Commit Graph

83 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael Halcrow fcd1283566 eCryptfs: grammatical fix (destruct to destroy)
Andrew Morton wrote:
> > +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void)
>
> ecryptfs_destroy_crypto would be more grammatically correct ;)

Grammatical fix for some function names.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:11 -07:00
Michael Halcrow af655dc6a9 eCryptfs: collapse flag set into one statement
Andrew Morton wrote:
> > +     crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED;
> > +     crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID;
>
> Maybe the compiler can optimise those two statements, but we'd
> normally provide it with some manual help.

This patch provides the compiler with some manual help for
optimizing the setting of some flags.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:11 -07:00
Michael Halcrow c59c2eb53f eCryptfs: remove unnecessary BUG_ON
Andrew Morton wrote:
> > +     mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
> > +     BUG_ON(mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks == 0);
> > +     mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
>
> That's odd-looking.  If it was a bug for num_global_auth_toks to be
> zero, and if that mutex protects num_global_auth_toks then as soon
> as the lock gets dropped, another thread can make
> num_global_auth_toks zero, hence the bug is present.  Perhaps?

That was serving as an internal sanity check that should not have made
it into the final patch set in the first place. This patch removes it.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:11 -07:00
Andrew Morton 81acbcd6c5 ecryptfs: printk warning fixes
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'parse_tag_1_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:557: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'parse_tag_3_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:690: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'parse_tag_11_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:836: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'write_tag_1_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1413: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1413: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'long unsigned int'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'write_tag_11_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1472: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'write_tag_3_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1663: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1663: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'long unsigned int'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1778: warning: passing argument 2 of 'write_tag_11_packet' from incompatible pointer type
fs/ecryptfs/main.c: In function 'ecryptfs_parse_options':
fs/ecryptfs/main.c:363: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'size_t'

Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:11 -07:00
Michael Halcrow ca939e79e3 eCryptfs: update comment and debug statement
Trivial updates to comment and debug statement.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:11 -07:00
Michael Halcrow 146a46063b eCryptfs: fix Tag 11 writing code
Fix up the Tag 11 writing code to handle size limits and boundaries more
explicitly.  It looks like the packet length was 1 shorter than it should have
been, chopping off the last byte of the key identifier.  This is largely
inconsequential, since it is not much more likely that a key identifier
collision will occur with 7 bytes rather than 8.  This patch fixes the packet
to use the full number of bytes that were originally intended to be used for
the key identifier.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:11 -07:00
Michael Halcrow f648104a0d eCryptfs: fix Tag 11 parsing code
Fix up the Tag 11 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more
explicitly.  Pay attention to *8* bytes for the key identifier (literal data),
no more, no less.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:11 -07:00
Michael Halcrow c59becfcee eCryptfs: fix Tag 3 parsing code
Fix up the Tag 3 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more
explicitly.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:11 -07:00
Michael Halcrow 132181796a eCryptfs: fix Tag 1 parsing code
Fix up the Tag 1 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more
explicitly.  Initialize the new auth_tok's flags.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Josef Sipek <jsipek@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:10 -07:00
Michael Halcrow 956159c3d6 eCryptfs: kmem_cache objects for multiple keys; init/exit functions
Introduce kmem_cache objects for handling multiple keys per inode.  Add calls
in the module init and exit code to call the key list
initialization/destruction functions.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:10 -07:00
Michael Halcrow e0869cc144 eCryptfs: use list_for_each_entry_safe() when wiping auth toks
Use list_for_each_entry_safe() when wiping the authentication token list.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:10 -07:00
Michael Halcrow f4aad16adf eCryptfs: add key list structure; search keyring
Add support structures for handling multiple keys.  The list in crypt_stat
contains the key identifiers for all of the keys that should be used for
encrypting each file's File Encryption Key (FEK).  For now, each inode
inherits this list from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, via the
ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() function.

This patch also removes the global key tfm from the mount-wide crypt_stat
struct, instead keeping a list of tfm's meant for dealing with the various
inode FEK's.  eCryptfs will now search the user's keyring for FEK's parsed
from the existing file metadata, so the user can make keys available at any
time before or after mounting.

Now that multiple FEK packets can be written to the file metadata, we need to
be more meticulous about size limits.  The updates to the code for writing out
packets to the file metadata makes sizes and limits more explicit, uniformly
expressed, and (hopefully) easier to follow.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:10 -07:00
Nick Piggin 55144768e1 fs: remove some AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE
prepare/commit_write no longer returns AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE since OCFS2 and
GFS2 were converted to the new aops, so we can make some simplifications
for that.

[michal.k.k.piotrowski@gmail.com: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Piotrowski <michal.k.k.piotrowski@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:42:58 -07:00
Denis V. Lunev cd40b7d398 [NET]: make netlink user -> kernel interface synchronious
This patch make processing netlink user -> kernel messages synchronious.
This change was inspired by the talk with Alexey Kuznetsov about current
netlink messages processing. He says that he was badly wrong when introduced 
asynchronious user -> kernel communication.

The call netlink_unicast is the only path to send message to the kernel
netlink socket. But, unfortunately, it is also used to send data to the
user.

Before this change the user message has been attached to the socket queue
and sk->sk_data_ready was called. The process has been blocked until all
pending messages were processed. The bad thing is that this processing
may occur in the arbitrary process context.

This patch changes nlk->data_ready callback to get 1 skb and force packet
processing right in the netlink_unicast.

Kernel -> user path in netlink_unicast remains untouched.

EINTR processing for in netlink_run_queue was changed. It forces rtnl_lock
drop, but the process remains in the cycle until the message will be fully
processed. So, there is no need to use this kludges now.

Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10 21:15:29 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman b4b510290b [NET]: Support multiple network namespaces with netlink
Each netlink socket will live in exactly one network namespace,
this includes the controlling kernel sockets.

This patch updates all of the existing netlink protocols
to only support the initial network namespace.  Request
by clients in other namespaces will get -ECONREFUSED.
As they would if the kernel did not have the support for
that netlink protocol compiled in.

As each netlink protocol is updated to be multiple network
namespace safe it can register multiple kernel sockets
to acquire a presence in the rest of the network namespaces.

The implementation in af_netlink is a simple filter implementation
at hash table insertion and hash table look up time.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10 16:49:09 -07:00
Ryusuke Konishi 2aeb3db17f eCryptfs: fix possible fault in ecryptfs_sync_page
This will avoid a possible fault in ecryptfs_sync_page().

In the function, eCryptfs calls sync_page() method of a lower filesystem
without checking its existence.  However, there are many filesystems that
don't have this method including network filesystems such as NFS, AFS, and
so forth.  They may fail when an eCryptfs page is waiting for lock.

Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-08-31 01:42:23 -07:00
Andrew Morton 060d11b0b3 revert "eCryptfs: fix lookup error for special files"
This patch got appied twice.

Cc: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-08-31 01:42:22 -07:00
Ryusuke Konishi df06846416 eCryptfs: fix lookup error for special files
When ecryptfs_lookup() is called against special files, eCryptfs generates
the following errors because it tries to treat them like regular eCryptfs
files.

Error opening lower file for lower_dentry [0xffff810233a6f150], lower_mnt [0xffff810235bb4c80], and flags [0x8000]
Error opening lower_file to read header region
Error attempting to read the [user.ecryptfs] xattr from the lower file; return value = [-95]
Valid metadata not found in header region or xattr region; treating file as unencrypted

For instance, the problem can be reproduced by the steps below.

  # mkdir /root/crypt /mnt/crypt
  # mount -t ecryptfs /root/crypt /mnt/crypt
  # mknod /mnt/crypt/c0 c 0 0
  # umount /mnt/crypt
  # mount -t ecryptfs /root/crypt /mnt/crypt
  # ls -l /mnt/crypt

This patch fixes it by adding a check similar to directories and
symlinks.

Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-08-22 19:52:44 -07:00
Ryusuke Konishi a75de1b379 eCryptfs: fix error handling in ecryptfs_init
ecryptfs_init() exits without doing any cleanup jobs if
ecryptfs_init_messaging() fails.  In that case, eCryptfs leaves
sysfs entries, leaks memory, and causes an invalid page fault.
This patch fixes the problem.

Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-08-11 15:47:40 -07:00
Ryusuke Konishi 202a21d691 eCryptfs: fix lookup error for special files
When ecryptfs_lookup() is called against special files, eCryptfs generates
the following errors because it tries to treat them like regular eCryptfs
files.

Error opening lower file for lower_dentry [0xffff810233a6f150], lower_mnt [0xffff810235bb4c80], and flags
[0x8000]
Error opening lower_file to read header region
Error attempting to read the [user.ecryptfs] xattr from the lower file; return value = [-95]
Valid metadata not found in header region or xattr region; treating file as unencrypted

For instance, the problem can be reproduced by the steps below.

  # mkdir /root/crypt /mnt/crypt
  # mount -t ecryptfs /root/crypt /mnt/crypt
  # mknod /mnt/crypt/c0 c 0 0
  # umount /mnt/crypt
  # mount -t ecryptfs /root/crypt /mnt/crypt
  # ls -l /mnt/crypt

This patch fixes it by adding a check similar to directories and
symlinks.

Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-08-11 15:47:40 -07:00
Nick Piggin 1833633803 fix some conversion overflows
Fix page index to offset conversion overflows in buffer layer, ecryptfs,
and ocfs2.

It would be nice to convert the whole tree to page_offset, but for now
just fix the bugs.

Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-20 08:44:19 -07:00
Paul Mundt 20c2df83d2 mm: Remove slab destructors from kmem_cache_create().
Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
c59def9f22 change. They've been
BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
either.

This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
or the documentation references).

Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
2007-07-20 10:11:58 +09:00
Michael Halcrow 64ee4808a7 eCryptfs: ecryptfs_setattr() bugfix
There is another bug recently introduced into the ecryptfs_setattr()
function in 2.6.22.  eCryptfs will attempt to treat special files like
regular eCryptfs files on chmod, chown, and so forth.  This leads to a NULL
pointer dereference.  This patch validates that the file is a regular file
before proceeding with operations related to the inode's crypt_stat.

Thanks to Ryusuke Konishi for finding this bug and suggesting the fix.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-19 10:04:43 -07:00
Mika Kukkonen c381bfcf0c Couple fixes to fs/ecryptfs/inode.c
Following was uncovered by compiling the kernel with '-W' flag:

  CC [M]  fs/ecryptfs/inode.o
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c: In function ‘ecryptfs_lookup’:
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c:304: warning: comparison of unsigned expression < 0 is always false
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c: In function ‘ecryptfs_symlink’:
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c:486: warning: comparison of unsigned expression < 0 is always false

Function ecryptfs_encode_filename() can return -ENOMEM, so change the
variables to plain int, as in the first case the only real use actually
expects int, and in latter case there is no use beoynd the error check.

Signed-off-by: Mika Kukkonen <mikukkon@iki.fi>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-17 10:23:08 -07:00
Tejun Heo 7b595756ec sysfs: kill unnecessary attribute->owner
sysfs is now completely out of driver/module lifetime game.  After
deletion, a sysfs node doesn't access anything outside sysfs proper,
so there's no reason to hold onto the attribute owners.  Note that
often the wrong modules were accounted for as owners leading to
accessing removed modules.

This patch kills now unnecessary attribute->owner.  Note that with
this change, userland holding a sysfs node does not prevent the
backing module from being unloaded.

For more info regarding lifetime rule cleanup, please read the
following message.

  http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/510293

(tweaked by Greg to not delete the field just yet, to make it easier to
merge things properly.)

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <htejun@gmail.com>
Cc: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2007-07-11 16:09:06 -07:00