commit 34441427aa upstream.
Originally, commit d899bf7b ("procfs: provide stack information for
threads") attempted to introduce a new feature for showing where the
threadstack was located and how many pages are being utilized by the
stack.
Commit c44972f1 ("procfs: disable per-task stack usage on NOMMU") was
applied to fix the NO_MMU case.
Commit 89240ba0 ("x86, fs: Fix x86 procfs stack information for threads on
64-bit") was applied to fix a bug in ia32 executables being loaded.
Commit 9ebd4eba7 ("procfs: fix /proc/<pid>/stat stack pointer for kernel
threads") was applied to fix a bug which had kernel threads printing a
userland stack address.
Commit 1306d603f ('proc: partially revert "procfs: provide stack
information for threads"') was then applied to revert the stack pages
being used to solve a significant performance regression.
This patch nearly undoes the effect of all these patches.
The reason for reverting these is it provides an unusable value in
field 28. For x86_64, a fork will result in the task->stack_start
value being updated to the current user top of stack and not the stack
start address. This unpredictability of the stack_start value makes
it worthless. That includes the intended use of showing how much stack
space a thread has.
Other architectures will get different values. As an example, ia64
gets 0. The do_fork() and copy_process() functions appear to treat the
stack_start and stack_size parameters as architecture specific.
I only partially reverted c44972f1 ("procfs: disable per-task stack usage
on NOMMU") . If I had completely reverted it, I would have had to change
mm/Makefile only build pagewalk.o when CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR is
configured. Since I could not test the builds without significant effort,
I decided to not change mm/Makefile.
I only partially reverted 89240ba0 ("x86, fs: Fix x86 procfs stack
information for threads on 64-bit") . I left the KSTK_ESP() change in
place as that seemed worthwhile.
Signed-off-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com>
Cc: Stefani Seibold <stefani@seibold.net>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit 16a2164bb0 upstream.
If the kernel is large or the profiling step small, /proc/profile
leaks data and readprofile shows silly stats, until readprofile -r
has reset the buffer: clear the prof_buffer when it is vmalloc()ed.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit 86c38a31aa upstream.
GCC 4.5 introduces behavior that forces the alignment of structures to
use the largest possible value. The default value is 32 bytes, so if
some structures are defined with a 4-byte alignment and others aren't
declared with an alignment constraint at all - it will align at 32-bytes.
For things like the ftrace events, this results in a non-standard array.
When initializing the ftrace subsystem, we traverse the _ftrace_events
section and call the initialization callback for each event. When the
structures are misaligned, we could be treating another part of the
structure (or the zeroed out space between them) as a function pointer.
This patch forces the alignment for all the ftrace_event_call structures
to 4 bytes.
Without this patch, the kernel fails to boot very early when built with
gcc 4.5.
It's trivial to check the alignment of the members of the array, so it
might be worthwhile to add something to the build system to do that
automatically. Unfortunately, that only covers this case. I've asked one
of the gcc developers about adding a warning when this condition is seen.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
LKML-Reference: <4B85770B.6010901@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Andreas Radke <a.radke@arcor.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit e134d200d5 upstream.
creds_are_invalid() reads both cred->usage and cred->subscribers and then
compares them to make sure the number of processes subscribed to a cred struct
never exceeds the refcount of that cred struct.
The problem is that this can cause a race with both copy_creds() and
exit_creds() as the two counters, whilst they are of atomic_t type, are only
atomic with respect to themselves, and not atomic with respect to each other.
This means that if creds_are_invalid() can read the values on one CPU whilst
they're being modified on another CPU, and so can observe an evolving state in
which the subscribers count now is greater than the usage count a moment
before.
Switching the order in which the counts are read cannot help, so the thing to
do is to remove that particular check.
I had considered rechecking the values to see if they're in flux if the test
fails, but I can't guarantee they won't appear the same, even if they've
changed several times in the meantime.
Note that this can only happen if CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS is enabled.
The problem is only likely to occur with multithreaded programs, and can be
tested by the tst-eintr1 program from glibc's "make check". The symptoms look
like:
CRED: Invalid credentials
CRED: At include/linux/cred.h:240
CRED: Specified credentials: ffff88003dda5878 [real][eff]
CRED: ->magic=43736564, put_addr=(null)
CRED: ->usage=766, subscr=766
CRED: ->*uid = { 0,0,0,0 }
CRED: ->*gid = { 0,0,0,0 }
CRED: ->security is ffff88003d72f538
CRED: ->security {359, 359}
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:850!
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81049889>] [<ffffffff81049889>] __invalid_creds+0x4e/0x52
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8104a37b>] copy_creds+0x6b/0x23f
Note the ->usage=766 and subscr=766. The values appear the same because
they've been re-read since the check was made.
Reported-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
The mainline kernel as of 2.6.34-rc5 is not affected by this problem because
commit 10fad5e46f fixed it by refactoring.
lockdep fix incorrect percpu usage
Should use per_cpu_ptr() to obfuscate the per cpu pointers (RELOC_HIDE is needed
for per cpu pointers).
git blame points to commit:
lockdep.c: commit 8e18257d29
But it's really just moving the code around. But it's enough to say that the
problems appeared before Jul 19 01:48:54 2007, which brings us back to 2.6.23.
It should be applied to stable 2.6.23.x to 2.6.33.x (or whichever of these
stable branches are still maintained).
(tested on 2.6.33.1 x86_64)
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
CC: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
CC: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
CC: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
CC: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Based on commit e2912009fb upstream, but
done differently as this issue is not present in .33 or .34 kernels due
to rework in this area.
If a task is in the TASK_WAITING state, then try_to_wake_up() is working
on it, and it will place it on the correct cpu.
This commit ensures that neither migrate_task() nor __migrate_task()
calls set_task_cpu(p) while p is in the TASK_WAKING state. Otherwise,
there could be two concurrent calls to set_task_cpu(p), resulting in
the task's cfs_rq being inconsistent with its cpu.
Signed-off-by: John Wright <john.wright@hp.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit 84fba5ec91 upstream.
taskset on 2.6.34-rc3 fails on one of my ppc64 test boxes with
the following error:
sched_getaffinity(0, 16, 0x10029650030) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)
This box has 128 threads and 16 bytes is enough to cover it.
Commit cd3d8031eb (sched:
sched_getaffinity(): Allow less than NR_CPUS length) is
comparing this 16 bytes agains nr_cpu_ids.
Fix it by comparing nr_cpu_ids to the number of bits in the
cpumask we pass in.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Sharyathi Nagesh <sharyath@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jack Steiner <steiner@sgi.com>
Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com>
Cc: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
LKML-Reference: <20100406070218.GM5594@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit cd3d8031eb upstream.
[ Note, this commit changes the syscall ABI for > 1024 CPUs systems. ]
Recently, some distro decided to use NR_CPUS=4096 for mysterious reasons.
Unfortunately, glibc sched interface has the following definition:
# define __CPU_SETSIZE 1024
# define __NCPUBITS (8 * sizeof (__cpu_mask))
typedef unsigned long int __cpu_mask;
typedef struct
{
__cpu_mask __bits[__CPU_SETSIZE / __NCPUBITS];
} cpu_set_t;
It mean, if NR_CPUS is bigger than 1024, cpu_set_t makes an
ABI issue ...
More recently, Sharyathi Nagesh reported following test program makes
misterious syscall failure:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include<stdio.h>
#include<errno.h>
#include<sched.h>
int main()
{
cpu_set_t set;
if (sched_getaffinity(0, sizeof(cpu_set_t), &set) < 0)
printf("\n Call is failing with:%d", errno);
}
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the kernel assumes len argument of sched_getaffinity() is bigger
than NR_CPUS. But now it is not correct.
Now we are faced with the following annoying dilemma, due to
the limitations of the glibc interface built in years ago:
(1) if we change glibc's __CPU_SETSIZE definition, we lost
binary compatibility of _all_ application.
(2) if we don't change it, we also lost binary compatibility of
Sharyathi's use case.
Then, I would propse to change the rule of the len argument of
sched_getaffinity().
Old:
len should be bigger than NR_CPUS
New:
len should be bigger than maximum possible cpu id
This creates the following behavior:
(A) In the real 4096 cpus machine, the above test program still
return -EINVAL.
(B) NR_CPUS=4096 but the machine have less than 1024 cpus (almost
all machines in the world), the above can run successfully.
Fortunatelly, BIG SGI machine is mainly used for HPC use case. It means
they can rebuild their programs.
IOW we hope they are not annoyed by this issue ...
Reported-by: Sharyathi Nagesh <sharyath@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jack Steiner <steiner@sgi.com>
Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com>
Cc: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
LKML-Reference: <20100312161316.9520.A69D9226@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit 753649dbc4 upstream.
Network folks reported that directing all MSI-X vectors of their multi
queue NICs to a single core can cause interrupt stack overflows when
enough interrupts fire at the same time.
This is caused by the fact that we run interrupt handlers by default
with interrupts enabled unless the driver reuqests the interrupt with
the IRQF_DISABLED set. The NIC handlers do not set this flag, so
simultaneous interrupts can nest unlimited and cause the stack
overflow.
The only safe counter measure is to run the interrupt handlers with
interrupts disabled. We can't switch to this mode in general right
now, but it is safe to do so for MSI interrupts.
Force IRQF_DISABLED for MSI interrupt handlers.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit 5a7aadfe2f upstream.
When the cgroup freezer is used to freeze tasks we do not want to thaw
those tasks during resume. Currently we test the cgroup freezer
state of the resuming tasks to see if the cgroup is FROZEN. If so
then we don't thaw the task. However, the FREEZING state also indicates
that the task should remain frozen.
This also avoids a problem pointed out by Oren Ladaan: the freezer state
transition from FREEZING to FROZEN is updated lazily when userspace reads
or writes the freezer.state file in the cgroup filesystem. This means that
resume will thaw tasks in cgroups which should be in the FROZEN state if
there is no read/write of the freezer.state file to trigger this
transition before suspend.
NOTE: Another "simple" solution would be to always update the cgroup
freezer state during resume. However it's a bad choice for several reasons:
Updating the cgroup freezer state is somewhat expensive because it requires
walking all the tasks in the cgroup and checking if they are each frozen.
Worse, this could easily make resume run in N^2 time where N is the number
of tasks in the cgroup. Finally, updating the freezer state from this code
path requires trickier locking because of the way locks must be ordered.
Instead of updating the freezer state we rely on the fact that lazy
updates only manage the transition from FREEZING to FROZEN. We know that
a cgroup with the FREEZING state may actually be FROZEN so test for that
state too. This makes sense in the resume path even for partially-frozen
cgroups -- those that really are FREEZING but not FROZEN.
Reported-by: Oren Ladaan <orenl@cs.columbia.edu>
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit 8c2eb4805d upstream.
Ensure additions on touch_ts do not overflow. This can occur
when the top 32 bits of the TSC reach 0xffffffff causing
additions to touch_ts to overflow and this in turn generates
spurious softlockup warnings.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
LKML-Reference: <1268994482.1798.6.camel@lenovo>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit 220b140b52 upstream.
Anton Blanchard found that he could reliably make the kernel hit a
BUG_ON in the slab allocator by taking a cpu offline and then online
while a system-wide perf record session was running.
The reason is that when the cpu comes up, we completely reinitialize
the ctx field of the struct perf_cpu_context for the cpu. If there is
a system-wide perf record session running, then there will be a struct
perf_event that has a reference to the context, so its refcount will
be 2. (The perf_event has been removed from the context's group_entry
and event_entry lists by perf_event_exit_cpu(), but that doesn't
remove the perf_event's reference to the context and doesn't decrement
the context's refcount.)
When the cpu comes up, perf_event_init_cpu() gets called, and it calls
__perf_event_init_context() on the cpu's context. That resets the
refcount to 1. Then when the perf record session finishes and the
perf_event is closed, the refcount gets decremented to 0 and the
context gets kfreed after an RCU grace period. Since the context
wasn't kmalloced -- it's part of a per-cpu variable -- bad things
happen.
In fact we don't need to completely reinitialize the context when the
cpu comes up. It's sufficient to initialize the context once at boot,
but we need to do it for all possible cpus.
This moves the context initialization to happen at boot time. With
this, we don't trash the refcount and the context never gets kfreed,
and we don't hit the BUG_ON.
Reported-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Tested-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit dd5feea14a upstream
On platforms like dual socket quad-core platform, the scheduler load
balancer is not detecting the load imbalances in certain scenarios. This
is leading to scenarios like where one socket is completely busy (with
all the 4 cores running with 4 tasks) and leaving another socket
completely idle. This causes performance issues as those 4 tasks share
the memory controller, last-level cache bandwidth etc. Also we won't be
taking advantage of turbo-mode as much as we would like, etc.
Some of the comparisons in the scheduler load balancing code are
comparing the "weighted cpu load that is scaled wrt sched_group's
cpu_power" with the "weighted average load per task that is not scaled
wrt sched_group's cpu_power". While this has probably been broken for a
longer time (for multi socket numa nodes etc), the problem got aggrevated
via this recent change:
|
| commit f93e65c186
| Author: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
| Date: Tue Sep 1 10:34:32 2009 +0200
|
| sched: Restore __cpu_power to a straight sum of power
|
Also with this change, the sched group cpu power alone no longer reflects
the group capacity that is needed to implement MC, MT performance
(default) and power-savings (user-selectable) policies.
We need to use the computed group capacity (sgs.group_capacity, that is
computed using the SD_PREFER_SIBLING logic in update_sd_lb_stats()) to
find out if the group with the max load is above its capacity and how
much load to move etc.
Reported-by: Ma Ling <ling.ma@intel.com>
Initial-Analysis-by: Zhang, Yanmin <yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
[ -v2: build fix ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
LKML-Reference: <1266970432.11588.22.camel@sbs-t61.sc.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
commit 41d2e49493 upstream.
The hrtimer_interrupt hang logic adjusts min_delta_ns based on the
execution time of the hrtimer callbacks.
This is error-prone for virtual machines, where a guest vcpu can be
scheduled out during the execution of the callbacks (and the callbacks
themselves can do operations that translate to blocking operations in
the hypervisor), which in can lead to large min_delta_ns rendering the
system unusable.
Replace the current heuristics with something more reliable. Allow the
interrupt code to try 3 times to catch up with the lost time. If that
fails use the total time spent in the interrupt handler to defer the
next timer interrupt so the system can catch up with other things
which got delayed. Limit that deferment to 100ms.
The retry events and the maximum time spent in the interrupt handler
are recorded and exposed via /proc/timer_list
Inspired by a patch from Marcelo.
Reported-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit b6345879cc upstream.
A bug was found with Li Zefan's ftrace_stress_test that caused applications
to segfault during the test.
Placing a tracing_off() in the segfault code, and examining several
traces, I found that the following was always the case. The lock tracer
was enabled (lockdep being required) and userstack was enabled. Testing
this out, I just enabled the two, but that was not good enough. I needed
to run something else that could trigger it. Running a load like hackbench
did not work, but executing a new program would. The following would
trigger the segfault within seconds:
# echo 1 > /debug/tracing/options/userstacktrace
# echo 1 > /debug/tracing/events/lock/enable
# while :; do ls > /dev/null ; done
Enabling the function graph tracer and looking at what was happening
I finally noticed that all cashes happened just after an NMI.
1) | copy_user_handle_tail() {
1) | bad_area_nosemaphore() {
1) | __bad_area_nosemaphore() {
1) | no_context() {
1) | fixup_exception() {
1) 0.319 us | search_exception_tables();
1) 0.873 us | }
[...]
1) 0.314 us | __rcu_read_unlock();
1) 0.325 us | native_apic_mem_write();
1) 0.943 us | }
1) 0.304 us | rcu_nmi_exit();
[...]
1) 0.479 us | find_vma();
1) | bad_area() {
1) | __bad_area() {
After capturing several traces of failures, all of them happened
after an NMI. Curious about this, I added a trace_printk() to the NMI
handler to read the regs->ip to see where the NMI happened. In which I
found out it was here:
ffffffff8135b660 <page_fault>:
ffffffff8135b660: 48 83 ec 78 sub $0x78,%rsp
ffffffff8135b664: e8 97 01 00 00 callq ffffffff8135b800 <error_entry>
What was happening is that the NMI would happen at the place that a page
fault occurred. It would call rcu_read_lock() which was traced by
the lock events, and the user_stack_trace would run. This would trigger
a page fault inside the NMI. I do not see where the CR2 register is
saved or restored in NMI handling. This means that it would corrupt
the page fault handling that the NMI interrupted.
The reason the while loop of ls helped trigger the bug, was that
each execution of ls would cause lots of pages to be faulted in, and
increase the chances of the race happening.
The simple solution is to not allow user stack traces in NMI context.
After this patch, I ran the above "ls" test for a couple of hours
without any issues. Without this patch, the bug would trigger in less
than a minute.
Reported-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit a2f8071428 upstream.
When the trace iterator is read, tracing_start() and tracing_stop()
is called to stop tracing while the iterator is processing the trace
output.
These functions disable both the standard buffer and the max latency
buffer. But if the wakeup tracer is running, it can switch these
buffers between the two disables:
buffer = global_trace.buffer;
if (buffer)
ring_buffer_record_disable(buffer);
<<<--------- swap happens here
buffer = max_tr.buffer;
if (buffer)
ring_buffer_record_disable(buffer);
What happens is that we disabled the same buffer twice. On tracing_start()
we can enable the same buffer twice. All ring_buffer_record_disable()
must be matched with a ring_buffer_record_enable() or the buffer
can be disable permanently, or enable prematurely, and cause a bug
where a reset happens while a trace is commiting.
This patch protects these two by taking the ftrace_max_lock to prevent
a switch from occurring.
Found with Li Zefan's ftrace_stress_test.
Reported-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit 283740c619 upstream.
In the ftrace code that resets the ring buffer it references the
buffer with a local variable, but then uses the tr->buffer as the
parameter to reset. If the wakeup tracer is running, which can
switch the tr->buffer with the max saved buffer, this can break
the requirement of disabling the buffer before the reset.
buffer = tr->buffer;
ring_buffer_record_disable(buffer);
synchronize_sched();
__tracing_reset(tr->buffer, cpu);
If the tr->buffer is swapped, then the reset is not happening to the
buffer that was disabled. This will cause the ring buffer to fail.
Found with Li Zefan's ftrace_stress_test.
Reported-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit ea14eb7140 upstream.
If the graph tracer is active, and a task is forked but the allocating of
the processes graph stack fails, it can cause crash later on.
This is due to the temporary stack being NULL, but the curr_ret_stack
variable is copied from the parent. If it is not -1, then in
ftrace_graph_probe_sched_switch() the following:
for (index = next->curr_ret_stack; index >= 0; index--)
next->ret_stack[index].calltime += timestamp;
Will cause a kernel OOPS.
Found with Li Zefan's ftrace_stress_test.
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
commit 52fbe9cde7 upstream.
The ring buffer resizing and resetting relies on a schedule RCU
action. The buffers are disabled, a synchronize_sched() is called
and then the resize or reset takes place.
But this only works if the disabling of the buffers are within the
preempt disabled section, otherwise a window exists that the buffers
can be written to while a reset or resize takes place.
Reported-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
LKML-Reference: <4B949E43.2010906@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
