The goal of this patchset is to support multiple hugetlb page sizes. This
is achieved by introducing a new struct hstate structure, which
encapsulates the important hugetlb state and constants (eg. huge page
size, number of huge pages currently allocated, etc).
The hstate structure is then passed around the code which requires these
fields, they will do the right thing regardless of the exact hstate they
are operating on.
This patch adds the hstate structure, with a single global instance of it
(default_hstate), and does the basic work of converting hugetlb to use the
hstate.
Future patches will add more hstate structures to allow for different
hugetlbfs mounts to have different page sizes.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Acked-by: Adam Litke <agl@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Nishanth Aravamudan <nacc@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With Mel's hugetlb private reservation support patches applied, strict
overcommit semantics are applied to both shared and private huge page
mappings. This can be a problem if an application relied on unlimited
overcommit semantics for private mappings. An example of this would be an
application which maps a huge area with the intention of using it very
sparsely. These application would benefit from being able to opt-out of
the strict overcommit. It should be noted that prior to hugetlb
supporting demand faulting all mappings were fully populated and so
applications of this type should be rare.
This patch stack implements the MAP_NORESERVE mmap() flag for huge page
mappings. This flag has the same meaning as for small page mappings,
suppressing reservations for that mapping.
Thanks to Mel Gorman for reviewing a number of early versions of these
patches.
This patch:
When a small page mapping is created with mmap() reservations are created
by default for any memory pages required. When the region is read/write
the reservation is increased for every page, no reservation is needed for
read-only regions (as they implicitly share the zero page). Reservations
are tracked via the VM_ACCOUNT vma flag which is present when the region
has reservation backing it. When we convert a region from read-only to
read-write new reservations are aquired and VM_ACCOUNT is set. However,
when a read-only map is created with MAP_NORESERVE it is indistinguishable
from a normal mapping. When we then convert that to read/write we are
forced to incorrectly create reservations for it as we have no record of
the original MAP_NORESERVE.
This patch introduces a new vma flag VM_NORESERVE which records the
presence of the original MAP_NORESERVE flag. This allows us to
distinguish these two circumstances and correctly account the reserve.
As well as fixing this FIXME in the code, this makes it much easier to
introduce MAP_NORESERVE support for huge pages as this flag is available
consistantly for the life of the mapping. VM_ACCOUNT on the other hand is
heavily used at the generic level in association with small pages.
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@shadowen.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Adam Litke <agl@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@saeurebad.de>
Cc: Andy Whitcroft <apw@shadowen.org>
Cc: William Lee Irwin III <wli@holomorphy.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch allows architectures to define functions to deal with
additional protections bits for mmap() and mprotect().
arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() maps additonal protection bits to vm_flags
arch_vm_get_page_prot() maps additional vm_flags to the vma's vm_page_prot
arch_validate_prot() checks for valid values of the protection bits
Note: vm_get_page_prot() is now pretty ugly, but the generated code
should be identical for architectures that don't define additional
protection bits.
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Fix a regression introduced by
commit 4cc6028d40
Author: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Date: Wed Feb 6 22:39:44 2008 +0100
brk: check the lower bound properly
The check in sys_brk() on minimum value the brk might have must take
CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK setting into account. When this option is turned on
(i.e. we support ancient legacy binaries, e.g. libc5-linked stuff), the
lower bound on brk value is mm->end_code, otherwise the brk start is
allowed to be arbitrarily shifted.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The atomic_t type is 32bit but a 64bit system can have more than 2^32
pages of virtual address space available. Without this we overflow on
ludicrously large mappings
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The kernel implements readlink of /proc/pid/exe by getting the file from
the first executable VMA. Then the path to the file is reconstructed and
reported as the result.
Because of the VMA walk the code is slightly different on nommu systems.
This patch avoids separate /proc/pid/exe code on nommu systems. Instead of
walking the VMAs to find the first executable file-backed VMA we store a
reference to the exec'd file in the mm_struct.
That reference would prevent the filesystem holding the executable file
from being unmounted even after unmapping the VMAs. So we track the number
of VM_EXECUTABLE VMAs and drop the new reference when the last one is
unmapped. This avoids pinning the mounted filesystem.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: improve comments]
[yamamoto@valinux.co.jp: fix dup_mmap]
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc:"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch renames mpol_copy() to mpol_dup() because, well, that's what it
does. Like, e.g., strdup() for strings, mpol_dup() takes a pointer to an
existing mempolicy, allocates a new one and copies the contents.
In a later patch, I want to use the name mpol_copy() to copy the contents from
one mempolicy to another like, e.g., strcpy() does for strings.
Signed-off-by: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is a change that was requested some time ago by Mel Gorman. Makes sense
to me, so here it is.
Note: I retain the name "mpol_free_shared_policy()" because it actually does
free the shared_policy, which is NOT a reference counted object. However, ...
The mempolicy object[s] referenced by the shared_policy are reference counted,
so mpol_put() is used to release the reference held by the shared_policy. The
mempolicy might not be freed at this time, because some task attached to the
shared object associated with the shared policy may be in the process of
allocating a page based on the mempolicy. In that case, the task performing
the allocation will hold a reference on the mempolicy, obtained via
mpol_shared_policy_lookup(). The mempolicy will be freed when all tasks
holding such a reference have called mpol_put() for the mempolicy.
Signed-off-by: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It is not easy to actually understand the "if (!file || !vma_merge())"
code, turn it into "if (file && vma_merge())". This makes immediately
obvious that the subsequent "if (file)" is superfluous.
As Hugh Dickins pointed out, we can also factor out the ->i_writecount
corrections, and add a small comment about that.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Convert special mapping install from nopage to fault.
Because the "vm_file" is NULL for the special mapping, the generic VM
code has messed up "vm_pgoff" thinking that it's an anonymous mapping
and the offset does't matter. For that reason, we need to undo the
vm_pgoff offset that got added into vmf->pgoff.
[ We _really_ should clean that up - either by making this whole special
mapping code just use a real file entry rather than that ugly array of
"struct page" pointers, or by just making the VM code realize that
even if vm_file is NULL it may not be a regular anonymous mmap.
- Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There is a check in sys_brk(), that tries to make sure that we do not
underflow the area that is dedicated to brk heap.
The check is however wrong, as it assumes that brk area starts immediately
after the end of the code (+bss), which is wrong for example in
environments with randomized brk start. The proper way is to check whether
the address is not below the start_brk address.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
In order to change the layout of the page tables after an mmap has crossed the
adress space limit of the current page table layout a architecture hook in
get_unmapped_area is needed. The arguments are the address of the new mapping
and the length of it.
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Drivers that register a ->fault handler, but do not range-check the
offset argument, must set VM_DONTEXPAND in the vm_flags in order to
prevent an expanding mremap from overflowing the resource.
I've audited the tree and attempted to fix these problems (usually by
adding VM_DONTEXPAND where it is not obvious).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Randomize the location of the heap (brk) for i386 and x86_64. The range is
randomized in the range starting at current brk location up to 0x02000000
offset for both architectures. This, together with
pie-executable-randomization.patch and
pie-executable-randomization-fix.patch, should make the address space
randomization on i386 and x86_64 complete.
Arjan says:
This is known to break older versions of some emacs variants, whose dumper
code assumed that the last variable declared in the program is equal to the
start of the dynamically allocated memory region.
(The dumper is the code where emacs effectively dumps core at the end of it's
compilation stage; this coredump is then loaded as the main program during
normal use)
iirc this was 5 years or so; we found this way back when I was at RH and we
first did the security stuff there (including this brk randomization). It
wasn't all variants of emacs, and it got fixed as a result (I vaguely remember
that emacs already had code to deal with it for other archs/oses, just
ifdeffed wrongly).
It's a rare and wrong assumption as a general thing, just on x86 it mostly
happened to be true (but to be honest, it'll break too if gcc does
something fancy or if the linker does a non-standard order). Still its
something we should at least document.
Note 2: afaik it only broke the emacs *build*. I'm not 100% sure about that
(it IS 5 years ago) though.
[ akpm@linux-foundation.org: deuglification ]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixing:
CHECK mm/mmap.c
mm/mmap.c:1623:29: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
mm/mmap.c:1623:29: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
mm/mmap.c:1944:29: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
Signed-off-by: Richard Knutsson <ricknu-0@student.ltu.se>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Given a specifically crafted binary do_brk() can be used to get low
pages available in userspace virtually memory and can thus be used to
circumvent the mmap_min_addr low memory protection. Add security checks
in do_brk().
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If mmap_min_addr is set and a process attempts to mmap (not fixed) with a
non-null hint address less than mmap_min_addr the mapping will fail the
security checks. Since this is just a hint address this patch will round
such a hint address above mmap_min_addr.
gcj was found to try to be very frugal with vm usage and give hint addresses
in the 8k-32k range. Without this patch all such programs failed and with
the patch they happily get a higher address.
This patch is wrappad in CONFIG_SECURITY since mmap_min_addr doesn't exist
without it and there would be no security check possible no matter what. So
we should not bother compiling in this rounding if it is just a waste of
time.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add security checks to make sure we are not attempting to expand the
stack into memory protected by mmap_min_addr
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix mprotect bug in recent commit 3ed75eb8f1
(setup vma->vm_page_prot by vm_get_page_prot()): the vma_wants_writenotify
case was setting the same prot as when not.
Nothing wrong with the use of protection_map[] in mmap_region(),
but use vm_get_page_prot() there too in the same ~VM_SHARED way.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Coly Li <coyli@suse.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch uses vm_get_page_prot() to setup vma->vm_page_prot.
Though inside vm_get_page_prot() the protection flags is AND with
(VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC|VM_SHARED), it does not hurt correct code.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <coyli@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch contains the following cleanups that are now possible:
- remove the unused security_operations->inode_xattr_getsuffix
- remove the no longer used security_operations->unregister_security
- remove some no longer required exit code
- remove a bunch of no longer used exports
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
mm.h doesn't use directly anything from mutex.h and backing-dev.h, so
remove them and add them back to files which need them.
Cross-compile tested on many configs and archs.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The new exec code inserts an accounted vma into an mm struct which is not
current->mm. The existing memory check code has a hard coded assumption
that this does not happen as does the security code.
As the correct mm is known we pass the mm to the security method and the
helper function. A new security test is added for the case where we need
to pass the mm and the existing one is modified to pass current->mm to
avoid the need to change large amounts of code.
(Thanks to Tobias for fixing rejects and testing)
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Cc: WU Fengguang <wfg@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Cc: Tobias Diedrich <ranma+kernel@tdiedrich.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Andi Kleen
Andy Whitcroft
Jan Beulich
Dave Kleikamp
Jiri Kosina
Alan Cox
Matt Helsley
Lee Schermerhorn
Oleg Nesterov
Nick Piggin
Martin Schwidefsky
Richard Knutsson
Eric Paris
Hugh Dickins
Coly Li
Adrian Bunk
Alexey Dobriyan
Alan Cox