Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - TPM core and driver updates/fixes
   - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO)
   - Lots of Apparmor fixes
   - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change
     syscall #"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits)
  apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling
  tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family)
  tpm: Factor out common startup code
  tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset
  tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check
  tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction
  tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt
  tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies
  apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated
  apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
  apparmor: do not expose kernel stack
  apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked
  apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present
  apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed
  apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification
  apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task
  apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next
  apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile
  apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read
  apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds
  ...

security/integrity/iint.c

@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
 	kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
 }
 
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
 	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
 }
 
 static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)

security/integrity/ima/ima.h

@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ struct ima_template_desc {
 };
 
 struct ima_template_entry {
+	int pcr;
 	u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];	/* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc; /* template descriptor */
 	u32 template_data_len;
@@ -154,7 +155,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
 };
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -162,19 +164,20 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			   int xattr_len);
+			   int xattr_len, int pcr);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			    struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
-		       struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
+		       struct inode *inode,
+		       const unsigned char *filename, int pcr);
 void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
 const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
-		     int flags);
+		     int flags, int *pcr);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy_flag(void);

security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ out:
  */
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 		       int violation, struct inode *inode,
-		       const unsigned char *filename)
+		       const unsigned char *filename, int pcr)
 {
 	static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
 	static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error";
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 		}
 		memcpy(entry->digest, hash.hdr.digest, hash.hdr.length);
 	}
+	entry->pcr = pcr;
 	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename);
 	return result;
 }
@@ -144,7 +145,8 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		result = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err_out;
 	}
-	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode,
+				    filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
 	if (result < 0)
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 err_out:
@@ -157,6 +159,7 @@ err_out:
  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
  * @func: caller identifier
+ * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -168,13 +171,13 @@ err_out:
  * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
  *
  */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
 {
 	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE;
 
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags);
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags, pcr);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -252,7 +255,7 @@ out:
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			   int xattr_len)
+			   int xattr_len, int pcr)
 {
 	static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
 	static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM";
@@ -263,7 +266,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 					    xattr_len, NULL};
 	int violation = 0;
 
-	if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
+	if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
 		return;
 
 	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
@@ -273,9 +276,11 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		return;
 	}
 
-	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
-	if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
+	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr);
+	if (!result || result == -EEXIST) {
 		iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
+		iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr);
+	}
 	if (result < 0)
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 }

security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 	if (!ima_appraise)
 		return 0;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE);
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE, NULL);
 }
 
 static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
 		return;
 
 	iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+	iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
 	if (digsig)
 		iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
 	return;

security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c

@@ -123,7 +123,6 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	struct ima_template_entry *e;
 	char *template_name;
 	int namelen;
-	u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
 	bool is_ima_template = false;
 	int i;
 
@@ -137,10 +136,10 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 
 	/*
 	 * 1st: PCRIndex
-	 * PCR used is always the same (config option) in
-	 * little-endian format
+	 * PCR used defaults to the same (config option) in
+	 * little-endian format, unless set in policy
 	 */
-	ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr));
+	ima_putc(m, &e->pcr, sizeof(e->pcr));
 
 	/* 2nd: template digest */
 	ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
@@ -219,7 +218,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	    e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
 
 	/* 1st: PCR used (config option) */
-	seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
+	seq_printf(m, "%2d ", e->pcr);
 
 	/* 2nd: SHA1 template hash */
 	ima_print_digest(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);

security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c

@@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 	}
 
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
-				    boot_aggregate_name);
+				    boot_aggregate_name,
+				    CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
 	if (result < 0) {
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 		audit_cause = "store_entry";

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c

@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		if ((iint->version != inode->i_version) ||
 		    (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
 			iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
+			iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
 			if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
 				ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
 		}
@@ -162,6 +163,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
 	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
+	int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
 	int xattr_len = 0;
 	bool violation_check;
@@ -174,7 +176,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
-	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func);
+	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func, &pcr);
 	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
 			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
 	if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -209,7 +211,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	 */
 	iint->flags |= action;
 	action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
-	action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1);
+	action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
+
+	/* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */
+	if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)))
+		action ^= IMA_MEASURE;
 
 	/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
 	if (!action) {
@@ -238,7 +244,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
-				      xattr_value, xattr_len);
+				      xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr);
 	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
 		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname,
 					      xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #define IMA_FSUUID	0x0020
 #define IMA_INMASK	0x0040
 #define IMA_EUID	0x0080
+#define IMA_PCR		0x0100
 
 #define UNKNOWN		0
 #define MEASURE		0x0001	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -40,6 +41,9 @@
 #define DONT_APPRAISE	0x0008
 #define AUDIT		0x0040
 
+#define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
+	(a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
+
 int ima_policy_flag;
 static int temp_ima_appraise;
 
@@ -60,6 +64,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
 	u8 fsuuid[16];
 	kuid_t uid;
 	kuid_t fowner;
+	int pcr;
 	struct {
 		void *rule;	/* LSM file metadata specific */
 		void *args_p;	/* audit value */
@@ -319,6 +324,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
  * @func: IMA hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+ * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
  *
  * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
  * conditions.
@@ -328,7 +334,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
  */
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
-		     int flags)
+		     int flags, int *pcr)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -353,6 +359,9 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 		else
 			actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
 
+		if ((pcr) && (entry->flags & IMA_PCR))
+			*pcr = entry->pcr;
+
 		if (!actmask)
 			break;
 	}
@@ -478,7 +487,8 @@ enum {
 	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
 	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
 	Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner,
-	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio
+	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
+	Opt_pcr
 };
 
 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -502,6 +512,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
 	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
 	{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
+	{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -773,6 +784,20 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			break;
 		case Opt_permit_directio:
 			entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
+			break;
+		case Opt_pcr:
+			if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+			ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from);
+
+			result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr);
+			if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr))
+				result = -EINVAL;
+			else
+				entry->flags |= IMA_PCR;
+
 			break;
 		case Opt_err:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
@@ -1011,6 +1036,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 		seq_puts(m, " ");
 	}
 
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
+		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
 	if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) {
 		seq_printf(m, "fsuuid=%pU", entry->fsuuid);
 		seq_puts(m, " ");

security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c

@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ struct ima_h_table ima_htable = {
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_extend_list_mutex);
 
 /* lookup up the digest value in the hash table, and return the entry */
-static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value)
+static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value,
+						       int pcr)
 {
 	struct ima_queue_entry *qe, *ret = NULL;
 	unsigned int key;
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value)
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_htable.queue[key], hnext) {
 		rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digest, digest_value, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
-		if (rc == 0) {
+		if ((rc == 0) && (qe->entry->pcr == pcr)) {
 			ret = qe;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -89,14 +90,14 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash)
+static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr)
 {
 	int result = 0;
 
 	if (!ima_used_chip)
 		return result;
 
-	result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash);
+	result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcr, hash);
 	if (result != 0)
 		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
 	return result;
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
 	if (!violation) {
 		memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest));
-		if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) {
+		if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest, entry->pcr)) {
 			audit_cause = "hash_exists";
 			result = -EEXIST;
 			goto out;
@@ -135,7 +136,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 	if (violation)		/* invalidate pcr */
 		memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest));
 
-	tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
+	tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest, entry->pcr);
 	if (tpmresult != 0) {
 		snprintf(tpm_audit_cause, AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX, "TPM_error(%d)",
 			 tpmresult);

security/integrity/integrity.h

@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	struct inode *inode;	/* back pointer to inode in question */
 	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
 	unsigned long flags;
+	unsigned long measured_pcrs;
 	enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;