Add a new function gpiochip_reserve() to reserve ranges of gpios that platform
code has pre-allocated. That is, this marks gpio numbers which will be
claimed by drivers that haven't yet been loaded, and thus are not available
for dynamic gpio number allocation.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded __must_check]
[david-b@pacbell.net: don't export gpiochip_reserve (section fix)]
Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <avorontsov@ru.mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: David Brownell <dbrownell@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
As long as one or more GPIOs on a gpio chip are used its driver should not be
unloaded. The existing mechanism (gpiochip_remove failure) doesn't address
that, since rmmod can no longer be made to fail by having the cleanup code
report errors. Module usecounts are the solution.
Assuming standard "initialize struct to zero" policies, this change won't
affect SOC platform drivers. However, drivers for external chips (on I2C and
SPI busses) should be updated if they can be built as modules.
Signed-off-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <g.liakhovetski@pengutronix.de>
[ gpio_ensure_requested() needs to update module usecounts too ]
Signed-off-by: David Brownell <dbrownell@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes things like this:
fs/super.c: In function `deactivate_super':
fs/super.c:182: warning: statement with no effect
fs/super.c: In function `do_remount_sb':
fs/super.c:644: warning: statement with no effect
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, we just turn quotas off on remount of filesystem to read-only
state. The patch below adds necessary framework so that we can turn quotas
off on remount RO but we are able to automatically reenable them again when
filesystem is remounted to RW state. All we need to do is to keep references
to inodes of quota files when remounting RO and using these references to
reenable quotas when remounting RW.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cleanups in quota code:
Change __inline__ to inline.
Change some macros to inline functions.
Remove vfs_quota_off_mount() macro.
DQUOT_OFF() should be (0) is CONFIG_QUOTA is disabled.
Move declaration of mark_dquot_dirty and dirty_dquot from quota.h to dquot.c
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add list_is_singular() to check a list has just one entry.
list_is_singular() is useful to check whether a list_head which have been
temporarily allocated for listing objects can be released or not.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Prohibit users from probing preempt_schedule(). One way of prohibiting the
user from probing functions is by marking such functions with __kprobes. But
this method doesn't work for those functions, which are already marked to
different section like preempt_schedule() (belongs to __sched section). So we
use blacklist approach to refuse user from probing these functions.
In blacklist approach we populate the blacklisted function's starting address
and its size in kprobe_blacklist structure. Then we verify the user specified
address against start and end of the blacklisted function. So any attempt to
register probe on blacklisted functions will be rejected.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Srinivasa DS <srinivasa@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Some accessibility modules need to be able to catch the output on the
console before the VT interpretation, and possibly swallow it.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch extends the sm501 mfd with 8250 uart support. We're currently
doing this in the board specific r2d-1 code already, but it would be nice to
do move things into the mfd since it's more chip specific than board specific.
Signed-off-by: Magnus Damm <damm@igel.co.jp>
Cc: Ben Dooks <ben-linux@fluff.org>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Turn CONFIG_DMI into a selectable option if EMBEDDED is defined, in
order to be able to remove the DMI table scanning code if it's not
needed, and then reduce the kernel code size.
With CONFIG_DMI (i.e before) :
text data bss dec hex filename
1076076 128656 98304 1303036 13e1fc vmlinux
Without CONFIG_DMI (i.e after) :
text data bss dec hex filename
1068092 126308 98304 1292704 13b9a0 vmlinux
Result:
text data bss dec hex filename
-7984 -2348 0 -10332 -285c vmlinux
The new option appears in "Processor type and features", only when
CONFIG_EMBEDDED is defined.
This patch is part of the Linux Tiny project, and is based on previous work
done by Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Removes some externs from C files, noticed from the sparse warnings:
fs/ncpfs/dir.c:90:26: warning: symbol 'ncp_root_dentry_operations' was not declared. Should it be static?
fs/ncpfs/symlink.c:107:5: warning: symbol 'ncp_symlink' was not declared. Should it be static?
fs/ncpfs/symlink.c:101:39: warning: symbol 'ncp_symlink_aops' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Petr Vandrovec <VANDROVE@vc.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix things like this:
security/selinux/netnode.c: In function 'sel_netnode_find':
security/selinux/netnode.c:126: warning: 'idx' may be used uninitialized in this function
security/selinux/netnode.c: In function 'sel_netnode_sid':
security/selinux/netnode.c:225: warning: 'ret' may be used uninitialized in this function
security/selinux/netnode.c:168: warning: 'idx' may be used uninitialized in this function
due to code correctly not expecting BUG() to return.
For some reason this reduces the object code size for that particular file.
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0
based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem
support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)
possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain
privilege via (set)uid-0.
Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few
user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently
prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many
applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel
will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.
Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is
desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their
privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable
sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser
from the process' tree of children.
The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege
associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to
initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited
through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the
historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which
has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.
With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop
all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently
fork()'d/exec()'d children with:
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);
This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is
enabled at configure time.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]
[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
