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Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux

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Pull mudule updates from Rusty Russell:
 "We get rid of the general module prefix confusion with a binary config
  option, fix a remove/insert race which Never Happens, and (my
  favorite) handle the case when we have too many modules for a single
  commandline.  Seriously, the kernel is full, please go away!"

* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux:
  modpost: fix unwanted VMLINUX_SYMBOL_STR expansion
  X.509: Support parse long form of length octets in Authority Key Identifier
  module: don't unlink the module until we've removed all exposure.
  kernel: kallsyms: memory override issue, need check destination buffer length
  MODSIGN: do not send garbage to stderr when enabling modules signature
  modpost: handle huge numbers of modules.
  modpost: add -T option to read module names from file/stdin.
  modpost: minor cleanup.
  genksyms: pass symbol-prefix instead of arch
  module: fix symbol versioning with symbol prefixes
  CONFIG_SYMBOL_PREFIX: cleanup.
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
2013-05-05 10:58:06 -07:00
parent 24d0c2542b a53a11f357
commit f8ce1faf55
23 changed files with 202 additions and 140 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+48 -9
View File
@@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ int rsa_extract_mpi(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return 0;
}
/* The keyIdentifier in AuthorityKeyIdentifier SEQUENCE is tag(CONT,PRIM,0) */
#define SEQ_TAG_KEYID (ASN1_CONT << 6)
/*
* Process certificate extensions that are used to qualify the certificate.
*/
@@ -407,21 +410,57 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
}
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
size_t key_len;
/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
if (vlen < 5)
return -EBADMSG;
if (v[0] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS << 5)) ||
v[1] != vlen - 2 ||
v[2] != (ASN1_CONT << 6) ||
v[3] != vlen - 4)
return -EBADMSG;
v += 4;
vlen -= 4;
f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
/* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
if (v[0] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS << 5)))
return -EBADMSG;
/* Authority Key Identifier is not indefinite length */
if (unlikely(vlen == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH))
return -EBADMSG;
if (vlen < ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) {
/* Short Form length */
if (v[1] != vlen - 2 ||
v[2] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID ||
v[3] > vlen - 4)
return -EBADMSG;
key_len = v[3];
v += 4;
} else {
/* Long Form length */
size_t seq_len = 0;
size_t sub = v[1] - ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH;
if (sub > 2)
return -EBADMSG;
/* calculate the length from subsequent octets */
v += 2;
for (i = 0; i < sub; i++) {
seq_len <<= 8;
seq_len |= v[i];
}
if (seq_len != vlen - 2 - sub ||
v[sub] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID ||
v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
return -EBADMSG;
key_len = v[sub + 1];
v += (sub + 2);
}
f = kmalloc(key_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!f)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++)
for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++)
sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
pr_debug("authority %s\n", f);
ctx->cert->authority = f;