On most ARM systems the per-cpu clockevents are truly per-cpu in
the sense that they can't be controlled on any other CPU besides
the CPU that they interrupt. If one of these clockevents were to
become a broadcast source we will run into a lot of trouble
because the broadcast source is enabled on the first CPU to go
into deep idle (if that CPU suffers from FEAT_C3_STOP) and that
could be a different CPU than what the clockevent is interrupting
(or even worse the CPU that the clockevent interrupts could be
offline).
Theoretically it's possible to support per-cpu clockevents as the
broadcast source but so far we haven't needed this and supporting
it is rather complicated. Let's just deny the possibility for now
until this becomes a reality (let's hope it never does!).
Signed-off-by: Soren Brinkmann <soren.brinkmann@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
If irq_exit() is called on the arch's specified irq stack,
it should be safe to run softirqs inline under that same
irq stack as it is near empty by the time we call irq_exit().
For example if we use the same stack for both hard and soft irqs here,
the worst case scenario is:
hardirq -> softirq -> hardirq. But then the softirq supersedes the
first hardirq as the stack user since irq_exit() is called in
a mostly empty stack. So the stack merge in this case looks acceptable.
Stack overrun still have a chance to happen if hardirqs have more
opportunities to nest, but then it's another problem to solve.
So lets adapt the irq exit's softirq stack on top of a new Kconfig symbol
that can be defined when irq_exit() runs on the irq stack. That way
we can spare some stack switch on irq processing and all the cache
issues that come along.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
The commit facd8b80c6
("irq: Sanitize invoke_softirq") converted irq exit
calls of do_softirq() to __do_softirq() on all architectures,
assuming it was only used there for its irq disablement
properties.
But as a side effect, the softirqs processed in the end
of the hardirq are always called on the inline current
stack that is used by irq_exit() instead of the softirq
stack provided by the archs that override do_softirq().
The result is mostly safe if the architecture runs irq_exit()
on a separate irq stack because then softirqs are processed
on that same stack that is near empty at this stage (assuming
hardirq aren't nesting).
Otherwise irq_exit() runs in the task stack and so does the softirq
too. The interrupted call stack can be randomly deep already and
the softirq can dig through it even further. To add insult to the
injury, this softirq can be interrupted by a new hardirq, maximizing
the chances for a stack overrun as reported in powerpc for example:
do_IRQ: stack overflow: 1920
CPU: 0 PID: 1602 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Not tainted 3.10.4-300.1.fc19.ppc64p7 #1
Call Trace:
[c0000000050a8740] .show_stack+0x130/0x200 (unreliable)
[c0000000050a8810] .dump_stack+0x28/0x3c
[c0000000050a8880] .do_IRQ+0x2b8/0x2c0
[c0000000050a8930] hardware_interrupt_common+0x154/0x180
--- Exception: 501 at .cp_start_xmit+0x3a4/0x820 [8139cp]
LR = .cp_start_xmit+0x390/0x820 [8139cp]
[c0000000050a8d40] .dev_hard_start_xmit+0x394/0x640
[c0000000050a8e00] .sch_direct_xmit+0x110/0x260
[c0000000050a8ea0] .dev_queue_xmit+0x260/0x630
[c0000000050a8f40] .br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0xc4/0x130 [bridge]
[c0000000050a8fc0] .br_dev_xmit+0x198/0x270 [bridge]
[c0000000050a9070] .dev_hard_start_xmit+0x394/0x640
[c0000000050a9130] .dev_queue_xmit+0x428/0x630
[c0000000050a91d0] .ip_finish_output+0x2a4/0x550
[c0000000050a9290] .ip_local_out+0x50/0x70
[c0000000050a9310] .ip_queue_xmit+0x148/0x420
[c0000000050a93b0] .tcp_transmit_skb+0x4e4/0xaf0
[c0000000050a94a0] .__tcp_ack_snd_check+0x7c/0xf0
[c0000000050a9520] .tcp_rcv_established+0x1e8/0x930
[c0000000050a95f0] .tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x21c/0x570
[c0000000050a96c0] .tcp_v4_rcv+0x734/0x930
[c0000000050a97a0] .ip_local_deliver_finish+0x184/0x360
[c0000000050a9840] .ip_rcv_finish+0x148/0x400
[c0000000050a98d0] .__netif_receive_skb_core+0x4f8/0xb00
[c0000000050a99d0] .netif_receive_skb+0x44/0x110
[c0000000050a9a70] .br_handle_frame_finish+0x2bc/0x3f0 [bridge]
[c0000000050a9b20] .br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x2ac/0x420 [bridge]
[c0000000050a9bd0] .br_nf_pre_routing+0x4dc/0x7d0 [bridge]
[c0000000050a9c70] .nf_iterate+0x114/0x130
[c0000000050a9d30] .nf_hook_slow+0xb4/0x1e0
[c0000000050a9e00] .br_handle_frame+0x290/0x330 [bridge]
[c0000000050a9ea0] .__netif_receive_skb_core+0x34c/0xb00
[c0000000050a9fa0] .netif_receive_skb+0x44/0x110
[c0000000050aa040] .napi_gro_receive+0xe8/0x120
[c0000000050aa0c0] .cp_rx_poll+0x31c/0x590 [8139cp]
[c0000000050aa1d0] .net_rx_action+0x1dc/0x310
[c0000000050aa2b0] .__do_softirq+0x158/0x330
[c0000000050aa3b0] .irq_exit+0xc8/0x110
[c0000000050aa430] .do_IRQ+0xdc/0x2c0
[c0000000050aa4e0] hardware_interrupt_common+0x154/0x180
--- Exception: 501 at .bad_range+0x1c/0x110
LR = .get_page_from_freelist+0x908/0xbb0
[c0000000050aa7d0] .list_del+0x18/0x50 (unreliable)
[c0000000050aa850] .get_page_from_freelist+0x908/0xbb0
[c0000000050aa9e0] .__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x21c/0xae0
[c0000000050aaba0] .alloc_pages_vma+0xd0/0x210
[c0000000050aac60] .handle_pte_fault+0x814/0xb70
[c0000000050aad50] .__get_user_pages+0x1a4/0x640
[c0000000050aae60] .get_user_pages_fast+0xec/0x160
[c0000000050aaf10] .__gfn_to_pfn_memslot+0x3b0/0x430 [kvm]
[c0000000050aafd0] .kvmppc_gfn_to_pfn+0x64/0x130 [kvm]
[c0000000050ab070] .kvmppc_mmu_map_page+0x94/0x530 [kvm]
[c0000000050ab190] .kvmppc_handle_pagefault+0x174/0x610 [kvm]
[c0000000050ab270] .kvmppc_handle_exit_pr+0x464/0x9b0 [kvm]
[c0000000050ab320] kvm_start_lightweight+0x1ec/0x1fc [kvm]
[c0000000050ab4f0] .kvmppc_vcpu_run_pr+0x168/0x3b0 [kvm]
[c0000000050ab9c0] .kvmppc_vcpu_run+0xc8/0xf0 [kvm]
[c0000000050aba50] .kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x5c/0x1a0 [kvm]
[c0000000050abae0] .kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x478/0x730 [kvm]
[c0000000050abc90] .do_vfs_ioctl+0x4ec/0x7c0
[c0000000050abd80] .SyS_ioctl+0xd4/0xf0
[c0000000050abe30] syscall_exit+0x0/0x98
Since this is a regression, this patch proposes a minimalistic
and low-risk solution by blindly forcing the hardirq exit processing of
softirqs on the softirq stack. This way we should reduce significantly
the opportunities for task stack overflow dug by softirqs.
Longer term solutions may involve extending the hardirq stack coverage to
irq_exit(), etc...
Reported-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: #3.9.. <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
"case 0" in free_pid() assumes that disable_pid_allocation() should
clear PIDNS_HASH_ADDING before the last pid goes away.
However this doesn't happen if the first fork() fails to create the
child reaper which should call disable_pid_allocation().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains only "|", a NULL pointer
dereference happens upon core dump because argv_split("") returns
argv[0] == NULL.
This bug was once fixed by commit 264b83c07a ("usermodehelper: check
subprocess_info->path != NULL") but was by error reintroduced by commit
7f57cfa4e2 ("usermodehelper: kill the sub_info->path[0] check").
This bug seems to exist since 2.6.19 (the version which core dump to
pipe was added). Depending on kernel version and config, some side
effect might happen immediately after this oops (e.g. kernel panic with
2.6.32-358.18.1.el6).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Recent commit 8fd37a4 (PM / hibernate: Create memory bitmaps after
freezing user space) broke the resume part of the user space driven
hibernation (s2disk), because I forgot that the resume utility
loaded the image into memory without freezing user space (it still
freezes tasks after loading the image). This means that during user
space driven resume we need to create the memory bitmaps at the
"device open" time rather than at the "freeze tasks" time, so make
that happen (that's a special case anyway, so it needs to be treated
in a special way).
Reported-and-tested-by: Ronald <ronald645@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
With VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN, cputime_t becomes 64-bit. In order
to use that feature, arch code should be audited to ensure there are no
races in concurrent read/write of cputime_t. For example,
reading/writing 64-bit cputime_t on some 32-bit arches may require
multiple accesses for low and high value parts, so proper locking
is needed to protect against concurrent accesses.
Therefore, add CONFIG_HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN which arches can
enable after they've been audited for potential races.
This option is automatically enabled on 64-bit platforms.
Feature requested by Frederic Weisbecker.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman <khilman@linaro.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Arm Linux <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Pull scheduler, timer and x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
- A context tracking ARM build and functional fix
- A handful of ARM clocksource/clockevent driver fixes
- An AMD microcode patch level sysfs reporting fixlet
* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
arm: Fix build error with context tracking calls
* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
clocksource: em_sti: Set cpu_possible_mask to fix SMP broadcast
clocksource: of: Respect device tree node status
clocksource: exynos_mct: Set IRQ affinity when the CPU goes online
arm: clocksource: mvebu: Use the main timer as clock source from DT
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/microcode/AMD: Fix patch level reporting for family 15h
Pull scheduler fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Three small fixes"
* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched/balancing: Fix cfs_rq->task_h_load calculation
sched/balancing: Fix 'local->avg_load > busiest->avg_load' case in fix_small_imbalance()
sched/balancing: Fix 'local->avg_load > sds->avg_load' case in calculate_imbalance()
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Assorted standalone fixes"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/x86/intel: Add model number for Avoton Silvermont
perf: Fix capabilities bitfield compatibility in 'struct perf_event_mmap_page'
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Don't use smp_processor_id() in validate_group()
perf: Update ABI comment
tools lib lk: Uninclude linux/magic.h in debugfs.c
perf tools: Fix old GCC build error in trace-event-parse.c:parse_proc_kallsyms()
perf probe: Fix finder to find lines of given function
perf session: Check for SIGINT in more loops
perf tools: Fix compile with libelf without get_phdrnum
perf tools: Fix buildid cache handling of kallsyms with kcore
perf annotate: Fix objdump line parsing offset validation
perf tools: Fill in new definitions for madvise()/mmap() flags
perf tools: Sharpen the libaudit dependencies test
Give the root user the ability to read the system keyring and put read
permission on the trusted keys added during boot. The latter is actually more
theoretical than real for the moment as asymmetric keys do not currently
provide a read operation.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED to indicate that a key either comes from a trusted source
or had a cryptographic signature chain that led back to a trusted key the
kernel already possessed.
Add KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED_ONLY to indicate that a keyring will only accept links to
keys marked with KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
