plausible exit paths from
audit_filter_user_rules() where it does not set 'state', keeping the
variable uninitialized. For example if a filter rule has an AUDIT_POSSIBLE
action. Initialize to 'wont audit'. Fix whitespace damage too.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently the kernel audit system represents arch's as numbers and will
gladly accept comparisons between archs using >, <, >=, <= when the only
thing that makes sense is = or !=. I'm told that the next revision of
auditctl will do this checking but this will provide enforcement in the
kernel even for old userspace. A simple command to show the issue would
be to run
auditctl -d entry,always -F arch>i686 -S chmod
with this patch the kernel will reject this with -EINVAL
Please comment/ack/nak as soon as possible.
-Eric
kernel/auditfilter.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Rename selinux_ctxid_to_string to selinux_sid_to_string to be
consistent with other interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Make the audit message for implicit rule removal more informative.
Make the rule update message consistent with other messages.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Hello,
During some troubleshooting, I found that ppid was accidentally omitted from
the legacy rule section. This resulted in EINVAL for any rule with ppid sent
with AUDIT_ADD.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Michael C Thompson wrote: [Tue Aug 01 2006, 02:36:36PM EDT]
> The trigger for this oops is:
> # auditctl -a exit,always -S pread64 -F 'inode<1'
Setting the err value will fix it.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Allow to tie upper bits of syscall bitmap in audit rules to kernel-defined
sets of syscalls. Infrastructure, a couple of classes (with 32bit counterparts
for biarch targets) and actual tie-in on i386, amd64 and ia64.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements
of the SELinux context.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
kernel/auditfilter.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds
additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming
avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++----
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add support for a rule key, which can be used to tie audit records to audit
rules. This is useful when a watched file is accessed through a link or
symlink, as well as for general audit log analysis.
Because this patch uses a string key instead of an integer key, there is a bit
of extra overhead to do the kstrdup() when a rule fires. However, we're also
allocating memory for the audit record buffer, so it's probably not that
significant. I went ahead with a string key because it seems more
user-friendly.
Note that the user must ensure that filterkeys are unique. The kernel only
checks for duplicate rules.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hpd.com>
