The system deadlocks (at least since 2.6.10) when
call_usermodehelper(UMH_WAIT_EXEC) request triggers
call_usermodehelper(UMH_WAIT_PROC) request.
This is because "khelper thread is waiting for the worker thread at
wait_for_completion() in do_fork() since the worker thread was created
with CLONE_VFORK flag" and "the worker thread cannot call complete()
because do_execve() is blocked at UMH_WAIT_PROC request" and "the khelper
thread cannot start processing UMH_WAIT_PROC request because the khelper
thread is waiting for the worker thread at wait_for_completion() in
do_fork()".
The easiest example to observe this deadlock is to use a corrupted
/sbin/hotplug binary (like shown below).
# : > /tmp/dummy
# chmod 755 /tmp/dummy
# echo /tmp/dummy > /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug
# modprobe whatever
call_usermodehelper("/tmp/dummy", UMH_WAIT_EXEC) is called from
kobject_uevent_env() in lib/kobject_uevent.c upon loading/unloading a
module. do_execve("/tmp/dummy") triggers a call to
request_module("binfmt-0000") from search_binary_handler() which in turn
calls call_usermodehelper(UMH_WAIT_PROC).
In order to avoid deadlock, as a for-now and easy-to-backport solution, do
not try to call wait_for_completion() in call_usermodehelper_exec() if the
worker thread was created by khelper thread with CLONE_VFORK flag. Future
and fundamental solution might be replacing singleton khelper thread with
some workqueue so that recursive calls up to max_active dependency loop
can be handled without deadlock.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment to kmod_thread_locker]
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
vprintk_emit() prefix parsing should only be done for internal kernel
messages. This allows existing behavior to be kept in all cases.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The current form of a KERN_<LEVEL> is "<.>".
Add printk_get_level and printk_skip_level functions to handle these
formats.
These functions centralize tests of KERN_<LEVEL> so a future modification
can change the KERN_<LEVEL> style and shorten the number of bytes consumed
by these headers.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build error and warning]
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Wu Fengguang <wfg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On the suspend/resume path the boot CPU does not go though an
offline->online transition. This breaks the NMI detector post-resume
since it depends on PMU state that is lost when the system gets
suspended.
Fix this by forcing a CPU offline->online transition for the lockup
detector on the boot CPU during resume.
To provide more context, we enable NMI watchdog on Chrome OS. We have
seen several reports of systems freezing up completely which indicated
that the NMI watchdog was not firing for some reason.
Debugging further, we found a simple way of repro'ing system freezes --
issuing the command 'tasket 1 sh -c "echo nmilockup > /proc/breakme"'
after the system has been suspended/resumed one or more times.
With this patch in place, the system freeze result in panics, as
expected.
These panics provide a nice stack trace for us to debug the actual issue
causing the freeze.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fiddle with code comment]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make lockup_detector_bootcpu_resume() conditional on CONFIG_SUSPEND]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix section errors]
Signed-off-by: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Mandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org>
Cc: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
panic_lock is meant to ensure that panic processing takes place only on
one cpu; if any of the other cpus encounter a panic, they will spin
waiting to be shut down.
However, this causes a regression in this scenario:
1. Cpu 0 encounters a panic and acquires the panic_lock
and proceeds with the panic processing.
2. There is an interrupt on cpu 0 that also encounters
an error condition and invokes panic.
3. This second invocation fails to acquire the panic_lock
and enters the infinite while loop in panic_smp_self_stop.
Thus all panic processing is stopped, and the cpu is stuck for eternity
in the while(1) inside panic_smp_self_stop.
To address this, disable local interrupts with local_irq_disable before
acquiring the panic_lock. This will prevent interrupt handlers from
executing during the panic processing, thus avoiding this particular
problem.
Signed-off-by: Vikram Mulukutla <markivx@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Just setting the "error" to error number is enough on failure and It
doesn't require to set "error" variable to zero in each switch case,
since it was already initialized with zero. And also removed return 0
in switch case with break statement
Signed-off-by: Sasikantha babu <sasikanth.v19@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Like do_wp_page(), __replace_page() should do munlock_vma_page()
for the case when the old page still has other !VM_LOCKED
mappings. Unfortunately this needs mm/internal.h.
Also, move put_page() outside of ptl lock. This doesn't really
matter but looks a bit better.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120729182249.GA20372@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
1. vma_address() returns loff_t, this looks confusing and this
is unnecessary after the previous change. Make it return "ulong",
all callers truncate the result anyway.
2. Its name conflicts with mm/rmap.c:vma_address(), rename it to
offset_to_vaddr(), this matches vaddr_to_offset().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120729182247.GA20365@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
1. register_for_each_vma() checks that vma_address() == vaddr,
but this is not enough. We should also ensure that
vaddr >= vm_start, find_vma() guarantees "vaddr < vm_end" only.
2. After the prevous changes, register_for_each_vma() is the
only reason why vma_address() has to return loff_t, all other
users know that we have the valid mapping at this offset and
thus the overflow is not possible.
Change the code to use vaddr_to_offset() instead, imho this looks
more clean/understandable and now we can change vma_address().
3. While at it, remove the unnecessary type-cast.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120729182244.GA20362@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Currently build_probe_list() builds the list of all uprobes
attached to the given inode, and the caller should filter out
those who don't fall into the [start,end) range, this is
sub-optimal.
This patch turns find_least_offset_node() into
find_node_in_range() which returns the first node inside the
[min,max] range, and changes build_probe_list() to use this node
as a starting point for rb_prev() and rb_next() to find all
other nodes the caller needs. The resulting list is no longer
sorted but we do not care.
This can speed up both build_probe_list() and the callers, but
there is another reason to introduce find_node_in_range(). It
can be used to figure out whether the given vma has uprobes or
not, this will be needed soon.
While at it, shift INIT_LIST_HEAD(tmp_list) into
build_probe_list().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120729182240.GA20352@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
uprobe_munmap() does get_user_pages() and it is also called from
the final mmput()->exit_mmap() path. This slows down
exit/mmput() for no reason, and I think it is simply
dangerous/wrong to try to fault-in a page into the dying mm. If
nothing else, this happens after the last sync_mm_rss(), afaics
handle_mm_fault() can change the task->rss_stat and make the
subsequent check_mm() unhappy.
Change uprobe_munmap() to check mm->mm_users != 0.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120729182231.GA20336@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The bug was introduced by me in 449d0d7c ("uprobes: Simplify the
usage of uprobe->pending_list").
Yes, we do not care about uprobe->pending_list after return and
nobody can remove the current list entry, but put_uprobe(uprobe)
can actually free it and thus we need list_for_each_safe().
Reported-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120729182229.GA20329@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The comment above write_opcode()->lock_page(old_page) tells
about the race with do_wp_page(). I don't really understand
which exactly race it means, but afaics this lock_page() was not
enough to close all races with do_wp_page().
Anyway, since:
77fc4af1b5 uprobes: Change register_for_each_vma() to take mm->mmap_sem for writing
this code is always called with ->mmap_sem held for writing,
so we can forget about do_wp_page().
However, we can't simply remove this lock_page(), and the only
(afaics) reason is __replace_page()->try_to_free_swap().
Nothing in write_opcode() needs it, move it into
__replace_page() and fix the comment.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120729182220.GA20322@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
write_opcode() does lock_page(new_page) for no reason. Nobody
can see this page until __replace_page() exposes it under ptl
lock, and we do nothing with this page after pte_unmap_unlock().
If nothing else, the similar code in do_wp_page() doesn't lock
the new page for page_add_new_anon_rmap/set_pte_at_notify.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120729182218.GA20315@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
page_address_in_vma(old_page) in __replace_page() is ugly and
wrong. The caller already knows the correct virtual address,
this page was found by get_user_pages(vaddr).
However, page_address_in_vma() can actually fail if
page->mapping was cleared by __delete_from_page_cache() after
get_user_pages() returns. But this means the race with page
reclaim, write_opcode() should not fail, it should retry and
read this page again. Probably the race with remove_mapping() is
not possible due to page_freeze_refs() logic, but afaics at
least shmem_writepage()->shmem_delete_from_page_cache() can
clear ->mapping.
We could change __replace_page() to return -EAGAIN in this case,
but it would be better to simply use the caller's vaddr and rely
on page_check_address().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120729182216.GA20311@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
write_opcode() rechecks valid_vma() and ->f_mapping, this is
pointless. The caller, register_for_each_vma() or uprobe_mmap(),
has already done these checks under mmap_sem.
To clarify, uprobe_mmap() checks valid_vma() only, but we can
rely on build_probe_list(vm_file->f_mapping->host).
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120729182212.GA20304@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Adds audit messages for unexpected link restriction violations so that
system owners will have some sort of potentially actionable information
about misbehaving processes.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This adds symlink and hardlink restrictions to the Linux VFS.
Symlinks:
A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based
time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable
directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw
is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a
root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely
incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp
The solution is to permit symlinks to only be followed when outside
a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and
follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner.
Some pointers to the history of earlier discussion that I could find:
1996 Aug, Zygo Blaxell
http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=87602167419830&w=2
1996 Oct, Andrew Tridgell
http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/9610.2/0086.html
1997 Dec, Albert D Cahalan
http://lkml.org/lkml/1997/12/16/4
2005 Feb, Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/0502.0/1896.html
2010 May, Kees Cook
https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/30/144
Past objections and rebuttals could be summarized as:
- Violates POSIX.
- POSIX didn't consider this situation and it's not useful to follow
a broken specification at the cost of security.
- Might break unknown applications that use this feature.
- Applications that break because of the change are easy to spot and
fix. Applications that are vulnerable to symlink ToCToU by not having
the change aren't. Additionally, no applications have yet been found
that rely on this behavior.
- Applications should just use mkstemp() or O_CREATE|O_EXCL.
- True, but applications are not perfect, and new software is written
all the time that makes these mistakes; blocking this flaw at the
kernel is a single solution to the entire class of vulnerability.
- This should live in the core VFS.
- This should live in an LSM. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/31/135)
- This should live in an LSM.
- This should live in the core VFS. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/8/2/188)
Hardlinks:
On systems that have user-writable directories on the same partition
as system files, a long-standing class of security issues is the
hardlink-based time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in
world-writable directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation
of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given
hardlink (i.e. a root process follows a hardlink created by another
user). Additionally, an issue exists where users can "pin" a potentially
vulnerable setuid/setgid file so that an administrator will not actually
upgrade a system fully.
The solution is to permit hardlinks to only be created when the user is
already the existing file's owner, or if they already have read/write
access to the existing file.
Many Linux users are surprised when they learn they can link to files
they have no access to, so this change appears to follow the doctrine
of "least surprise". Additionally, this change does not violate POSIX,
which states "the implementation may require that the calling process
has permission to access the existing file"[1].
This change is known to break some implementations of the "at" daemon,
though the version used by Fedora and Ubuntu has been fixed[2] for
a while. Otherwise, the change has been undisruptive while in use in
Ubuntu for the last 1.5 years.
[1] http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/linkat.html
[2] http://anonscm.debian.org/gitweb/?p=collab-maint/at.git;a=commitdiff;h=f4114656c3a6c6f6070e315ffdf940a49eda3279
This patch is based on the patches in Openwall and grsecurity, along with
suggestions from Al Viro. I have added a sysctl to enable the protected
behavior, and documentation.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Recently, glibc made a change to suppress sign-conversion warnings in
FD_SET (glibc commit ceb9e56b3d1). This uncovered an issue with the
kernel's definition of __NFDBITS if applications #include
<linux/types.h> after including <sys/select.h>. A build failure would
be seen when passing the -Werror=sign-compare and -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
flags to gcc.
It was suggested that the kernel should either match the glibc
definition of __NFDBITS or remove that entirely. The current in-kernel
uses of __NFDBITS can be replaced with BITS_PER_LONG, and there are no
uses of the related __FDELT and __FDMASK defines. Given that, we'll
continue the cleanup that was started with commit 8b3d1cda4f
("posix_types: Remove fd_set macros") and drop the remaining unused
macros.
Additionally, linux/time.h has similar macros defined that expand to
nothing so we'll remove those at the same time.
Reported-by: Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
[ .. and fix up whitespace as per akpm ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
