[ Upstream commit c6ab5c915da460c0397960af3c308386c3f3247b ]
Prevent ecc_digits_from_bytes from reading too many bytes from the input
byte array in case an insufficient number of bytes is provided to fill the
output digit array of ndigits. Therefore, initialize the most significant
digits with 0 to avoid trying to read too many bytes later on. Convert the
function into a regular function since it is getting too big for an inline
function.
If too many bytes are provided on the input byte array the extra bytes
are ignored since the input variable 'ndigits' limits the number of digits
that will be filled.
Fixes: d67c96fb97b5 ("crypto: ecdsa - Convert byte arrays with key coordinates to digits")
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3b0565c703503f832d6cd7ba805aafa3b330cb9d ]
When extracting a signature component r or s from an ASN.1-encoded
integer, ecdsa_get_signature_rs() subtracts the expected length
"bufsize" from the ASN.1 length "vlen" (both of unsigned type size_t)
and stores the result in "diff" (of signed type ssize_t).
This results in a signed integer overflow if vlen > SSIZE_MAX + bufsize.
The kernel is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow, which implies -fwrapv,
meaning signed integer overflow is not undefined behavior. And the
function does check for overflow:
if (-diff >= bufsize)
return -EINVAL;
So the code is fine in principle but not very obvious. In the future it
might trigger a false-positive with CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP=y.
Avoid by comparing the two unsigned variables directly and erroring out
if "vlen" is too large.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 546ce0bdc91afd9f5c4c67d9fc4733e0fc7086d1 ]
Since ecc_digits_from_bytes will provide zeros when an insufficient number
of bytes are passed in the input byte array, use it to convert the r and s
components of the signature to digits directly from the input byte
array. This avoids going through an intermediate byte array that has the
first few bytes filled with zeros.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: 3b0565c70350 ("crypto: ecdsa - Avoid signed integer overflow on signature decoding")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 703ca5cda1ea04735e48882a7cccff97d57656c3 ]
In cases where 'keylen' was referring to the size of the buffer used by
a curve's digits, it does not reflect the purpose of the variable anymore
once NIST P521 is used. What it refers to then is the size of the buffer,
which may be a few bytes larger than the size a coordinate of a key.
Therefore, rename keylen to bufsize where appropriate.
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: 3b0565c70350 ("crypto: ecdsa - Avoid signed integer overflow on signature decoding")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d67c96fb97b5811e15c881d5cb72e293faa5f8e1 ]
For NIST P192/256/384 the public key's x and y parameters could be copied
directly from a given array since both parameters filled 'ndigits' of
digits (a 'digit' is a u64). For support of NIST P521 the key parameters
need to have leading zeros prepended to the most significant digit since
only 2 bytes of the most significant digit are provided.
Therefore, implement ecc_digits_from_bytes to convert a byte array into an
array of digits and use this function in ecdsa_set_pub_key where an input
byte array needs to be converted into digits.
Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: 3b0565c70350 ("crypto: ecdsa - Avoid signed integer overflow on signature decoding")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 662f2f13e66d3883b9238b0b96b17886179e60e2 ]
Since commit 8f4f68e788c3 ("crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for
PADATA_RESET"), the pcrypt encryption and decryption operations return
-EAGAIN when the CPU goes online or offline. In alg_test(), a WARN is
generated when pcrypt_aead_decrypt() or pcrypt_aead_encrypt() returns
-EAGAIN, the unnecessary panic will occur when panic_on_warn set 1.
Fix this issue by calling crypto layer directly without parallelization
in that case.
Fixes: 8f4f68e788c3 ("crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for PADATA_RESET")
Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b81e286ba154a4e0f01a94d99179a97f4ba3e396 ]
As algorithm testing is carried out without holding the main crypto
lock, it is always possible for the algorithm to go away during the
test.
So before crypto_alg_tested updates the status of the tested alg,
it checks whether it's still on the list of all algorithms. This
is inaccurate because it may be off the main list but still on the
list of algorithms to be removed.
Updating the algorithm status is safe per se as the larval still
holds a reference to it. However, killing spawns of other algorithms
that are of lower priority is clearly a deficiency as it adds
unnecessary churn.
Fix the test by checking whether the algorithm is dead.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3c44d31cb34ce4eb8311a2e73634d57702948230 ]
Algorithm registration is usually carried out during module init,
where as little work as possible should be carried out. The SIMD
code violated this rule by allocating a tfm, this then triggers a
full test of the algorithm which may dead-lock in certain cases.
SIMD is only allocating the tfm to get at the alg object, which is
in fact already available as it is what we are registering. Use
that directly and remove the crypto_alloc_tfm call.
Also remove some obsolete and unused SIMD API.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 70fd1966c93bf3bfe3fe6d753eb3d83a76597eef upstream.
In find_asymmetric_key(), if all NULLs are passed in the id_{0,1,2}
arguments, the kernel will first emit WARN but then have an oops
because id_2 gets dereferenced anyway.
Add the missing id_2 check and move WARN_ON() to the final else branch
to avoid duplicate NULL checks.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static
analysis tool.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.17+
Fixes: 7d30198ee2 ("keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID")
Suggested-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ab9a244c396aae4aaa34b2399b82fc15ec2df8c1 ]
Commit c055e3eae0 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking")
switched from using jiffies to ktime-based performance benchmarking.
This works nicely on machines which have a fine-grained ktime()
clocksource as e.g. x86 machines with TSC.
But other machines, e.g. my 4-way HP PARISC server, don't have such
fine-grained clocksources, which is why it seems that 800 xor loops
take zero seconds, which then shows up in the logs as:
xor: measuring software checksum speed
8regs : -1018167296 MB/sec
8regs_prefetch : -1018167296 MB/sec
32regs : -1018167296 MB/sec
32regs_prefetch : -1018167296 MB/sec
Fix this with some small modifications to the existing code to improve
the algorithm to always produce correct results without introducing
major delays for architectures with a fine-grained ktime()
clocksource:
a) Delay start of the timing until ktime() just advanced. On machines
with a fast ktime() this should be just one additional ktime() call.
b) Count the number of loops. Run at minimum 800 loops and finish
earliest when the ktime() counter has progressed.
With that the throughput can now be calculated more accurately under all
conditions.
Fixes: c055e3eae0 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking")
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Tested-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
v2:
- clean up coding style (noticed & suggested by Herbert Xu)
- rephrased & fixed typo in commit message
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 23e4099bdc3c8381992f9eb975c79196d6755210 ]
I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding
cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer
needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that
previously held the private key.
Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead <hailmo@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 73e5984e540a76a2ee1868b91590c922da8c24c9 ]
private_key is overwritten with the key parameter passed in by the
caller (if present), or alternatively a newly generated private key.
However, it is possible that the caller provides a key (or the newly
generated key) which is shorter than the previous key. In that
scenario, some key material from the previous key would not be
overwritten. The easiest solution is to explicitly zeroize the entire
private_key array first.
Note that this patch slightly changes the behavior of this function:
previously, if the ecc_gen_privkey failed, the old private_key would
remain. Now, the private_key is always zeroized. This behavior is
consistent with the case where params.key is set and ecc_is_key_valid
fails.
Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit eb5739a1efbc9ff216271aeea0ebe1c92e5383e5 upstream.
Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for
RSA-related and other algorithms.
The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names
"crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these
aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance,
when using the `add_key` function, the hash algorithm is typically
loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not.
Steps to test:
1. Cert is generated usings ima-evm-utils test suite with
`gen-keys.sh`, example cert is provided below:
$ base64 -d >test-gost2012_512-A.cer <<EOF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=
EOF
2. Optionally, trace module requests with: trace-cmd stream -e module &
3. Trigger add_key call for the cert:
# keyctl padd asymmetric "" @u <test-gost2012_512-A.cer
939910969
# lsmod | head -3
Module Size Used by
ecrdsa_generic 16384 0
streebog_generic 28672 0
Repored-by: Paul Wolneykien <manowar@altlinux.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 48e4fd6d54f54d0ceab5a952d73e47a9454a6ccb upstream.
Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for
RSA-related and other algorithms.
The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names
"crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these
aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance,
when using the `add_key` function, the hash algorithm is typically
loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not.
Steps to test:
1. Create certificate
openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey ec \
-pkeyopt "ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1" -keyout key.pem -days 365 \
-subj '/CN=test' -nodes -outform der -out nist-p384.der
2. Optionally, trace module requests with: trace-cmd stream -e module &
3. Trigger add_key call for the cert:
# keyctl padd asymmetric "" @u < nist-p384.der
641069229
# lsmod | head -2
Module Size Used by
ecdsa_generic 16384 0
Fixes: c12d448ba9 ("crypto: ecdsa - Register NIST P384 and extend test suite")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dcaa86b904ea3761e62c849957dd0904e126bf4a upstream.
Make ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE select CRYPTO_SIG to avoid build
errors like the following, which were possible with
CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y && CONFIG_CRYPTO_SIG=n:
ld: vmlinux.o: in function `public_key_verify_signature':
(.text+0x306280): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_sig'
ld: (.text+0x306300): undefined reference to `crypto_sig_set_pubkey'
ld: (.text+0x306324): undefined reference to `crypto_sig_verify'
ld: (.text+0x30636c): undefined reference to `crypto_sig_set_privkey'
Fixes: 63ba4d6759 ("KEYS: asymmetric: Use new crypto interface without scatterlists")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 67b164a871af1d736f131fd6fe78a610909f06f3 ]
Having multiple in-flight AIO requests results in unpredictable
output because they all share the same IV. Fix this by only allowing
one request at a time.
Fixes: 83094e5e9e ("crypto: af_alg - add async support to algif_aead")
Fixes: a596999b7d ("crypto: algif - change algif_skcipher to be asynchronous")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d872ca165cb67112f2841ef9c37d51ef7e63d1e4 ]
Static checkers insist that the mpi_alloc() allocation can fail so add
a check to prevent a NULL dereference. Small allocations like this
can't actually fail in current kernels, but adding a check is very
simple and makes the static checkers happy.
Fixes: 6637e11e4a ("crypto: rsa - allow only odd e and restrict value in FIPS mode")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bb40d32689d73c46de39a0529d551f523f21dc9b ]
Since commit adad556efc ("crypto: api - Fix built-in testing
dependency failures"), the following warning appears when booting an
x86_64 kernel that is configured with
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS=y and CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_NI_INTEL=y,
even when CONFIG_CRYPTO_XTS=y and CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES=y:
alg: skcipher: skipping comparison tests for xts-aes-aesni because xts(ecb(aes-generic)) is unavailable
This is caused by an issue in the xts template where it allocates an
"aes" single-block cipher without declaring a dependency on it via the
crypto_spawn mechanism. This issue was exposed by the above commit
because it reversed the order that the algorithms are tested in.
Specifically, when "xts(ecb(aes-generic))" is instantiated and tested
during the comparison tests for "xts-aes-aesni", the "xts" template
allocates an "aes" crypto_cipher for encrypting tweaks. This resolves
to "aes-aesni". (Getting "aes-aesni" instead of "aes-generic" here is a
bit weird, but it's apparently intended.) Due to the above-mentioned
commit, the testing of "aes-aesni", and the finalization of its
registration, now happens at this point instead of before. At the end
of that, crypto_remove_spawns() unregisters all algorithm instances that
depend on a lower-priority "aes" implementation such as "aes-generic"
but that do not depend on "aes-aesni". However, because "xts" does not
use the crypto_spawn mechanism for its "aes", its dependency on
"aes-aesni" is not recognized by crypto_remove_spawns(). Thus,
crypto_remove_spawns() unexpectedly unregisters "xts(ecb(aes-generic))".
Fix this issue by making the "xts" template use the crypto_spawn
mechanism for its "aes" dependency, like what other templates do.
Note, this fix could be applied as far back as commit f1c131b454
("crypto: xts - Convert to skcipher"). However, the issue only got
exposed by the much more recent changes to how the crypto API runs the
self-tests, so there should be no need to backport this to very old
kernels. Also, an alternative fix would be to flip the list iteration
order in crypto_start_tests() to restore the original testing order.
I'm thinking we should do that too, since the original order seems more
natural, but it shouldn't be relied on for correctness.
Fixes: adad556efc ("crypto: api - Fix built-in testing dependency failures")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8f4f68e788c3a7a696546291258bfa5fdb215523 ]
We found a hungtask bug in test_aead_vec_cfg as follows:
INFO: task cryptomgr_test:391009 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
Call trace:
__switch_to+0x98/0xe0
__schedule+0x6c4/0xf40
schedule+0xd8/0x1b4
schedule_timeout+0x474/0x560
wait_for_common+0x368/0x4e0
wait_for_completion+0x20/0x30
wait_for_completion+0x20/0x30
test_aead_vec_cfg+0xab4/0xd50
test_aead+0x144/0x1f0
alg_test_aead+0xd8/0x1e0
alg_test+0x634/0x890
cryptomgr_test+0x40/0x70
kthread+0x1e0/0x220
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks
For padata_do_parallel, when the return err is 0 or -EBUSY, it will call
wait_for_completion(&wait->completion) in test_aead_vec_cfg. In normal
case, aead_request_complete() will be called in pcrypt_aead_serial and the
return err is 0 for padata_do_parallel. But, when pinst->flags is
PADATA_RESET, the return err is -EBUSY for padata_do_parallel, and it
won't call aead_request_complete(). Therefore, test_aead_vec_cfg will
hung at wait_for_completion(&wait->completion), which will cause
hungtask.
The problem comes as following:
(padata_do_parallel) |
rcu_read_lock_bh(); |
err = -EINVAL; | (padata_replace)
| pinst->flags |= PADATA_RESET;
err = -EBUSY |
if (pinst->flags & PADATA_RESET) |
rcu_read_unlock_bh() |
return err
In order to resolve the problem, we replace the return err -EBUSY with
-EAGAIN, which means parallel_data is changing, and the caller should call
it again.
v3:
remove retry and just change the return err.
v2:
introduce padata_try_do_parallel() in pcrypt_aead_encrypt and
pcrypt_aead_decrypt to solve the hungtask.
Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Guo Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
