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Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Browse Source 
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - Smack adds secmark support for Netfilter
   - /proc/keys is now mandatory if CONFIG_KEYS=y
   - TPM gets its own device class
   - Added TPM 2.0 support
   - Smack file hook rework (all Smack users should review this!)"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (64 commits)
  cipso: don't use IPCB() to locate the CIPSO IP option
  SELinux: fix error code in policydb_init()
  selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs
  selinux: quiet the filesystem labeling behavior message
  selinux: Remove unused function avc_sidcmp()
  ima: /proc/keys is now mandatory
  Smack: Repair netfilter dependency
  X.509: silence asn1 compiler debug output
  X.509: shut up about included cert for silent build
  KEYS: Make /proc/keys unconditional if CONFIG_KEYS=y
  MAINTAINERS: email update
  tpm/tpm_tis: Add missing ifdef CONFIG_ACPI for pnp_acpi_device
  smack: fix possible use after frees in task_security() callers
  smack: Add missing logging in bidirectional UDS connect check
  Smack: secmark support for netfilter
  Smack: Rework file hooks
  tpm: fix format string error in tpm-chip.c
  char/tpm/tpm_crb: fix build error
  smack: Fix a bidirectional UDS connect check typo
  smack: introduce a special case for tmpfs in smack_d_instantiate()
  ...
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
2015-02-11 20:25:11 -08:00
parent 7184487f14 04f81f0154
commit 8cc748aa76
45 changed files with 2661 additions and 1085 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
-1
View File
@@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed"
depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
default y
help
This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
security/keys/Kconfig
-18
View File
@@ -80,21 +80,3 @@ config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
depends on KEYS
help
This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which
can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the
reading process.
The only keys included in the list are those that grant View
permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them.
Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further
filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view.
Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in
the resulting table.
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
security/keys/proc.c
-8
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
#include <asm/errno.h>
#include "internal.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);
static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos);
@@ -38,7 +37,6 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_keys_fops = {
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = seq_release,
};
#endif
static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos);
@@ -67,11 +65,9 @@ static int __init key_proc_init(void)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *p;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
p = proc_create("keys", 0, NULL, &proc_keys_fops);
if (!p)
panic("Cannot create /proc/keys\n");
#endif
p = proc_create("key-users", 0, NULL, &proc_key_users_fops);
if (!p)
@@ -86,8 +82,6 @@ __initcall(key_proc_init);
* Implement "/proc/keys" to provide a list of the keys on the system that
* grant View permission to the caller.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);
@@ -275,8 +269,6 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */
static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n)
{
while (n) {
security/selinux/avc.c
-5
View File
@@ -517,11 +517,6 @@ out:
return rc;
}
static inline int avc_sidcmp(u32 x, u32 y)
{
return (x == y || x == SECSID_WILD || y == SECSID_WILD);
}
/**
* avc_update_node Update an AVC entry
* @event : Updating event
security/selinux/hooks.c
+8 -21
View File
@@ -401,23 +401,14 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK)
return 1;
/* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
return 1;
/*
* Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
* setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
*/
if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
/* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
}
static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
@@ -456,10 +447,6 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
else
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+6 -2
View File
@@ -289,12 +289,16 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
goto out;
p->filename_trans = hashtab_create(filenametr_hash, filenametr_cmp, (1 << 10));
if (!p->filename_trans)
if (!p->filename_trans) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
p->range_tr = hashtab_create(rangetr_hash, rangetr_cmp, 256);
if (!p->range_tr)
if (!p->range_tr) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
security/smack/Kconfig
+12
View File
@@ -28,3 +28,15 @@ config SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
access rule set once the behavior is well understood.
This is a superior mechanism to the oft abused
"permissive" mode of other systems.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
bool "Packet marking using secmarks for netfilter"
depends on SECURITY_SMACK
depends on NETWORK_SECMARK
depends on NETFILTER
default n
help
This enables security marking of network packets using
Smack labels.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
security/smack/Makefile
+1
View File
@@ -5,3 +5,4 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) := smack.o
smack-y := smack_lsm.o smack_access.o smackfs.o
smack-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER) += smack_netfilter.o
security/smack/smack.h
+11
View File
@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
/*
* Shared data.
*/
extern int smack_enabled;
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
@@ -298,6 +299,16 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
return tsp->smk_task;
}
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct(const struct task_struct *t)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
rcu_read_lock();
skp = smk_of_task(__task_cred(t)->security);
rcu_read_unlock();
return skp;
}
/*
* Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob.
*/
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+147 -52
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+96
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
/*
* Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
*
* This file contains the Smack netfilter implementation
*
* Author:
* Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
*
* Copyright (C) 2014 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
* as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include "smack.h"
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct net_device *in,
const struct net_device *out,
int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
{
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
if (skb && skb->sk && skb->sk->sk_security) {
ssp = skb->sk->sk_security;
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
#endif /* IPV6 */
static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct net_device *in,
const struct net_device *out,
int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
{
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
if (skb && skb->sk && skb->sk->sk_security) {
ssp = skb->sk->sk_security;
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
static struct nf_hook_ops smack_nf_ops[] = {
{
.hook = smack_ipv4_output,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
.hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
{
.hook = smack_ipv6_output,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
.hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
.priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
#endif /* IPV6 */
};
static int __init smack_nf_ip_init(void)
{
int err;
if (smack_enabled == 0)
return 0;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "Smack: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
err = nf_register_hooks(smack_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_nf_ops));
if (err)
pr_info("Smack: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
return 0;
}
__initcall(smack_nf_ip_init);