Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking
  work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking,
  allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default
  monolithic module (e.g.  SELinux, Smack, AppArmor).

  See
        https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/

  This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the
  mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users.  Also, this is a
  useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
  tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add()
  vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq
  tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level.
  ima: update builtin policies
  ima: extend "mask" policy matching support
  ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition
  ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()
  Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj()
  selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS
  selinux: Remove unused permission definitions
  selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files
  selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.
  selinux: update netlink socket classes
  signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds()
  selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs
  Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap
  Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs
  ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation()
  ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure
  integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter
  ...

Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy

@@ -20,17 +20,19 @@ Description:
 		action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit
 		condition:= base | lsm  [option]
 			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
-				 [fowner]]
+				[euid=] [fowner=]]
 			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
 				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
 			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]
 
 		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
 				[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
-			mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
+			mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
+			       [[^]MAY_EXEC]
 			fsmagic:= hex value
 			fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6)
 			uid:= decimal value
+			euid:= decimal value
 			fowner:=decimal value
 		lsm:  	are LSM specific
 		option:	appraise_type:= [imasig]
@@ -49,11 +51,25 @@ Description:
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
 			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
 			# RAMFS_MAGIC
-			dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
 			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
+			# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
+			# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
 			# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
 			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
+			# SELINUX_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+			# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+			# NSFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673
 
 			measure func=BPRM_CHECK
 			measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
@@ -70,10 +86,6 @@ Description:
 		Examples of LSM specific definitions:
 
 		SELinux:
-			# SELINUX_MAGIC
-			dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
-			dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
-
 			dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
 			dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t
 			dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -1413,7 +1413,15 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			The list of supported hash algorithms is defined
 			in crypto/hash_info.h.
 
-	ima_tcb		[IMA]
+	ima_policy=	[IMA]
+			The builtin measurement policy to load during IMA
+			setup.  Specyfing "tcb" as the value, measures all
+			programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
+			opened with the read mode bit set by either the
+			effective uid (euid=0) or uid=0.
+			Format: "tcb"
+
+	ima_tcb		[IMA] Deprecated.  Use ima_policy= instead.
 			Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted
 			Computing Base.  This means IMA will measure all
 			programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
@@ -1421,7 +1429,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 
 	ima_template=   [IMA]
 			Select one of defined IMA measurements template formats.
-			Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" }
+			Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" | "ima-sig" }
 			Default: "ima-ng"
 
 	ima_template_fmt=

Documentation/security/Smack.txt

@@ -206,11 +206,11 @@ netlabel
 	label. The format accepted on write is:
 		"%d.%d.%d.%d label" or "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d label".
 onlycap
-	This contains the label processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+	This contains labels processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
 	and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to be effective. If this file is empty
 	these capabilities are effective at for processes with any
-	label. The value is set by writing the desired label to the
+	label. The values are set by writing the desired labels, separated
-	file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
+	by spaces, to the file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
 ptrace
 	This is used to define the current ptrace policy
 	0 - default: this is the policy that relies on Smack access rules.

crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h

@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 
 extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
 
+extern int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
+					  struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+					  size_t hexlen);
 static inline
 const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
 {

crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c

@@ -104,6 +104,15 @@ static bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(
 	return false;
 }
 
+/* helper function can be called directly with pre-allocated memory */
+inline int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
+				   struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+				   size_t hexlen)
+{
+	match_id->len = hexlen;
+	return hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen);
+}
+
 /**
  * asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id - Convert a hex string into a key ID.
  * @id: The ID as a hex string.
@@ -111,21 +120,20 @@ static bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(
 struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
 {
 	struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
-	size_t hexlen;
+	size_t asciihexlen;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!*id)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	hexlen = strlen(id);
+	asciihexlen = strlen(id);
-	if (hexlen & 1)
+	if (asciihexlen & 1)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + hexlen / 2,
+	match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + asciihexlen / 2,
 			   GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!match_id)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-	match_id->len = hexlen / 2;
+	ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id, match_id, asciihexlen / 2);
-	ret = hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen / 2);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		kfree(match_id);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c

@@ -28,17 +28,30 @@ static bool use_builtin_keys;
 static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
 
 #ifndef MODULE
+static struct {
+	struct asymmetric_key_id id;
+	unsigned char data[10];
+} cakey;
+
 static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
 {
 	if (!str)		/* default system keyring */
 		return 1;
 
 	if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
-		struct asymmetric_key_id *p;
+		struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
-		p = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3);
+		size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
-		if (p == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
+		int ret;
-			pr_err("Unparsable hex string in ca_keys\n");
+
-		else if (!IS_ERR(p))
+		if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
+			pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
+		else
 			ca_keyid = p;	/* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
 	} else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
 		use_builtin_keys = true;

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c

@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
 
 	memcpy_fromio(&pa, &priv->cca->cmd_pa, 8);
 	pa = le64_to_cpu(pa);
-	priv->cmd = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, le64_to_cpu(pa),
+	priv->cmd = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, pa,
 					 ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size));
 	if (!priv->cmd) {
 		dev_err(dev, "ioremap of the command buffer failed\n");
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
 
 	memcpy_fromio(&pa, &priv->cca->rsp_pa, 8);
 	pa = le64_to_cpu(pa);
-	priv->rsp = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, le64_to_cpu(pa),
+	priv->rsp = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, pa,
 					 ioread32(&priv->cca->rsp_size));
 	if (!priv->rsp) {
 		dev_err(dev, "ioremap of the response buffer failed\n");

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c

@@ -578,6 +578,9 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
+	ibmvtpm->dev = dev;
+	ibmvtpm->vdev = vio_dev;
+
 	crq_q = &ibmvtpm->crq_queue;
 	crq_q->crq_addr = (struct ibmvtpm_crq *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!crq_q->crq_addr) {
@@ -622,8 +625,6 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
 
 	crq_q->index = 0;
 
-	ibmvtpm->dev = dev;
-	ibmvtpm->vdev = vio_dev;
 	TPM_VPRIV(chip) = (void *)ibmvtpm;
 
 	spin_lock_init(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log)
 
 	basep = of_get_property(np, "linux,sml-base", NULL);
 	if (basep == NULL) {
-		pr_err(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - SML not found\n", __func__);
+		pr_err("%s: ERROR - SML not found\n", __func__);
 		goto cleanup_eio;
 	}
 

fs/xattr.c

@@ -298,18 +298,18 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
-	if (error) {
+	if (error)
-		mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+		goto out;
-		return error;
-	}
 
 	error = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, name);
-	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
 	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
 		evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
 	}
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	return error;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_removexattr);

include/linux/sched.h

@@ -2421,7 +2421,6 @@ extern void sched_dead(struct task_struct *p);
 
 extern void proc_caches_init(void);
 extern void flush_signals(struct task_struct *);
-extern void __flush_signals(struct task_struct *);
 extern void ignore_signals(struct task_struct *);
 extern void flush_signal_handlers(struct task_struct *, int force_default);
 extern int dequeue_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, sigset_t *mask, siginfo_t *info);

kernel/signal.c

@@ -414,21 +414,16 @@ void flush_sigqueue(struct sigpending *queue)
 }
 
 /*
- * Flush all pending signals for a task.
+ * Flush all pending signals for this kthread.
  */
-void __flush_signals(struct task_struct *t)
-{
-	clear_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_SIGPENDING);
-	flush_sigqueue(&t->pending);
-	flush_sigqueue(&t->signal->shared_pending);
-}
-
 void flush_signals(struct task_struct *t)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
-	__flush_signals(t);
+	clear_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_SIGPENDING);
+	flush_sigqueue(&t->pending);
+	flush_sigqueue(&t->signal->shared_pending);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
 }
 

security/Makefile

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ obj-y					+= commoncap.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MMU)			+= min_addr.o
 
 # Object file lists
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o capability.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/

security/apparmor/domain.c

@@ -347,9 +347,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
 	};
 	const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
-	int error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+	int error = 0;
-	if (error)
-		return error;
 
 	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
 		return 0;
@@ -531,15 +529,13 @@ cleanup:
  */
 int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
-
 	/* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
 	 * and stored in bprm->unsafe.
 	 */
-	if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED))
+	if (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)
-		ret = 1;
+		return 1;
 
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**

security/apparmor/lsm.c

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  * License.
  */
 
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
@@ -96,19 +96,11 @@ static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 					unsigned int mode)
 {
-	int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-
 	return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
 }
 
 static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
-	int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-
 	return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
 }
 
@@ -123,10 +115,10 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 	cred = __task_cred(target);
 	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 
-	*effective = cred->cap_effective;
+	/*
-	*inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
+	 * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
-	*permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
+	 * initialize effective and permitted.
-
+	 */
 	if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
 		*effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
 		*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
@@ -140,13 +132,11 @@ static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 			    int cap, int audit)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
-	/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
+	int error = 0;
-	int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
+
-	if (!error) {
 	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 	if (!unconfined(profile))
 		error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
-	}
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -615,49 +605,46 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
 	return error;
 }
 
-static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
-	.name =				"apparmor",
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
 
-	.ptrace_access_check =		apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
-	.ptrace_traceme =		apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
-	.capget =			apparmor_capget,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
-	.capable =			apparmor_capable,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
 
-	.path_link =			apparmor_path_link,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
-	.path_unlink =			apparmor_path_unlink,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
-	.path_symlink =			apparmor_path_symlink,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
-	.path_mkdir =			apparmor_path_mkdir,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
-	.path_rmdir =			apparmor_path_rmdir,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
-	.path_mknod =			apparmor_path_mknod,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
-	.path_rename =			apparmor_path_rename,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
-	.path_chmod =			apparmor_path_chmod,
-	.path_chown =			apparmor_path_chown,
-	.path_truncate =		apparmor_path_truncate,
-	.inode_getattr =                apparmor_inode_getattr,
 
-	.file_open =			apparmor_file_open,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
-	.file_permission =		apparmor_file_permission,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
-	.file_alloc_security =		apparmor_file_alloc_security,
-	.file_free_security =		apparmor_file_free_security,
-	.mmap_file =			apparmor_mmap_file,
-	.mmap_addr =			cap_mmap_addr,
-	.file_mprotect =		apparmor_file_mprotect,
-	.file_lock =			apparmor_file_lock,
 
-	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
-	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
 
-	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
-	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
-	.cred_prepare =			apparmor_cred_prepare,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
-	.cred_transfer =		apparmor_cred_transfer,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
 
-	.bprm_set_creds =		apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
-	.bprm_committing_creds =	apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
-	.bprm_committed_creds =		apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
-	.bprm_secureexec =		apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
-
-	.task_setrlimit =		apparmor_task_setrlimit,
 };
 
 /*
@@ -898,7 +885,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
-	if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
+	if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) {
 		aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
 		apparmor_enabled = 0;
 		return 0;
@@ -913,17 +900,10 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 	error = set_init_cxt();
 	if (error) {
 		AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
-		goto register_security_out;
+		aa_free_root_ns();
-	}
+		goto alloc_out;
-
-	error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
-	if (error) {
-		struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
-		aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
-		cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
-		AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
-		goto register_security_out;
 	}
+	security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks));
 
 	/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
 	apparmor_initialized = 1;
@@ -936,9 +916,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 
 	return error;
 
-register_security_out:
-	aa_free_root_ns();
-
 alloc_out:
 	aa_destroy_aafs();
 

security/commoncap.c

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
@@ -53,11 +53,6 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
 	}
 }
 
-int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
  * @cred: The credentials to use
@@ -941,7 +936,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
  * @pages: The size of the mapping
  *
  * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
- * task is permitted, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.
+ * task is permitted, returning 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
  */
 int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
@@ -950,7 +945,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 	if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
 			SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
 		cap_sys_admin = 1;
-	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
+	return cap_sys_admin;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -981,3 +976,33 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+
+struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, cap_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, cap_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, cap_task_prctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, cap_task_setscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, cap_task_setioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, cap_task_setnice),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, cap_vm_enough_memory),
+};
+
+void __init capability_add_hooks(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks));
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */

security/integrity/digsig.c

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 	return err;
 }
 
-int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path)
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
 {
 	key_ref_t key;
 	char *data;