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cf89aed924
Fully scripted conversion, see script in initial SPDX license commit message. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
83 lines
2.6 KiB
Bash
Executable File
83 lines
2.6 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#! /bin/bash
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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# Copyright (c) 2017 Google, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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#
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# FS QA Test No. 435
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#
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# Test that without the encryption key for a directory, long filenames are
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# presented in a way which avoids collisions, even though they are abbreviated
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# in order to support names up to NAME_MAX bytes.
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#
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# Regression test for:
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# 6332cd32c829 ("f2fs: check entire encrypted bigname when finding a dentry")
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# 6b06cdee81d6 ("fscrypt: avoid collisions when presenting long encrypted filenames")
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#
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# Even with these two fixes it's still possible to create intentional
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# collisions. For now this test covers "accidental" collisions only.
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#
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seq=`basename $0`
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seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
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echo "QA output created by $seq"
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here=`pwd`
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tmp=/tmp/$$
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status=1 # failure is the default!
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trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
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_cleanup()
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{
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cd /
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rm -f $tmp.*
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}
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# get standard environment, filters and checks
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. ./common/rc
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. ./common/filter
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. ./common/encrypt
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# remove previous $seqres.full before test
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rm -f $seqres.full
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# real QA test starts here
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_supported_fs generic
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_supported_os Linux
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_require_scratch_encryption
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_require_xfs_io_command "set_encpolicy"
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_require_command "$KEYCTL_PROG" keyctl
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# set up an encrypted directory
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_new_session_keyring
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_scratch_mkfs_encrypted &>> $seqres.full
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_scratch_mount
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mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
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keydesc=$(_generate_encryption_key)
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# -f 0x2: zero-pad to 16-byte boundary (i.e. encryption block boundary)
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$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy -f 0x2 $keydesc" $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
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# Create files with long names (> 32 bytes, long enough to trigger the use of
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# "digested" names) in the encrypted directory.
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#
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# Use 100,000 files so that we have a good chance of detecting buggy filesystems
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# that solely use a 32-bit hash to distinguish files, which f2fs was doing.
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#
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# Furthermore, make the filenames differ only in the last 16-byte encryption
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# block. This reproduces the bug where it was not accounted for that ciphertext
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# stealing (CTS) causes the last two blocks to appear "flipped".
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seq -f "$SCRATCH_MNT/edir/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345%.0f" 100000 | xargs touch
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find $SCRATCH_MNT/edir/ -type f | xargs stat -c %i | sort | uniq | wc -l
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_unlink_encryption_key $keydesc
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_scratch_cycle_mount
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# Verify that every file has a unique inode number and can be removed without
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# error. With the bug(s), some filenames incorrectly pointed to the same inode,
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# and ext4 reported a "Structure needs cleaning" error when removing files.
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find $SCRATCH_MNT/edir/ -type f | xargs stat -c %i | sort | uniq | wc -l
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rm -rf $SCRATCH_MNT/edir |& head -n 10
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stat $SCRATCH_MNT/edir |& _filter_scratch
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# success, all done
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status=0
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exit
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