Commit Graph

134 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Vernon Lovejoy
d8cfe5ccc9 x86/show_trace_log_lvl: Ensure stack pointer is aligned, again
commit 2e4be0d011f21593c6b316806779ba1eba2cd7e0 upstream.

The commit e335bb51cc ("x86/unwind: Ensure stack pointer is aligned")
tried to align the stack pointer in show_trace_log_lvl(), otherwise the
"stack < stack_info.end" check can't guarantee that the last read does
not go past the end of the stack.

However, we have the same problem with the initial value of the stack
pointer, it can also be unaligned. So without this patch this trivial
kernel module

	#include <linux/module.h>

	static int init(void)
	{
		asm volatile("sub    $0x4,%rsp");
		dump_stack();
		asm volatile("add    $0x4,%rsp");

		return -EAGAIN;
	}

	module_init(init);
	MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

crashes the kernel.

Fixes: e335bb51cc ("x86/unwind: Ensure stack pointer is aligned")
Signed-off-by: Vernon Lovejoy <vlovejoy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512104232.GA10227@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-05-30 14:03:32 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
27bc50fc90 Merge tag 'mm-stable-2022-10-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:

 - Yu Zhao's Multi-Gen LRU patches are here. They've been under test in
   linux-next for a couple of months without, to my knowledge, any
   negative reports (or any positive ones, come to that).

 - Also the Maple Tree from Liam Howlett. An overlapping range-based
   tree for vmas. It it apparently slightly more efficient in its own
   right, but is mainly targeted at enabling work to reduce mmap_lock
   contention.

   Liam has identified a number of other tree users in the kernel which
   could be beneficially onverted to mapletrees.

   Yu Zhao has identified a hard-to-hit but "easy to fix" lockdep splat
   at [1]. This has yet to be addressed due to Liam's unfortunately
   timed vacation. He is now back and we'll get this fixed up.

 - Dmitry Vyukov introduces KMSAN: the Kernel Memory Sanitizer. It uses
   clang-generated instrumentation to detect used-unintialized bugs down
   to the single bit level.

   KMSAN keeps finding bugs. New ones, as well as the legacy ones.

 - Yang Shi adds a userspace mechanism (madvise) to induce a collapse of
   memory into THPs.

 - Zach O'Keefe has expanded Yang Shi's madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE) to
   support file/shmem-backed pages.

 - userfaultfd updates from Axel Rasmussen

 - zsmalloc cleanups from Alexey Romanov

 - cleanups from Miaohe Lin: vmscan, hugetlb_cgroup, hugetlb and
   memory-failure

 - Huang Ying adds enhancements to NUMA balancing memory tiering mode's
   page promotion, with a new way of detecting hot pages.

 - memcg updates from Shakeel Butt: charging optimizations and reduced
   memory consumption.

 - memcg cleanups from Kairui Song.

 - memcg fixes and cleanups from Johannes Weiner.

 - Vishal Moola provides more folio conversions

 - Zhang Yi removed ll_rw_block() :(

 - migration enhancements from Peter Xu

 - migration error-path bugfixes from Huang Ying

 - Aneesh Kumar added ability for a device driver to alter the memory
   tiering promotion paths. For optimizations by PMEM drivers, DRM
   drivers, etc.

 - vma merging improvements from Jakub Matěn.

 - NUMA hinting cleanups from David Hildenbrand.

 - xu xin added aditional userspace visibility into KSM merging
   activity.

 - THP & KSM code consolidation from Qi Zheng.

 - more folio work from Matthew Wilcox.

 - KASAN updates from Andrey Konovalov.

 - DAMON cleanups from Kaixu Xia.

 - DAMON work from SeongJae Park: fixes, cleanups.

 - hugetlb sysfs cleanups from Muchun Song.

 - Mike Kravetz fixes locking issues in hugetlbfs and in hugetlb core.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAOUHufZabH85CeUN-MEMgL8gJGzJEWUrkiM58JkTbBhh-jew0Q@mail.gmail.com [1]

* tag 'mm-stable-2022-10-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (555 commits)
  hugetlb: allocate vma lock for all sharable vmas
  hugetlb: take hugetlb vma_lock when clearing vma_lock->vma pointer
  hugetlb: fix vma lock handling during split vma and range unmapping
  mglru: mm/vmscan.c: fix imprecise comments
  mm/mglru: don't sync disk for each aging cycle
  mm: memcontrol: drop dead CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP config symbol
  mm: memcontrol: use do_memsw_account() in a few more places
  mm: memcontrol: deprecate swapaccounting=0 mode
  mm: memcontrol: don't allocate cgroup swap arrays when memcg is disabled
  mm/secretmem: remove reduntant return value
  mm/hugetlb: add available_huge_pages() func
  mm: remove unused inline functions from include/linux/mm_inline.h
  selftests/vm: add selftest for MADV_COLLAPSE of uffd-minor memory
  selftests/vm: add file/shmem MADV_COLLAPSE selftest for cleared pmd
  selftests/vm: add thp collapse shmem testing
  selftests/vm: add thp collapse file and tmpfs testing
  selftests/vm: modularize thp collapse memory operations
  selftests/vm: dedup THP helpers
  mm/khugepaged: add tracepoint to hpage_collapse_scan_file()
  mm/madvise: add file and shmem support to MADV_COLLAPSE
  ...
2022-10-10 17:53:04 -07:00
Alexander Potapenko
37ad4ee836 x86: kmsan: don't instrument stack walking functions
Upon function exit, KMSAN marks local variables as uninitialized.  Further
function calls may result in the compiler creating the stack frame where
these local variables resided.  This results in frame pointers being
marked as uninitialized data, which is normally correct, because they are
not stack-allocated.

However stack unwinding functions are supposed to read and dereference the
frame pointers, in which case KMSAN might be reporting uses of
uninitialized values.

To work around that, we mark update_stack_state(), unwind_next_frame() and
show_trace_log_lvl() with __no_kmsan_checks, preventing all KMSAN reports
inside those functions and making them return initialized values.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-40-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-10-03 14:03:25 -07:00
Jiri Slaby
5258b80e60 x86/dumpstack: Don't mention RIP in "Code: "
Commit

  238c91115c ("x86/dumpstack: Fix misleading instruction pointer error message")

changed the "Code:" line in bug reports when RIP is an invalid pointer.
In particular, the report currently says (for example):

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
  ...
  RIP: 0010:0x0
  Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.

That

  Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.

is quite confusing as RIP value is 0, not -42. That -42 comes from
"regs->ip - PROLOGUE_SIZE", because Code is dumped with some prologue
(and epilogue).

So do not mention "RIP" on this line in this context.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b772c39f-c5ae-8f17-fe6e-6a2bc4d1f83b@kernel.org
2022-09-20 16:11:54 +02:00
Arnd Bergmann
36903abedf x86: remove __range_not_ok()
The __range_not_ok() helper is an x86 (and sparc64) specific interface
that does roughly the same thing as __access_ok(), but with different
calling conventions.

Change this to use the normal interface in order for consistency as we
clean up all access_ok() implementations.

This changes the limit from TASK_SIZE to TASK_SIZE_MAX, which Al points
out is the right thing do do here anyway.

The callers have to use __access_ok() instead of the normal access_ok()
though, because on x86 that contains a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() check that cannot
be used inside of NMI context while tracing.

The check in copy_code() is not needed any more, because this one is
already done by copy_from_user_nmi().

Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YgsUKcXGR7r4nINj@zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2022-02-25 09:36:05 +01:00
Eric W. Biederman
0e25498f8c exit: Add and use make_task_dead.
There are two big uses of do_exit.  The first is it's design use to be
the guts of the exit(2) system call.  The second use is to terminate
a task after something catastrophic has happened like a NULL pointer
in kernel code.

Add a function make_task_dead that is initialy exactly the same as
do_exit to cover the cases where do_exit is called to handle
catastrophic failure.  In time this can probably be reduced to just a
light wrapper around do_task_dead. For now keep it exactly the same so
that there will be no behavioral differences introducing this new
concept.

Replace all of the uses of do_exit that use it for catastraphic
task cleanup with make_task_dead to make it clear what the code
is doing.

As part of this rename rewind_stack_do_exit
rewind_stack_and_make_dead.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-12-13 12:04:45 -06:00
Stephen Boyd
9ef8af2a8f x86/dumpstack: use %pSb/%pBb for backtrace printing
Let's use the new printk formats to print the stacktrace entries when
printing a backtrace to the kernel logs.  This will include any module's
build ID[1] in it so that offline/crash debugging can easily locate the
debuginfo for a module via something like debuginfod[2].

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-8-swboyd@chromium.org
Link: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/FeatureBuildId [1]
Link: https://sourceware.org/elfutils/Debuginfod.html [2]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 11:48:22 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
405f868f13 Merge tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cleanups from Borislav Petkov:
 "Another branch with a nicely negative diffstat, just the way I
  like 'em:

   - Remove all uses of TIF_IA32 and TIF_X32 and reclaim the two bits in
     the end (Gabriel Krisman Bertazi)

   - All kinds of minor cleanups all over the tree"

* tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (24 commits)
  x86/ia32_signal: Propagate __user annotation properly
  x86/alternative: Update text_poke_bp() kernel-doc comment
  x86/PCI: Make a kernel-doc comment a normal one
  x86/asm: Drop unused RDPID macro
  x86/boot/compressed/64: Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
  x86/head64: Remove duplicate include
  x86/mm: Declare 'start' variable where it is used
  x86/head/64: Remove unused GET_CR2_INTO() macro
  x86/boot: Remove unused finalize_identity_maps()
  x86/uaccess: Document copy_from_user_nmi()
  x86/dumpstack: Make show_trace_log_lvl() static
  x86/mtrr: Fix a kernel-doc markup
  x86/setup: Remove unused MCA variables
  x86, libnvdimm/test: Remove COPY_MC_TEST
  x86: Reclaim TIF_IA32 and TIF_X32
  x86/mm: Convert mmu context ia32_compat into a proper flags field
  x86/elf: Use e_machine to check for x32/ia32 in setup_additional_pages()
  elf: Expose ELF header on arch_setup_additional_pages()
  x86/elf: Use e_machine to select start_thread for x32
  elf: Expose ELF header in compat_start_thread()
  ...
2020-12-14 13:45:26 -08:00
Thomas Gleixner
860aaabac8 x86/dumpstack: Do not try to access user space code of other tasks
sysrq-t ends up invoking show_opcodes() for each task which tries to access
the user space code of other processes, which is obviously bogus.

It either manages to dump where the foreign task's regs->ip points to in a
valid mapping of the current task or triggers a pagefault and prints "Code:
Bad RIP value.". Both is just wrong.

Add a safeguard in copy_code() and check whether the @regs pointer matches
currents pt_regs. If not, do not even try to access it.

While at it, add commentary why using copy_from_user_nmi() is safe in
copy_code() even if the function name suggests otherwise.

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117202753.667274723@linutronix.de
2020-11-18 12:56:29 +01:00
Hui Su
09a217c105 x86/dumpstack: Make show_trace_log_lvl() static
show_trace_log_lvl() is not used by other compilation units so make it
static and remove the declaration from the header file.

Signed-off-by: Hui Su <sh_def@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113133943.GA136221@rlk
2020-11-17 19:05:32 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
da9803dfd3 Merge tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov:
 "SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV
  by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers
  inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
  switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
  exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.

  With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
  hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
  mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
  Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
  Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared
  between the guest and the hypervisor.

  Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest
  so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init
  code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself,
  brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early
  boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand
  building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do
  not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled
  one.

  The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
  mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate
  from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
  SEV-ES-specific files:

    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c

  Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and
  behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES
  setups.

  Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others"

* tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits)
  x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer
  x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
  x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
  x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
  x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
  x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
  x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
  x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
  x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
  x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
  x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
  ...
2020-10-14 10:21:34 -07:00
Mark Mossberg
238c91115c x86/dumpstack: Fix misleading instruction pointer error message
Printing "Bad RIP value" if copy_code() fails can be misleading for
userspace pointers, since copy_code() can fail if the instruction
pointer is valid but the code is paged out. This is because copy_code()
calls copy_from_user_nmi() for userspace pointers, which disables page
fault handling.

This is reproducible in OOM situations, where it's plausible that the
code may be reclaimed in the time between entry into the kernel and when
this message is printed. This leaves a misleading log in dmesg that
suggests instruction pointer corruption has occurred, which may alarm
users.

Change the message to state the error condition more precisely.

 [ bp: Massage a bit. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Mossberg <mark.mossberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201002042915.403558-1-mark.mossberg@gmail.com
2020-10-02 11:33:55 +02:00
Joerg Roedel
6b27edd74a x86/dumpstack/64: Add noinstr version of get_stack_info()
The get_stack_info() functionality is needed in the entry code for the
#VC exception handler. Provide a version of it in the .text.noinstr
section which can be called safely from there.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-45-joro@8bytes.org
2020-09-09 11:33:19 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
4ee4810315 Merge tag 'x86-core-2020-08-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 debug fixlets from Ingo Molnar:
 "Improve x86 debuggability: print registers with the same log level as
  the backtrace"

* tag 'x86-core-2020-08-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/dumpstack: Show registers dump with trace's log level
  x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to __show_regs()
  x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to show_iret_regs()
2020-08-03 17:00:00 -07:00
Dmitry Safonov
ef2ff0f5d6 x86/dumpstack: Show registers dump with trace's log level
show_trace_log_lvl() provides x86 platform-specific way to unwind
backtrace with a given log level. Unfortunately, registers dump(s) are
not printed with the same log level - instead, KERN_DEFAULT is always
used.

Arista's switches uses quite common setup with rsyslog, where only
urgent messages goes to console (console_log_level=KERN_ERR), everything
else goes into /var/log/ as the console baud-rate often is indecently
slow (9600 bps).

Backtrace dumps without registers printed have proven to be as useful as
morning standups. Furthermore, in order to introduce KERN_UNSUPPRESSED
(which I believe is still the most elegant way to fix raciness of sysrq[1])
the log level should be passed down the stack to register dumping
functions. Besides, there is a potential use-case for printing traces
with KERN_DEBUG level [2] (where registers dump shouldn't appear with
higher log level).

After all preparations are done, provide log_lvl parameter for
show_regs_if_on_stack() and wire up to actual log level used as
an argument for show_trace_log_lvl().

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/20190724170249.9644-1-dima@arista.com/

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200629144847.492794-4-dima@arista.com
2020-07-22 23:56:54 +02:00
Dmitry Safonov
44e215352c x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to __show_regs()
show_trace_log_lvl() provides x86 platform-specific way to unwind
backtrace with a given log level. Unfortunately, registers dump(s) are
not printed with the same log level - instead, KERN_DEFAULT is always
used.

Arista's switches uses quite common setup with rsyslog, where only
urgent messages goes to console (console_log_level=KERN_ERR), everything
else goes into /var/log/ as the console baud-rate often is indecently
slow (9600 bps).

Backtrace dumps without registers printed have proven to be as useful as
morning standups. Furthermore, in order to introduce KERN_UNSUPPRESSED
(which I believe is still the most elegant way to fix raciness of sysrq[1])
the log level should be passed down the stack to register dumping
functions. Besides, there is a potential use-case for printing traces
with KERN_DEBUG level [2] (where registers dump shouldn't appear with
higher log level).

Add log_lvl parameter to __show_regs().
Keep the used log level intact to separate visible change.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/20190724170249.9644-1-dima@arista.com/

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200629144847.492794-3-dima@arista.com
2020-07-22 23:56:53 +02:00
Dmitry Safonov
fd07f802a7 x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to show_iret_regs()
show_trace_log_lvl() provides x86 platform-specific way to unwind
backtrace with a given log level. Unfortunately, registers dump(s) are
not printed with the same log level - instead, KERN_DEFAULT is always
used.

Arista's switches uses quite common setup with rsyslog, where only
urgent messages goes to console (console_log_level=KERN_ERR), everything
else goes into /var/log/ as the console baud-rate often is indecently
slow (9600 bps).

Backtrace dumps without registers printed have proven to be as useful as
morning standups. Furthermore, in order to introduce KERN_UNSUPPRESSED
(which I believe is still the most elegant way to fix raciness of sysrq[1])
the log level should be passed down the stack to register dumping
functions. Besides, there is a potential use-case for printing traces
with KERN_DEBUG level [2] (where registers dump shouldn't appear with
higher log level).

Add log_lvl parameter to show_iret_regs() as a preparation to add it
to __show_regs() and show_regs_if_on_stack().

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/20190724170249.9644-1-dima@arista.com/

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200629144847.492794-2-dima@arista.com
2020-07-22 23:56:53 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
d181d2da01 x86/dumpstack: Dump user space code correctly again
H.J. reported that post 5.7 a segfault of a user space task does not longer
dump the Code bytes when /proc/sys/debug/exception-trace is enabled. It
prints 'Code: Bad RIP value.' instead.

This was broken by a recent change which made probe_kernel_read() reject
non-kernel addresses.

Update show_opcodes() so it retrieves user space opcodes via
copy_from_user_nmi().

Fixes: 98a23609b1 ("maccess: always use strict semantics for probe_kernel_read")
Reported-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87h7tz306w.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
2020-07-22 23:47:48 +02:00
Christoph Hellwig
fe557319aa maccess: rename probe_kernel_{read,write} to copy_{from,to}_kernel_nofault
Better describe what these functions do.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-17 10:57:41 -07:00
Dmitry Safonov
9cb8f069de kernel: rename show_stack_loglvl() => show_stack()
Now the last users of show_stack() got converted to use an explicit log
level, show_stack_loglvl() can drop it's redundant suffix and become once
again well known show_stack().

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-51-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09 09:39:13 -07:00
Dmitry Safonov
a832ff0224 x86: add show_stack_loglvl()
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization.  It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).

Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side.  In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages.  And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.

Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers.  Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.

Introduce show_stack_loglvl(), that eventually will substitute
show_stack().

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-42-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09 09:39:12 -07:00
Dmitry Safonov
d46b3df78a x86: add missing const qualifiers for log_lvl
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization.  It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).

Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side.  In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages.  And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.

Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers.  Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.

Keep log_lvl const show_trace_log_lvl() and printk_stack_address() as the
new generic show_stack_loglvl() wants to have a proper const qualifier.

And gcc rightfully produces warnings in case it's not keept:
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c: In function `show_stack':
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:294:37: warning: passing argument 4 of `show_trace_log_lv ' discards `const' qualifier from pointer target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers]
  294 |  show_trace_log_lvl(task, NULL, sp, loglvl);
      |                                     ^~~~~~
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:163:32: note: expected `char *' but argument is of type `const char *'
  163 |    unsigned long *stack, char *log_lvl)
      |                          ~~~~~~^~~~~~~

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-41-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09 09:39:12 -07:00
Jann Horn
2f004eea0f x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP
Make #GP exceptions caused by out-of-bounds KASAN shadow accesses easier
to understand by computing the address of the original access and
printing that. More details are in the comments in the patch.

This turns an error like this:

  kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
  kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
  general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
      0xe017577ddf75b7dd: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI

into this:

  general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
      0xe017577ddf75b7dd: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
  KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range
      [0x00badbeefbadbee8-0x00badbeefbadbeef]

The hook is placed in architecture-independent code, but is currently
only wired up to the X86 exception handler because I'm not sufficiently
familiar with the address space layout and exception handling mechanisms
on other architectures.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191218231150.12139-4-jannh@google.com
2019-12-31 13:15:38 +01:00
Jann Horn
aa49f20462 x86/dumpstack: Introduce die_addr() for die() with #GP fault address
Split __die() into __die_header() and __die_body(). This allows inserting
extra information below the header line that initiates the bug report.

Introduce a new function die_addr() that behaves like die(), but is for
faults only and uses __die_header() and __die_body() so that a future
commit can print extra information after the header line.

 [ bp: Comment the KASAN-specific usage of gp_addr. ]

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191218231150.12139-3-jannh@google.com
2019-12-31 13:11:35 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
cb376c2697 x86/dumpstack: Indicate PREEMPT_RT in dumps
Stack dumps print whether the kernel has preemption enabled or not. Extend
it so a PREEMPT_RT enabled kernel can be identified.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190726212124.699136351@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-07-31 19:03:36 +02:00