The old pci_remove_bus_device actually did stop and remove.
Make the name reflect that to reduce confusion.
This patch is done by sed scripts and changes back some incorrect
__pci_remove_bus_device changes.
Suggested-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
Current rescan will not touch bridge MMIO and IO.
Try to reuse pci_assign_unassigned_bridge_resources(bridge) to update bridge
resources, if child devices need more resources.
Only do that for bridges whose children are all removed already; i.e. don't
release resources that could already be in use by drivers on child devices.
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security:
capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition
security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()
ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat
capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions
capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call
capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable
capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit
capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability
capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces
capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit
capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable
capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod
selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs
selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static
SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()
Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv():
- the interface was removed in commit fd77846152 ("security: remove
the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()")
- a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b9 ("crypto: Add
userspace configuration API")
causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the
issue.
security_capable takes ns, cred, cap. But the LSM capable() hook takes
cred, ns, cap. The capability helper functions also take cred, ns, cap.
Rather than flip argument order just to flip it back, leave them alone.
Heck, this should be a little faster since argument will be in the right
place!
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
They were implicitly getting it from device.h --> module.h but
we want to clean that up. So add the minimal header for these
macros.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Requested by Greg KH to fix a race condition in the creating of PCI bus
cpuaffinity files.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
After remove the device from /sys, we have to rescan all or
find out the bridge and access /sys../device/rescan there.
this patch add /sys/.../pci_bus/.../rescan. So user can rescan more easy.
that is more clean and easy to understand.
like after remove 0000:c4:00.0, you can rescan 0000:c4 directly.
-v2: According to Jesse, use function instead of exposing attr, so could hide
#ifdef in header file.
also add code to remove rescan file in remove path.
-v3: GregKH pointed out that we should use dev_attrs to avoid racing.
So add pcibus_attrs and make it to be member of pcibus_attrs.
-v4: Change name to pcibus_dev_attrs according to GregKH
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
user namespace.
The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
only potential uid confusion issues left.
I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.
Changelog:
11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we
were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
he was the creator. Reverse those checks.
12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
it! Fix the check in cap_capable().
02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable,
fixing a compile failure.
02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some
couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare
them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add
a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h
without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations
together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use
kernel-doc format.
02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable().
02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable.
(Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version
acked by him)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs]
[serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'linux-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jbarnes/pci-2.6:
PCI: label: remove #include of ACPI header to avoid warnings
PCI: label: Fix compilation error when CONFIG_ACPI is unset
PCI: pre-allocate additional resources to devices only after successful allocation of essential resources.
PCI: introduce reset_resource()
PCI: data structure agnostic free list function
PCI: refactor io size calculation code
PCI: do not create quirk I/O regions below PCIBIOS_MIN_IO for ICH
PCI hotplug: acpiphp: set current_state to D0 in register_slot
PCI: Export ACPI _DSM provided firmware instance number and string name to sysfs
PCI: add more checking to ICH region quirks
PCI: aer-inject: Override PCIe AER Mask Registers
PCI: fix tlan build when CONFIG_PCI is not enabled
PCI: remove quirk for pre-production systems
PCI: Avoid potential NULL pointer dereference in pci_scan_bridge
PCI/lpc: irq and pci_ids patch for Intel DH89xxCC DeviceIDs
PCI: sysfs: Fix failure path for addition of "vpd" attribute
This reintroduces commit 47970b1b which was subsequently reverted
as f00eaeea. The original change was broken and caused X startup
failures and generally made privileged processes incapable of reading
device dependent config space. The normal capable() interface returns
true on success, but the LSM interface returns 0 on success. This thinko
is now fixed in this patch, and has been confirmed to work properly.
So, once again...Eric Paris noted that commit de139a3 ("pci: check caps
from sysfs file open to read device dependent config space") caused the
capability check to bypass security modules and potentially auditing.
Rectify this by calling security_capable() when checking the open file's
capabilities for config space reads.
Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: Alex Riesen <raa.lkml@gmail.com>
Cc: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@googlemail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This reverts commit 47970b1b2a.
It turns out it breaks several distributions. Looks like the stricter
selinux checks fail due to selinux policies not being set to allow the
access - breaking X, but also lspci.
So while the change was clearly the RightThing(tm) to do in theory, in
practice we have backwards compatibility issues making it not work.
Reported-by: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Acked-by: Alex Riesen <raa.lkml@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Eric Paris noted that commit de139a3 ("pci: check caps from sysfs file
open to read device dependent config space") caused the capability check
to bypass security modules and potentially auditing. Rectify this by
calling security_capable() when checking the open file's capabilities
for config space reads.
Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Commit 280c73d ("PCI: centralize the capabilities code in
pci-sysfs.c") changed the initialisation of the "rom" and "vpd"
attributes, and made the failure path for the "vpd" attribute
incorrect. We must free the new attribute structure (attr), but
instead we currently free dev->vpd->attr. That will normally be NULL,
resulting in a memory leak, but it might be a stale pointer, resulting
in a double-free.
Found by inspection; compile-tested only.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
The PCI sysfs ROM interface requires an enabling write to access the ROM
image, but the default file mode is 0400. The original proposed patch
adding sysfs ROM support was a true read-only interface, with the
enabling bit coming in as a feature request. I suspect it was simply an
oversight that the file mode didn't get updated to match the API.
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
I just loaded 2.6.37-rc2 on my machines, and I noticed that X no longer starts.
Running an strace of the X server shows that it's doing this:
open("/sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:07:00.0/resource0", O_RDWR) = 10
mmap(NULL, 16777216, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, 10, 0) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)
This code seems to be asking for a shared read/write mapping of 16MB worth of
BAR0 starting at file offset 0, and letting the kernel assign a starting
address. Unfortunately, this -EINVAL causes X not to start. Looking into
dmesg, there's a complaint like so:
process "Xorg" tried to map 0x01000000 bytes at page 0x00000000 on 0000:07:00.0 BAR 0 (start 0x 96000000, size 0x 1000000)
...with the following code in pci_mmap_fits:
pci_start = (mmap_api == PCI_MMAP_SYSFS) ?
pci_resource_start(pdev, resno) >> PAGE_SHIFT : 0;
if (start >= pci_start && start < pci_start + size &&
start + nr <= pci_start + size)
It looks like the logic here is set up such that when the mmap call comes via
sysfs, the check in pci_mmap_fits wants vma->vm_pgoff to be between the
resource's start and end address, and the end of the vma to be no farther than
the end. However, the sysfs PCI resource files always start at offset zero,
which means that this test always fails for programs that mmap the sysfs files.
Given the comment in the original commit
3b519e4ea6, I _think_ the old procfs files
require that the file offset be equal to the resource's base address when
mmapping.
I think what we want here is for pci_start to be 0 when mmap_api ==
PCI_MMAP_PROCFS. The following patch makes that change, after which the Matrox
and Mach64 X drivers work again.
Acked-by: Martin Wilck <martin.wilck@ts.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
Cast pci_resource_start() and pci_resource_len() to u64 for printk.
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c:753: warning: format '%16Lx' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 9 has type 'resource_size_t'
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c:753: warning: format '%16Lx' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 10 has type 'resource_size_t'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
The checks for valid mmaps of PCI resources made through /proc/bus/pci files
that were introduced in 9eff02e204 have several
problems:
1. mmap() calls on /proc/bus/pci files are made with real file offsets > 0,
whereas under /sys/bus/pci/devices, the start of the resource corresponds
to offset 0. This may lead to false negatives in pci_mmap_fits(), which
implicitly assumes the /sys/bus/pci/devices layout.
2. The loop in proc_bus_pci_mmap doesn't skip empty resouces. This leads
to false positives, because pci_mmap_fits() doesn't treat empty resources
correctly (the calculated size is 1 << (8*sizeof(resource_size_t)-PAGE_SHIFT)
in this case!).
3. If a user maps resources with BAR > 0, pci_mmap_fits will emit bogus
WARNINGS for the first resources that don't fit until the correct one is found.
On many controllers the first 2-4 BARs are used, and the others are empty.
In this case, an mmap attempt will first fail on the non-empty BARs
(including the "right" BAR because of 1.) and emit bogus WARNINGS because
of 3., and finally succeed on the first empty BAR because of 2.
This is certainly not the intended behaviour.
This patch addresses all 3 issues.
Updated with an enum type for the additional parameter for pci_mmap_fits().
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Wilck <martin.wilck@ts.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
This patch exports SMBIOS provided firmware instance and label of
onboard PCI devices to sysfs. New files are:
/sys/bus/pci/devices/.../label which contains the firmware name for
the device in question, and
/sys/bus/pci/devices/.../index which contains the firmware device type
instance for the given device.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Hargrave <jordan_hargrave@dell.com>
Signed-off-by: Narendra K <narendra_k@dell.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
PCI sysfs resource files currently only allow mmap'ing. On x86 this
works fine for memory backed BARs, but doesn't work at all for I/O
port backed BARs. Add read/write to I/O port PCI sysfs resource
files to allow userspace access to these device regions.
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
This reverts commit 75568f8094.
Since they're just a convenience anyway, remove these symlinks since
they're causing duplicate filename errors in the wild.
Acked-by: Alex Chiang <achiang@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
The PCI config space bin_attr read handler has a hardcoded CAP_SYS_ADMIN
check to verify privileges before allowing a user to read device
dependent config space. This is meant to protect from an unprivileged
user potentially locking up the box.
When assigning a PCI device directly to a guest with libvirt and KVM,
the sysfs config space file is chown'd to the unprivileged user that
the KVM guest will run as. The guest needs to have full access to the
device's config space since it's responsible for driving the device.
However, despite being the owner of the sysfs file, the CAP_SYS_ADMIN
check will not allow read access beyond the config header.
With this patch we check privileges against the capabilities used when
openining the sysfs file. The allows a privileged process to open the
file and hand it to an unprivileged process, and the unprivileged process
can still read all of the config space.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This allows bin_attr->read,write,mmap callbacks to check file specific data
(such as inode owner) as part of any privilege validation.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Yinghai Lu
Linus Torvalds
Eric Paris
Paul Gortmaker
Lucas De Marchi
Serge E. Hallyn
Chris Wright
Ben Hutchings
Alex Williamson
Darrick J. Wong
Randy Dunlap
Martin Wilck
Narendra K
Kulikov Vasiliy
Jesse Barnes